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`1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2022
`Syllabus
`NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`Syllabus
`STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v.
`PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`THE FIRST CIRCUIT
`No. 20–1199. Argued October 31, 2022—Decided June 29, 2023*
`Harvard College and the University of North Carolina (UNC) are two of
`the oldest institutions of higher le arning in the United States. Every
`year, tens of thousands of students apply to each school; many fewer
`are admitted. Both Harvard and UNC employ a highly selective ad-
`missions process to make their decisions. Admission to each school can
`depend on a student’s grades, recommendation letters, or extracurric-
`ular involvement. It can also depend on their race. The question pre-
`sented is whether the admissions systems used by Harvard College
`and UNC are lawful under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
`teenth Amendment.
`At Harvard, each application for admission is initially screened by a
`“first reader,” who assigns a numerical score in each of six categories:
`academic, extracurricular, athletic, school support, personal, and over-
`all. For the “overall” category—a composite of the five other ratings—
`a first reader can and does consider the applicant’s race. Harvard’s
`admissions subcommittees then review all applications from a partic-
`ular geographic area. These regional subcommittees make recommen-
`dations to the full admissions committee, and they take an applicant’s
`race into account. When the 40-member full admissions committee
`begins its deliberations, it discusses the relative breakdown of appli-
`cants by race. The goal of the process, according to Harvard’s director
`of admissions, is ensuring there is no “dramatic drop-off” in minority
`admissions from the prior class. An applicant receiving a majority of
`——————
`*Together with No. 21–707, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Uni-
`versity of North Carolina et al. , on certiorari before judgment to the
`United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
`Case: 19-2005 Document: 00118025868 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Entry ID: 6577045
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`2 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
`AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
`Syllabus
`the full committee’s votes is tentatively accepted for admission. At the
`end of this process, the racial co mposition of the tentative applicant
`pool is disclosed to the committee. The last stage of Harvard’s admis-
`sions process, called the “lop,” winnows the list of tentatively admitted
`students to arrive at the final class. Applicants that Harvard consid-
`ers cutting at this stage are placed on the “lop list,” which contains
`only four pieces of information: legacy status, recruited athlete status,
`financial aid eligibility, and race. In the Harvard admissions process,
`“race is a determinative tip for” a significant percentage “of all admit-
`ted African American and Hispanic applicants.”
`UNC has a similar admissions proc ess. Every application is re-
`viewed first by an admissions office reader, who assigns a numerical
`rating to each of several categories. Readers are required to consider
`the applicant’s race as a factor in their review. Readers then make a
`written recommendation on each a ssigned application, and they may
`provide an applicant a substantial “plus” depending on the applicant’s
`race. At this stage, most recommend ations are provisionally final. A
`committee of experienced staff members then conducts a “school group
`review” of every initial decision made by a reader and either approves
`or rejects the recommendation. In making those decisions, the com-
`mittee may consider the applicant’s race.
`Petitioner, Students for Fair Ad missions (SFFA), is a nonprofit or -
`ganization whose stated purpose is “to defend human and civil rights
`secured by law, including the right of individuals to equal protection
`under the law.” SFFA filed separate lawsuits against Harvard and
`UNC, arguing that their race-based admissions programs violate, re -
`spectively, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pro-
`tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After separate bench
`trials, both admissions programs were found permissible under the
`Equal Protection Clause and this Court’s precedents. In the Harvard
`case, the First Circuit affirmed, and this Court granted certiorari. In
`the UNC case, this Court granted certiorari before judgment.
`Held: Harvard’s and UNC’s admissions programs violate the Equal Pro-
`tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 6–40.
`(a) Because SFFA complies with th e standing requirements for or -
`ganizational plaintiffs articulated by this Court in Hunt v. Washington
`State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, SFFA’s obligations un-
`der Article III are satisfied, and this Court has jurisdiction to consider
`the merits of SFFA’s claims.
`The Court rejects UNC’s argument that SFFA lacks standing be-
`cause it is not a “genuine” membership organization. An organiza -
`tional plaintiff can satisfy Article III jurisdiction in two ways, one of
`which is to assert “standing solely as the representative of its mem-
`Case: 19-2005 Document: 00118025868 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Entry ID: 6577045
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`3 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`Syllabus
`bers,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 511, an approach known as rep-
`resentational or organizational standing. To invoke it, an organization
`must satisfy the three-part test in Hunt. Respondents do not suggest
`that SFFA fails Hunt ’s test for organizational standing. They argue
`instead that SFFA cannot invoke organizational standing at all be-
`cause SFFA was not a genuine membership organization at the time
`it filed suit. Respondents maintain that, under Hunt, a group qualifies
`as a genuine membership organizati on only if it is controlled and
`funded by its members. In Hunt, this Court determined that a state
`agency with no traditional member s could still qualify as a genuine
`membership organization in subs tance because the agency repre-
`sented the interests of individuals and otherwise satisfied Hunt’s
`three-part test for organizational standing. See 432 U. S., at 342.
`Hunt’s “indicia of membership” analysis, however, has no applicability
`here. As the courts below found, SFFA is indisputably a voluntary
`membership organization with iden tifiable members who support its
`mission and whom SFFA represents in good faith. SFFA is thus enti-
`tled to rely on the organizational standing doctrine as articulated in
`Hunt. Pp. 6–9.
`(b) Proposed by Congress and ratifi ed by the States in the wake of
`the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall
`“deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” Proponents
`of the Equal Protection Clause described its “foundation[al] principle”
`as “not permit[ing] any distinctions of law based on race or color.” Any
`“law which operates upon one man,” they maintained, should “operate
`equally upon all.” Accordingly, as this Court’s early decisions inter -
`preting the Equal Protection Clau se explained, the Fourteenth
`Amendment guaranteed “that the law in the States shall be the same
`for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or
`white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States.”
`Despite the early recognition of the broad sweep of the Equal Pro-
`tection Clause, the Court—alongsid e the country—quickly failed to
`live up to the Clause’s core commitments. For almost a century after
`the Civil War, state-mandated segr egation was in many parts of the
`Nation a regrettable norm. This Cour t played its own role in that ig-
`noble history, allowing in Plessy v. Ferguson the separate but equal
`regime that would come to deface much of America. 163 U. S. 537.
`After Plessy, “American courts . . . labored with the doctrine [of sep-
`arate but equal] for over half a century.” Brown v. Board of Education,
`347 U. S. 483, 491. Some cases in this period attempted to curtail the
`perniciousness of the doctrine by em phasizing that it required States
`to provide black students educational opportunities equal to—even if
`formally separate from—those en joyed by white students. See, e.g.,
`Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 349–350. But the
`Case: 19-2005 Document: 00118025868 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Entry ID: 6577045
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`4 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
`AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
`Syllabus
`inherent folly of that approach—of trying to derive equality from ine-
`quality—soon became apparent. As the Court subsequently recog -
`nized, even racial distinctions that were argued to have no palpable
`effect worked to subordinate the afflicted students. See, e.g., McLau-
`rin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U. S. 637, 640–642.
`By 1950, the inevitable truth of the Fourteenth Amendment had thus
`begun to reemerge: Separate cannot be equal.
`The culmination of this approach came finally in Brown v. Board of
`Education, 347 U. S. 483. There, the Court overturned the separate
`but equal regime established in Plessy and began on the path of inval-
`idating all de jure racial discrimination by the States and Federal Gov-
`ernment. The conclusion reached by the Brown Court was unmistak-
`ably clear: the right to a public education “must be made available to
`all on equal terms.” 347 U. S., at 493. The Court reiterated that rule
`just one year later, holding that “full compliance” with Brown required
`schools to admit students “on a racially nondiscriminatory basis.”
`Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300–301.
`In the years that followed, Brown’s “fundamental principle that ra-
`cial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional,” id., at 298,
`reached other areas of life—for example, state and local laws requiring
`segregation in busing, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U. S. 903 ( per curiam);
`racial segregation in the enjoyment of public beaches and bathhouses
`Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U. S. 877 (per cu-
`riam); and antimiscegenation laws, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1.
`These decisions, and others like them, reflect the “core purpose” of the
`Equal Protection Clause: “do[ing] away with all governmentally im-
`posed discrimination based on race.” Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429,
`432.
`Eliminating racial discrimination means eliminating all of it. Ac-
`cordingly, the Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause applies
`“without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality”—
`it is “universal in [its] application.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356,
`369. For “[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing
`when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a
`person of another color.” Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S.
`265, 289–290.
`Any exceptions to the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee must
`survive a daunting two-st ep examination known as “strict scrutiny,”
`Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 227, which asks
`first whether the racial classification is used to “further compelling
`governmental interests,” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 326, and
`second whether the government’s use of race is “narrowly tailored,”
`i.e., “necessary,” to achieve that interest, Fisher v. University of Tex. at
`Austin, 570 U. S. 297, 311–312. Acceptance of race-based state action
`Case: 19-2005 Document: 00118025868 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Entry ID: 6577045
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`5 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`Syllabus
`is rare for a reason: “[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of
`their ancestry are by their very na ture odious to a free people whose
`institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” Rice v. Cay-
`etano, 528 U. S. 495, 517. Pp. 9–16.
`(c) This Court first considered whether a university may make race-
`based admissions decisions in Bakke, 438 U. S. 265. In a deeply splin-
`tered decision that produced six different opinions, Justice Powell’s
`opinion for himself alone would eventually come to “serv[e] as the
`touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions
`policies.” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 323. After rejecting three of the Uni-
`versity’s four justifications as not sufficiently compelling, Justice Pow-
`ell turned to its last interest asserted to be compelling—obtaining the
`educational benefits that flow from a racially diverse student body.
`Justice Powell found that interest to be “a constitutionally permissible
`goal for an institution of higher education,” which was entitled as a
`matter of academic freedom “to make its own judgments as to . . . the
`selection of its student body.” 438 U. S., at 311–312. But a university’s
`freedom was not unlimited—“[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any
`sort are inherently suspect,” Justice Powell explained, and antipathy
`toward them was deeply “rooted in our Nation’s constitutional and de-
`mographic history.” Id., at 291. Accordingly, a university could not
`employ a two-track quota system wi th a specific number of seats re -
`served for individuals from a preferred ethnic group. Id., at 315. Nei-
`ther still could a university use race to foreclose an individual from all
`consideration. Id., at 318. Race could only operate as “a ‘plus’ in a
`particular applicant’s file,” and even then it had to be weighed in a
`manner “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity
`in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant.” Id., at 317.
`Pp. 16–19.
`(d) For years following Bakke , lower courts struggled to determine
`whether Justice Powell’s decision was “binding precedent.” Grutter,
`539 U. S., at 325. Then, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court for the first
`time “endorse[d] Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a
`compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
`admissions.” Ibid. T h e Grutter majority’s analysis tracked Justice
`Powell’s in many respects, includin g its insistence on limits on how
`universities may consider race in their admissions programs. Those
`limits, Grutter explained, were intended to guard against two dangers
`that all race-based government action portends. The first is the risk
`that the use of race will devolve into “illegitimate . . . stereotyp[ing].”
`Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. , 488 U. S. 469, 493 (plurality opinion).
`Admissions programs could thus not operate on the “belief that minor-
`ity students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic
`minority viewpoint on any issue.” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 333 (internal
`Case: 19-2005 Document: 00118025868 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Entry ID: 6577045
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`6 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
`AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
`Syllabus
`quotation marks omitted). The second risk is that race would be used
`not as a plus, but as a negative—to discriminate against those racial
`groups that were not the beneficiaries of the race-based preference. A
`university’s use of race, accordingly, could not occur in a manner that
`“unduly harm[ed] nonminority applicants.” Id., at 341.
`To manage these concerns, Grutter imposed one final limit on race-
`based admissions programs: At some point, the Court held, they must
`end. Id., at 342. Recognizing that “[e]nshrining a permanent justifi -
`cation for racial preferences would offend” the Constitution’s unambig-
`uous guarantee of equal protection , the Court expressed its expecta-
`tion that, in 25 years, “the use of racial preferences will no longer be
`necessary to further the interest approved today.” Id., at 343. Pp. 19–
`21.
`(e) Twenty years have passed since Grutter, with no end to race-
`based college admissions in sight. But the Court has permitted race-
`based college admissions only within the confines of narrow re-
`strictions: such admissions programs must comply with strict scrutiny,
`may never use race as a stereotyp e or negative, and must—at some
`point—end. Respondents’ admissions systems fail each of these crite-
`ria and must therefore be invalidated under the Equal Protection
`Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 21–34.
`(1) Respondents fail to operat e their race-based admissions pro-
`grams in a manner that is “sufficien tly measurable to permit judicial
`[review]” under the rubric of strict scrutiny. Fisher v. University of
`Tex. at Austin, 579 U. S. 365, 381. First, the interests that respondents
`view as compelling cannot be subjected to meaningful judicial review.
`Those interests include training future leaders, acquiring new
`knowledge based on diverse outlooks, promoting a robust marketplace
`of ideas, and preparing engaged and productive citizens. While these
`are commendable goals, they are not sufficiently coherent for purposes
`of strict scrutiny. It is unclear how courts are supposed to measure
`any of these goals, or if they coul d, to know when they have been
`reached so that racial preferences can end. The elusiveness of respond-
`ents’ asserted goals is further illustrated by comparing them to recog-
`nized compelling interests. For example, courts can discern whether
`the temporary racial segregation of inmates will prevent harm to those
`in the prison, see Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 512–513, but
`the question whether a pa rticular mix of minority students produces
`“engaged and productive citizens” or effectively “train[s] future lead-
`ers” is standardless.
`Second, respondents’ admissions programs fail to articulate a mean-
`ingful connection between the means they employ and the goals they
`pursue. To achieve the educational benefits of diversity, respondents
`measure the racial composition of their classes using racial categories
`Case: 19-2005 Document: 00118025868 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Entry ID: 6577045
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`7 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`Syllabus
`that are plainly overbroad (expressing, for example, no concern
`whether South Asian or East Asian students are adequately repre-
`sented as “Asian”); arbitrary or undefined (the use of the category “His-
`panic”); or underinclusive (no category at all for Middle Eastern stu-
`dents). The unclear connection between the goals that respondents
`seek and the means they employ preclude cour ts from meaningfully
`scrutinizing respondents’ admissions programs.
`The universities’ main response to these criticisms is “trust us.”
`They assert that universities are owed deference when using race to
`benefit some applicants but not others. While this Court has recog -
`nized a “tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s aca-
`demic decisions,” it has made clear that deference must exist “within
`constitutionally prescribed limits.” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 328. Re-
`spondents have failed to present an exceedingly persuasive justifica -
`tion for separating students on th e basis of race that is measurable
`and concrete enough to permit judicial review, as the Equal Protection
`Clause requires. Pp. 22–26.
`(2) Respondents’ race-based admissions systems also fail to com-
`ply with the Equal Protection Clause’s twin commands that race may
`never be used as a “negative” and that it may not operate as a stereo-
`type. The First Circuit found that Harvard’s consideration of race has
`resulted in fewer admissions of Asian-American students. Respond-
`ents’ assertion that race is never a negative factor in their admissions
`programs cannot withstand scrutiny. College admissions are zero-
`sum, and a benefit provided to some applicants but not to others nec -
`essarily advantages the former at the expense of the latter.
`Respondents admissions programs are infirm for a second reason as
`well: They require ster eotyping—the very thing Grutter foreswore.
`When a university admits students “on the basis of race, it engages in
`the offensive and demeaning assumption that [students] of a particu-
`lar race, because of their race, think alike.” Miller v. Johnson , 515
`U. S. 900, 911–912. Such stereotyping is contrary to the “core purpose”
`of the Equal Protection Clause. Palmore, 466 U. S., at 432. Pp. 26–
`29.
`(3) Respondents’ admissions programs also lack a “logical end
`point” as Grutter required. 539 U. S., at 342. Respondents suggest
`that the end of race-based admissions programs will occur once mean-
`ingful representation and diversity are achieved on college campuses.
`Such measures of success amount to little more than comparing the
`racial breakdown of the incoming class and comparing it to some other
`metric, such as the racial makeup of the previous incoming class or the
`population in general, to see whether some proportional goal has been
`reached. The problem with this approach is well established:
`“[O]utright racial balancing” is “patently unconstitutional.” Fisher,
`Case: 19-2005 Document: 00118025868 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Entry ID: 6577045
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`8 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
`AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
`Syllabus
`570 U. S., at 311. Respondents’ second proffered end point—when stu-
`dents receive the educational benefits of diversity—fares no better. As
`explained, it is unclear how a court is supposed to determine if or when
`such goals would be adequately met. Third, respondents suggest the
`25-year expectation in Grutter means that race-based preferences
`must be allowed to continue until at least 2028. The Court’s statement
`in Grutter, however, reflected only that Court’s expectation that race-
`based preferences would, by 2028, be unnecessary in the context of ra-
`cial diversity on college campuses. Finally, respondents argue that the
`frequent reviews they conduct to determine whether racial preferences
`are still necessary obviates the need for an end point. But Grutter
`never suggested that periodic revi ew can make unconstitutional con-
`duct constitutional. Pp. 29–34.
`(f) Because Harvard’s and UNC’s ad missions programs lack suffi-
`ciently focused and measurable objectives warranting the use of race,
`unavoidably employ race in a negati ve manner, involve racial stereo-
`typing, and lack meaningful end points, those admissions programs
`cannot be reconciled with the guar antees of the Equal Protection
`Clause. At the same time, nothing prohibits universities from consid-
`ering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected the applicant’s life,
`so long as that discussion is concretely tied to a quality of character or
`unique ability that the particular applicant can contribute to the uni-
`versity. Many universities have for too long wrongly concluded that
`the touchstone of an individual’s identity is not challenges bested,
`skills built, or lessons learned, but the color of their skin. This Nation’s
`constitutional history does not tolerate that choice. Pp. 39–40.
`No. 20–1199, 980 F. 3d 157; No. 21–707, 567 F. Supp. 3d 580, reversed.
` R
`OBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinio n of the Court, in which T HOMAS,
`ALITO, G ORSUCH, K AVANAUGH, and B ARRETT, JJ., joined. T HOMAS, J.,
`filed a concurring opinion. G ORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in
`which T HOMAS, J., joined. K AVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion.
`SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined, and
`in which J ACKSON, J., joined as it applies to No. 21–707. J ACKSON, J.,
`filed a dissenting opinion in No. 21–707, in which S OTOMAYOR and K A-
`GAN, JJ., joined. J ACKSON, J., took no part in th e consideration or deci-
`sion of the case in No. 20–1199.
`Case: 19-2005 Document: 00118025868 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Entry ID: 6577045
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`_________________
`_________________
`1 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`Opinion of the Court
`NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
`Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
`pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`Nos. 20–1199 and 21–707
`STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.,
`PETITIONER
`20–1199 v.
`PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF
`HARVARD COLLEGE
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
`STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.,
`PETITIONER
`21–707 v.
`UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
`[June 29, 2023]
` CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
`Court.
`In these cases we consider whether the admissions sys-
`tems used by Harvard College and the University of North
`Carolina, two of the oldest institutions of higher learning in
`the United States, are lawful under the Equal Protection
`Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
`I
`A
`Founded in 1636, Harvard College has one of the most
`Case: 19-2005 Document: 00118025868 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Entry ID: 6577045
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`2 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
`AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
`Opinion of the Court
`selective application processes in the country. Over 60,000
`people applied to the school last year; fewer than 2,000 were
`admitted. Gaining admission to Harvard is thus no easy
`feat. It can depend on having excellent grades, glowing rec-
`ommendation letters, or overcomi ng significant adversity.
`See 980 F. 3d 157, 166–169 (CA1 2020). It can also depend
`on your race.
`The admissions process at Harvard works as follows.
`Every application is initially screened by a “first reader,”
`who assigns scores in six categories: academic, extracurric-
`ular, athletic, school suppo rt, personal, and overall. Ibid.
`A rating of “1” is the best; a rating of “6” the worst. Ibid. In
`the academic category, for example, a “1” signifies “near -
`perfect standardized test scores and grades”; in the extra -
`curricular category, it indicates “truly unusual achieve-
`ment”; and in the personal category, it denotes “outstand-
`ing” attributes like maturi ty, integrity, leadership,
`kindness, and courage. Id., at 167–168. A score of “1” on
`the overall rating—a composite of the five other ratings—
`“signifies an exceptional candidate with >90% chance of ad-
`mission.” Id., at 169 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
`assigning the overall rating, the first readers “can and do
`take an applicant’s race into account.” Ibid.
`Once the first read process is complete, Harvard convenes
`admissions subcommittees. Ibid. Each subcommittee
`meets for three to five days and evaluates all applicants
`from a particular geographic area. Ibid. The subcommit-
`tees are responsible for making recommendations to the full
`admissions committee. Id., at 169–170. The subcommit-
`tees can and do take an applicant’s race into account when
`making their recommendations. Id., at 170.
`The next step of the Harvard process is the full committee
`meeting. The committee has 40 members, and its discus-
`sion centers around the applicants who have been recom-
`mended by the regional subcommittees. Ibid. At the begin-
`ning of the meeting, the committee discusses the relative
`Case: 19-2005 Document: 00118025868 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Entry ID: 6577045
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`3 Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`Opinion of the Court
`breakdown of applicants by race. The “goal,” according to
`Harvard’s director of admissions, “is to make sure that
`[Harvard does] not hav[e] a dramatic drop-off ” in minority
`admissions from the prior class. 2 App. in No. 20–1199,
`pp. 744, 747–748. Each applicant considered by the full
`committee is discussed one by one, and every member of the
`committee must vote on admission. 980 F. 3d, at 170. Only
`when an applicant secures a majority of the full committee’s
`votes is he or she tentatively accepted for admission. Ibid.
`At the end of the full committee meeting, the racial compo-
`sition of the pool of tentatively admitted students is dis-
`closed to the committee. Ibid.; 2 App. in No. 20–1199, at
`861.
`The final stage of Harvard’s process is called the “lop,”
`during which the list of tentatively admitted students is
`winnowed further to arrive at the final class. Any appli-
`cants that Harvard considers cutting at this stage are
`placed on a “lop list,” which contains only four pieces of
`information: legacy status, recruited athlete status,
`financial aid eligibility, and race. 980 F. 3d, at 170. The
`full committee decides as a group which students to lop.
`397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 144 (Mass. 2019). In doing so, the com-
`mittee can and does take race into account. Ibid. Once the
`lop process is complete, Harvard’s admitted class is set.
`Ibid. In the Harvard admissions process, “race is a deter -
`minative tip for” a significant percentage “of all admitted
`African American and Hispanic applicants.” Id., at 178.
`B
`Founded shortly after the Constitution was ratified,
`the University of North Carolina (UNC) prides itself on be-
`ing the “nation’s first public university.” 567 F. Supp.
`3d 580, 588 (MDNC 2021). Like Harvard, UNC’s “admis -
`sions process is highly selective”: In a typical year, the
`school “receives approximately 43,500 applications for
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`4 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
`AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
`Opinion of the Court
`its freshman class of 4,200.” Id., at 595.
`Every application the Universi ty receives is initially re -
`viewed by one of approximately 40 admissions office read-
`ers, each of whom reviews roughly five applications per
`hour. Id., at 596, 598. Readers are required to consider
`“[r]ace and ethnicity . . . as one factor” in their review. Id.,
`at 597 (internal quotation marks omitted). Other factors
`include academic performance and rigor, standardized test-
`ing results, extracurricular involvement, essay quality, per-
`sonal factors, and student background. Id., at 600. Readers
`are responsible for providing numerical ratings for the aca-
`demic, extracurricular, pers onal, and essay categories.
`Ibid. During the years at issue in this litigation, un-
`derrepresented minority students were “more likely to
`score [highly] on their personal ratings than their white and
`Asian American peers,” but were more likely to be “rated
`lower by UNC readers on their academic program, aca-
`demic performance, . . . extracurricular activities,” and es-
`says. Id., at 616–617.
`After assessing an applicant’s materials along these
`lines, the reader “formulates an opinion about whether the
`student should be offered admission” and then “writes a
`comment defending his or her recommended decision.” Id.,
`at 598 (internal quotation marks omitted). In making that
`decision, readers may offer students a “plus” based on their
`race, which “may be significant in an individual case.” Id.,
`at 601 (internal quotation marks omitted). The admissions
`decisions made by the first readers are, in most cases, “pro-
`visionally final.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Uni-
`versity of N. C. at Chapel Hill , No. 1:14–cv–954 (MDNC,
`Nov. 9, 2020), ECF Doc. 225, p. 7, ¶52.
`Following the first read proce ss, “applications then go to
`a process called ‘school group review’ . . . where a committee
`composed of experienced staff members reviews every [ini-
`tial] decision.” 567 F. Supp. 3d, at 599. The review com-
`mittee receives a report on each student which contains,
`Case: 19-2005 Document: 00118025868 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/29/2