No. 25-1495
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`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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`STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs-Appellees,
`v.
`LINDA MCMAHON, in her official capacity as Secretary of Education, et al.,
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`Defendants-Appellants.
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`On Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the District of Massachusetts
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`EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
`AND IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY
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` YAAKOV M. ROTH
`Acting Assistant Attorney General
`LEAH B. FOLEY
`United States Attorney
`ERIC D. MCARTHUR
`Deputy Assistant Attorney General
`MARK R. FREEMAN
`MELISSA N. PATTERSON
`STEVEN A. MYERS
`Attorneys, Appellate Staff
`Civil Division, Room 7232
`U.S. Department of Justice
`950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
`Washington, D.C. 20530
`(202) 305-8648
`Steven.A.Myers@usdoj.gov
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`INTRODUCTION
`It is no secret that the President would like the Department of Education to be
`abolished. The President campaigned on that proposal, and a March 2025 executive
`order reflects his view that “[c]losing the Department of Education would provide
`children and their families the opportunity to escape a system that is failing them.”
`Exec. Order No. 14,242, Improving Education Outcomes by Empowering Parents, States, and
`Communities, 90 Fed. Reg. 13,679, 13,679 (Mar. 20, 2025). It is undisputed, however,
`that the Department cannot be closed unless and until Congress enacts legislation
`closing it. See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. 42 (government counsel: “[T]he Department of Education
`is not closed and it is not closing absent an act of Congress.”).
`This litigation is therefore not about an Executive Branch attempt to
`unilaterally shutter a Cabinet department. It is instead about a personnel action: a
`reduction in force (RIF) affecting about a third of the employees working at the
`Department on Inauguration Day, leaving more than two thousand employees to
`perform the Department’s statutory functions. See U.S. Department of Education,
`U.S. Department of Education Initiates Reduction in Force (Mar. 11, 2025),
`https://perma.cc/7485-CZFU (RIF Press Release). That RIF does not undermine
`the Department’s commitment to “deliver on all statutory programs that fall under
`the agency’s purview, including formula funding, student loans, Pell Grants, funding
`for special needs students, and competitive grantmaking.” Id. The district court
`enjoined that RIF, ordering the Department to return to the status quo prior to
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`January 20, 2025; this Court should enter an immediate administrative stay and a stay
`pending appeal.
`There are numerous reasons why the district court lacked authority to entertain
`these consolidated challenges, which are brought by states, schools, and unions
`representing teachers. At the outset, those claims depend upon speculation that the
`Department cannot perform its statutory functions with its remaining employees, but
`Article III does not permit standing to rest upon speculation. Instead, as a court
`recently recognized in rejecting a similar challenge, if the Department fails to perform
`a particular action to which plaintiffs claim legal entitlement, they may challenge the
`purported failure then. See Carter v. Department of Education, No. 25-744, 2025 WL
`1453562, at *13 (D.D.C. May 21, 2025).
`Moreover, Congress has divested district courts of jurisdiction to entertain
`challenges to federal personnel actions. In the Civil Service Reform Act, Congress
`authorized federal employees to challenge their own terminations before the Merit
`Systems Protection Board, with judicial review in the Federal Circuit. That scheme
`does not permit federal-services beneficiaries to challenge terminations. The court’s
`exercise of jurisdiction flouts Congress’s unambiguous determination about how
`federal-personnel challenges should be heard.
`Even putting aside jurisdiction, plaintiffs’ claims fail on the merits. The
`Executive Branch is not seeking to unilaterally close the Department—so to the
`extent the district court’s analysis proceeded on a contrary assumption, it was chasing
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`phantoms. And insofar as the district court believed the Department would function
`less effectively given the challenged RIF, such determinations are entrusted to the
`Executive Branch, and the Administrative Procedure Act does not authorize a
`blunderbuss challenge to an agency’s day-to-day operations. See Norton v. Southern
`Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004). The district court did not
`even attempt to confine its sweeping relief to discrete agency duties mandated by
`statute or to relief within the court’s traditional equitable powers, instead ordering
`Department leadership to reinstate employees and return to the prior administration’s
`choices about how many employees are appropriate to carry out both discretionary
`and mandatory statutory functions.
`Finally, the equities and the public interest favor the government. The
`injunction represents an extraordinary incursion on the Executive Branch’s authority
`to manage its workforce. Beyond that, it requires the government to indefinitely
`retain and pay employees whose services it no longer requires, and the government
`cannot recoup those salaries if it prevails on appeal. On the other side of the ledger,
`plaintiffs’ claims of irreparable harm all depend upon their speculation that the
`Department will no longer function as Congress intended.
`To correct those errors and prevent extraordinary harm to the government, this
`Court should enter an immediate administrative stay and a stay pending appeal. The
`government respectfully requests that the Court act on this request by Tuesday, May
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`27, at noon, so that the government may seek relief from the Supreme Court if the
`Solicitor General determines that doing so is warranted. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.
`STATEMENT
`1. Congress created the Department of Education in 1979. See Pub. L. No.
`96-88, 93 Stat. 668 (1979). That legislation established the Department, see id. § 201,
`as well as numerous offices within it, see id. §§ 203-214. As of January 20, 2025, the
`Department employed 4,133 employees. See RIF Press Release.
`President Trump campaigned on a proposal to abolish the Department. See,
`e.g., The American Presidency Project, 2024 Republican Party Platform,
`https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2024-republican-party-platform.
`Once in office, the President signed an executive order reiterating that “[c]losing the
`Department of Education would provide children and their families the opportunity
`to escape a system that is failing them.” Exec. Order No. 14,242. The executive
`order does not actually order the Department’s closure; instead, it directs the Secretary
`to facilitate closure “to the maximum extent appropriate and permitted by law.” Id.
`§ 2. The government has repeatedly acknowledged—and acknowledges again now—
`that the Department cannot be closed without an act of Congress.
`1
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`1 See Filip Timotija, Education secretary: Mass layoffs first step toward total shutdown,
`The Hill (Mar. 12, 2025), https://thehill.com/homenews/education/5190161-linda-
`mcmahon-education-department-mass-layoffs (Secretary of Education: “We know
`we’ll have to work with Congress” to close Department); Defs.’ PI Opp’n, No. 1:25-
`cv-10677, ECF 38, at 13 (“[The] Department of Education is not closed. And it will
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`2. Although the Executive Branch cannot unilaterally close the
`Department, it retains significant authority to control the contours of the
`Department’s workforce. That authority includes the ability to conduct a RIF, which
`permits an agency to release employees for a variety of reasons. See 5 C.F.R.
`§ 351.201(a)(2); see generally 5 U.S.C. § 3502.
`On March 11, 2025, the Department announced a RIF affecting approximately
`a third of the Department’s workforce.
`2 See RIF Press Release. Affected employees
`were placed on administrative leave on March 21, and “all impacted employees will
`receive full pay and benefits until June 9th.” Id.
`The announcement stated that the Department would “continue to deliver on
`all statutory programs that fall under the agency’s purview, including formula funding,
`student loans, Pell Grants, funding for special needs students, and competitive
`grantmaking.” Id. In letters to stakeholders, the Department reiterated that the RIF
`“will not directly impact students and families,” that “critical functions for elementary
`and secondary education will not be impacted by these cuts,” that “funds will
`continue to flow normally, and program functions will not be disrupted,” and that the
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`not be closing without congressional action.”); Hr’g Tr. 42 (Government counsel:
`“Our brief comes out and acknowledges that the Department of Education is not
`closed and it is not closing absent an act of Congress.”).
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`2 The press release indicates that the RIF affects “nearly 50% of the
`Department’s workforce,” but that figure includes 572 employees who opted for
`deferred resignation or voluntary separation. See RIF Press Release. Plaintiffs are not
`seeking relief regarding those employees. See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. 44.
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`RIF will “not affect the Department’s critical work supporting individuals with
`disabilities.” No. 1:25-cv-10601, ECF 71-6; see also id. ECF 71-7 (similar commitment
`concerning higher education functions). Unless Congress closes the Department, the
`only activities intended to be eliminated are those left to agency discretion.
`Finally, on March 21, the President indicated at a press conference that he had
`“decided” that the Small Business Administration would take over the Department’s
`student loan portfolio, and that the Department of Health and Human Services would
`handle special education, nutrition, and related services. Op. 59. Neither plaintiffs
`nor the district court have identified any concrete steps taken by the agency to
`effectuate any such transfer.
`3. The Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) “establishe[s] a comprehensive
`system for reviewing personnel action taken against federal employees.” United States
`v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 455 (1988). Under the CSRA, most civilian employees can
`appeal major adverse personnel actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board
`(MSPB). 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512, 7513(d), 7701. Employees subject to RIFs may also
`pursue challenges before the MSPB, where class-wide litigation is possible. See 5
`C.F.R. §§ 1201.27, 351.901. The CSRA empowers the MSPB to order relief, including
`reinstatement. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1204(a)(2), 7701(g). Employees aggrieved by final
`decisions of the MSPB may obtain review in the Federal Circuit. Id. § 7703(a)(1),
`(b)(1).
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`The Federal Service Labor–Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) governs
`labor relations between the Executive Branch and its employees. See 5 U.S.C.
`§§ 7101-7135; American Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Trump, 929 F.3d 748, 752 (D.C. Cir.
`2019). The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) is charged with adjudicating
`federal labor disputes. 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(2). Review of the FLRA’s decisions is
`available in the courts of appeals. Id. § 7123(a).
`4. This appeal involves two consolidated lawsuits—one filed by states, and
`one by schools and unions representing teachers and other school and university
`employees. Each turns on plaintiffs’ belief that the RIF will render the Department
`unable to perform its statutory functions, causing plaintiffs harm as beneficiaries of
`Department services. Each plaintiff demanded that the Department be enjoined from
`proceeding with the RIF. See Somerville PI Mem., No. 1:25-cv-10677, ECF 26, at 34
`(seeking “a preliminary injunction of the Mass Termination Order”); States PI Mem.,
`No. 1:25-cv-10601, ECF 70, at 40 (similar); see also Hr’g Tr. 13.
`On May 22, 2025, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary
`injunction. See No. 1:25-cv-10601, ECF 128 (Op). Notwithstanding the
`government’s concessions that it cannot unilaterally close the Department, the
`opinion proceeds from the premise that the case concerns “an attempt by Defendants
`to shut down the Department without Congressional approval.” Op. 2. Rejecting the
`government’s argument that plaintiffs only speculated about future harms, the court
`found that plaintiffs “are already being harmed” by what the court deemed the
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`“effective incapacitation of the Department to carry out congressionally mandated
`functions” through the RIF. Op. 35-36. The court found that plaintiffs had standing
`for similar reasons. Op. 38.
`The district court rejected the government’s contention that the CSRA divested
`it of jurisdiction. In so holding, it reasoned that plaintiffs “are not federal employees
`or labor unions who have access to the MSPB or FLRA.” Op. 43. The court found
`persuasive a district court decision in a different challenge to a purported RIF brought
`by non-employee plaintiffs, see Maryland v. USDA, --- F. Supp. 3d. ----, 2025 WL
`973159 (D. Md. Apr. 1, 2025)—even though the Fourth Circuit stayed that decision
`after concluding that the district court likely lacked jurisdiction. See Maryland v.
`USDA, No. 25-1248, 2025 WL 1073657, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 2025).
`The district court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits.
`Again casting this case as a unilateral effort to close the Department, the court found
`that such actions would violate the separation of powers, Op. 46-50, and be ultra
`vires, Op. 50-52. The court further found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on
`their APA claims, finding that defendants had made a “decision” to “close the
`Department, without Congress’s approval.” Op. 52. In the court’s view, plaintiffs
`were “not challenging some broad, abstract policy,” but rather “the mass terminations
`designed to get rid of the Department.” Op. 53. The district court then reasoned
`that such actions were beyond the agency’s authority and arbitrary and capricious.
`Op. 54-63.
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`The district court concluded that the remaining factors favored plaintiffs. The
`court held that plaintiffs “are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the form of financial
`uncertainty and delay damaging student education, (2) impeded access to vital
`knowledge upon which students, districts, and educators rely, and (3) loss of essential
`services provided by the office of Federal Student Aid and the Office for Civil
`Rights.” Op. 84. And the equitable balance favored plaintiffs, the court decided,
`given the public interest in following the law and the importance of education. Op.
`85-87.
`The court thus entered a preliminary injunction. Among other things, the
`court enjoined the government “from carrying out the reduction-in-force announced
`on March 11, 2025; from implementing President Trump’s March 20, 2025 Executive
`Order; and from carrying out the President’s March 21, 2025 Directive to transfer
`management of federal student loans and special education functions out of the
`Department.” Op. 88. The order further requires the government to “reinstate
`federal employees whose employment was terminated or otherwise eliminated on or
`after January 20, 2025, as part of the reduction-in-force announced on March 11, 2025
`to restore the Department to the status quo such that it is able to carry out its
`statutory functions.” Id. And the court required the government to submit weekly
`status reports, starting next week, “until the Department is restored to the status quo
`prior to January 20, 2025.” Id.
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`Although the government had preemptively requested that the district court
`stay any injunction pending appeal, see Defs.’ PI Opp’n, No. 1:25-cv-10677, ECF 38,
`at 27, the injunction is “effective immediately upon entry,” Op. 88. After appealing,
`the government filed a separate stay motion in district court, noting its intention to
`seek relief from this Court today. See Defs.’ Mot., No. 1:25-cv-10601, ECF 133. The
`district court denied that motion this morning. See No. 1:25-cv-10601, ECF 136.
`ARGUMENT
`A stay pending appeal is plainly warranted. The government is likely to succeed
`on the merits and will face irreparable injury absent a stay, and the balance of equities
`and public interest support a stay. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009).
`I. The Government Is Likely To Prevail On The Merits.
`A. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction.
`The district court lacked jurisdiction for at least two reasons. First, under
`Article III, plaintiffs cannot bring a nebulous challenge to the purported closure of
`the Department, nor can they rest their claim to standing on speculation that, contrary
`to the Secretary of Education’s judgment, the Department’s remaining 2,183
`employees will be unable to perform the Department’s statutory functions. Second,
`plaintiffs’ challenges to the RIF are precluded by the CSRA, which requires that
`challenges to personnel actions be brought by affected employees before the MSPB.
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`1. Article III Standing
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`a. Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a broad, prospective challenge to the
`operation of the Department by its politically accountable leadership based on
`speculation about the Department’s inability to perform its statutory obligations.
`Under Article III, “[f]ederal courts do not exercise general legal oversight of the
`Legislative and Executive Branches,” but instead address concrete injuries to specific
`interests. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423-24 (2021). Article III thus
`requires “that the plaintiff have suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest
`which is … concrete and particularized, and that the dispute is traditionally thought to
`be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,
`819 (1997) (first alteration in original) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
`Plaintiffs’ principal contention is that the Executive Branch is encroaching on
`the Legislative Branch’s prerogatives by closing an agency established by statute. This
`interest in vindicating the separation of powers is exactly the sort of abstract and
`generalized grievance that cannot be redressed by a federal court. First, even
`(wrongly) assuming the truth of plaintiffs’ allegations, a generalized dispute over
`whether an agency will perform its statutory duties or have sufficient resources to do
`so involves no “legally and judicially cognizable” harm that is “traditionally thought to
`be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 819. Such
`suits have no “ground[ing] in historical practice” or “close relationship to a harm that
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`has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or
`American courts.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016).
`Second, plaintiffs lack a particularized interest in safeguarding the separation of
`powers, because “[a]ll citizens” share “an interest in the independence of each branch
`of Government.” Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220, 226
`(1974). This “generalized interest … is too abstract to constitute a ‘case or
`controversy’ appropriate for judicial resolution.” Id. at 227.
`Third, such a programmatic injury is not redressable, as it would require
`“interpos[ing] the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and
`soundness of … administration, contrary to the more modest role Article III
`envisions.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006) (citation omitted).
`b. Any personal harms plaintiffs identify are plainly speculative. A plaintiff
`seeking injunctive relief to protect against future injury must demonstrate that the
`injury is “certainly impending,” for “[a]llegations of possible future injury are not
`sufficient.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (citation omitted);
`accord, e.g., FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024) (“speculative”
`injuries insufficient).
`Instead of attempting to satisfy this demanding standard, the district court
`principally focused on harms that could or might occur. See, e.g., Op. 3 (reasonable to
`“expect” RIF to cause harms); Op. 19 (delay of funding “threatens” disruption of
`operations); Op. 23 (focusing on what plaintiffs “claim,” “contend” and “argue” will
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`occur); Op. 25 (positing that “any RIF-induced loss of funding threatens to reduce
`school staff”); Op. 26 (plaintiffs “fear” educational access restriction); Op. 30 (if
`federal funding is “uncertain” then cuts “may” have to be made). The district court’s
`obvious disagreement with the Department’s assessment of appropriate staffing levels
`does not establish Article III jurisdiction. See OPM v. AFGE, No. 24A904, 2025 WL
`1035208 (U.S. Apr. 8, 2025) (granting government’s stay application because
`organizations’ allegations that they may be denied agency services are, “under
`established law, … presently insufficient to support” standing); Carter, 2025 WL
`1453562, at *8 (rejecting similar challenge to Department RIF where declarations were
`“conclusory”).
`2. CSRA Preclusion
`Even if plaintiffs had standing, the district court would still lack jurisdiction to
`adjudicate their challenges to the Department’s personnel decisions. In the CSRA,
`Congress “established a comprehensive system” that provides the “exclusive means”
`for reviewing such matters. Elgin v. Department of the Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 5, 8 (2012)
`(quotation marks omitted); accord Rodriguez v. United States, 852 F.3d 67, 82 (1st Cir.
`2017) (CSRA is “the exclusive mechanism for challenging adverse personnel actions
`in federal employment”). And those “exclusive means” are MSPB proceedings
`brought by affected employees or FLRA proceedings brought by their unions, not
`lawsuits by third parties in district court. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Velez, 864 F.3d 45, 51
`(1st Cir. 2017) (absent inapplicable statutory exceptions, CSRA “precludes resort to
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`other forms of redress”); Berrios v. Department of the Army, 884 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir.
`1989) (“The legislative history of the CSRA establishes beyond dispute that Congress
`intended that statute to provide an exclusive procedure for challenging federal
`personnel decisions.”).
`The district court never disputed that if this lawsuit were brought by the real
`parties in interest—affected employees—it could proceed only through the statutory
`scheme. See, e.g., Op. 42. Yet it concluded that those statutory limitations are
`irrelevant because of the RIF’s “magnitude” and because states cannot pursue judicial
`or administrative review under the CSRA. Op. 42-44.
`That analysis is fundamentally backward. There is no statutory exception to the
`CSRA’s exclusivity based on the number of employees affected. See Fornaro v. James,
`416 F.3d 63, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts, J.) (rejecting “collateral, systemwide
`challenge” and explaining that “what you get under the CSRA is what you get”). And
`when a comprehensive remedial scheme permits review at the behest of some types
`of plaintiffs but not others, the proper inference is that the excluded parties cannot
`bring claims at all. In Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340 (1984), the
`Supreme Court considered a statute that permitted dairy handlers—but not
`consumers—to obtain review of “market orders.” Id. at 346. When consumers
`sought review, the Supreme Court explained that “[i]n a complex scheme of this type,
`the omission of such a provision [permitting consumers to participate] is sufficient
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`reason to believe that Congress intended to foreclose consumer participation in the
`regulatory process.” Id. at 347.
`Courts have faithfully applied those principles to the CSRA. In United States v.
`Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988), the Supreme Court applied Block to conclude that federal
`employees who lack CSRA appeal rights “should not be able to demand judicial
`review for the type of personnel action covered by that chapter.” Id. at 448. As the
`Court explained, “the absence of provision for these employees to obtain judicial
`review” is a “manifestation of a considered congressional judgment that they should
`not have statutory entitlement to review.” Id. at 448-49. And more recently, after a
`district court reinstated various terminated federal employees in litigation brought by
`state governments, the Fourth Circuit entered a stay because the government was
`“likely to succeed in showing the district court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
`claims.” Maryland, 2025 WL 1073657, at *1. Thus, while plaintiffs here cannot invoke
`the CSRA, that does not mean that they may circumvent it. It instead means that they
`may not sue at all. See Grosdidier v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors, 560 F.3d 495, 497
`(D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he CSRA is the exclusive avenue for suit even if the plaintiff
`cannot prevail in a claim under the CSRA.”).
`It is no answer that plaintiffs are bringing claims “distinct” from those typically
`presented under the CSRA. See Op. 44 (citing Maryland, 2025 WL 973159, at *15,
`stayed pending appeal, 2025 WL 1073657). Plaintiffs contend that a federal personnel
`action was unlawful, and they persuaded a district court to reverse that action through
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`a preliminary injunction. Undoing a personnel action is exactly the relief that federal
`employees routinely seek through the CSRA, and constitutional claims are not exempt
`from the CSRA’s scheme. See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22 (constitutional claims fall within
`the CSRA scheme where they are “the vehicle by which [plaintiffs] seek to reverse the
`removal decisions”).
`At bottom, Congress did not leave a gaping hole in the CSRA by permitting
`third parties to challenge federal employees’ terminations in district court actions. If
`Congress had wanted to authorize review by other parties who suffer downstream
`injuries when a federal employee is terminated—his state of residence, spouse,
`creditors, etc.—it could have done so. Instead, Congress limited review of federal
`employment actions to actions by affected employees themselves.
`B. Plaintiffs’ Claims Fail On The Merits.
`Even if the Court had jurisdiction, plaintiffs’ claims would still fail. As noted
`above, the district court’s analysis assumes that defendants seek to unilaterally close
`the Department. That assumption is wrong, but even if correct it still would not
`justify an injunction that goes far beyond ensuring the Department’s continued
`existence and instead directs the Department to return to its “status quo prior to
`January 20, 2025.”
`3
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`3 With respect to the district court’s injunction barring the Department from
`“carrying out the President’s March 21, 2025 Directive to transfer management of
`federal student loans and special education functions out of the Department,” Op. 88,
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`In actuality, plaintiffs are trying to thwart the current Department leadership’s
`efforts to implement the President’s policy goals “to the maximum extent appropriate
`and permitted by law,” Exec. Order No. 14,242, § 2, and to freeze the Department in
`the form a prior administration considered appropriate. The Department lacks
`discretion to close itself, see Op. 54-55, but the Department obviously has enormous
`discretion about the composition of its workforce, see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). Indeed,
`the government has “traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the ‘dispatch of
`its own internal affairs,’” and courts are “quite wrong” to “routinely apply[] …
`traditional standards governing more orthodox” requests for equitable relief. Sampson
`v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83-84 (1974). It violates neither the Constitution nor any other
`law for the government to endeavor to operate as efficiently as possible or for
`politically accountable officials to make and implement their own judgments about
`staffing levels needed to carry out any statutory mandates. And plaintiffs cannot cast
`their statutory claims in constitutional garb by simply asserting that actions taken in
`violation of statutory authority are unconstitutional. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462,
`
`three points bear emphasis. First, plaintiffs have identified no basis to conclude that
`any transfer of the Department’s handling of student loans or special education is
`imminent. Second, the Department acknowledges that it cannot “transfer” its
`statutorily assigned functions to another Department in violation of statutory
`provisions. Third, while the Department does not understand the injunction to
`prohibit the Department from entering agreements pursuant to which another agency
`would assist the Department with its statutory functions, to the extent that the district
`court meant to enjoin such a future agreement, it identified no reason why such an
`agreement would be illegal.
`Case: 25-1495 Document: 00118289655 Page: 18 Date Filed: 05/23/2025 Entry ID: 6723404
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`18
`474 (1994); Widakuswara v. Lake, No. 25-5144, 2025 WL 1288817, at *5 (D.C. Cir.
`May 3, 2025). Nor do plaintiffs come close to the satisfying the demanding standards
`that apply to nonstatutory ultra vires claims. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Department of
`Comm., 39 F.4th 756, 763-64 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
`Beyond that, plaintiffs’ attempts to shoehorn this case into the APA framework
`cannot succeed because plaintiffs do not challenge reviewable agency action. See
`5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 551(13). As the Supreme Court has explained, a reviewable “action”
`is limited to the set of “circumscribed, discrete agency actions” identified in the
`statute. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 62. The APA thus does not permit “general judicial
`review of [an agency’s] day-to-day operations,” Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497
`U.S. 871, 899 (1990), nor does it authorize agencies to oversee “the common business
`of managing government programs,” Fund for Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land
`Mgmt., 460 F.3d 13, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Under these principles, agency plans,
`strategies, and “intention[s],” Op. 2, are not reviewable. Fund for Animals, 460 F.3d at
`20.
` To be sure, a RIF may constitute a reviewable action—but only through the
`CSRA’s mechanisms. See supra pp.13-16. The premise of the district court’s order,
`however, is that plaintiffs bring more than a garden-variety “unlawful terminations
`employment action,” Op. 3, attacking more broadly how the Department performs its
`assigned statutory functions. That is not a viable APA claim. See Carter, 2025 WL
`Case: 25-1495 Document: 00118289655 Page: 19 Date Filed: 05/23/2025 Entry ID: 6723404
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`19
`1453562, at *9 (claim challenging Department’s “general operations” and complaint-
`processing speed not cognizable under APA).
` Ultimately, if a harm abou