Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`Fifth Circuit
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Fifth Circuit
`____________
`
`No. 23-10718
`____________
`
`Jennifer VanDerStok; Michael G. Andren; Tactical
`Machining, L.L.C., a limited liability company; Firearms Policy
`Coalition, Incorporated, a nonprofit corporation,
`
`
`FILED
`November 9, 2023
`
`Lyle W. Cayce
`Clerk
`
`Plaintiffs—Appellees,
`
`
`Blackhawk Manufacturing Group, Incorporated, doing
`business as 80 Percent Arms; Defense Distributed; Second
`Amendment Foundation, Incorporated; Not An L.L.C.,
`doing business as JSD Supply; Polymer80, Incorporated,
`
`
`Intervenor Plaintiffs—Appellees,
`
`
`
`versus
`
`
`Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General; United States
`Department of Justice; Steven Dettelbach, in his official
`capacity as Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives;
`Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives,
`
`
`Defendants—Appellants.
`______________________________
`
`
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of Texas
`USDC No. 4:22-CV-691
`______________________________
`
`
`Before Willett, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`Kurt D. Engelhardt, Circuit Judge:
`
`It has long been said—correctly—that the law is the expression of
`
`legislative will.1 As such, the best evidence of the legislature’s intent is the
`carefully chosen words placed purposefully into the text of a statute by our
`
`duly-elected representatives. Critically, then, law-making power—the ability
`
`to transform policy into real-world obligations—lies solely with the
`legislative branch.2 Where an executive agency engages in what is, for all
`intents and purposes, “law-making,” the legislature is deprived of its
`
`primary function under our Constitution, and our citizens are robbed of their
`
`right to fair representation in government. This is especially true when the
`
`executive rule-turned-law criminalizes conduct without the say of the people
`
`who are subject to its penalties.
`
`The agency rule at issue here flouts clear statutory text and exceeds
`
`the legislatively-imposed limits on agency authority in the name of public
`
`policy. Because Congress has neither authorized the expansion of firearm
`
`regulation nor permitted the criminalization of previously lawful conduct, the
`
`_____________________
`
`1 “Positive law is a manifestation of the legislative will.” Arnold v. United States, 13
`U.S. 104, 119 (1815); see also Farrar v. United States, 30 U.S. 373, 379 (1831) (“[The
`President] cannot in the absence of law exercise the power of making contracts, and much
`less, as in this case, against the expression of the legislative will.”) (emphasis added); Kindle
`v. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc., 792 F.2d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 1986) (describing “the express
`legislative will” as “the determinant”); Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., Md., 48 F.3d
`810, 820 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting the “deference to legislative will” inherent in statutory
`interpretation); Winstead v. Ed's Live Catfish & Seafood, Inc., 554 So. 2d 1237, 1242 (La. Ct.
`App. 1989), writ denied, 558 So. 2d 570 (La. 1990) (“The supreme expression of legislative
`will . . . is of course the codes and statutes.”); In re Chin A On, 18 F. 506, 506–07 (D. Cal.
`1883) (“[I]t is the duty of the court to obey the law, as being the latest expression of the
`legislative will.”).
`
`2 See Forrest General Hospital v. Azar, 926 F.3d 221, 228 (5th Cir. 2019) (“The
`Constitution, after all, vests lawmaking power in Congress. How much lawmaking power?
`‘All,’ declares the Constitution’s first substantive word.”).
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`proposed rule constitutes unlawful agency action, in direct contravention of
`
`the legislature’s will. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we
`
`AFFIRM IN PART and VACATE AND REMAND IN PART the
`
`judgment of the district court.
`
`I. Statutory and Regulatory Background
`
`In April of 2022, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
`
`Explosives (“ATF”) issued a Final Rule in which the terms “firearm” and
`
`“frame or receiver,” among others, were given “an updated, more
`
`comprehensive definition.” Definition of “Frame or Receiver” and
`
`Identification of Firearms, 87 Fed. Reg. 24652 (Apr. 26, 2022) (the “Final
`
`Rule”). The Final Rule was almost immediately the subject of litigation
`
`claiming that ATF had exceeded its statutory authority. It is that Final Rule
`
`that is before this Court now.
`
`First, a brief history of the regulatory agency under fire here. ATF
`
`was created in 1972 as an independent bureau of the U.S. Department of the
`Treasury.3 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 later transferred ATF to the
`U.S. Department of Justice, where it remains active today. See 6 U.S.C.
`
`§ 531. Upon its creation, ATF obtained jurisdiction to act under earlier
`legislation, including the Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”),4 which
`
`_____________________
`
`3 ATF History Timeline, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives,
`https://www.atf.gov/our-history/atf-history-timeline.
`
`4 The GCA’s predecessor statutes include the National Firearms Act of 1934 and
`the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, both of which involved the taxation and regulation of
`firearms. See National Firearms Act of 1934, ch. 757, Pub. L. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236; Federal
`Firearms Act of 1938, ch. 850, Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938) (repealed 1968).
`
`Of particular note, the Supreme Court has stated: “The Nation’s legislators chose
`to place under a registration requirement only a very limited class of firearms, those they
`considered especially dangerous.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 (Ginsburg, J.,
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`permits the regulation and taxation of certain “firearms.” Under the GCA,
`
`Congress granted to the Attorney General the power to prescribe rules and
`
`regulations necessary to carry out the GCA’s provisions. See 18 U.S.C.
`
`§ 926. The Attorney General thereafter delegated this authority to ATF, to
`
`“[i]nvestigate, administer, and enforce the laws related to alcohol, tobacco,
`
`firearms, explosives, and arson, and perform other duties as assigned by the
`
`Attorney General.” 28 C.F.R. § 0.130. Pursuant to this authority, ATF
`
`proposed the Final Rule as an extension of the GCA’s regulation of firearms.
`
`The GCA requires all manufacturers and dealers of firearms to have
`
`a federal firearms license; manufacturers and dealers are thus known as
`
`“Federal Firearms Licensees” or “FFLs.” When those FFLs sell or
`
`transfer “firearms,” they must conduct background checks in most cases,
`
`record the firearm transfer, and serialize the firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(t),
`
`923(a), 923(g)(1)(A), 923(i).
`
`The primary method by which the GCA ensures that the manufacture
`
`and sale of firearms are regulated as intended is through the imposition of
`criminal penalties.5 As one example, the GCA generally prohibits “any
`
`_____________________
`
`concurring) (noting also “the purpose of the mens rea requirement—to shield people
`against punishment for apparently innocent activity”).
`
`5 The GCA is found in Title 18 of the United States Code, which bears the label
`“Crimes and Criminal Procedure.” See 18 U.S.C. § 922.
`
`Interestingly, Congress’s jurisdictional hook whereby it finds authority to regulate
`firearms in the manner described is the requirement that the firearm travelled in interstate
`commerce. See generally id.; 18 U.S.C. § 921(2) (defining “interstate or foreign
`commerce”); see also, e.g., 2.43D Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon, Fifth Circuit
`District Judges Association Pattern Jury Instructions Committee, Pattern Jury
`Instructions, Criminal Cases (2019) (requiring, under element number four of the offense,
`that the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt “[t]hat the firearm [ammunition]
`possessed traveled in [affected] interstate . . . commerce; that is, before the defendant
`possessed the firearm, it had traveled at some time from one state to another”). While not
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`person” who is not “a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed
`
`dealer” (i.e., an FFL) from “importing, manufacturing, or dealing in
`
`firearms” and from “ship[ping] or transport[ing] in interstate or foreign
`
`commerce any firearm to any person.” Id. at § 922(a). As another example,
`
`the GCA prohibits a large class of persons from not only shipping or
`
`transporting firearms, but from possessing them at all. Id. at § 922(g). Should
`
`a person commit these or any of the other unlawful acts found in the twenty-
`
`six subsections of section 922, section 924 authorizes various penalties,
`
`including fines, imprisonment, or both. Id. at § 924.
`
`The bedrock of the GCA and its plethora of requirements and
`
`restrictions is the word “firearm.” The GCA defines a “firearm” as: “(A)
`
`any weapon . . . which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to
`
`expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of
`
`any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any
`
`destructive device.” Id. at § 921(a)(3)(C). As no definition for “frame or
`
`receiver” is given in the GCA, ATF previously defined a “frame or
`
`receiver” in 1978 as: “That part of a firearm which provides housing for the
`
`hammer, bolt or breechblock, and firing mechanism, and which is usually
`
`threaded at its forward portion to receive the barrel.” Title and Definition
`
`Changes, 43 Fed. Reg. 13531, 13537 (Mar. 31, 1978). This definition remained
`
`unchanged for over forty years, until ATF issued the Final Rule in 2022.
`
`ATF’s 1978 regulatory definition sufficiently captured most firearms
`
`of the era. Modern firearms, however, have developed such that many
`
`firearms no longer fall within the definition. In the Final Rule, ATF states
`
`that “the majority of firearms in the United States” no longer have a clear
`
`_____________________
`
`challenged in this appeal, the interstate-commerce requirement may call into question
`ATF’s jurisdictional authority to promulgate certain provisions of the Final Rule.
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`“frame” or “receiver” that includes all three elements of the prior definition
`
`(that is, a hammer, bolt or breechblock, and firing mechanism). 87 Fed. Reg.
`at 24655. ATF uses the example of an AR-15,6 which does not have a single
`housing for the bolt (which is part of the “upper assembly”) and the hammer
`
`and trigger (which is part of the “lower assembly”). Id. Thus, as several
`
`district courts have recently recognized, the lower assembly of the AR-15,
`
`taken alone, is likely not covered by federal regulations. See, e.g., United States
`
`v. Rowold, 429 F. Supp. 3d 469, 475–76 (N.D. Ohio 2019) (“The language of
`
`the regulatory definition in § 478.11 lends itself to only one interpretation:
`
`namely, that under the GCA, the receiver of a firearm must be a single unit
`
`that holds three, not two, components: 1) the hammer, 2) the bolt or
`
`breechblock, and 3) the firing mechanism.”). Likewise, weapons such as
`
`Glock semiautomatic pistols, which use a “striker” rather than a “hammer”
`
`as a firing mechanism, and the Sig Sauer P320 pistol, which has no one unit
`
`containing those three parts, seemingly may not be regulated under the prior
`
`GCA-related definitions. 87 Fed. Reg. at 24655.
`
`The Final Rule was also concerned with the rise of privately made
`firearms (“PMFs”).7 These PMFs, also known colloquially as “ghost
`guns,” are often made from readily purchasable “firearm parts kits,
`
`standalone frame or receiver parts, and easy-to-complete frames or
`
`receivers.” Id. at 24652. Because the kits and standalone parts were not
`
`_____________________
`
`6 The Supreme Court has held that, to be banned, a weapon must be “both
`dangerous and unusual,” and thus, “the relative dangerousness of a weapon is irrelevant
`when the weapon belongs to a class of arms commonly used for lawful purposes.” Caetano
`v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411, 418 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring). Of course, for many years
`now, millions of AR-15 rifles have been sold to civilians, who may lawfully possess them.
`
`7 The Final Rule defines a PMF as: “A firearm, including a frame or receiver,
`completed, assembled, or otherwise produced by a person other than a licensed
`manufacturer, and without a serial number placed by a licensed manufacturer at the time
`the firearm was produced.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24735.
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`themselves considered “firearms” under any interpretation of the GCA and
`
`ATF’s related definitions, manufacturers of such kits are neither subject to
`
`licensing requirements nor required to conduct background checks on
`
`purchasers. Id. Further, when made for personal use, PMFs “are not
`
`required by the GCA to have a serial number placed on the frame or
`
`receiver.” Id. These facts, ATF contends, make PMFs attractive to criminal
`
`actors and “pose a challenge to law enforcement’s ability to investigate
`
`crimes.” Id. at 24658.
`
`Notably, the PMFs that play a central role in the Final Rule were not
`
`unknown at the time of the GCA’s—or, for that matter, its predecessors’—
`
`enactment. “Because gunsmithing was a universal need in early America,
`
`many early Americans who were professionals in other occupations engaged
`
`in gunsmithing as an additional occupation or hobby.” Joseph G.S. Greenlee,
`
`The American Tradition of Self-Made Arms, 54 St. Mary’s L.J. 35, 66
`
`(2023). The tradition of at-home gun-making predates this nation’s
`
`founding, extends through the revolution, and reaches modern times. See id.
`
`at 48 (“During the Revolutionary War, when the British attempted to
`
`prevent the Americans from acquiring firearms and ammunition, the
`
`Americans needed to build their own arms to survive.”). Considering this
`
`long tradition, “[t]he federal government has never required a license to
`
`build a firearm for personal use.” Id. at 80. “In fact, there were no restrictions
`
`on the manufacture of arms for personal use in America during the
`
`seventeenth, eighteenth, or nineteenth centuries.” Id. at 78 (emphasis
`
`added). And in perfect accord with the historic tradition of at-home gun-
`
`making, Congress made it exceedingly clear when enacting the GCA that
`
`“this title is not intended to discourage or eliminate the private ownership or
`
`use of firearms by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” Pub. L. 90-618,
`
`Title I, § 101, 82 Stat. 1213, 1213 (Oct. 22, 1968). ATF’s Final Rule alters
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`this understanding by adding significant requirements for those engaged in
`
`private gun-making activities.
`
`In response to the observed changes in modern firearm construction,
`
`the Final Rule provides (in part) that “[t]he terms ‘frame’ and ‘receiver’
`
`shall include a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or
`
`receiver, including a frame or receiver parts kit, that is designed to or may
`
`readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to
`
`function as a frame or receiver, i.e., to house or provide a structure for the
`
`primary energized component of a handgun, breech blocking or sealing
`
`component of a projectile weapon other than a handgun.” 87 Fed. Reg. at
`
`24739. The Final Rule also supplements the definition of “firearm” to
`
`include a “weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed,
`
`assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by action of
`an explosive.” Id. at 24728.8 The Final Rule took effect on August 24, 2022.
`Id. at 24652.
`
`II. Factual and Procedural Background
`
`On August 11, 2022, the plaintiffs in this case9 filed a petition for
`review in the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs claimed that two
`
`_____________________
`
`8 Among other things not substantially challenged in this litigation, the Final Rule
`also defined the term “frame” in relation to handguns and the term “receiver” in relation
`to long guns, defined what “variant” means relative to firearms, required that FFLs
`serialize PMFs that they accept into inventory, and required FFLs to maintain records on
`firearms transactions for the entirety of their business operations, replacing a prior twenty-
`year requirement. Finally, the Final Rule contains a severability clause. See 87 Fed. Reg. at
`24730.
`
`9 The plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors in this action are two individuals, Jennifer
`VanDerStok and Michael Andren; Tactical Machining, LLC; Firearms Policy Coalition,
`Inc.; BlackHawk Manufacturing Group, Inc. d/b/a 80 Percent Arms; Defense Distributed;
`Second Amendment Foundation, Inc.; Not An LLC d/b/a JSD Supply; and Polymer80,
`Inc.
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`portions of the Final Rule, which redefine “frame or receiver” and
`
`“firearm,” exceeded ATF’s congressionally mandated authority. The
`
`plaintiffs requested that the court hold unlawful and set aside the Final Rule,
`
`and that the court preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Government
`
`from enforcing or implementing the Final Rule.
`
`Roughly a month later, the district court issued its first of several
`
`preliminary injunctions. In this first injunction, the district court found that
`
`ATF’s new definition of “frame or receiver” is facially unlawful because it
`
`included “firearm parts that are not yet frames or receivers” in contravention
`
`of Congress’s clear language in the GCA. VanDerStok v. Garland, 625 F.
`
`Supp. 3d 570, 578–79 (N.D. Tex. 2022), opinion clarified, No. 4:22-CV-
`
`00691-O, 2022 WL 6081194 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2022) (emphasis in
`
`original). The district court also found that weapon parts kits cannot be
`
`regulated by ATF under the GCA because “Congress’s definition does not
`
`cover weapon parts, or aggregations of weapon parts, regardless of whether
`
`the parts may be readily assembled into something that may fire a projectile.”
`
`Id. at 580 (emphasis in original). Relying on this same logic, the district court
`
`subsequently expanded the preliminary injunction and extended similar
`
`injunctions to other plaintiffs. The Government timely appealed each of
`
`these injunctions.
`
`While those two appeals were pending, the district court granted
`
`summary judgment to the plaintiffs and vacated the Final Rule in its entirety.
`
`VanDerStok v. Garland, No. 4:22-CV-00691-O, 2023 WL 4539591 (N.D.
`
`Tex. June 30, 2023). The logic of the district court’s order closely tracked its
`
`_____________________
`
`The defendants in this action are Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General; the
`United States Department of Justice; Steven Dettelbach, in his official capacity as Director
`of ATF; and ATF. These defendants are collectively referred to herein as “the
`Government.”
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`logic at the injunctive stage: the court held that “the Final Rule’s amended
`
`definition of ‘frame or receiver’ does not accord with the ordinary meaning
`
`of those terms and is therefore in conflict with the plain statutory language.”
`
`Id. at *14. ATF “may not,” the court continued, “properly regulate a
`
`component as a ‘frame or receiver’ even after ATF determines that the
`
`component in question is not a frame or receiver.” Id. (emphasis in original).
`
`Additionally, the court held that because “Congress did not regulate firearm
`
`parts as such, let alone aggregations of parts,” ATF had no authority to
`
`regulate weapon parts kits. Id. at *17. Holding that vacatur is “the ‘default
`
`rule’ for agency action otherwise found to be unlawful,” the court vacated
`
`the Final Rule under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). Id. at *18.
`
`The Government promptly filed a notice of appeal, and subsequently
`
`filed an emergency motion to stay pending appeal. The district court denied
`
`the request for a stay pending appeal but granted a seven-day administrative
`
`stay so that the Government might seek emergency relief from this Court.
`
`The Government did so.
`
`This Court considered and denied the Government’s emergency
`
`motion to stay the district court’s judgment as to the two challenged portions
`
`of the Final Rule but granted a stay as to the non-challenged provisions of the
`
`rule. VanDerStok v. Garland, No. 23-10718, 2023 WL 4945360 (5th Cir. July
`
`24, 2023). The Government then requested a full stay from the Supreme
`
`Court. Without discussion, the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s
`
`order and judgment “insofar as they vacate the [F]inal [R]ule” pending (1)
`
`this Court’s decision and (2) either denial of certiorari thereafter or judgment
`
`issued by the Supreme Court after grant of certiorari. Garland v. Vanderstok,
`
`No. 23A82, 2023 WL 5023383 (U.S. Aug. 8, 2023).
`
`This Court held oral argument on September 7, 2023. Shortly
`
`beforehand, the Government voluntarily dismissed the two appeals relating
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`to the injunctions. Thus, all that remains before this Court now is the appeal
`
`of the district court’s final judgment vacating the Final Rule in its entirety.
`
`III. Standard of Review
`
`“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all the
`
`evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all
`
`reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Parm v. Shumate, 513 F.3d 135,
`
`142 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 234 F.3d 899,
`
`902 (5th Cir. 2000)). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the
`
`movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
`
`movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see
`
`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
`
`IV. Analysis
`
`The plaintiffs challenged two portions of the Final Rule in the
`
`underlying lawsuit: (1) ATF’s proposed definition of “frame or receiver”
`
`including incomplete frames and receivers; and (2) ATF’s proposed
`
`definition of “firearm” including weapon parts kits. We analyze each
`
`challenged portion of the Final Rule in turn below, before addressing the
`
`appropriate relief should these specific portions of the Final Rule be held
`
`unlawful.
`
`At the outset, we must ensure that we look through the proper lens
`when analyzing ATF’s actions here.10 “It is axiomatic that an administrative
`agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the
`
`authority delegated by Congress.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
`
`_____________________
`
`10 Notably, the Chevron doctrine has not been invoked on appeal. Even if the
`Government had done so, Chevron would likely not apply for several reasons, including the
`GCA’s unambiguous text and its imposition of criminal penalties. See, e.g., Cargill v.
`Garland, 57 F.4th 447, 464–66, 472–73 (5th Cir. 2023).
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`204, 208 (1988); see also Clean Water Action v. U.S. Env't Prot. Agency, 936
`
`F.3d 308, 313 n.10 (5th Cir. 2019) (“To be sure, agencies, as mere creatures
`
`of statute, must point to explicit Congressional authority justifying their
`
`decisions.”). In the GCA—the source of ATF’s capacity to promulgate the
`
`Final Rule—Congress delegated authority to ATF through the Attorney
`
`General to “prescribe only such rules and regulations as are necessary to
`
`carry out the provisions of this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 926(a). Such a grant of
`
`authority from the legislature to an executive agency is generally policed by
`
`the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which allows courts to set aside
`
`agency action found to be, among other things, “in excess of statutory
`
`jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C.
`
`§ 706(2)(C). Thus, a core inquiry in a case such as this one is whether the
`
`proposed agency rule is a lawful extension of the statute under which the
`
`agency purports to act, or whether the agency has indeed exceeded its
`
`“statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” See id.
`
`How do we know when an agency has exceeded its statutory
`
`authority? Simple: the plain language of the statute tells us so. Therefore,
`
`“[w]e start, as we always do, with the text.” Sackett v. Env't Prot. Agency, 598
`
`U.S. 651, 671 (2023); see also Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
`
`519, 544 (2012) (“[T]he best evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory
`
`text.”). “In statutory interpretation disputes, a court’s proper starting point
`
`lies in a careful examination of the ordinary meaning and structure of the law
`
`itself.” Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019).
`
`Here, we read the words of the GCA “in their context and with a view to
`
`their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dep't of
`
`Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). Only where the statutory text shows that
`
`ATF has “clear congressional authorization” to enact a regulation can such
`
`a regulation withstand judicial scrutiny. See West Virginia v. Env't Prot.
`
`Agency, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2614 (2022) (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. E.P.A.,
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 13 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)). As explained below, we hold that ATF lacked
`
`congressional authorization to promulgate the two challenged portions of the
`
`Final Rule.
`
`a. ATF’s proposed definition of “frame or receiver”
`
`The GCA includes as a “firearm” the “frame or receiver” of a
`
`weapon. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(C). The GCA itself does not define the term
`
`“frame or receiver.” See id. The Final Rule, however, newly defines the term
`
`“frame or receiver” to include “a partially complete, disassembled, or
`
`nonfunctional frame or receiver, including a frame or receiver parts kit, that
`
`is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise
`
`converted to function as a frame or receiver.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24739.
`
`Because Congress did not define “frame or receiver” in the GCA, the
`
`ordinary meaning of the words control. See Bouchikhi v. Holder, 676 F.3d 173,
`
`177 (5th Cir. 2012). Both a “frame” and a “receiver” had set, well-known
`
`definitions at the time of the enactment of the GCA in 1968. In 1971,
`
`Webster’s Dictionary defined a “frame” as “the basic unit of a handgun
`
`which serves as a mounting for the barrel and operating parts of the arm” and
`
`a “receiver” as “the metal frame in which the action of a firearm is fitted and
`
`which the breech end of the barrel is attached.” Webster’s Third International
`
`Dictionary 902, 1894 (1971). Similarly, ATF’s 1978 definition of frame and
`
`receiver—the most recent iteration of the definition before the Final Rule’s
`
`proposed change—defined “frame or receiver” as “[t]hat part of a firearm
`
`which provides housing for the hammer, bolt or breechblock, and firing
`
`mechanism, and which is usually threaded at its forward position to receive
`the barrel.”11 43 Fed. Reg. at 13537. As is apparent from a comparison of the
`
`_____________________
`
`11 ATF’s 1968 definition of “frame or receiver” was identical: “That part of a
`firearm which provides housing for the hammer, bolt or breechblock, and firing mechanism,
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 14 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`dictionary definitions and the regulatory definition, ATF’s previous
`
`understanding of “frame or receiver” closely tracked the public’s common
`understanding of such terms at the time of enactment.12
`
`After almost fifty years of uniform regulation, ATF, via the Final
`
`Rule, now purports to expand the terms “frame” and “receiver,” as they
`
`were understood in 1968, to include changes in firearms in modern times. But
`
`the meanings of statutes do not change with the times. See Bostock v. Clayton
`
`County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020). “This Court normally interprets a
`
`statute in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of
`
`its enactment. After all, only the words on the page constitute the law adopted
`
`by Congress and approved by the President.” Id. (emphasis added). ATF’s
`
`inclusion now of “partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional”
`
`frames and receivers materially deviates from past definitions of these words
`
`to encompass items that were not originally understood to fall within the
`
`ambit of the GCA. See New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019)
`
`(“[W]ords generally should be interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning
`
`at the time Congress enacted the statute” because “if judges could freely
`
`invest old statutory terms with new meanings, we would risk amending
`
`legislation outside the single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
`
`procedure the Constitution commands.”) (cleaned up). As such, the
`
`proposed definition is an impermissible extension of the statutory text
`
`approved by Congress.
`
`_____________________
`
`and which is usually threaded at its forward portion to receive the barrel.” Commerce in
`Firearms and Ammunition, 33 Fed. Reg. 18,555, 18,558 (Dec. 14, 1968).
`
`12 The Government itself acknowledged that “ATF’s prior regulatory definitions
`have been ‘consistent with common and technical dictionary definitions.’” VanDerStok,
`2023 WL 4539591, at *13 (quoting Defs.’ Supp. Br.) (emphasis removed).
`
`14
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 15 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`A plain reading of the Final Rule demonstrates ATF’s error. In the
`
`GCA’s definition of “firearm,” the first subsection includes flexible
`
`language such as “designed to or may readily be converted to expel a
`
`projectile by the action of an explosive.” See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A). But
`
`the subsection immediately thereafter, which contains the term “frame or
`
`receiver,” does not include such flexibility. “[W]hen Congress includes
`
`particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section
`
`of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
`
`purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct.
`
`1761, 1782 (2021) (citation omitted). ATF’s assertion that Congress has
`
`repeatedly used language such as “designed to” and “readily” in other
`
`definitions or statutes only emphasizes the point: Congress explicitly
`
`declined to use such language in regard to frames or receivers. Thus, we
`
`presume the exclusion of the phrase “designed to or may readily be
`
`converted” in the “frame or receiver” subsection to be purposeful, such that
`
`ATF cannot add such language where Congress did not intend it to exist. See
`
`Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“We have
`
`stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a
`
`statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”).
`
`There is also a clear logical flaw in ATF’s proposal. As written, the
`
`Final Rule states that the phrase “frame or receiver” includes things that are
`
`admittedly not yet frames or receivers but that can easily become frames or
`
`receivers—in other words: parts. As the district court put it, under the Final
`
`Rule, “ATF may properly regulate a component as a ‘frame or receiver’
`
`even after ATF determines that the component in question is not a frame or
`
`receiver.” VanDerStok, 2023 WL 4539591, at *14 (emphasis in original).
`
`Such a proposition defies logic: “a part cannot be both not yet a receiver and
`
`a receiver at the same time.” Id. (emphasis in original). This confusion
`
`15
`
`

`

`Case: 23-10718 Document: 00516963058 Page: 16 Date Filed: 11/09/2023
`
`No. 23-10718
`
`highlights ATF’s attempt to stretch the GCA’s language to fit modern
`understandings of firearms without the support of statutory text.13
`
`The Government argues that ATF has historically regulated parts
`
`that are not yet frames or receivers as frames or