No. 25-1477
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
`
`
`STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF HAWAII;
`STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF COLORADO; STATE OF
`CONNECTICUT; STATE OF DELAWARE; STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF
`MAINE; STATE OF MARYLAND; COMMONWEALTH OF
`MASSACHUSETTS; PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN; STATE OF
`MINNESOTA; STATE OF NEVADA; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF
`NEW MEXICO; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF
`WASHINGTON; STATE OF WISCONSIN; STATE OF ARIZONA ,
`
`Plaintiffs-Appellees,
`
`(caption continued on inside cover)
`
`
`On Appeal from the United States Distr ict Court
`for the District of Rhode Island
`
`
`REPLY BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
`
`
`
`
`
`BRETT A. SHUMATE
`Assistant Attorney General
`SARA MIRON BLOOM
`Acting United States Attorney
`MELISSA N. PATTERSON
`SIMON G. JEROME
`Attorneys, Appellate Staff
`Civil Division, Room 7209
`U.S. Department of Justice
`950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
`Washington, DC 20530
`(202) 514-1673
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`
`
`Case: 25-1477 Document: 00118342667 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Entry ID: 6752239
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`
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`v.
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`DONALD J. TRUMP, in their official capacity as President of the United States;
`INSTITUTE OF MUSEUM AND LIBRARY SERVICES; KEITH E.
`SONDERLING, in their official capacity as Acting Director of the Institute of
`Museum and Library Services; MINORITY BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
`AGENCY; MADIHA D. LATIF, in their official capacity as Deputy Under Secretary
`of Commerce for Minority Business Development; FEDERAL MEDIATION AND
`CONCILIATION SERVICE; GREGORY GOLDSTEIN, in their official capacity
`as Acting Director of the Federal Mediation a nd Conciliation Service; HOWARD
`LUTNICK, in their official capacity as Secretary of Commerce; RUSSELL
`THURLOW VOUGHT, in their official capacity as Director of the Office of
`Management and Budget; US OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET ,
`
`Defendants-Appellants,
`
`US INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS; KENNETH JACKSON,
`in their official capacity as Acting Executive Director of the US Interagency Council
`of Homelessness,
`
` Defendant.
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`Case: 25-1477 Document: 00118342667 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Entry ID: 6752239
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`Page
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................ ii
`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ............................................................................ 1
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 2
`I. Plaintiffs Are Not Likely to Succeed on the Merits. .............................................. 2
`A. Plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable. ............................................................. 2
`1. Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge “Closure Decisions.” ............. 2
`2. “Closure Decisions” are not final agency actions subject to
`APA review. ........................................................................................ 5
`
`3. Plaintiffs lack a constitutional cause of action. ................................ 8
`B. The district court erred by ordering the reinstatement of grants
`and personnel............................................................................................... 10
`
`1. The district court lacked authority to order payment of
`grant monies. .................................................................................... 10
`
`2. The district court lacked authority to order reinstatement of
`personnel. .......................................................................................... 15
`
`II. The Preliminary Injunction Is Vastly Overbroad. ............................................... 20
`III. The Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors Favor Vacatur.......................... 22
`CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 24
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`Case: 25-1477 Document: 00118342667 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Entry ID: 6752239
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`ii
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`Cases: Page(s)
`AFGE v. Trump:
` 145 S. Ct. 2635 (2025) ................................................................................................. 10
` 782 F. Supp. 3d 793 (N.D. Cal. 2025) ........................................................................ 10
` --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 1482511 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2025) ........................... 10
`Aiken County, In re,
` 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ...................................................................................... 9
`Allen v. Wright,
`468 U.S. 737 (1984) ......................................................................................................... 2
`American Pub. Health Ass’n v. National Insts. of Health:
` 145 S. Ct. 2658 (2025) .......................................................................... 1, 12, 13, 14, 24
` 145 F.4th 39 (1st Cir. 2025) ........................................................................................ 13
` No. 25-cv-10787, 2025 WL 1747128 (D. Mass. June 23, 2025) .............................. 12
`Anglers Conservation Network v. Pritzker,
` 809 F.3d 664 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................... 8
`Axon Enter., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n,
` 598 U.S. 175 (2023) ............................................................................................... 18, 19
`Bennett v. Spear,
` 520 U.S. 154 (1997) ....................................................................................................... 7
`California v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
` 132 F.4th 92 (1st Cir. 2025) ........................................................................................ 13
`Chamber of Com. of the U.S. v. Reich,
`74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ........................................................................................ 9
`Charlesbank Equity Fund II v. Blinds to Go, Inc. ,
` 370 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 2004) ....................................................................................... 22
`Climate United Fund v. Citibank, N.A.,
`--- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 2502881 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 2025) ......................................... 10
`Crowley Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. Gen eral Servs. Admin.,
` 38 F.4th 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2022) ................................................................................... 11
`DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
` 547 U.S. 332 (2006) ....................................................................................................... 3
`Case: 25-1477 Document: 00118342667 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Entry ID: 6752239
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`iii
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`Dalton v. Specter,
` 511 U.S. 462 (1994) ....................................................................................................... 9
`Department of Educ. v. California,
` 604 U.S. 650 (2025) .................................................................................... 1, 12, 13, 23
`Elgin v. Department of Treasury,
` 567 U.S. 1 (2012) ............................................................................................. 17, 18, 19
`FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Med.,
` 602 U.S. 367 (2024) ................................................................................................... 2, 3
`Fornaro v. James,
` 416 F.3d 63 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ...................................................................................... 17
`Fund for Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt. ,
`460 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2006) .......................................................................................... 6
`Global Health Council v. Trump,
` --- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 2480618 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 2025) ................................. 9, 10
`Heckler v. Chaney,
` 470 U.S. 821 (1985) ..................................................................................................... 20
`Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp.,
` 823 F.3d 724 (1st Cir. 2016) ......................................................................................... 4
`Lincoln v. Vigil,
` 508 U.S. 182 (1993) ............................................................................................... 14, 15
`Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n,
` 497 U.S. 871 (1990) ................................................................................................... 5, 6
`Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak ,
` 567 U.S. 209 (2012) ................................................................................................ 10-11
`McMahon v. New York,
` 145 S. Ct. 2643 (2025) ............................................................................................. 1, 23
`Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman,
` 310 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2002) .............................................................................. 14, 15
`Missouri v. Jenkins,
`515 U.S. 70 (1995) ........................................................................................................... 4
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`Case: 25-1477 Document: 00118342667 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Entry ID: 6752239
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`iv
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`National Treasury Emps. Union v. Vought,
`--- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 2371608 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 2025) ....................................... 10
`North Carolina v. Covington,
` 581 U.S. 486 (2017) ..................................................................................................... 21
`Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness All. ,
`542 U.S. 55 (2004) ....................................................................................................... 6, 8
`Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc.,
`217 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2000).............................................................................................. 20
`Sampson v. Murray,
` 415 U.S. 61 (1974) ....................................................................................................... 19
`SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu ,
`584 U.S. 357 (2018) ....................................................................................................... 18
`Starbucks Co. v. McKinney,
` 602 U.S. 339 (2024) ..................................................................................................... 21
`Sustainability Inst. v. Trump,
` No. 25-1575, 2025 WL 1587100 (4th Cir. June 5, 2025) .......................................... 11
`Trafalgar Cap. Assocs., Inc. v. Cuomo,
` 159 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1998) ............................................................................................ 5
`Trump v. Boyle,
` 145 S. Ct. 2653 (2025) ................................................................................................. 23
`Trump v. CASA, Inc. ,
`145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025) ............................................................................................. 20, 22
`Union of Concerned Scientists v. Wheeler,
` 954 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2020) ........................................................................ 13-14, 15, 19
`United States v. Fausto,
` 484 U.S. 439 (1988) ..................................................................................................... 17
`United States v. Texas,
` 599 U.S. 670 (2023) ....................................................................................................... 2
`Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
` 555 U.S. 7 (2008) ......................................................................................................... 22
`
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`Case: 25-1477 Document: 00118342667 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Entry ID: 6752239
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`v
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`Statutes:
`
`Administrative Procedure Act (APA):
`5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) ...................................................................................................... 13
`5 U.S.C. § 702 ............................................................................................................... 11
`5 U.S.C. § 706(1) ...................................................................................................... 8, 19
`28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) ...................................................................................................... 11
`
`Other Authority:
`Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law:
`Governmental Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power,
`131 Harv. L. Rev. 685 (2018) .................................................................................... 3-4
`Case: 25-1477 Document: 00118342667 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Entry ID: 6752239
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`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
`The district court entered a sweeping preliminary injunction mandating that
`three federal agencies unwind all compliance with a facially valid Executive Order ,
`even steps taken to comply that have no effect whatsoever on plaintiffs. Moreover,
`the injunction subjects the Executive Branch officials responsible for those agencies
`to judicial oversight whenever they use lawful tools for controlling an Executive
`Branch agency. The plaintiffs who secured this extraordinary remedy plainly disagree
`with defendants’ intention to streamline the agencies in accordance with the
`President’s policies, but federal law prevents them from installing themselves or the
`courts as supervisors of day -to-day agency operations. Two aspects of the district
`court’s injunction in particular—the required reinstatement of agency personnel and
`restoration of grant agreements—cannot be reconciled with recent decisions of the
`Supreme Court granting interim relief from similar orders. National Insts. of Health v.
`American Pub. Health Ass’n (APHA II), 145 S. Ct. 2658 (2025); McMahon v. New York,
`145 S. Ct. 2643 (2025); Department of Educ. v. California, 604 U.S. 650 (2025).
`This Court should promptly relieve the three agencies’ politically accountable
`leaders from the restraints the district court imposed. Plaintiffs cannot establish
`jurisdiction over this broadside attack on defendants’ management of the agencies’
`employees and operations; no cause of action permits such a challenge; independent
`obstacles prevent grant- and employee-specific relief ; and the injunction is fatally
`overbroad. Any one of these grounds warrants vacatur in full.
`Case: 25-1477 Document: 00118342667 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Entry ID: 6752239
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`2
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`ARGUMENT
`I. Plaintiffs Are Not Likely to Succeed on the Merits.
`A. Plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable .
`1. Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge “Closure
`Decisions.”
`“The principle of Article III standing is ‘built on a single basic idea—the idea
`of separation of powers.’” United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 675 (2023) (quoting
`Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)). “Standing doctrine helps safeguard the
`Judiciary’s proper—and properly limited—role in our constitutional system. ” Id. at
`675-76. That doctrine demands a plaintiff show an actual, cognizable injury that is
`traceable to the challenged conduct and susceptible to judicial remedy. FDA v.
`Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024).
`Plaintiffs do not dispute that their standing theory rests entirely on predicted
`deprivations of funding and agency programming. Ans. Br. 20-21; see Br. 14. To be
`sure, any such cuts, if realized, might satisfy standing’s “injury-in-fact” requirement. 1
`Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381. But even assuming plaintiffs could satisfy
`that requirement, their theory founders at the second and third steps insofar as their
`suit challenges not individual terminations, but “Closure Decisions” at each agency,
`
`1 Acknowledging this point does not “effectively concede” any part of
`plaintiffs’ flawed standing theory with respect to IMLS (or any other agency). Ans.
`Br. 19. Rather, as explained, the reinstatement of IMLS’s Grants to States was
`voluntary. Br. 25 n.3.
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`3
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`A67-68. As the government explained (and plaintiffs do not controvert), Br. 15, the
`“causation requirement … rules out attenuated links—that is, where the government
`action is so far removed from its distant (even if predictable) ripple effects that the
`plaintiffs cannot establish Article III standing.” Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S.
`at 383. That is the case here, where the particular hypothesized actions plaintiffs have
`identified (“Closure Decisions”) bear only an attenuated connection to the
`consequences they say they will (or might) suffer.
`Independently, any downstream injury causally linked to a “Closure Decision”
`cannot serve as a basis for an order against that decision—precisely the sort of order
`the district court entered, A51 -53—because the result is to install a federal court as
`overseer of continuing agency operations, many of which bear no relationship
`whatsoever to plaintiffs or their claimed injuries . See Br. 14 (quoting DaimlerChrysler
`Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006)). Standing serves to prevent exactly that result.
`Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 378-80. It is no answer to say that the
`injunction permits the government to take “lawful” managerial “steps,” Ans. Br. 22-
`23 (quotation omitted), when the very existence of the injunct ion casts the threat of
`sanctions proceedings over agency officials’ actions.2 And plaintiffs’ attempts to
`
`2 Plaintiffs fault the government for citing “no evidence that the preliminary
`injunction exposes the government to the risk of contempt proceedings and other
`sanctions,” Ans. Br. 55 n.11 (quotation omitted), but the threat of contempt
`proceedings should be beyond dispute. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of
`Administrative Law: Governmental Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 Harv. L.
`Continued on next page.
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`4
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`distinguish the cases cited in the government’s opening brief are unpersuasive:
`private-party micromanagement (with judicial enforcement ) of an agency’s wide-
`ranging process of complying with a facially valid Executive Order is precisely the sort
`of “systemic reform” standing doctrine prohibits a federal court from overseeing.
`Ans. Br. 23 (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 74 (1995)). The upshot is that even
`if plaintiffs might have standing to challenge individual grant terminations and the
`termination of specific agency programs, Article III does not allow them to bootstrap
`those limited injuries into an injunction mandating the agency-wide reform they seek.
`See Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 733 (1st Cir. 2016).
`What plaintiffs disparage as “boilerplate,” Ans. Br. 21, are in fact bedrock
`standing principles confirming that plaintiffs lack any alternative interest (apart from
`their grant and programming theories) in dictating the day-to-day details of agency
`management. Br. 12-15. At bottom, however particularized or concrete plaintiffs’
`claims to individual grants and agency programs might be, plaintiffs have no
`cognizable interest at the level of a “Closure Decision.”
`
`Rev. 685, 692 (2018) (“Viewed generally, beyond the context of administrative law, a
`contempt finding is potent for the obvious reason that a court can back it up with
`sanctions.”); see also id. at 697 (concluding after empirical research that although
`federal courts may be disinclined to permit sanctions against federal officials for
`violations of preliminary injunctions, “contempt findings . . . nonetheless have a
`shaming effect that gives them substantial if imperfect deterrent power”).
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`5
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`2. “Closure Decisions” are not final agency actions
`subject to APA review.
`a. Section 706(2) of the APA limits judicial review to final agency action. Br.
`17-23. The “Closure Decisions” plaintiffs challenged below are not final agency
`actions, contrary to the district court’s conclusion.
`In the district court’s words, a “Closure Decision” is a “policy” at each agency
`“that applies the measure ‘of eliminating all functions and components not mandated
`by statute, and of dramatically reducing their remaining functions’ across the board.”
`A22 (quoting Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 14-15, Dkt. No. 44). The
`government’s opening brief explained why that is not a final agency action. First,
`there is no “policy” in any real or meaningful sense; that term is merely plaintiffs’
`description of distinct (potentially related or unrelated) and ongoing agency
`operations. Br. 16-17, 18 & n.2; see Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 890
`(1990).
`Second, even accepting the district court’s unsupported finding that a policy
`existed—there is, after all, no “definitive statement” or other evidence in the record
`that would confirm as much, Trafalgar Cap. Assocs., Inc. v. Cuomo, 159 F.3d 21, 35 (1st
`Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); see also Ans. Br. 39 (citing Trafalgar Capital Associates)—
`it is not the sort of policy courts have accepted as final agency action. That is so
`because an initiative intending to reduce agency operations to the extent permissible
`by law is not discrete, has no concrete effects (legal or otherwise) on anyone
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`6
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`(including plaintiffs), and does not “consummate” a decisionmaking process. Br. 18-
`19. Confirming the point, it is impossible to analyze plaintiffs’ theories sensibly at the
`level of a “Closure Decision,” a point to which plaintiffs offer no rebuttal. See Br. 20-
`21.
`Plaintiffs have not established otherwise in their brief. There is not “unrefuted
`evidence” of a sufficiently particularized policy as plaintiffs allege, Ans. Br. 37; see also
`Ans. Br. 38; there is instead , at most, evidence of a variety of reduction -related
`activities (i.e., terminations of grants and personnel). Simply applying the label
`“policy” to an amalgamation of alleged “violation[s] of the law” does not mean that
`“the scope of the controversy has been reduced to more manageable proportions, and
`its factual components fleshed out, by some concrete action” that harms plaintiffs .
`Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890-91; see Ans. Br. 40 (asserting in conclusory fashion that
`plaintiffs challenge “a completed universe of particular agency orders and
`regulations,” and “some particular measure [applied] across the board,” not “‘abstract’
`policy goals or strategy” (first quoting Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890 (alteration omitted), then
`quoting Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890 n.2, then quoting Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness All.
`(“SUWA”), 542 U.S. 55, 66 (2004)). Rather, “Closure Decision” remains an umbrella
`term for “various decisions, including which programs (and grants) to retain, the
`number of staff necessary to administer programs and grants that continue to operate,
`and how and when to terminate unnecessary staff.” Br. 16-17 (citing Fund for Animals,
`Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt. , 460 F.3d 13, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). For that reason,
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`7
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`the “policies” at issue are nothing like the policies held to be final agency action in the
`cases plaintiffs cite (at 41), as the government has already explained. Br. 18 -19
`(explaining that plaintiffs cite cases in which t he relevant agency actions were
`construed to involve defined practices with uniform results ).
`Plaintiffs attempt to circumvent this reality by surreptitiously abandoning the
`Closure-Decision framing altogether. It is not enough to say that a particular grant
`termination is not “tentative or interlocutory,” see Ans. Br. 38 (quoting Bennett v. Spear,
`520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997)), because that means at most that the government’s
`decisionmaking process with respect to that grant has been consummated, see Bennett ,
`520 U.S. at 178. Simply to restate the concept of a “Closure Decision” —a policy of
`reducing agency operations to a level consistent with law—by its own terms refutes
`that any process has been consummated and made concrete. Similarly, plaintiffs miss
`the mark in focusing on the “consequences” of individual terminations, Ans. Br. 39-
`40, when the proper inquiry is into the actual or imminent consequences for plaintiffs
`of a “policy … of eliminating all functions and components not mandated by statute.”
`A22 (quotation omitted). Quite plainly, plaintiffs have pointed to none. Br. 17-18.
`b. That the APA contains a cause of action, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), better suited to
`the nature of plaintiffs’ grievances further supports the conclusion that the district
`court erred in finding final agency action in the form of “Closure Decisions.”
`Plaintiffs may have “elected to bring claims under § 706(2),” Ans. Br. 42, but that fact
`only suggests they sought to avoid the considerably more stringent standard of review
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`8
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`under § 706(1). See Br. 21-22. Tellingly, plaintiffs do not endeavor to explain why
`reducing the staff working in one of IMLS’s offices rises to the level of failing to
`perform a “‘ministerial or non-discretionary’ duty” so precise as to amount to “a
`specific, unequivocal command,” Anglers Conservation Network v. Pritzker, 809 F.3d 664,
`670 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting SUWA, 542 U.S. at 63); see Ans. Br. 43, or a “precise,
`definite act about which an official had no discretion whatever,” SUWA, 542 U.S. at
`63 (alterations and quotation omitted). That is likely so because “conducting …
`regular research and data collection ,” Ans. Br. 43 (quotation omitted) is an ongoing
`programmatic initiative of precisely the sort the Supreme Court held not to be
`susceptible to review under § 706(1). See SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64. Had plaintiffs
`brought their claims under the appropriate cause of action, the “same result” should
`not have obtained, but see Ans. Br. 43, suggesting that § 706(2) should not be available
`to circumvent § 706(1)’s limits.
`3. Plaintiffs lack a constitutional cause of ac tion.
`At its core, the legal theory behind plaintiffs’ case is as follows: the statutes
`creating the three defendant agencies and authorizing them to perform particular
`functions contain an (ill-defined) set of obligations, which the government has ceased
`(or soon will, or may potentially, cease) to perform in violation of those statutes. See
`Ans. Br. 48. To this straightforwardly statute-based logic plaintiffs attempt to add a
`constitutional gloss—that by violating the statutes, defendants have also violated the
`separation of powers and the Take Care Clause.
`Case: 25-1477 Document: 00118342667 Page: 15 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Entry ID: 6752239
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`9
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`The government explained in its opening brief why Dalton v. Specter , 511 U.S.
`462 (1994), forecloses plaintiffs’ attempted constitutionalization of their statutory
`claims. Br. 24-25. In response, plaintiffs focus on Dalton ’s holding with respect to
`statutory discretion conferred on the President. Ans. Br. 50 . “But Dalton had four
`holdings,” and beyond addressing statutory discretion, it more broadly explained “that
`statutory claims cannot be transformed into constitutional ones ” and that review is
`unavailable where “the constitutional claim is predicated on underlying statutory
`violations.” Global Health Council v. Trump , --- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 2480618, at *8
`(D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 2025) (noting that “[o]nly the fourth holding was at issue in
`Reich”); see Ans. Br. 50 (citing Chamber of Com. of the U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C.
`Cir. 1996)). It thus does not matter that Dalton implicated a different statute that
`conferred a purportedly different quantum of discretion. Ans. Br. 50 -51. Plaintiffs
`also cite In re Aiken County , 725 F.3d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2013), for the proposition
`that the Executive must “expend the funds that Congress duly authorizes and
`appropriates.” Ans. Br. 48. “But the dispute there was about whether a federal
`agency had to continue with a mandatory licensing process despite lacking sufficient
`funds to complete the process, thereby only indirectly implicating appropriated
`funds.” Global Health Council, 2025 WL 2480618, at *8 (discussing Aiken County). And
`the Aiken County plaintiffs sued under § 706(1) of the APA, not the Constitution
`directly. See id. Both features distinguish that case from this one.
`Case: 25-1477 Document: 00118342667 Page: 16 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Entry ID: 6752239
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`10
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`Plaintiffs also dispute the nature of their argument, saying that it is “not that
`the President exceeded his statutory authority . . . but rather that the Executive acted
`without any authority, constitutional or statutory.” Ans. Br. 51 (alteration omitted)
`(quoting AFGE v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 793, 821 (N.D. Cal. 2025)3). The D.C.
`Circuit has repeatedly explained in recent weeks why that argument fails: because
`where the claim i s one that the government has failed to comply with a statutory
`mandate, it is a claim that the relevant officials have acted in excess of statutory
`authority, and is thus barred by Dalton. Climate United Fund v. Citibank, N.A., --- F.4th
`----, 2025 WL 2502881, at *10 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 2025); Global Health Council, 2025 WL
`2480618, at *8; National Treasury Emps. Union v. Vought, --- F.4th ----, 2025 WL
`2371608, at *19-20 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 2025).
`B. The district court erred by ordering the reinstatement of
`grants and personnel.
`1. The district court lacked authority to order payment of
`grant monies.
`a. The parties agree that the government is immune from suit under the APA
`where “any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the
`relief which is sought .” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.
`
`3 The cited language comes from an opinion granting a temporary restraining
`order. The court that issued that relief reached the same conclusion in identical terms
`a few weeks later, in an order granting a preliminary injunction. AFGE v. Trump, ---
`F. Supp. 3d ---- , 2025 WL 1482511, at *19 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2025). The Supreme
`Court stayed that preliminary injunction shortly thereafter. Trump v. AFGE , 145 S.
`Ct. 2635 (2025).
`Case: 25-1477 Document: 00118342667 Page: 17 Date Filed: 09/19/2025 Entry ID: 6752239
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`11
`
`Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 215 (2012) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702); see Ans. Br. 24. There
`likewise appears to be no dispute about the test applicable to whether the Tucker Act,
`which grants the Court of Federal Claims “jurisdiction to render judgment upon any
`claim against the United States founded” on “any express or implied contract with the
`United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), operates as such a statute: if (i) “the source of
`the rights upon which the plaintiff bases its claims” and (ii) “the type of relief sought”
`are both contractual, the district court lacked jurisdiction. Crowley Gov’t Servs., Inc. v.
`General Servs. Admin., 38 F.4th 1099, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted); see
`Ans. Br. 27. Under those principles, the source of the alleged entitlement to monies
`plaintiffs seek to vindicate is indeed contractual, not statutory or constitutional.4 See
`Br. 27-28. The same is true of the remedy, specific performance, that they seek. Br.
`28.
`In its opening brief, the government explained why the Supreme Court’ s stay
`decision in Department of Education v. California, 604 U.S. 650, confirmed that both the
`“source” of the plaintiffs’ rights and the remedy they seek here are contractual in
`
`4 Plaintiffs err in suggesting that Sustainability Institute v. Trump, No. 25-1575 (4th
`Cir.), is irrelevant because the grants at issue there were “authorized by omnibus
`appropriations statutes.” Ans. Br. 29 (quotation omitted). The sentence that
`plaintiffs quote reads “funded and authorized by omnibus appropriations statutes,”
`Sustainability Inst. v. Trump, No. 25-1575, 2025 WL 1587100, at *2 (4th Cir. June 5,
`2025), a statement that is true in part here, see Br. 32-33. And in any event, the
`plaintiff