`
`No. 24-50721 and 25-50096
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Fifth Circuit
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`COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
`AND NETCHOICE, L.L.C.,
`Plaintiffs-Appellees,
`v.
`KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF TEXAS,
`Defendant-Appellant.
` STUDENTS ENGAGED IN ADVANCING TEXAS; M.F., BY AND
`THROUGH NEXT FRIEND, VANESSA FERNANDEZ;
`AMPERSAND GROUP, L.L.C.; BRANDON CLOSSON,
`Plaintiffs-Appellees,
`v.
`KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF TEXAS,
`Defendant-Appellant.
`On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
`Western District of Texas
`Hon. Robert Pitman District Court Case Nos. 1:24-cv-
`849 and 1:24-cv-945
`
`BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE SOFTWARE & INFORMATION
`INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES
`
`Anne Voigts
`Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP
`2550 Hanover Street
`Palo Alto, California 94304-1115
`T: 650.233.4500/F: 650.233.4545
`E: anne.voigts@pillsburylaw.com
`Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Software
`& Information Industry Association
`
`Jonathan T. Sink
`Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP
`609 Main Street, Suite 2000
`Houston, Texas 77002
`T: 713.276.7600
`E: Jonathan.sink@pillsburylaw.com
`July 10, 2025
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`Case: 24-50721 Document: 113 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025
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`CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
`
`Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 29.2, the undersigned counsel of record certifies
`that, in addition to the persons and en tities listed in Petitioners’ Certificate of
`Interested Persons, the following listed persons and entities as described in the fourth
`sentence of Fifth Circuit Rule 28.2.1 have an interest in the outcome of this case.
`These representations are made in order th at the judges of this Court may evaluate
`possible disqualification or recusal:
`Amicus Curiae:
`Software & Information Industry Association
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae:
`Anne M. Voigts
`Jonathan T. Sink
`
`Dated: July 10, 2025 PI LLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW
`PITTMAN LLP
`
`By: /s/ Anne Voigts
`
`2550 Hanover Street
`Palo Alto, California 94304-1115
`Telephone: 650.233.4500
`Facsimile: 650.233.4545
`Email: anne.voigts@pillsburylaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Software
`& Information Industry Association
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`Case: 24-50721 Document: 113 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/10/2025
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS ........................................................ i
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii
`INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................................................................ 1
`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................ 2
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 4
`I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SECTION 230 PROTECT
`COMPLEMENTARY INTERESTS .................................................................. 4
`A. The First Amendment Protects Digital Service Provider’s Exercise Of
`Editorial Control In Publishing Third-Party Speech .................................. 5
`B. Section 230 Also Protects the Act of Online Publication .......................... 7
`C. Plaintiffs Can Raise Both First Amendment and Section 230 Claims At
`the Same Time .......................................................................................... 10
`D. A Contrary Rule Would Stifle Online Speech and Impede Economic
`Development ............................................................................................. 12
`II. THE USE OF ALGORITHMS TO EXECUTE HUMAN EDITORIAL
`JUDGMENT IS PROTECTED UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
`SECTION 230 .................................................................................................. 14
`A. The Use of Algorithms in Content Moderation Furthers Expressive
`Choices ..................................................................................................... 15
`B. The Use of Tools To Execute Expressive Choices Is Protected First
`Amendment Activity ................................................................................ 18
`C. The Use of Algorithms Does Not Dilute Section 230’s Application ....... 19
`III. FREE SPEECH COALITION REAFFIRMED THAT THE FIRST
`AMENDMENT (AND STRICT SCRUTINY) APPLY .................................. 21
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 23
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`Page(s)
`Cases
`Batzel v. Smith,
`333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................ 11
`Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online,
`206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000) .............................................................................. 9
`Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn.,
`564 U.S. 786 (2011) ........................................................................................ 5, 22
`Computer & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n v. Paxton,
`747 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (W.D. Tex. 2024) .....................................................passim
`Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,
`776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ....................................................................... 7
`Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,
`528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) ................................................................................ 9
`Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp.,
`934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019) ........................................................................ 9, 19
`Erznoznik v. Jacksonville,
`422 U.S. 205 (1975) .............................................................................................. 5
`Force v. Facebook,
`934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019) ....................................................................... 9, 20, 21
`Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton,
`606 U.S. __, No. 23-1122, 2025 WL 1773625 (June 27, 2025) ..................passim
`Google Inc. v. Hood,
`822 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2016) .............................................................................. 11
`Gonzalez v. Google LLC,
`598 U.S. 617 (2023) .............................................................................................. 1
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`Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.
`515 U.S. 557 (1995) .............................................................................................. 6
`Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
`485 U.S. 46 (1988) .............................................................................................. 14
`Johnson v. Arden,
`614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010) .............................................................................. 10
`Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC,
`755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014) ................................................................................ 9
`Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc.,
`836 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 2016) .............................................................................. 9
`Klayman v. Zuckerberg,
`753 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................ 9
`La'Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc.,
`272 F. Supp. 3d 981 (S.D. Tex. 2017) .................................................................. 8
`Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo,
`418 U.S. 241 (1974) .............................................................................................. 6
`Monsarrat v. Newman,
`28 F.4th 314 (1st Cir. 2022) .................................................................................. 9
`Moody v. NetChoice, LLC,
`603 U.S. 707 (2024) .....................................................................................passim
`Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal.
`475 U.S. 1, 11, n.7 (1986) ..................................................................................... 6
`Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy,
`1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) ................................................. 7
`Students Engaged in Advancing Texas v. Paxton,
`765 F.Supp.3d 575 (W.D. Tex. 2025) ........................................................ 2, 5, 22
`Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh,
`598 U.S. 471 (2023) .............................................................................................. 1
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`Zeran v. Am. Online,
`129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................ 9
`Statutes and Codes
`United States Code
`Title 47, Section 230 ....................................................................................passim
`
`Texas Business & Commercial Code
`Section 509.053(a) ................................................................................................ 2
`Other Authorities
`Blazina & Stocking, Key Facts About Parler, Pew Research Center (Oct. 20,
`2022), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/10/20/fast-facts-
`about-parler-as-kanye-west-reportedly-plans-acquisition-of-site/ (visited
`July 9, 2025) ....................................................................................................... 15
`Buckley & Schafer, “Censorship-Free” Platforms: Evaluating Content
`Moderation Policies and Practice of Alternative Social Media, 4
`For(e)Dialogue 7 (Feb. 3, 2022),
`https://foredialogue.pubpub.org/pub/bsh5uhll/release/1 (visited July 9,
`2025) ................................................................................................................... 15
`Congressional Record
`Volume 141, H. 8471 (Aug. 4, 1995) ........................................................... 11, 12
`Desjardins, How Much Data Is Generated Each Day?, World Economic
`Forum https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/how-much-data-is-
`generated-each-day-cf4bddf29f/ (visited July 10, 2025) ............................. 13, 14
`Elliot Harmon, No, Section 230 Does Not Require Platforms to Be
`“Neutral”, Electronic Frontier Foundation (April 12, 2018),
`https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/no-section-230-does-not-require-
`platforms-be-neutral (visited July 9, 2025) ........................................................ 11
`Ethan Wham, The Economic Case for Section 230, Disruptive Competition
`Project, Computer & Communications Industry Association (Sept. 6,
`2019), https://www.project-disco.org/innovation/090619-an-economic-
`case-for-section-230/ ................................................................................... 13, 14
`Case: 24-50721 Document: 113 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/10/2025
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`Google, Search Quality Rater Guidelines: An Overview, Google,
`https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/hsw-sqrg.pdf (visited July 9,
`2025) ................................................................................................................... 17
`Jeff Kosseff, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET
`(2019). ................................................................................................................... 8
`Key Facts About Parler, Pew Research Center (Oct. 20, 2022),
`https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/10/20/fast-facts-about-
`parler-as-kanye-west-reportedly-plans-acquisition-of-site/ (visited July
`9, 2025) ............................................................................................................... 15
`Merriam-Webster, Algorithm, https://www.merriam-
`webster.com/dictionary/algorithm (visited July 9, 2025) .................................. 16
`Senate Report No. 104-230 (1996) ............................................................................ 7
`Singhal et al., SoK: Content Moderation in Social Media, from Guidelines to
`Enforcement, and Research to Practice (Mar. 2023),
`https://arxiv.org/pdf/2206.14855.pdf (visited July 9, 2025) .............................. 16
`Troy Beamer, 402.74 Million Terabytes of Data Is Created Every Day,
`https://www.techbusinessnews.com.au/blog/402-74-million-terrabytes-
`of-data-is-created-every-day/ (visited July 10, 2025) ........................................ 13
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`1
`INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
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`The Software and Information Industry Association (“SIIA”) is the principal
`trade association for those in the busine ss of information. SIIA’s membership
`includes nearly 400 software companies, pl atforms, data and analytics firms, and
`digital publishers that serve nearly ever y segment of society, including business,
`education, government, health care, and consumers. It is dedicated to creating a
`healthy environment for the creation, dissemination, and productive use of
`information. SIIA protects the rights of its members to use software as a tool for the
`dissemination of information.
`SIIA and its members have a particular interest in the robust and predictable
`application of the First Amendment a nd 47 U.S.C. § 230. Indeed, SIIA has
`participated as amicus curiae in, among others, Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U.S.
`471 (2023), Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024), and Gonzalez v. Google
`LLC, 598 U.S. 617 (2023). Consistent application of those constitutional and
`statutory rules of the road promotes free speech and economic growth. Accordingly,
`SIIA submits this amicus brief to address: (1) Texa s’s incorrect assertion that
`Appellees’ First Amendment claims cannot coexist with their Section 230 claims;
`
`1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party
`authored this brief in whole or in part, and no entity or person, aside from amicus
`curiae, its members, or its counsel, made any monetary contribution intended to fund
`the preparation or submission of this brief. Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E).
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`(2) why the First Amendment and Section 230 apply with undiluted force to HB 18’s
`provisions even where they regulate, expr essly or implicitly, the use of algorithms
`for content moderation and ta rgeted advertising; and (3) why the Supreme Court’s
`recent decision in Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton confirms that strict scrutiny
`applies here, where the regulations in qu estion are plainly content-based and the
`speech they would curtail constitutionally protected.
`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`HB 18 requires covered digital servic e providers (DSPs) to “develop and
`implement a strategy to prevent [a] know n minor’s exposure to” broadly defined
`categories of speech, including content “that promotes, glorifies, or facilitates”: (A)
`“suicide, self-harm, or eating disorders”; (B) “substance abuse”; (C) “stalking,
`bullying, or harassment”; a nd (D) “grooming, trafficki ng, child pornography, or
`other sexual exploitation or abuse.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 509.053(a). As the
`district court correctly recognized, most of that proscribed content, “even if highly
`distasteful,” is nonetheless covered by the First Amendment, the statute proscribing
`it is plainly content-based, and its requi rements more restric tive and less tailored
`than they need to be to survive that level of scrutiny. Students Engaged in Advancing
`Tex. v. Paxton, 765 F.Supp.3d 575, 597 n.13 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (“S.E.A.T.”); see also
`Computer & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n v. Paxton, 747 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1036-1038
`and n.13 (W.D. Tex. 2024) (“CCIA”). And, as the court also correctly recognized,
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`HB 18’s attempt to regulate digital service providers’ publication of third-party
`speech is preempted by Section 230, which “specifically proscribes liability” for
`“decisions relating to the monitoring, sc reening, and deletion of content.” CCIA,
`747 F. Supp. 3d at 1042. This Court should affirm.
`At least three arguments support affirmance. First, the First Amendment and
`Section 230 are mutually reinforcing. In seeking to overturn the district court’s
`decision on appeal, Texas argues that appellees cannot advance both First
`Amendment and Section 230 claims because t hose claims are mutu ally exclusive.
`They are not. The state’s largely unprecedented position would strip companies of
`critical constitutional and statutory protections to which they are entitled, dilute First
`Amendment protections, and nullify Sec tion 230. Nothing in Texas’s brief
`argument, the constitutional or statutory te xt, or existing case law warrants such a
`result.
`Second, this Court should reject a ny argument that HB 18’s provisions
`regulating the use of algorithms survive First Amendment scrutiny or Section 230
`preemption. When covered entities use algorithms, rather than human reviewers, to
`implement their editorial choices, their use of those algorithms to apply website rules
`and standards at scale does not displace human decision making. It certainly does
`not strip that decision making of its constitutional protections. Algorithms are
`simply tools created by humans to impl ement human decisions and apply human
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`values. Content-moderation actions using those tools simply reflect their human
`administrators’ constitutionally protected, expressive choices. Their use can no
`more strip away First Amendment protecti ons than does the use of a printing press
`instead of a feather pen.
`Third, HB 18 fails strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in
`Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton , 606 U.S. __, No. 23-1122, 2025 WL 1773625
`(June 27, 2025), confirms that strict scrutiny applies to content-based regulation of
`protected speech like HB 18—and that HB 18 fails that standard by a country mile.
`While the Court applied inte rmediate scrutiny to the age verification requirements
`there, it did so because those requirements were ancillary to speech, and the covered
`speech constitutionally unprotected as to minor s. By contrast here, the explicit
`content-moderation requirements direc tly limit access to a broad swath of
`constitutionally protected spee ch. As the district court correctly concluded, that
`cannot be squared with the First Amendment.
`ARGUMENT
`
`I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SECTION 230 PROTECT
`COMPLEMENTARY INTERESTS
`Both the First Amendment and Section 230 protect social media companies’
`compilation and curation of third-party content. While the parameters for both may
`differ, neither can be squared with HB 18’s sweeping regulations.
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`A. The First Amendment Protects Digital Service Provider’s Exercise
`Of Editorial Control In Publishing Third-Party Speech
`The First Amendment unquestionably protects editorial choices. In
`concluding that Texas was not likely to succeed in enforcing another recent law that
`also sought to control social media comp anies’ content moderation, the Supreme
`Court recently reaffirmed that “whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution
`to ever-advancing technology, the basic principles” of the First Amendment “do not
`vary.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC , 603 U.S. 707, 733 (2024) (quoting Brown v.
`Entertainment Merchants Assn., 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011)). Those principles protect
`against government interference with a private speaker’s own editorial choices about
`the mix of speech it wants to convey. Moody, 603 U.S. at 734. And, as the district
`court here recognized, those principles do not give way to government concerns that
`“[s]peech that is neither obscene as to yo uths nor subject to some other legitimate
`proscription” should be “suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images
`that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.” S.E.A.T., 765 F. Supp. 3d at 596
`(quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1975)).
`Those protections encompass expressive activity even where that activity
`involves presenting a curated compilation of speech originally created by others.
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`Moody, 603 U.S. at 728. That’s because the First Amendment protects the “crucial
`process” of “exercise[ing] of editorial control and judgment” over the speech or
`expressions of others. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
`(1974). In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., the Court,
`applying strict scrutiny, confirmed that an interest in “offer[ing] the public a greater
`variety of views” could not justify compelling the utility to “alter its own message”
`by forcing it to include third-party material in its newsletter. 475 U.S. 1, 11, n.7, 12,
`15 (1986). And in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
`Boston, Inc., the Court held that the First Amendment prevented Massachusetts from
`compelling parade organizers to admit a particular group because doing so would
`“alter the expressive content of the[] parade.” 515 U.S. 557, 572–574 (1995). Under
`the First Amendment, the organizers’ decision to exclude the group’s message could
`not be constitutionally second-guessed by the state.
`While those cases dealt with the forced inclusion of particular speech, the
`same constitutional principles apply to forced exclusion. First, as the Supreme Court
`recognized in Moody, the First Amendment applies when an entity compiles and
`curates others’ speech into an expressive product of its own. Moody, 603 U.S. at
`709-10. Second, “none of that changes just because a compiler includes most items
`and excludes just a few.” Id. at 710. Third, “the government cannot get its way just
`by asserting an interest in better balancing the marketplace of ideas”—that interest
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`is not a compelling one, and the stat utory means for accomplishing it are not
`narrowly tailored. Id.
`B. Section 230 Also Protects the Act of Online Publication
`Section 230 provides that “[n]o interac tive computer service shall be treated
`as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by” someone else. 47 U.S.C.
`§ 230(c)(1); CCIA, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 1042. It was enacted to “promote the
`continued development of the Internet ,” and encourage the development of
`“forum[s] for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
`development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3),
`(b)(1). And it came partly in congression al response to cases holding that, so long
`as a website exercised “editorial control over the content of messages posted on its”
`site, it could be held liable for publishi ng third-party speech that the editor did not
`exclude. See, e g., Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *2 (N.Y. Sup.
`Ct. May 24, 1995); S. Rep. No. 104-230, at 194 (1996); cf. Cubby, Inc. v.
`CompuServe Inc ., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In enacting Section 230,
`Congress wanted to ensure that websites could remove some offensive third-party
`content without becoming liable as a common-law publisher for all third-party
`content.2
`
`2 Section 230 replaced what was effectively a notice and takedown regime under the
`common law. Under existing First Amendment law, once a publisher knew that an
`item was defamatory, for example, they could be liable for distributing it. See
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`Accordingly, as the district court r ecognized, Section 230 provides all DSPs
`“broad immunity” for “all claims stemmi ng from their publication of information
`created by third parties.” CCIA, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 1042. By preempting
`“inconsistent” laws, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3), Congress “specifically proscribe[d]
`liability” for “decisions relating to the m onitoring, screening, and deletion of
`content.” CCIA, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 1042. (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d
`413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008); citing La'Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc ., 272 F. Supp. 3d 981,
`993 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (“Thus ‘any activity th at can be boiled down to deciding
`whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune
`under section 230’”)). “That is the point of Section 230: to immunize websites for
`harm caused by unremoved speech.” CCIA, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 1042. (cleaned up).
`That includes purported “failure[s] to impl ement basic safety measures to protect
`minors.” Id.
`Since its inception, Section 230 has co nsistently protected websites from
`liability for the “exercise of a publisher’ s traditional editorial functions—such as
`
`generally Smith v. People of the State of California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (providing
`reasoning for scienter require ment). And if they rem oved some content (but not
`others), they could be liable for what they failed to remove. See generally
`Jeff Kosseff, T HE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET, 10 (2019).
`That discouraged content moderation efforts, to the detriment of everyone—website
`operators and users alike. Id. Section 230 was designe d to encourage content
`moderation without fear of liability.
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`deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.” See, e.g., Zeran
`v. Am. Online , 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). It specifically provides that no
`website that relies on user-generated cont ent “shall be treated as the publisher or
`speaker of any information provided by another information content provider,” and
`it preempts claims that “treat” website s “as the publisher or speaker of any
`information provided by another information content provider,” rather than the
`website itself. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Section 230’s protections thus turn on whether
`the allegedly injurious content is “creat[ed] or develop[ed]” by someone other than
`the website itself. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). If so, Section 230 precludes liability for
`posting, removing, arranging, and otherwise organizing that third-party content.3
`
`3 See, e.g., Zeran , 129 F.3d at 330; see also Monsarrat v. Newman , 28 F.4th 314,
`319 (1st Cir. 2022) (Section 230 applied to and barred claim for “reposting …
`libelous information” created by a third party); Force v. Facebook, 934 F.3d 53, 65
`(2d Cir. 2019) (Section 230 barred claim challenging use of “algorithms to suggest
`content to users”); Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., 934 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.
`2019) (Section 230 barred challenge to decision to “publish[] information created or
`developed by third parties,” including by using “algorithms” to “recommend[]”
`content); Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir.
`2014) (Section 230 barred cha llenge to website’s “exercise of a publisher’s
`traditional editorial functions”); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C.
`Cir. 2014) (Section 230 bars challenge to “decision whether to print or retract a given
`piece of content”); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791-92 (8th Cir. 2010) (same);
`Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (Section 230 barred challenge
`to “decisions relating to the monitoring, screening, and dele tion of content”); Ben
`Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Congress
`clearly enacted § 230 to forbid the impositio n of publisher liability on a service
`provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions”); cf. Kimzey
`v. Yelp! Inc. , 836 F.3d 1263, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 2016) (Section 230(c)(1) barred
`challenge to Yelp!’s display of negative reviews).
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`10
`C. Plaintiffs Can Raise Both First Amendment and Section 230
`Claims At the Same Time
`Thus, Section 230 and First Amendment protections are not an either/or
`proposition. Websites that disseminate third-party content both exercise First-
`Amendment-protected editorial control and enjoy Section 230 protection from
`publisher liability. As a matter of black -letter law, Section 230’s statutory
`protections cannot erode the First Amen dment’s constitutional ones. U.S. CONST.,
`Art. VI, Cl. 2. But neither does the application of the First Amendment preclude the
`application of Section 230. Indeed, appl ying the rule that Texas proposes would
`nullify the protection for third-party spee ch in Section 230(c)(1). Section 230
`protection is necessary precisely becau se when websites engage in content
`moderation of third-party material, they exercise the kind of First-Amendment-
`protected editorial discretion that would have given rise to publisher liability under
`the common law.
`In the face of this precedent, Texas argues incorrectly that appellees cannot
`“invoke § 230 preemption while simultaneously claiming HB 18 violates their own
`First Amendment rights.” Paxton Br. at 49. More specifically, it contends,
`Appellees cannot assert both that (1) HB 18 is unconstitutional because it infringes
`DSPs’ speech rights and (2) Section 230 preempts HB 18 because it imposes liability
`for other people’s speech. Id. Accordingly, Texas argues, appellees must pick a
`horse. Going even further, it implies, because appellees purportedly cannot have
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`both, they are entitled to neither. That does not work, either as a matter of law, or
`as a matter of math.
`The First Amendment and Section 230 are not mutually exclusive—far from
`it. True, they are not coterminous: in some circumstances, one may protect more
`than the other. Thus, Section 230 may apply where the First Amendment does not
`(to some dissemination of user-created defamation, for example), and the First
`Amendment may apply where Section 230 does not (to websites’ own speech, for
`example). But the fact that sometimes they overlap and sometimes they don’t does
`not mean that when they do overlap, a plaintiff can’t invoke both. Websites “are
`within their First Amendment rights to moderate their online platforms however they
`like, and they’re additionally shielded by Section 230 for many types of liability for
`their users’ speech. It’s not one or the other: It’s both.” Elliot Harmon, No, Section
`230 Does Not Require Platforms to Be “Neutral” , Electronic Frontier Foundation
`(April 12, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/no-section-230-does-not-
`require-platforms-be-neutral.
`That makes good legal sense. As cour ts (including this one) and Congress
`have recognized, Section 230 is animated by core First Amendment values. See
`Google Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2016) (“First Amendment values
`… drive” Section 230); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (Section
`230 “sought to further First Amendment … interests on the Internet”); 141 Cong.
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`Rec. H. 8471 (Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren) (Section 230
`“preserve[s] the First Amendment … on the Net”). Texas’s position serves none of
`those values and should be rejected.
`D. A Contrary Rule Would Stifle Online Speech and Impede
`Economic Development
`Texas’s position is wrong.
`The easiest way to demonstrate the fl aws in Texas’s view is to assume
`arguendo that it is correct. In the current st ate of the internet, websites compete
`through the kinds of communities they creat e and the ideas that they allow to be
`promoted. Some will intentionally excl ude political discussions. Others will
`exclude ad hominem attacks. Others will allow their users to post exactly what the
`law allows. That editorial selection creates paradigmatic competition in the
`marketplace of ideas, and it has enabled the United States’ information businesses
`to be the envy of the world.
`But suppose, for example, that Texas’ position were correct and that a website
`became aware of a third-pa rty defamatory statement and had to choose between
`Section 230’s protection and First Amendment protection. If the state were correct,
`the website’s choice would have two bad out comes: either adopt the risk of third-
`party content and stand on the First Amendment, or eschew content moderation and
`act as a pure intermediary in reliance on Section 230. In one case, there is free spe