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`No. 25-1477
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`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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`STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF HAWAII;
`STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF COLORADO; STATE OF
`CONNECTICUT; STATE OF DELAWARE; STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF
`MAINE; STATE OF MARYLAND; COMMONWEALTH OF
`MASSACHUSETTS; PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN; STATE OF
`MINNESOTA; STATE OF NEVADA; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF
`NEW MEXICO; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF
`WASHINGTON; STATE OF WISCONSIN; STATE OF ARIZONA,
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`Plaintiffs-Appellees,
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`(caption continued on next page)
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`On Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the District of Rhode Island
`BRIEF OF LAW SCHOLARS AMICI CURIAE
`IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, INCLUDING
`AFFIRMANCE OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S PRELIMINARY
`INJUNCTION
`Susannah Landes Weaver Jonas Monast
`ENVOLVE LAW Patrick R. Jacobi
`5100 Wisconsin Ave. NW, Suite 306 Alexandra L. St. Romain
`Washington, DC 20016 CENTER FOR APPLIED ENVIRONMENTAL
`(202) 556-7898 LAW AND POLICY
`712 H Street NE, Suite 90006
`Washington, DC 20002
`(703) 405-8950
`patrick.jacobi@caelp.org
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`Counsel for Law Scholars Amici Curiae
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`v.
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`DONALD J. TRUMP, in their official capacity as President of the United States;
`INSTITUTE OF MUSEUM AND LIBRARY SERVICES; KEITH E.
`SONDERLING, in their official capacity as Acting Director of the Institute of
`Museum and Library Services; MINORITY BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
`AGENCY; MADIHA D. LATIF, in their official capacity as Deputy Under
`Secretary of Commerce for Minority Business Development; FEDERAL
`MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE; GREGORY GOLDSTEIN, in
`their official capacity as Acting Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
`Service; HOWARD LUTNICK, in their official capacity as Secretary of
`Commerce; RUSSELL THURLOW VOUGHT, in their official capacity as
`Director of the Office of Management and Budget; U.S. OFFICE OF
`MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
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`Defendants-Appellants,
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`U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS; KENNETH
`JACKSON, in their official capacity as Acting Executive Director of the US
`Interagency Council of Homelessness,
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`Defendant.
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`RULE 26.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
`Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1, counsel for Law Scholars Amici Curiae
`states that no party to this brief is a publicly held corporation, issues stock, or has a
`parent corporation.
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`Dated: September 2, 2025 /s/ Patrick R. Jacobi
`Patrick R. Jacobi
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`RULE 26.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ..................................... iii
`TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iv
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................... v
`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................................................................... 1
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 2
`I. The Unitary-Executive Cases Recognize the Need for and Reality of
`Presidential Control Over Agency Leadership and Function, but They Do
`Not Authorize the President to Direct Agencies to Violate Statutes. .............. 7
`II. The Major-Questions-Doctrine Cases Have Constrained Executive Authority
`Even Where the President Has Exerted Significant Control Over Agencies.
` .......................................................................................................................12
`III. This Court Should Uphold the District Court’s Injunction and Recognize
`Congress’s Central Role in Empowering and Constraining the President and
`His Subordinates Alike. .................................................................................17
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................24
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................26
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................27
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`Cases
`Am. Forest Res. Council v. United States,
`77 F.4th 787 (D.C. Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1110 (2024) ................ 19
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`Biden v. Nebraska,
`600 U.S. 477 (2023) ........................................................................ 12, 16, 17, 20
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`Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’ t v. Allbaugh,
`295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ....................................................................... 10, 11
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`Chamber of Com. v. Reich,
`74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ..................................................................... 19, 21
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`Clinton v. City of New York,
`524 U.S. 417 (1998) ............................................................................................ 2
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`Collins v. Yellen,
`594 U.S. 220 (2021) ............................................................................................ 9
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`Dalton v. Specter,
`511 U.S. 462 (1994) ..................................................................................... 18, 19
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`Dames & Moore v. Regan,
`453 U.S. 654 (1981) .......................................................................................... 19
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`FCC v. Consumers’ Research,
`145 S. Ct. 2482 (2025) ........................................................................... 15, 21, 22
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`Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,
`561 U.S. 477 (2010) ............................................................................ 7, 8, 10, 23
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`INS v. Chadha,
`462 U.S. 919 (1983) .......................................................................................... 22
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`In re Aiken Cnty.,
`725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ................................................................... 3, 8, 12
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`In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union,
`190 F.3d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ........................................................................... 23
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`Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,
`37 U.S. 524 (1838) ............................................................................................ 23
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`Kennedy v. Braidwood Mgmt.,
`145 S. Ct. 2427 (2025) ....................................................................................... 20
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`Kovac v. Wray,
`109 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2024) ............................................................................ 24
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`Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
`603 U.S. 369 (2024) ...................................................................... 6, 7, 18, 19, 22
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`Marbury v. Madison,
`5 U.S. 137 (1803) ............................................................................................ 2, 6
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`Mistretta v. United States,
`488 U.S. 361 (1989) ...................................................................................... 6, 21
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`Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab.,
`595 U.S. 109 (2022) .......................................................................................... 14
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`Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
`591 U.S. 197 (2020) .................................................................................. 7, 9, 10
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`Trump v. Am. Fed. of Gov’t Emps.,
`No. 24A1174, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 2667 (July 8, 2025)....................................... 11
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`Trump v. United States,
`603 U.S. 593 (2024) .................................................................................. 3, 6, 11
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`United States v. Arthrex, Inc.,
`594 U.S. 1 (2021) .......................................................................................... 9, 10
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`United States v. Texas,
`599 U.S. 670 (2023) .......................................................................................... 22
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`Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EP A,
`573 U.S. 302 (2014) .................................................................................... 13, 14
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`West Virginia v. EP A,
`597 U.S. 697 (2022) ........................................................................ 12, 13, 14, 16
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`Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
`343 U.S. 579 (1952) ................................................................... 6, 11, 21, 22, 23
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`Constitutional Provisions
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`U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ....................................................................................... 20
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`U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ....................................................................................... 7
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`U.S. Const. art. II § 3 ................................................................................................. 7
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`Regulations
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`EPA, Repeal of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired
`Electric Generating Units: Federal Register, 90 Fed. Reg. 25752 (June 17,
`2025) ................................................................................................................... 5
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`Executive Branch Materials
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`Exec. Order 14217, 90 Fed. Reg. 10577 (Feb. 25, 2025) ........................................ 21
`Exec. Order 14238, 90 Fed. Reg. 13043 (Mar. 20, 2025) ................................... 2, 19
`Memorandum on Directing the Repeal of Unlawful Regulations, 2025 Daily
`Comp. Doc. 466 (Apr. 9, 2025) ........................................................................... 5
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`Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, M-25-28, Guidance Implementing the President’s
`Memorandum Directing the Repeal of Unlawful Regulations (May 7, 2025),
`https://perma.cc/8PF7-NWK9 ............................................................................. 5
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`Remarks at Georgetown University, 2013 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 452 (June 25,
`2013) .................................................................................................................. 15
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`Remarks by the President in Announcing the Clean Power Plan, 2015 Daily Comp.
`Pres. 546 (Aug. 3, 2015) .................................................................................... 15
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`Other Authorities
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`Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib, & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution
`and Article II, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2111 (2019) ................................................... 23
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`Appl. to Stay the Order Issued by the U.S. District Ct. for the Northern District of
`California and Req. for an Immediate Administrative Stay, Trump v. Am. Fed’n
`of Gov’t Emps., No. 24A1174 (June 2, 2025),
`https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24A1174/362080/20250602120
`234175_Trump_v_AFGE_Stay_Appl_2.pdf ...................................................... 5
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`Jodi L. Short & Jed H. Shugerman, Major Questions About Presidentialism:
`Untangling the “Chain of Dependence” Across Administrative Law, 65 B.C. L.
`Rev. 511 (2024) ........................................................................................... 14, 16
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`Natasha Brunstein & Donald L. R. Goodson, Unheralded and Transformative:
`The Test for Major Questions After West Virginia, 47 Wm. & Mary Env’t L. &
`Pol’y Rev. 47 (2022) .......................................................................................... 13
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`Noah A. Rosenblum & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Presidential Administration after
`Arthrex, 75 Duke L.J. (forthcoming 2026), available at
`https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5122594 ...................... 8, 9
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`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
`Law Scholars Amici Curiae are law professors who teach and write in the
`fields of constitutional and administrative law. Amicus William W. Buzbee is the
`Edward and Carole Walter Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law
`Center. Amicus Noah Rosenblum is an Associate Professor of Law at New York
`University School of Law. Amicus Jodi Short is the Mary Kay Kane Distinguished
`Professor of Law at University of California College of Law, San Francisco.
`Law Scholars Amici Curiae have a strong interest in the sound development
`of constitutional and administrative law in the federal courts. They submit this
`brief because of the important separation-of-powers issues implicated by the
`Trump Administration’s recent attempts to unilaterally dismantle three
`congressionally created agencies. As leading constitutional- and administrative-
`law scholars, Law Scholars Amici Curiae are well-positioned to provide insights
`that may assist the Court in evaluating the parties’ arguments concerning
`separation-of-power principles.
`
`1 Counsel for Law Scholars Amici Curiae certifies that the parties in these
`consolidated proceedings have been consulted, and that no party opposes the
`timely filing of this brief. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4), counsel for Law
`Scholars Amici Curiae states that no party or party’s counsel authored this brief in
`whole or in part, and that no other person besides Law Scholars Amici Curiae or
`their counsel contributed money intended to fund the preparation or submission of
`this brief.
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`ARGUMENT
`This case requires this Court to determine the proper relationship between
`Congress and the Executive Branch. The Administration here relies on an
`unbounded view of presidential power to support its “attempts to dismantle” three
`“congressionally sanctioned agencies” through withholding of appropriated funds
`and large-scale reductions in force (“RIFs”) of the staff necessary to perform the
`agencies’ statutorily mandated duties. Appendix (“A.”) 2; see also A. 7–9. In this
`Court, the Administration argues that its actions carrying out President Trump’s
`Executive Order, “Continuing the Reduction of the Federal Bureaucracy,” Exec.
`Order 14238, 90 Fed. Reg. 13043 (Mar. 20, 2025), are not reviewable.
`Appellees’ Brief correctly explains why judicial review is warranted here.
`“There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to
`amend, or to repeal statutes.” Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438
`(1998); see also Appellees’ Br., Doc. 00118332945, at 47 (discussing Clinton and
`other authority). Accordingly, neither the President nor an executive agency may,
`without Congress, dismantle statutorily created federal agencies. See A. 39–40.
`For those reasons alone, the Administration’s arguments fail.
`The Administration’s position here reflects its larger attempt to disrupt the
`judiciary’s duty to “say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177
`(1803). It seeks to frustrate or even preclude judicial review in cases challenging
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`this President’s actions while supercharging review in cases challenging the prior
`President’s actions. But when, as here, the power at issue derives from delegation
`in congressionally enacted statutes rather than a “conclusive and preclusive”
`authority of the President, Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593, 607 (2024)
`(citation omitted), courts must ensure that the entire Executive Branch complies
`with those statutes, regardless of the action under review. The Administration
`cannot simply avoid statutory requirements or judicial review by appeal to “the
`President’s policy priorities.” Appellants’ Br., Doc. No. 00118318361, at 46; see
`also In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (rejecting this
`argument). This amicus brief explains why this conclusion follows from two
`emerging bodies of the Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence: one
`focused on presidential removal power and another focused on review of
`executive-agency actions.
`In a series of cases relying on aspects of the “unitary-executive theory” to
`extend the President’s authority to remove certain agency leadership, the Supreme
`Court has proclaimed the President the most democratically accountable
`government official and has stressed the practical and legal importance of a “chain
`of dependence” between the President and leadership in the Executive Branch. It
`is that “chain of dependence,” the Court has explained, that provides political
`accountability and democratic legitimacy to Executive Branch actions.
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`In a separate set of cases, the Supreme Court coined the “major-questions
`doctrine” to subject executive-agency actions carrying out presidential directives to
`stringent review, characterizing them as the work of politically unaccountable
`bureaucrats. The Court grounds these major-questions-doctrine limits in a
`constitutional imperative to protect the authority vested in a democratically elected
`Congress. Yet the invalidated actions were duly taken at the direction of the
`President by his appointed and confirmed agency secretary or administrator,
`through the same “chain of dependence” that is central to the unitary-executive-
`removal cases.
`The Supreme Court has yet to clarify how these two lines of cases interact
`with one another. This case presents an opportunity for this Court to harmonize
`them. It cannot be true that the President is the most democratically accountable
`government actor based on his connection to executive agency leadership through
`a chain of dependence and that executive agencies must be subject to stringent
`review because they are not accountable to the people. This disconnect is
`particularly acute in the major-questions-doctrine cases where the Court has
`subjected agency actions of vast economic and political significance carried out at
`the direction of the President to heightened judicial scrutiny.
`The Trump Administration attempts to exploit the potential tensions between
`these two doctrines. When seeking to drastically reduce or even eliminate
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`executive agencies through mass RIFs or the withholding of congressionally
`appropriated funds, the Administration seeks unbounded power for the Executive
`Branch. See, e.g., Appellants’ Br. at 46–47 (urging the Court not to insert itself
`“into the day-to-day, internal operations of a federal agency, impinging on its
`flexibility to shift resources and make staffing decisions”).2 By contrast, when
`seeking to repeal the previous Administration’s duly promulgated, still-valid
`regulations with minimal or no regard for statutory requirements, the Trump
`Administration invokes the major-questions-doctrine cases that constrain
`Executive Branch authority.3 Yet there is no principled way to distinguish these
`cases. This “heads I win, tails you lose” approach to judicial review of executive
`
`2 In a Supreme Court filing regarding the dismantling of various agencies via large-
`scale RIFs, the Administration expressly relied on some of the unitary-executive-
`removal cases discussed in this brief. See Appl. to Stay the Order Issued by the
`U.S. District Ct. for the Northern District of California and Req. for an Immediate
`Administrative Stay at 1–2, 5, 22–25, Trump v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., No.
`24A1174 (June 2, 2025),
`https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24A1174/362080/20250602120234
`175_Trump_v_AFGE_Stay_Appl_2.pdf.
`3 See Memorandum on Directing the Repeal of Unlawful Regulations, 2025 Daily
`Comp. Doc. 466 (Apr. 9, 2025); Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, M-25-28, Guidance
`Implementing the President’s Memorandum Directing the Repeal of Unlawful
`Regulations (May 7, 2025), https://perma.cc/8PF7-NWK9. Agencies have started
`carrying out this guidance. See, e.g., EPA, Repeal of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
`Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units: Federal Register, 90
`Fed. Reg. 25752, 25765 (June 17, 2025) (justifying its proposed rollback as
`“necessary to avoid implicating the major questions doctrine as articulated by the
`Supreme Court in West Virginia”).
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`action threatens to subvert separation-of-powers principles embedded in the
`Constitution. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“[T]he
`separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to
`the preservation of liberty.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
`579, 629 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The doctrine of the separation of
`powers was adopted . . . to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose
`was . . . to save the people from autocracy.” (citation omitted)).
`Reading these two bodies of cases together leads to two straightforward
`conclusions. First, a president’s ability, as head of the Executive Branch, to direct
`agency action does not preclude or constrain judicial review of that action for
`compliance with substantive or procedural statutory requirements. If it did, the
`presidentially directed policies at issue in the major-questions-doctrine cases would
`not have been subject to review, much less heightened scrutiny. Second, judicial
`review of a president’s authority in executing statutes should not be supercharged
`in some cases and neutered in others. Courts should align review of presidential
`and agency action where the authority being exercised is not within a specifically
`identified “conclusive and preclusive” constitutional authority of the President,
`Trump, 603 U.S. at 607 (citation omitted), but rather is governed by the statutory
`delegation of authority from Congress. In every case, courts should “say what the
`law is,” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177, under the “best reading” of the relevant statutes,
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`Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 395 (2024), and need not place a
`thumb on the scale for or against executive action based on the political
`significance of the case.
`I. The Unitary-Executive Cases Recognize the Need for and Reality of
`Presidential Control Over Agency Leadership and Function, but They
`Do Not Authorize the President to Direct Agencies to Violate Statutes.
`Since 2010, the Supreme Court has issued a series of opinions that bolster
`the President’s control over agency leadership and function. Specifically, these
`cases rely on aspects of the unitary-executive theory, under which “the ‘executive
`Power’—all of it—is ‘vested in a President,’ who must ‘take Care that the Laws be
`faithfully executed.’” Seila L., LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197,
`203 (2020) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. § 3). These cases recognize
`the President as “the most democratic and politically accountable official in
`Government” and require a “chain of dependence” between the President and the
`agencies that Congress charges with faithfully executing myriad laws. Seila L.,
`591 U.S. at 224 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., id. at 204 (“[T]he Constitution
`gives the President ‘the authority to remove those who assist him in carrying out
`his duties.’ . . . ‘Without such power, the President could not be held fully
`accountable for discharging his own responsibilities; the buck would stop
`somewhere else.’” (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561
`U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010))). But none of these cases, nor Trump v. United States,
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`suggests that the President may act outside the bounds of congressionally delegated
`authority as set out in statutes. See Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d at 259 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
`(Kavanaugh, J.) (“[T]he Executive must abide by statutory mandates and
`prohibitions. Those basic constitutional principles apply to the President and
`subordinate executive agencies.”).
`The modern line of cases reflecting this unitary-executive vision began in
`2010 in Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. 477. There, the Supreme Court concluded
`that the two-layer statutory scheme protecting the tenure of Public Company
`Accounting Oversight Board members unduly restricted the President’s power to
`remove them. Id. at 483–84. The Court elaborated on the need for presidential
`control over agency function: “The growth of the Executive Branch, which now
`wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life, heightens the
`concern that it may slip from the executive’s control, and thus from that of the
`people.” Id. at 499. The President needs command of government officials—
`described as a “chain of dependence”—because he is the conduit by which the
`people control the agency. Id. at 498 (citation omitted). Free Enterprise Fund
`“shifted the grounds of judicial review” of removal power from “a small set of
`formalistic limits” to “a probing theoretical question”—whether “the design of the
`agency undercut the connection between the people, the president, and the
`bureaucracy putatively necessary to maintain a democratic state?” Noah A.
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`Rosenblum & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Presidential Administration after Arthrex, 75
`Duke L.J. (forthcoming 2026) (manuscript at 31).4
`The Court further delineated the scope of the President’s removal power
`over agency leadership in the ensuing years. In Seila Law, the Court struck down
`statutory removal protections for the Director of the Consumer Financial
`Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), an agency considered to be otherwise “independent”
`from executive control, because the Director must be held accountable to “the most
`democratic and politically accountable official in Government”—the President.
`591 U.S. at 224–25. In Collins v. Yellen, the Court deemed unlawful the statute
`limiting the President to for-cause removal of the Federal Housing Finance
`Agency’s single Director because agency heads must “serve the people effectively
`and in accordance with the policies that the people presumably elected the
`president to promote.” 594 U.S. 220, 226–28, 252 (2021) (citations omitted).
`In United States v. Arthrex, Inc., the Court addressed not the President’s
`authority to remove agency heads at will, but rather the degree of presidential
`control over substantive agency decision-making that Article II demands. 594 U.S.
`1 (2021). The Court held unlawful the structure of the Patent and Trial Appeal
`Board (“PTAB”), which had authority to make final, binding decisions to
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`4 Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5122594.
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`invalidate previously issued patents in proceedings brought by private parties,
`because “the President can neither oversee the PTAB himself nor ‘attribute the
`Board’s failings to those whom he can oversee.’” Id. at 8–9, 17 (quoting Free
`Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496). To remedy the constitutional violation, the Court
`ordered that the presidentially appointed Director of the Patent and Trademark
`Office exercise review of the PTAB’s decisions. Id. at 26 (plurality), 44 (Breyer,
`J., dissenting but joining remedy).
`All these cases embrace the unitary-executive theory and conclude that a
`“chain of dependence” from agency leadership to the President ensures agencies’
`democratic accountability. Yet in none of these cases did the Supreme Court
`question, much less invalidate, the statutes that govern Executive Branch behavior
`in a host of ways that leave intact the chain of dependence from the President to
`agency leadership. See, e.g., Seila L., 591 U.S. at 235 (“The provisions of the
`Dodd-Frank Act bearing on the CFPB’s structure and duties remain fully operative
`without the offending tenure restriction.”); Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509 (“The
`Sarbanes-Oxley Act remains ‘fully operative as a law’ with these tenure restrictions
`excised.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, executive-agency “officers are duty-
`bound to give effect to the policies embodied in the President’s direction” but only
`“to the extent allowed by the law.” Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Allbaugh, 295
`F.3d 28, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2002). It remains the case that “the President’s power [under
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`Article II, § 3] to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is
`to be a lawmaker,” id. (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 (alteration in
`Allbaugh)), and that how laws shall be carried into execution remains a firmly
`Article I power, see Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588 (observing that Article I provides
`“that Congress may ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
`carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this
`Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
`Officer thereof’”). Presidents therefore can select and oversee executive-agency
`leadership but cannot unilaterally ignore or rewrite statutes, including
`appropriations statutes.
`This reading of the unitary-executive-removal cases comports with the
`Supreme Court’s more recent articulation of executive power in Trump v. United
`States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024). Where the President cannot rely on “his exclusive
`constitutional power” to take an action, and the Executive Branch must derive its
`authority from a statute, id. at 607–09, all links in the chain of Executive Branch
`dependence (including the President) must abide by the terms of the statutory
`delegation, see Trump v. Am. Fed. of Gov’ t Emps., No. 24A1174, 2025 U.S. LEXIS
`2667, at *17 (July 8, 2025) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“While the President no doubt
`has the authority to manage the Executive Branch, our system does not allow the
`President to rewrite laws on his own under the guise of that authority.”). In other
`Case: 25-