No. 26-____
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`
`IN RE TESLA, INC.,
`Petitioner.
`
`
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
`
`
`On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States Patent and
`Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board, in
`Nos. IPR2025-00943, IPR2025-00944, IPR2025-01034, IPR2025-01035
`
`
`Debra J. McComas
`Michael Qian
`HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP
`2801 N. Harwood Street, Suite 2300
`Dallas, TX 75201
`Phone: (214) 651-5375
`
`Jonathan R. Bowser
`HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP
`888 16th Street NW, Suite 300
`Washington, DC 20006
`Phone: (202) 654-4503
`Ashraf Fawzy
`TESLA, INC.
`800 Connecticut Avenue NW
`5th Floor
`Washington, DC 20006
`Phone: (202) 905-9221
`December 1, 2025
`Laura N. Vu
`HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP
`1 Post Street, Suite 2800
`San Francisco, CA 94104
`Phone: (415) 293-8930
`
`Counsel for Petitioner Tesla, Inc.
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 1 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
`Case Number 26-
`Short Case Caption In re Tesla, Inc.
`Filing Party/Entity Tesla, Inc.
`
`I certify the following information and any attached sheets are accurate and
`complete to the best of my knowledge.
`Date: December 1, 2025 Signature: /s/ Debra J. McComas
` Name: Debra J. McComas
`1. Represented
`Entities.
`Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(1).
`2. Real Party in
`Interest.
`Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(2).
`3. Parent Corporations
`and Stockholders.
`Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(3).
`Provide the full names of
`all entities represented by
`undersigned counsel in
`this case.
`Provide the full names of
`all real parties in interest
`for the entities. Do not
`list the real parties if they
`are the same as the
`entities.
`Provide the full names of
`all parent corporations
`for the entities and all
`publicly held companies
`that own 10% or more
`stock in the entities.
`__ None/Not Applicable X None/Not Applicable X None/Not Applicable
`Tesla, Inc.
`
`
`Instructions: Complete each section of the form. In answering items 2 and 3, be
`specific as to which represented entities the answers apply; lack of specificity may result in
`non-compliance. Please enter only one item per box; attach additional pages as needed
`and check the relevant box. Counsel must immediately file an amended Certificate of
`Interest if information changes. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(b).
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 2 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`4. Legal Representatives. List all law firms, partners, and associates that (a)
`appeared for the entities in the originating court or agency or (b) are expected
`to appear in this court for the entities. Do not include those who have already
`entered an appearance in this court. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(4).
` None/Not Applicable Additional pages attached
`Jennifer C. Bailey
`(Erise IP, P.A.)
`Adam M. Sandwell
`(Erise IP, P.A.)
`Kevin J. Rongish
`(Erise IP, P.A.)
`Justin N. Grimes
`(Erise IP, P.A.)
`Gina Cremona
`(Tesla, Inc.)
`
`
`5. Related Cases. Other than the originating case(s) for this case, are there
`related or prior cases that meet the criteria under Fed. Cir. R. 47.5(a)?
` X Yes (file separate notice; see below) No N/A (amicus/movant)
`If yes, concurrently file a separate Notice of Related Case Information that
`complies with Fed. Cir. R. 47.5(b). Please do not duplicate information. This
`separate Notice must only be filed with the first Certificate of Interest or,
`subsequently, if information changes during the pendency of the appeal. Fed. Cir.
`R. 47.5(b).
`
`6. Organizational Victims and Bankruptcy Cases. Provide any information
`required under Fed. R. App. P. 26.1(b) (organizational victims in criminal cases)
`and 26.1(c) (bankruptcy case debtors and trustees). Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(6).
` X None/Not Applicable __ Additional pages attached
`
`
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 3 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST ........................................................................... i
`TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................... iii
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................v
`STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES ................................................................. 1
`RELIEF SOUGHT ................................................................................................ 2
`INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 3
`ISSUES PRESENTED ...........................................................................................6
`BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 7
`I. Congress established IPR. ................................................................... 7
`II. The USPTO created its own extra- statutory IPR institution
`criteria without notice and comment. ..................................................9
`III. Tesla sought IPR. .............................................................................. 11
`IV. Even though Tesla complied with all the new, extra- statutory
`institution considerations, the USPTO denied institution here
`based solely on the time to trial. ........................................................ 11
`STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................. 12
`REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD ISSUE ................................................ 12
`I. The USPTO’s errors in exceeding its statutory authority in
`violation of the APA and separation of powers are clear and
`indisputable. ..................................................................................... 12
`A. Congress did not empower the Director to create extra-
`statutory institution criteria. ................................................... 13
`B. The USPTO’s time -to-trial rationale fails for lack of
`notice and comment. ............................................................... 19
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 4 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`II. The remaining mandamus criteria are satisfied. ............................... 20
`A. The USPTO’s errors are reviewable in mandamus. ............... 20
`B. Petitioners have no other adequate means of relief. ................. 23
`CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 25
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................................................................... 27
`PROOF OF SERVICE ......................................................................................... 28
`
`
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 5 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
` Page(s)
`Cases
`Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.,
`IPR2020-00019, 2020 WL 2126495 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) .............................. 9
`Apple Inc. v. Vidal,
`63 F.4th 1 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ......................................................................... 21, 22
`In re BigCommerce, Inc.,
`890 F.3d 978 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .......................................................................... 24
`Bittner v. United States,
`598 U.S. 85 (2023) ........................................................................................... 18
`In re Cray Inc.,
`871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .......................................................................... 24
`Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee,
`579 U.S. 261 (2016) ................................................................................. 5, 14, 21
`Dabico Airport Sols. Inc. v. AXA Power ApS,
`IPR2025-00408, Paper 21 (AD June 2025) ........................................................ 5
`Gallo v. Dep’t of Transp.,
`725 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ......................................................................... 18
`In re Google LLC,
`No. 25-144, 2025 WL 3096849 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 2025) .................................... 4
`Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr,
`589 U.S. 221 (2020) .........................................................................................20
`Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
`513 U.S. 561 (1995) ........................................................................................... 15
`Halverson v. Slater,
`129 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ...................................................................... 15, 18
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 6 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`vi
`Hanauer v. Reich,
`82 F.3d 1304 (4th Cir. 1996) ............................................................................. 21
`IGT v. Zynga Inc.,
`144 F.4th 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2025) ........................................................................ 22
`Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke,
`211 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ..................................................................... 15, 18
`Leedom v. Kyne,
`358 U.S. 184 (1958) .......................................................................................... 21
`Motorola Sols., Inc. v. Stellar, LLC,
`IPR2024-01205, Paper 19 (PTAB Mar. 28, 2025) ....................................... 10, 11
`In re Motorola Solutions, Inc.,
`-- F.4th --, 2025 WL 3096514 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 2025) ..................... 4, 19, 21, 22
`Mylan Lab’ys Ltd. v. Janssen Pharm., N.V.,
`989 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ............................................................. 12, 20, 22
`Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health
`Admin.,
`595 U.S. 109 (2022) ......................................................................................... 14
`In re Palo Alto Networks, Inc.,
`44 F.4th 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ......................................................................... 23
`In re SAP Am., Inc.,
`No.25-132, 2025 WL 3096788 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 2025) ..................................... 4
`SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu,
`584 U.S. 357 (2018) ............................................................................... 18, 20, 21
`Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
`909 F.3d 635 (4th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................ 14
`Taylor Energy Co. v. Dep’t of the Interior,
`990 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ......................................................................... 22
`Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC,
`IPR2025-00340, Paper 18 (USPTO Nov. 5, 2025) ............................................. 5
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 7 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`vii
`Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Techs., LP,
`590 U.S. 45 (2020) ........................................................................................... 21
`Verizon Connect Inc. v. Omega Patents, LLC,
`No. 25-1994 (Fed. Cir. docketed Aug. 6, 2025) .................................................. 5
`Statutes
`5 U.S.C. § 553 ....................................................................................................... 10
`5 U.S.C. § 706 ............................................................................................ 12, 14, 20
`35 U.S.C. § 135 ..................................................................................................... 17
`35 U.S.C. § 311 .................................................................................................... 3, 7
`35 U.S.C. § 312 ....................................................................................................... 3
`35 U.S.C. § 313 ..................................................................................................... 13
`35 U.S.C. § 314 ............................................................................................... passim
`35 U.S.C. § 315 ....................................................................................... 3, 13, 15, 17
`35 U.S.C. § 316 ............................................................................................... passim
`35 U.S.C. § 325 ..................................................................................... 13, 14, 15, 17
`Other Authorities
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8 ...................................................................................................... 3
`88 Fed. Reg. 24,503 (Apr. 21, 2023) .................................................................. 8, 10
`89 Fed. Reg. 28,693 (Apr. 19, 2024) ........................................................................ 8
`90 Fed. Reg. 48,335 (Oct. 17, 2025) .................................................................... 6, 8
`90 Fed. Reg. 48,342 (Oct. 17, 2025) ........................................................................ 8
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 8 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`viii
`Dennis Crouch, An Era of No: The USPTO’s New 0% Institution Rate ,
`PatentlyO (Nov. 12, 2025),
`https://patentlyo.com/patent/2025/11/usptos-institution-
`rate.html ............................................................................................................ 6
`H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 (2011) ................................................................................... 7
`
`
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 9 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
`No appeal in or from the same civil action or proceeding in the U.S. Patent
`and Trademark Office (USPTO) was previously before this or any other appellate
`court. The Petitions for Inter Partes Review that are the subject of this appeal relate
`to U.S. Patent Nos. 12,037,004 (IPR25- 1034, IPR25 -1035), U.S. Patent
`No. U.S. 11,597,402 (IPR25-943), and U.S. Patent No. 11,738,765 (IPR25 -944) (the
`“Asserted Patents”). Each of these patents has been asserted against Tesla, Inc. in
`Granite Vehicle Ventures LLC v. Tesla, Inc., 2:24-cv-01007 (E.D. Tex.).
`
`
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 10 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`RELIEF SOUGHT
`Tesla Inc. (Tesla) respectfully requests a writ of mandamus vacating the
`discretionary denial of institution for inter partes review in IPR2025-943, -944, -1034,
`-1035. The Court should direct the USPTO to reconsider institution solely under the
`statutory criteria, not the agency’s extra- statutory framework. At a minimum, the
`Court should direct the USPTO to reconsider institution without time-to-trial as the
`sole determinative criteria.
`
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 11 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`INTRODUCTION
`Congress expressly identified the criteria that the USPTO is to consider in
`determining whether to institute IPR. “Time to trial”— the sole basis for denying
`institution in this case —is not among them. The USPTO has no authority to make
`up its own reasons to deny institution. By exceeding its authority, the USPTO
`violated the AIA and the separation of powers. Mandamus is appropriate to correct
`this violation.
`Consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 311 et seq. , Tesla did everything the statute
`requires to obtain fair consideration by the USPTO of whether “there is a reasonable
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail [in challenging the patentability] with
`respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition .” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`Tesla timely filed petition s for inter partes review (IPR) that set forth the grounds
`supporting unpatentability of each of the challenged claims of the challenged patents.
`See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311 and 312. It disclosed itself as the sole real party in interest. See
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2); 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1). And it paid tens of thousands of dollars
`in filing fees to obtain consideration of its petitions . 35 U.S.C. §312 (a)(1). None of
`the statutory bars to IPR applied. See, e.g., § 315 (timing of petition, estoppel). Yet,
`the USPTO never reached the question of whether “there is a reasonable likelihood
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 12 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in
`the petition” or any of the other statutory considerations for institution.
`Instead, through a procedure the USPTO has dubbed “discretionary denial,”
`the USPTO denied institution in each of Tesla’s four IPRs solely because then -
`Acting Director Stewart (AD) concluded that “it is unlikely that a final written
`decision in this proceeding will issue before the district court trial occurs.” Appx 2
`(Dec. Denying Institution in IPR2025 -00943, -944), Appx6 (incorporating analysis
`from Appx2 in Decision Denying Institution of IPR2025-01034, -1035). But the AIA
`does not allow the USPTO to deny institution based on “time to trial.”
`Tesla acknowledges this Court’s recent denial of petitions for writ of
`mandamus in In re Motorola Solutions, Inc. , -- F.4th --, 2025 WL 3096514 (Fed. Cir.
`Nov. 6, 2025), In re Google LLC , No. 25-144, 2025 WL 3096849 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6,
`2025) (non-precedential), and In re SAP Am., Inc. , No.25-132, 2025 WL 3096788
`(Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 2025) (non-precedential). But none of those petitions squarely
`brought into question the statutory limits on the USPTO’s discretion. In Motorola,
`the Court recognized that notwithstanding § 314(d), institution decisions are
`reviewable in mandamus for “colorable constitutional claims” and “certain
`statutory challenges.” 2025 WL 3096514, at *3 (citing and quoting Mylan Lab’ys Ltd.
`v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V., 989 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2021) and Apple Inc.
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 13 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`v. Vidal, 63 F.4th 1, 12 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ). The U.S. Supreme Court has more
`explicitly directed that § 314(d)’s judicial- review bar does not excuse
`“shenanigans,” including action “contrary to constitutional right,” “in excess of
`statutory jurisdiction,” or “arbitrary and capricious.” Cuozzo Speed Techs. , LLC v.
`Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 275 (2016) (alterations omitted).
` Over the course of this year, the USPTO has chiseled away at IPR to the brink
`of its extermination . And at each stroke, the USPTO throws up more arbitrary
`roadblocks to ever reaching the actual AIA-mandated considerations for institution.
`In addition to the “time to trial” rationale applied in this case, the USPTO now
`claims that it may deny IPR just because a patent is more than a few years old. Dabico
`Airport Sols. Inc. v. AXA Power ApS, IPR2025-00408, Paper 21, at 2 (AD June 2025).
`It has denied institution for no other stated reason than the existence of ex parte
`reexamination as an available alternative. See, e.g., In re Intel Corp., 26-113 (Fed. Cir.
`filed Nov. 21, 2025) ; see also Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC , IPR2025-
`00340, Paper 18 (USPTO Nov. 5, 2025) (reversing institution based on comparative
`status of and positions taken in district court litigation) . It has vacated institution
`following final written decision solely for the USPTO’s convenience. Verizon
`Connect Inc. v. Omega Patents, LLC, No. 25-1994 (Fed. Cir. docketed Aug. 6, 2025).
`It has proposed to deny IPR whenever a “petitioner intends to pursue” novelty or
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 14 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`obviousness challenges in any other venue (even when the challenge could not be
`raised in an IPR, like challenges based on system art). 90 Fed. Reg. 48335, 48338
`(Oct. 17, 2025). And more recently, it has stopped providing any explanation for its
`IPR institution decisions at all. Appx45-47 (Memorandum from USPTO Director to
`PTAB, Director Institution of AIA Trial Proceedings (Oct. 17, 2025) (“October
`Memorandum”)); e.g., Appx964 (order summarily denying 13 petitions) ; Appx968
`(Nov. 6, 2025 Squires order summarily denying 21 petitions). Its IPR institution rate
`has plummeted to near zero . See Appx976 (Dennis Crouch, An Era of No: The
`USPTO’s New 0 % Institution Rate , PatentlyO (Nov. 12, 2025),
`https://patentlyo.com/patent/2025/11/usptos-institution-rate.html).
`The USPTO’s overreach in applying extra -statutory excuses to avoid
`addressing IPR institution under the AIA’s statutory framework defines the very
`“shenanigans” the Supreme Court has found reviewable notwithstanding § 314(d)’s
`appeal bar. Mandamus is appropriate here as the sole mechanism available to compel
`the USPTO to act within the limits of its authority.
`ISSUES PRESENTED
`1. Did the USPTO exceed its authority—violating the APA, AIA, and the
`Constitution’s separation of powers—by inventing an extra-statutory “time to trial”
`rationale that fails to consider the statutory grounds for inter partes review?
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 15 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`2. Did the USPTO violate the APA by imposing a time -to-trial rationale
`for discretionary denial without proper notice -and-comment rulemaking?1
`BACKGROUND
`I. Congress established IPR.
`In enacting the AIA, Congress believed “questionable patents” were “too
`easily obtained” and “too difficult to challenge.” H.R. Rep. No. 112 -98, at 39 -40
`(2011). It created IPR specifically “to establish a more efficient and streamlined
`patent system that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and
`counterproductive litigation costs.” Id. at 40 . IPR allows anyone other than the
`patent owner to petition the USPTO to conduct a limited review of granted patents.
`35 U.S.C. § 311. To decide whether to institute IPR, Congress instructed the
`Director to determine whether “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner
`would prevail.” § 314(a). The USPTO “may not” institute IPR “unless” that
`requirement is met. § 314(a). Congress also established other considerations that
`may bar institution if not met, including a specific timeframe for filing a petition (e.g.,
`§ 315(b) one-year time bar after infringement complaint), and specific criteria for the
`USPTO to consider at its discretion ( e.g., § 315(d) considerations of other
`
`1 This issue is raised in the event the Court holds in the pending appeal in Apple Inc.
`v. Squires, Case No. 24-1864 that notice-and-comment rulemaking was required for
`the type of rationale applied here. That case is set for argument in January 2026.
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 16 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`proceedings before the USPTO). But the “threshold” Congress identified in the
`statutory section addressing “institution” is the likelihood the petitioner would
`prevail. § 314(a). Nowhere does the AIA state the USPTO has general discretion to
`invent new, additional institution criteria beyond those identified by Congress.
`The AIA further dictates that the Director “shall prescribe regulations”
`governing the IPR process, including “setting forth the standards for the showing of
`sufficient grounds to institute a review under section 314(a).” 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(2).
`The USPTO has repeatedly began —and abandoned 2—the notice -and-comment
`process to “prescribe regulations.” Id. In 2023, it issued an advance notice of
`proposed rulemaking , but no corresponding regulations were prescribed . 88 Fed.
`Reg. 24,503 (Apr. 21, 2023) . Following district court challenges to the absence of
`rulemaking, in 2024, the USPTO issued a notice of proposed rulemaking. 89 Fed.
`Reg. 28,693 (Apr. 19, 2024) . Earlier this year, the USPTO withdrew its previous
`rulemaking and proposed yet more new institution rules. 90 Fed. Reg. 48,335-48,341,
`48,342 (Oct. 17, 2025) . But no notice-and-comment regulation with IPR institution
`standards has ever issued.
`
`2 The abandonment followed thousands of comments criticizing the proposed rules.
`See, e.g. , https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-advances-rules-
`governing-ptab-review-practices-various-proceedings.
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 17 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`II. The USPTO created its own extra-statutory IPR institution criteria
`without notice and comment.
`Instead, the USPTO has issued IPR institution criteria via decisions and
`guidance documents. The Director designated as precedential the six Fintiv factors,
`governing whether to institute IPR when there is parallel district court litigation.
`Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020- 00019, 2020 WL 2126495, at *2 ( PTAB Mar. 20,
`2020) (precedential). In 2022, the Director “issue[d] binding agency guidance”
`governing IPR institution. Memorandum from PTO Director to PTAB, Interim
`Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District
`Court Litigation 3 (June 21, 2022) (Appx30). Among other things, that guidance
`reaffirmed the Fintiv factors. Appx28-29. It also announced that “the PTAB will not
`discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a
`petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same
`grounds or any grounds that could have reas onably been raised before the PTAB”
`(known as a “Sotera stipulation”). Appx30.
`In February 2025, the USPTO issued a website post rescinding institution
`guidance—the guidance the USPTO had purportedly been following since 2022.
`Appx37. On March 24, then-Chief Administrative Patent Judge issued a memo with
`new institution rules. Appx39-41. Two days later, the AD issued another memo with
`more new rules. Appx 42-44. The AD’s memo announced a new “discretionary
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 18 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`consideration”—the parties’ “[s]ettled expectations,” “such as the length of time
`the claims have been in force.” Appx 43. Two days after that, on March 28, 2025,
`the AD changed the landscape yet again, this time issuing a decision vacating
`institution after faulting the Board panel for failing to “give enough weight to the
`investment in the parallel proceeding” and giving “too much weight to Petitioner’s
`Sotera stipulation.” Motorola Sols., Inc. v. Stellar, LLC, IPR2024-01205, Paper 19, at
`2 (PTAB Mar. 28, 2025) . But the AD did not stop there. Suddenly, even a Sotera
`stipulation was not enough to break through the USPTO’s arbitrary barriers to
`statutory review of institution . In stead, in a non- precedential decision, the AD
`decided that a petitioner would need to surrender all invalidity challenges in district
`court to have a chance at institution in the face of competing district court litigation.
`Id. at 4.
`All these official actions were taken without reference to or consideration of
`the AIA’s limitations on the USPTO’s institution considerations. They were also
`taken without notice -and-comment rulemaking, despite the USPTO’s statutory
`obligations and repeated earlier commitments to pursue that path. 5 U.S.C. § 553;
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(2); 88 Fed. Reg. 24,503; 89 Fed. Reg. 28,693.
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 19 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`III. Tesla sought IPR.
`It is in the midst of these ever -changing IPR rules that Tesla found itself
`defending against a patent infringement lawsuit on the Asserted Patents. Granite
`Vehicle Ventures LLC v. Tesla, Inc. , No. 2 :24-cv-01007 (E.D. Tex.) (Appx264). In
`response and mere months after service of the complaint , Tesla filed IPR petitions
`challenging the patentability of the Asserted Patents. Appx275-387 (IPR25-944, filed
`5/2/25); Appx47-146 (IPR25-943, filed 5/5/25 ); Appx 498-625 (IPR25-1034, filed
`5/28/25); Appx739-848 (IPR25-01035, filed 5/28/25). It paid more than $200,000
`in filing fees to gain consideration of its petitions and incurred substantial costs
`preparing the petitions and supporting declarations. Appx24-27.
`IV. Even though Tesla complied with all the new , extra -statutory
`institution considerations, t he USPTO denied institution here
`based solely on the time to trial.
`Tesla argued to the USPTO that the AIA allows for none of the dizzying, ever-
`changing new requirements the USPTO ha s recently insisted upon. Appx239-245,
`Appx474-481, Appx709-717, Appx934-941. Still, Tesla explained that its petitions
`should have satisfied even these new conditions. Appx197-237, Appx 256-261,
`Appx440-474, Appx491-496, Appx673-709, Appx731-737, Appx896-933, Appx956-
`962. Tesla agreed to broad surrender of invalidity defenses in district court,
`satisfying the new enhanced Sotera requirement articulated in Motorola Sols.
`Appx163-164. The remaining original Fintiv factors were satisfied. Appx 217-225,
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 20 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`12
`Appx454-462, Appx689-697, Appx912-920. And, the challenged patents were young
`(issued in 2023), satisfying the new settled expectations requirement. Appx 2.
`Nonetheless, the AD seized on one factor (without regard to the countless factors
`favoring institution) as justification to discretionarily deny institution: “it is unlikely
`that a final written decision in this proceeding will issue before the district court trial
`occurs, resulting in significant duplication of effort, additional expense for the
`parties, and a risk of inconsistent decisions.” Appx2, Appx6.
`STANDARD OF REVIEW
`This Court has “jurisdiction to review any petition for a writ of mandamus
`denying institution of an IPR.” M ylan Lab ’ys Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. ,
`989 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2021) . A petitioner must show “a clear and
`indisputable legal right,” the lack of “other adequate method[s] of obtaining relief,”
`and the writ’s “appropriate[ness]” “under the circumstances.” Id. at 1382.
`REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD ISSUE
`I. The USPTO’s errors in exceeding its statutory authority in
`violation of the APA and separation of powers are clear and
`indisputable.
`Tesla respectfully requests that the USPTO’s time- to-trial rationale be set
`aside. In discretionarily denying Tesla’s IPRs based solely on th at rationale, the
`USPTO exceeded its authority —thus usurping Congress’s legislative power,
`transgressing the AIA, and violating the APA (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(C)).
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 21 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`13
`A. Congress did not empower the Director to create extra -
`statutory institution criteria.
`The USPTO’s rationale here also exceeds its authority for a more
`fundamental reason. Congress did not give the USPTO power to create new reasons
`to deny institution, like denying institution because a patent infringement lawsuit
`exists on the same patents . Congress outlined specific institution criteria for the
`Director to consider. E.g., §§ 314(a), 315(d), 325(d). It granted discretion in applying
`some of those criteria, as well as limited authority to promulgate “regulations”
`implementing those criteria, which the agency has failed to do ( § 316(a)(2)). But the
`USPTO instead believes it may invent any criteria it wishes (or even no criteria at
`all). See PTO Resp., In re Sandisk Techs., Inc., No. 25-152, ECF No. 39 at 23, 30 (“the
`IPR statute contains no criteria for institution” so denying institution is “entirely”
`up to Director). That is unlawful. Congress did not legislate a reticulated framework
`for the USPTO to simply disregard.
`In the AIA, Congress instructed the agency to apply statutory requirements,
`not create new ones out of whole cloth. Congress specified the core merits threshold
`in § 314(a); it instructed parties to address the “requirement[s] of this chapter” (§ 313
`(emphasis added)); and it set forth other reticulated considerations. Some are firm
`bars ( § 315(b)’s time limit and § 315(e)’s estoppel). Some are discretionary
`considerations ( § 315(d)’s docket-management authority and § 325(d)’s anti-
`Case: 26-116 Document: 2-1 Page: 22 Filed: 12/02/2025
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`duplication authority). Those are the criteria the USPTO must apply when deciding
`whether to institute IPR.
`To be sure, the Director has broad “discretion” within the AIA’s statutory
`markers. Cuozzo, 579 U.S. at 273 . But discretion within markers is not discretion to
`redraw entirely new boundaries , especially boundaries so narrow as to effectively
`eliminate IPR. And the AIA nowhere grants the USPTO power to ignore Congress’s
`framework and invent new criteria. “Administrative agencies are creatures of
`statute;” they “possess only the authority that Congress has provided.” Nat’l Fed’n
`of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 595 U.S. 109, 117
`(2022); see Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs , 909 F.3d 635, 648 (4 th Cir.
`2018) (finding agency exceeded authority granted under the Clean Water Act by
`imposing conditions on permitting that exceeded the conditions set by the Act); see
`also 5 U.S.C. § 706(C) (requiring the “reviewing court” to co rrect agency actions
`“in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations