Case: 22-10061 Document: 00516369693 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/24/2022
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`No. 22-10061
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`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
`_________________________________________________
`Jamie Wazelle; Tay Aung; Elizabeth Casel; Manivanh
`Chanthanakhone; Manuel Contreras, et al,
`Plaintiffs–Appellants,
`
`v.
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`Tyson Foods, Incorporated; Ernesto Sanchez;
`Kevin Kinikin; Farren Fernandez,
`Defendants–Appellees.
`________________________________________________
`
`On Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of Texas, Amarillo Division
`No. 2:20-CV-203, Hon. Matthew J. Kacsmaryk, Presiding Judge
`________________________________________________
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`REPLY BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS–APPELLANTS
`________________________________________________
`
`Kurt B. Arnold
`Andrew R. Gould
` Counsel of Record
`Brian M. Christensen
`ARNOLD & ITKIN LLP
`6009 Memorial Drive
`Houston, Texas 77007
`(713) 222-3800 Telephone
`(713) 222-3850 Facsimile
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`Counsel for Plaintiffs–Appellants
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`No. 22-10061
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`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
`_________________________________________________
`Jamie Wazelle; Tay Aung; Elizabeth Casel; Manivanh
`Chanthanakhone; Manuel Contreras, et al,
`Plaintiffs–Appellants,
`
`v.
`
`Tyson Foods, Incorporated; Ernesto Sanchez;
`Kevin Kinikin; Farren Fernandez,
`Defendants–Appellees.
`________________________________________________
`
`On Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of Texas, Amarillo Division
`No. 2:20-CV-203, Hon. Matthew J. Kacsmaryk, Presiding Judge
`________________________________________________
`
`REPLY BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS–APPELLANTS
`________________________________________________
`
`Kurt B. Arnold
`Andrew R. Gould
` Counsel of Record
`Brian M. Christensen
`ARNOLD & ITKIN LLP
`6009 Memorial Drive
`Houston, Texas 77007
`(713) 222-3800 Telephone
`(713) 222-3850 Facsimile
`
`Counsel for Plaintiffs–Appellants
`
`
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`Case: 22-10061 Document: 00516369693 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/24/2022
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Table of Authorities ..................................................................................... iii
`
`Introduction ................................................................................................. 1
`
`Argument in Reply ........................................................................................ 4
`
`Federal-officer-removal jurisdiction is absent. ...................................... 4
`I.
`
`Defendants have not established the necessary “subordinate
`A.
`relationship” for the “acting under” element. ............................. 4
`The federal government’s conduct and communications
`toward Defendants demonstrated coordination and
`regulation, not control or subservience. ................................ 5
`Defendants never acted under any directive. ....................... 12
`Defendants did not carry out a basic governmental task. .... 14
`Nor are Defendants’ federal defenses facially colorable, let
`alone meritorious. .................................................................... 18
`The Federal Meat Inspection Act does not preempt
`1.
`Plaintiffs’ claims because it does not govern worker
`safety. .................................................................................. 18
`The DPA and the “sum total” of federal communications
`do not provide Defendants with a colorable federal
`defense. ............................................................................... 22
`The district court equally erred in granting Defendants’ motions
`to dismiss. ......................................................................................... 24
`The Texas PLPA does not impose a heightened pleading
`A.
`standard. .................................................................................. 25
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`II.
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`1.
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`2.
`3.
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`2.
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`B.
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`ii
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`B.
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`The Individual Defendants ignore that, under Texas law,
`they are liable for their own tortious acts. ................................ 30
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`Conclusion .................................................................................................. 34
`
`Certificate of Service ................................................................................... 35
`
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`Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................... 36
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`iii
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Adame v. PetSmart LLC,
`No. 2:21-CV-00191, 2022 WL 961547
`(S.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2022) ..................................................... 30, 31, 32
`
`Agredano v. State Farm Lloyds,
`975 F.3d 504
`(5th Cir. 2020) .................................................................................. 26
`
`Anderson v. Hackett,
`646 F. Supp. 2d 1041
`(S.D. Ill. 2009) .................................................................................. 23
`
`Bell v. Thornburg,
`743 F.3d 84
`(5th Cir. 2014) .................................................................................... 7
`
`Box v. PetroTel, Inc.,
`33 F.4th 195
`(5th Cir. 2022) ............................................................................ 15, 18
`
`Buljic v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
`22 F.4th 730
`(8th Cir. 2021) ........................................................................... passim
`
`Butler v. Coast Elec. Power Ass’n,
`926 F.3d 190
`(5th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................... 7
`
`Colonial Oaks Assisted Living Lafayette, L.L.C. v. Hannie Dev., Inc.,
`972 F.3d 684
`(5th Cir. 2020) .................................................................................... 8
`
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`E. Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
`532 F.3d 957
`(5th Cir. 1976) ................................................................ 11, 12, 13, 23
`
`Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.,
`529 U.S. 861 (2000) ......................................................................... 23
`
`Guzman v. Cordero,
`481 F. Supp. 2d 787
`(W.D. Tex. 2007) ........................................................................ 31, 32
`
`Hoyt v. Lane Constr. Corp.,
`927 F.3d 287
`(5th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................. 32
`
`In re S. Scrap Material Co., LLC,
`541 F.3d 584
`(5th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................. 20
`
`Jacks v. Meridian Res. Co., LLC,
`701 F.3d 1224
`(8th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................... 6
`
`Leyendecker & Assocs. v. Wechter,
`683 S.W.2d 369
`(Tex. 1984) ....................................................................................... 30
`
`Maglioli v. All. HC Holdings LLC,
`16 F.4th 393
`(3rd Cir. 2021) .............................................................................. 5, 11
`
`Martin v. Petersen Health Operations, LLC,
`— F.4th —, No. 21-2959, 2022 WL 2154870
`(7th Cir. June 15, 2022) .................................................................. 4, 9
`
`Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C.,
`31 F.4th 178
`(4th Cir. 2022) .................................................................................. 14
`
`v
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`Mays v. City of Flint, Mich.,
`871 F.3d 437
`(6th Cir. 2017) .................................................................................. 14
`
`Mitchell v. Advanced HCS, L.L.C.,
`28 F.4th 580
`(5th Cir. 2022) ........................................................................... passim
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`Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris,
`565 U.S. 452 (2012) ............................................................. 19, 20, 21
`
`Residents of Gordon Plaza, Inc. v. Cantrell,
`25 F.4th 288
`(5th Cir. 2022) .................................................................................. 26
`
`Richardson v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., LLC,
`192 F. Supp. 3d 719
`(S.D. Tex. 2016) ................................................................................ 31
`
`Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,
`552 U.S. 312 (2008) ......................................................................... 19
`
`Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC,
`27 F.4th 679
`(9th Cir. 2022) .......................................................................... 4, 9, 10
`
`St. Charles Surgical Hosp. v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co.,
`935 F.3d 352
`(5th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................... 6
`
`Thule Drilling ASA v. Schimberg,
`290 F. App’x 745
`(5th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................... 30, 31, 32
`
`Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Tex.,
`726 F.3d 524
`(5th Cir. 2013) .................................................................................. 23
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`Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. AIG Specialty Ins. Co.,
`974 F.3d 528
`(5th Cir. 2020) .................................................................................... 4
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`Watson v. Philip Morris Cos.,
`551 U.S. 142 (2007) ............................................................... 9, 14, 16
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`Statutes
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`29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) ................................................................................. 19
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`21 U.S.C. § 678 ........................................................................................... 18
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`28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) ................................................................................ 4, 18
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`28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)(1) ............................................................................... 32
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`50 U.S.C. § 4511(a) .................................................................................... 16
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`50 U.S.C. § 4512 ......................................................................................... 11
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`50 U.S.C. § 4557 ......................................................................................... 23
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`Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.003 ........................................................ 26
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`Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 36A.008 ...................................................... 26
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`Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 82.008 ....................................................... 26
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`Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 148.003. ..................................................... 25
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`Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 148.003(a)(1) ............................................ 27
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`Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 148.003(a)(2) ............................................ 27
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`Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 148.003(b)(1) ...................................... 26, 27
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`Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 148.003(i) .................................................. 26
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`vii
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`viii
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`Rules & Regulations
` C.F.R. § 381.36(f) .................................................................................... 21
` C.F.R. § 381.45 ........................................................................................ 22
` C.F.R. § 416.4(a)–(d) .............................................................................. 21
` C.F.R. § 416.5 .......................................................................................... 21
` C.F.R. § 416.5(a)–(c) ............................................................................... 21
`
`42 C.F.R. § 85a ............................................................................................. 9
`
`42 C.F.R. § 85.1 ............................................................................................ 9
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`42 C.F.R. § 85.2 ............................................................................................ 9
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`85 Fed. Reg. 17,001 ................................................................................... 11
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`85 Fed. Reg. 17,592 ................................................................................... 11
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`85 Fed. Reg. 26,313 ..................................................................................... 9
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`85 Fed. Reg. 55,292 ................................................................................... 11
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`87 Fed. Reg. 31,357 ................................................................................... 17
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ..................................................................................... 25
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ................................................................................... 25
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` 9
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`Other Authorities
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`Dargan Southard, Tyson meat plant in Storm Lake to shut down temporarily
`after state confirms coronavirus outbreak,
`Des Moines Register
`(May 28, 2020),
`https://bit.ly/3NCQ2kN .................................................................... 13
`
`HHS Secretary Becerra Invokes Defense Production Act for Third Time to
`Further Increase Production of Infant Formula for American Families,
`HHS
`(May 27, 2022),
`https://bit.ly/3Odo27f ...................................................................... 17
`
`HHS Secretary Becerra Invokes Defense Production Act to Accelerate
`Delivery of Raw Materials and More Needed to
`Manufacture Infant Formula, HHS
`(May 22, 2022),
`https://bit.ly/3mNHhZr .................................................................... 16
`
`Letter from Sec’y Sonny Perdue,
`USDA (May 5, 2020),
`https://tinyurl.com/499n9zyu .......................................................... 24
`
`Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select
`Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis,
`(Oct. 27, 2021),
`https://bit.ly/3KupnEI ...................................................................... 29
`
`Memorandum of Understanding Between FDA and USDA Regarding the
`Potential Use of the Defense Production Act with Regard to
`FDA-Regulated Food During the COVID-19 Pandemic 1, 3, 4
`(May 18, 2020),
`https://bit.ly/3OHpoIn ................................................................. 8, 17
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`Memorandum on the Delegation of Authority Under the Defense Production
`Act to Ensure an Adequate Supply of Infant Formula,
`87 Fed. Reg. 31,357
` (May 18, 2022) ................................................................................ 17
`
`Modernization of Swine Slaughter Inspection,
`84 Fed. Reg. 52,300, 52,305 (Oct. 1, 2019) ................................ 19, 21
`
`Regulations at CDC,
`Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
`https://bit.ly/3QglTJP ........................................................................ 9
`
`Staff Report, Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Crisis, 117th Cong
`(May 12, 2022),
`https://bit.ly/3Meophb ........................................................... 8, 13, 28
`
`U.S. Department of Labor’s OSHA and CDC Issue Interim Guidance to Protect
`Workers in Meatpacking and Processing Industries,
`OSHA Nat’l News Release
`(Apr. 26, 2020),
`https://bit.ly/3H6RLLl ...................................................................... 22
`
`
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`INTRODUCTION
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`To save the district court’s opinion denying Plaintiffs’ motion to
`remand, Defendants seek to rewrite it. Defendants’ brief imagines an opinion
`in which the court’s jurisdictional analysis rested on something—anything—
`other than Tyson’s critical-infrastructure designation. See, e.g., Resp.Br.32–
`33. That strategy makes sense, considering that appellate courts nationwide
`(including this Court) have roundly rejected the district court’s holding “that
`[d]efendants were acting under the direction of a federal officer because of
`[d]efendants’ ‘critical infrastructure’ designation[.]” ROA.667 n.2; accord
`ROA.669. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Advanced HCS, L.L.C., 28 F.4th 580 (5th Cir.
`2022).
`But even setting aside the court’s now-repudiated analysis, Defendants
`have not established that Tyson “acted under” a federal officer’s directions.
`Defendants’ hodgepodge of alleged
`federal “directives” show mere
`coordination and regulation—not the compulsion or control required to
`create the special relationship of subordination. What is more, Defendants
`have not shown that Tyson actually acted under any of these purported
`“directives.” They cannot point to a single instance when Tyson’s actions
`shifted after the government supposedly brought Tyson under its “control.”
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`1
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`Finally, commercial food processing is not a basic governmental task. Yet
`even were it otherwise, the way the government executes that task is through
`a DPA contract or order. But the USDA here never exercised its delegated DPA
`authority.
`federal-officer-removal
`to defeat
`that alone suffices
`Although
`jurisdiction, the district court equally erred in finding that Defendants had
`pleaded colorable federal defenses. The FMIA plainly does not preempt
`Plaintiffs’ state-law negligence claims. The court’s unprecedented contrary
`conclusion—which would abolish state-law tort suits brought by workers in
`federally regulated meatpacking plants—writes the FMIA’s savings clause,
`which preserves Plaintiffs’ claims, out of existence. And it likewise ignores
`FSIS’s acknowledgment that OSHA (not FSIS) has the authority to regulate
`worker-safety issues, and that the OSH Act similarly preserves state-law tort
`claims like those brought by Plaintiffs. Nor does the unexercised DPA—much
`less some vague notion of the “sum total” of federal communications—give
`Defendants a colorable federal defense.
`As the district court lacked federal jurisdiction, there is no need to
`analyze its opinions granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss. But Defendants’
`arguments also cannot salvage the court’s equally flawed analyses.
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`2
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`Start with the PLPA. Contrary to Defendants’ belief and the district
`court’s rationale, that statute neither imposes a heightened pleading standard
`nor requires a party to prove causation at the pleading stage. Like other Texas
`statutes, the PLPA permits a party to “establish” her claims or defense through
`its designated procedures. To that end, causation is established post-pleading
`through two depositions and an expert report. Under well-established
`pleading principles, Plaintiffs’ allegations adequately stated a claim under
`both the “knowing exposure” and “causation” elements.
`Defendants’ defense of the district court’s dismissal of the Individual
`Defendants—managers “directly responsible” for Tyson’s COVID-19 response
`at its Amarillo plant—fares no better. Under Texas tort law, the Individual
`Defendants are liable independently of Tyson because (as Plaintiffs alleged)
`they actively directed and participated in causing Plaintiff’s injuries, and
`likewise created the dangerous “work while sick” environment. Alternatively,
`the district court should have granted leave to amend.
`Ultimately, Defendants cannot erase the several errors committed by
`the district court. This Court should reverse.
`
`3
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`ARGUMENT IN REPLY
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`I.
`
`Federal-officer-removal jurisdiction is absent.
`
`Abandoning federal-question jurisdiction, Tyson and the Individual
`Defendants argue for federal jurisdiction solely on the federal-officer removal
`statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a). See Resp.Br.23–49; see also, e.g., Waste Mgmt.,
`Inc. v. AIG Specialty Ins. Co., 974 F.3d 528, 533 n.2 (5th Cir. 2020) (unbriefed
`issues are waived). But their efforts to bolster the district court’s faulty
`analysis fall short.
`
`A. Defendants have not established the necessary “subordinate
`relationship” for the “acting under” element.
`
`Truth be told, this Court’s recent opinion in Mitchell all but resolves this
`case. There, this Court joined the COVID-19 decisions of the Third, Eighth,
`and Ninth Circuits—expressly finding their opinions “persuasive”—in
`rejecting a nursing home’s efforts to “recast private healthcare companies as
`deputies of the federal government.” Mitchell, 28 F.4th at 590–91 (citing
`Maglioli v. All. HC Holdings LLC, 16 F.4th 393, 400 (3d Cir. 2021); Saldana v.
`Glenhaven Healthcare LLC, 27 F.4th 679 (9th Cir. 2022); Buljic v. Tyson Foods,
`Inc., 22 F.4th 730, 739–42 (8th Cir. 2021)); accord Martin v. Petersen Health
`Operations, LLC, — F.4th —, No. 21-2959, 2022 WL 2154870 (7th Cir. June
`
`4
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`15, 2022) (joining Mitchell and companion cases). Mitchell reiterated the
`well-established principle that the “acting under” element “requires that a
`private party have a subordinate relationship to the federal officer or agency
`in question.” 28 F.4th at 590 (emphasis added). And it emphasized that
`federal communications “denoting guidance, not control” are “insufficient to
`establish the kind of relationship necessary to invoke the statute.” Id.
`(quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).
`Under any theory, Defendants cannot show that they “acted pursuant
`to a federal officer’s directions.” Id. at 589. First, absent an actual directive or
`order from the government—conveyed by conduct or language—the analysis
`ends. And so it ends here, because Defendants have not shown any such
`directive, but coordination and regulation. Second, Defendants have not
`shown that they acted under any of the alleged “directives” it received. See id.
`Third, they never carried out a basic governmental task the government
`would otherwise have to do itself.
`1.
`The federal government’s conduct and communications
`toward Defendants demonstrated coordination and
`regulation, not control or subservience.
`Defendants’ cases (Resp.Br.26–27) show the subservient relationship
`absent here. In two examples, the court concluded that a private contractor
`
`5
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`(Blue Cross) acted under the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) when
`it administered government-provided health insurance to federal employees.
`St. Charles Surgical Hosp. v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 935 F.3d 352, 355–
`56 (5th Cir. 2019); Jacks v. Meridian Res. Co., LLC, 701 F.3d 1224, 1229–34
`(8th Cir. 2012). In its role “as a claims processor,” Blue Cross “uniquely
`operate[d] within the United States Treasury” and “ultimately answer[ed] to
`federal officers.” St. Charles, 935 F.3d at 356 (quoting Jacks, 701 F.3d at
`1234). But the insurer was OPM, which owned the employee premiums and
`resolved coverage disputes. Id.
`As St. Charles and Jacks prove, the “archetypal” case of “acting under”
`arises “when a government contractor is sued.” Mitchell, 28 F.4th at 589
`(quotation marks omitted). That is because the government-contractor
`relationship establishes subservience—whether through the contract, the
`employer/employee or principal/agent relationship arising from that
`contract, and payments made under that contract. See Op.Br.40. But of
`course, no such government-contractor relationship exists here, and
`Defendants rightly do not claim otherwise.
`Nor are the Defendants like the non-contractor defendants found to
`have “acted under” federal officers. In those cases, the defendants both
`
`6
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`received “delegated authority” and were closely supervised to carry out basic
`governmental tasks. See, e.g., Bell v. Thornburg, 743 F.3d 84, 89 (5th Cir.
`2014) (private Chapter 13 standing bankruptcy trustee acted under federal
`officer where he was supervised by U.S. Trustee, tasked with carrying out
`federal Bankruptcy Code, received “delegated authority” such that he did not
`“merely comply with the law”); Butler v. Coast Elec. Power Ass’n, 926 F.3d
`190, 201 (5th Cir. 2019) (private rural power cooperatives acted under
`federal Rural Utilities Service “based on a close and detailed lending
`relationship and shared goal of furthering affordable rural electricity”; such
`cooperatives considered “instrumentalities of the United States”).
`Claiming Tyson was “enlisted” by the federal government (Resp.Br.27),
`Defendants cite a hodgepodge of alleged “directives” from “multiple federal
`agencies and officers”—including designation as critical infrastructure,
`emails with FEMA, public statements from Vice President Pence, one of
`President Trump’s tweets, the April 28 Executive Order, and one of Secretary
`Perdue’s letters of May 5. Resp.Br.29, 36–37, 39. But nothing in the language
`of these varied communications denoted a relationship of control. See
`Mitchell, 28 F.4th at 590. Borrowing Tyson’s words, the communications
`simply reflected “[c]lose coordination[.]” Resp.Br.30.
`
`7
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`Start with the pre-April 28 federal communications. As Buljic correctly
`understood, they “did not direct or enlist Tyson,” or even “tell Tyson
`specifically what to do.” 22 F.4th at 741.
`Nor did the later communications—never addressed by the district
`court (see ROA.667 n.2)—change matters. The April 28 Executive Order
`merely took “preliminary” steps under the DPA, while the May 5 letter just
`“expressed [USDA’s] support” for continued operations. Buljic, 22 F.4th at
`741 n.6. Still more, no evidence showed the exercise of the only authority the
`Executive Order purported to delegate: DPA authority. Id. Even USDA agreed
`(contra Resp.Br.32): its joint memorandum with FDA referenced only the
`“potential” or future “possible use of the DPA” under the April 28 Executive
`Order.1 As the United States’ amicus brief thus rightfully explains, the DPA
`was never exercised over Tyson—or any food processor. U.S.Br.4, 20–22.2
`
`
`See Memorandum of Understanding Between FDA and USDA Regarding the
`1
`Potential Use of the Defense Production Act with Regard to FDA-Regulated Food During
`the COVID-19 Pandemic 1, 3, 4 (May 18, 2020), https://bit.ly/3OHpoIn.
`
`A congressional report (published after Plaintiffs’ opening brief) confirms that
`Tyson itself understood as much. See Staff Report, Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Crisis,
`117th Cong. 28–31 (May 12, 2022), https://bit.ly/3Meophb (“Staff Report”); see also, e.g.,
`Colonial Oaks Assisted Living Lafayette, L.L.C. v. Hannie Dev., Inc., 972 F.3d 684, 688 n.9
`(5th Cir. 2020) (court may take judicial notice of documents in public record). As the
`report notes, “[e]ven Tyson acknowledged when circulating a memorandum on the DPA
`in connection with the draft order that certain [USDA] steps needed to take place before
`authority delegated under the DPA could be exercised.” Staff Report at 31; see also id. at
`32.
`
` 2
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`What, then, did the Executive Order and the Secretary’s letter actually
`direct Defendants to do? Defendants’ answer: “to ‘continue operations
`consistent with the guidance for their operations jointly issued by the CDC
`and OSHA.’” Resp.Br.35 (quoting Executive Order, 85 Fed. Reg. 26,313).
`So at most, the government simply required Tyson—which was already
`operating, and which was already regulated by CDC and OSHA3—to comply
`with CDC and OSHA’s new COVID-related regulations. Laid bare, Defendants’
`argument rests on the long-discarded “regulation plus” theory, which courts
`have rejected—even in the context of “hyper-involved” agencies closely
`monitoring private entities—both outside and in the COVID-19 context.
`Saldana, 27 F.4th at 685; see also Mitchell, 28 F.4th at 591; Watson v. Philip
`Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 157 (2007).
`Seeking to distinguish Mitchell and its companion cases, Defendants
`claim that “nursing homes were not subject to the full panoply of directives
`addressing meat-processing facilities[.]” Resp.Br.33. But the “panoply of
`directives” Defendants cite (see Resp.Br.24–39) no more “denote control”
`than the communications cited by the nursing homes. See Martin, 2022 WL
`
`
`3
`See Op.Br.43; Regulations at CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
`https://bit.ly/3QglTJP (citing 42 C.F.R. § 85a); 42 C.F.R. §§ 85.1, 85.2.
`
`9
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`Case: 22-10061 Document: 00516369693 Page: 20 Date Filed: 06/24/2022
`
`2154870 at *1; Mitchell, 28 F.4th at 590–91; Saldana, 27 F.4th at 684–85;
`Maglioli, 16 F.4th at 405–06; Resp.Br.5–16, 23–40. Like the nursing-home
`communications, the Executive Order and May 5 letter “d[id] not direct
`anything.” Mitchell, 28 F.4th at 591 n.4 (emphasis in original). The same
`conclusion follows: the mere “exhortations” and “shoulds” are “insufficient to
`establish the kind of relationship necessary to invoke the statute.” See id. at
`590.
`
`Perhaps recognizing their argument’s legal shortcomings, Defendants
`shift to effectively requesting that this Court abandon any requirement that
`the “acting under” element be established by a direct order or other language
`denoting control. See Resp.Br.35–37. Defendants threaten that, if their
`request is not accepted, “the United States can expect a series of not-until-
`you-compel-me-to responses to the next round of requests for industry
`cooperation in a crisis.” Resp.Br.35–36; accord id. 21, 37.
`But Defendants’ policy-based request cannot supersede what the
`federal-officer-removal statute requires: a subordinate relationship of control.
`When the government exercises control within the statute’s meaning, it uses
`language that eliminates discretion. For example, when the President issued
`an executive order in March 2020 prohibiting hoarding of COVID-related
`
`10
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`Case: 22-10061 Document: 00516369693 Page: 21 Date Filed: 06/24/2022
`
`medical supplies (85 Fed. Reg. 17,001), he expressly invoked and delegated
`to the HHS Secretary authority under 50 U.S.C. § 4512, which orders that “no
`person shall accumulate” excessive “materials which have been designated by
`the President as scarce materials[.]” 50 U.S.C. § 4512 (emphasis added). The
`Secretary then made such designations. See 85 Fed. Reg. 17,592. Similarly,
`the CDC’s order prohibiting evictions during part of 2020 provided that “a
`landlord . . . shall not evict any covered person from any residential property
`in any jurisdiction to which this Order applies[.]” 85 Fed. Reg. 55,292
`(emphasis added). Defendants can point to no such similar language here,
`because no such orders exist.
`Defendants’ reliance on Eastern Air Lines fares no better. See E. Air Lines,
`Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.3d 957 (5th Cir. 1976). Defendants
`interpret that case as holding that “the federal government does not have to
`use the word ‘must’ rather than ‘should’ when enlisting support for an
`important federal-government objective[.]” Resp.Br.36 (citing E. Air Lines,
`532 F.2d at 992–93).
`But even if Eastern Air Lines were a federal-officer-removal case (it is
`not), its facts are worlds away. There, the federal government first threatened
`“the entire aviation industry” that it would order DPA prioritization of
`
`11
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`Case: 22-10061 Document: 00516369693 Page: 22 Date Filed: 06/24/2022
`
`military contracts for airplanes—even non-urgent military ones—over all
`private contracts. 532 F.2d at 981–83. Then, “[a]s a quid pro quo” for not
`formally invoking the DPA, “the Defense Department insisted that particular
`military orders be given preference on an individual and informal basis”—an
`arrangement the industry accepted. Id. at 983 (emphasis added). Based on
`the evidence, the court concluded that “where compulsion is actually present,
`a vendor is justified in complying with a government request for priority, no
`matter how informally presented or politely phrased that demand may have
`been.” Id. at 995 (emphasis added). But here, no comparable contract—let
`alone actual “compulsion”—was present, as underscored by the permissive
`language of the federal communications Defendants received.
`Ultimately, Defendants ask this Court to fundamentally rewrite the
`federal-officer-removal statute. They may lobby Congress to do that, but their
`desired statute is not before this Court.
`2. Defendants never acted under any directive.
`If Tyson had been informally coerced into a relationship of subservience
`to the federal government, Defendants should be able to show that Tyson’s
`behavior changed as a result. Eastern Air Lines again provides an example,
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`12
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`Case: 22-10061 Document: 00516369693 Page: 23 Date Filed: 06/24/2022
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`where the aviation industry was forced (to its economic detriment) to
`prioritize military contracts over civilian contracts. 532 F.2d at 983, 986.
`But at no point in their brief do Defendants ever point to a time when
`their actions shifted as a result of any “directive.” See Resp.Br.24–39. Indeed,
`Defendants never refute that, from the earliest days of the pandemic
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