PUBLISHED
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`No. 17-3
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`
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`
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`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff – Appellee,
`
`
`
`v.
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`
`
`Defendant – Appellant.
`
`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
`
`
`
`
`
`DYLANN STORM ROOF,
`
`
`
`------------------------------
`
`AUTISTIC SELF ADVOCACY NETWORK; AUTISTIC WOMEN &
`NONBINARY NETWORK,
`
` Amici Supporting Appellee.
`
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
`Charleston. Richard Mark Gergel, District Judge. (2:15-cr-00472-RMG-1)
`
`
`
`
`Argued: May 25, 2021
`
`
`
`Decided: August 25, 2021
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`
`
`Before Duane BENTON, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
`Circuit, sitting by designation, Kent A. JORDAN, Circuit Judge of the United States Court
`of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation, and Ronald Lee GILMAN, Senior
`Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by
`designation.1
`
`
`1 Because all members of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
`
`
`
`

`

`
`Affirmed by published per curiam opinion.
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`
`
`
`
`
`ARGUED: Sapna Mirchandani, Greenbelt, Maryland, Margaret Alice-Anne Farrand,
`OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Los Angeles, California; Alexandra
`Wallace Yates, Concord, Massachusetts, for Appellant. Ann O’Connell Adams, Bonnie I.
`Robin-Vergeer, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
`Appellee. ON BRIEF: Amy M. Karlin, Interim Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles,
`California, James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
`DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Brian C. Rabbitt, Acting Assistant
`Attorney General, Robert A. Zink, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
`Criminal Division, Eric S. Dreiband, Assistant Attorney General, Alexander V. Maugeri,
`Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Thomas E. Chandler, Brant S. Levine, Appellate
`Section, Civil Rights Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
`Washington, D.C.; Peter M. McCoy, Jr., United States Attorney, Columbia, South
`Carolina, Nathan S. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
`UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. Samantha A.
`Crane, Kelly Israel, AUTISTIC SELF ADVOCACY NETWORK, Washington, D.C., for
`Amicus Autistic Self Advocacy Network. Lydia Brown, AUTISTIC WOMEN AND
`NONBINARY NETWORK, Lincoln, Nebraska, for Amicus Autistic Women and
`Nonbinary Network.
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`I.
`Overview .............................................................................................................. 5
`Background ........................................................................................................... 6
`II.
`The Crime .............................................................................................................. 6
`A.
`B. Arrest, Confession, and Evidence Collection ........................................................ 6
`C.
`Indictment and Trial ............................................................................................... 8
`D. Appeal .................................................................................................................. 10
`III.
`Issues Related to Competency ............................................................................ 10
`A. Competency Background ..................................................................................... 11
`1. First Competency Hearing .................................................................................. 12
`
`
`are recused in this case, a panel of judges from outside the Circuit was appointed for this
`appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 291, 294.
`
`2
`
`

`

`C.
`
`D.
`
`IV.
`A.
`B.
`
`2. Second Competency Hearing ............................................................................. 19
`B.
`Issue 1: The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Finding Roof Competent to
`Stand Trial .......................................................................................................... 24
`Issue 2: The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Granting Only in
`Part Defense Counsel’s Request for a Continuance of the First Competency
`Hearing ............................................................................................................... 31
`Issue 3: The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Limiting Evidence
`Allowed at the Second Competency Hearing..................................................... 33
`Issues Related to Self-Representation ................................................................ 36
`Self-Representation Background ......................................................................... 37
`Issue 4: Under McCoy v. Louisiana, Preventing the Presentation of Mental
`Health Evidence Cannot Be the “Objective” of a Defense ................................ 43
`Issue 5: A Defendant Has a Sixth Amendment Right to Represent Himself
`During His Capital Sentencing ........................................................................... 48
`Issue 6: Neither the Constitution nor the Federal Death Penalty Act Requires
`that Mitigation Evidence Be Presented During Capital Sentencing over a
`Defendant’s Objection ........................................................................................ 53
`Issue 7: Roof’s Waiver of Counsel Was Knowing, Voluntary, and Intelligent .. 58
`E.
`1. Legal Standard .................................................................................................... 58
`2. Roof Was Appropriately Aware of His Role and Responsibilities .................... 59
`3. The District Court Need Not Have Informed Roof of the Ability to Selectively
`Use Counsel for Different Parts of the Case ............................................................. 62
`Issue 8: The District Court Did Not Err in Granting Roof’s Motion to Waive
`Counsel ............................................................................................................... 63
`Issue 9: The District Court Did Not Err in Finding Roof Competent to Self-
`Represent ........................................................................................................... 65
`Issue 10: The District Court Did Not Err in Denying Roof Further Assistance
`from Standby Counsel or Additional Accommodations .................................... 68
`1. Standby Counsel ................................................................................................. 68
`2. Accommodations ................................................................................................ 69
`Issues Related to Death Verdict ......................................................................... 70
`V.
`A. Death Verdict Background .................................................................................. 70
`1. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors ................................................................... 70
`2. Penalty Phase ...................................................................................................... 73
`3.
`Jury Deliberations ............................................................................................... 76
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`F.
`
`G.
`
`H.
`
`3
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`

`

`B.
`
`VI.
`A.
`
`Issue 11: The Court Did Not Improperly Preclude Roof from Presenting
`Mitigating Evidence ........................................................................................... 78
`1. The Precluded Mitigating Factors and Evidence of Prison Conditions ............. 78
`2. The Prosecutor’s Remarks at Closing Argument ............................................... 82
`3. The Court’s Response to Jury Notes .................................................................. 85
`C.
`Issue 12: Isolated Witness Testimony Describing Roof as “Evil” and Stating
`that He Would Go to “the Pit of Hell” Did Not Render the Trial
`Fundamentally Unfair ......................................................................................... 86
`1. The Testimony in Question ................................................................................ 87
`2. Standard of Review ............................................................................................ 88
`3. The Merits of Roof’s Claims .............................................................................. 90
`D.
`Issue 13: Neither the Admission of Victim-Impact Evidence nor the
`Prosecution’s Closing Argument Violated Roof’s Constitutional Rights .......... 92
`1. Victim-Impact Evidence ..................................................................................... 93
`E.
`Issue 14: Roof’s Death Sentence Is Not Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under
`the Eighth Amendment ....................................................................................... 96
`1. Age...................................................................................................................... 97
`2. Mental Incapacity ............................................................................................. 100
`Issues Related to Guilt Verdict ......................................................................... 100
`Issue 15: Roof’s Commerce Clause Challenges to the Religious-Obstruction
`Statute Do Not Require Reversal of Those Convictions .................................. 101
`1. The Religious-Obstruction Statute Is Facially Valid ....................................... 105
`2. The Religious-Obstruction Statute Is Valid as Applied to Roof ...................... 109
`3. The Jury Instructions Were Proper ................................................................... 115
`B.
`Issue 16: The Religious-Obstruction Statute Does Not Require Proof of
`Religious Hostility ............................................................................................ 119
`Issue 17: Congress Did Not Exceed Its Thirteenth Amendment Authority in
`Enacting the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 249 ............................ 120
`1. Hate Crimes Background ................................................................................. 120
`2. The HCPA Is Appropriate Legislation Under Controlling Thirteenth
`Amendment Precedent ............................................................................................. 122
`D.
`Issue 18: The Attorney General Did Not Erroneously Certify Roof’s Federal
`Prosecution ...................................................................................................... 130
`1. Certification Background ................................................................................ 130
`2. The AG Did Not Erroneously Certify Roof’s Federal Prosecution ................. 131
`
`C.
`
`4
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`

`

`E.
`Issue 19: Roof’s 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1) Firearm Convictions Are Valid ........... 133
`1. Firearm Offense Background .......................................................................... 133
`2. Legal Framework .............................................................................................. 134
`3. “Crime of Violence” Jurisprudence ................................................................. 137
`4. “Death Results” Offenses Under § 249(a)(1) Are Crimes of Violence ........... 139
`5. “Death Results” Offenses Under § 247(a)(2) Are Crimes of Violence ........... 143
`Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 149
`
`VII.
`
`
`
`PER CURIAM:
`
`I.
`
`OVERVIEW
`
`In 2015, Dylann Storm Roof, then 21 years old, shot and killed nine members of the
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`historic Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church (“Mother Emanuel”) in Charleston,
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`South Carolina during a meeting of a Wednesday night Bible-study group. A jury
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`convicted him on nine counts of racially motivated hate crimes resulting in death, three
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`counts of racially motivated hate crimes involving an attempt to kill, nine counts of
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`obstructing religion resulting in death, three counts of obstructing religion involving an
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`attempt to kill and use of a dangerous weapon, and nine counts of use of a firearm to
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`commit murder during and in relation to a crime of violence. The jury unanimously
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`recommended a death sentence on the religious-obstruction and firearm counts, and he was
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`sentenced accordingly. He now appeals the convictions and sentence. Having jurisdiction
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`under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3595(a), we will affirm.2
`
`
`2 The present panel is sitting by designation, but because we are applying Fourth
`Circuit law, and for ease of reference, we take the liberty of speaking in the first-person
`plural.
`
`5
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`

`

`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`The Crime
`
`On June 17, 2015, twelve parishioners and church leaders of Mother Emanuel—all
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`African Americans—gathered in the Fellowship Hall for their weekly Bible-study. Around
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`8:16 p.m., Roof entered the Fellowship Hall carrying a small bag that concealed a Glock
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`.45 semi-automatic handgun and eight magazines loaded with eleven bullets each. The
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`parishioners welcomed Roof, handing him a Bible and a study sheet.
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`For the next 45 minutes, Roof worshipped with the parishioners. They stood and
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`shut their eyes for closing prayer. Roof then took out his gun and started shooting.
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`Parishioners dove under tables to hide. Roof continued shooting, reloading multiple times.
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`After firing approximately seventy-four rounds, Roof reached one parishioner who was
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`praying aloud. He told her to “shut up” and then asked if he had shot her yet. (J.A. at
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`5017.) She said no. Roof responded, “I’m going to leave you here to tell the story.” (J.A.
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`at 5017.) Roof left the church around 9:06 p.m. When police arrived, seven of the twelve
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`parishioners were dead. Two others died soon after. Roof killed Reverend Sharonda
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`Coleman-Singleton, Cynthia Hurd, Susie Jackson, Ethel Lee Lance, Reverend Depayne
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`Middleton-Doctor, Reverend Clementa Pinckney, Tywanza Sanders, Reverend Daniel
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`Simmons, Sr., and Reverend Myra Thompson.
`
`B.
`
`Arrest, Confession, and Evidence Collection
`
`Police began searching for Roof, publicizing photos and setting up a phone bank.
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`Acting on a tip the next morning, officers in Shelby, North Carolina stopped Roof’s car.
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`Roof complied with their directions, identified himself, admitted involvement in the
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`6
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`shooting, and said that there was a gun in his backseat. Officers took Roof to the Shelby
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`police station, where he agreed to speak with FBI agents.
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`After obtaining a written Miranda waiver, two FBI agents interviewed Roof for
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`about two hours. He confessed: “Well, I did, I killed them.” (J.A. at 4265.) He also
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`laughingly stated, “I am guilty. We all know I’m guilty.” (J.A. at 4308.) He explained that
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`he shot the parishioners with a Glock .45 handgun he had bought two months earlier.
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`Calling himself a “white nationalist,” he told agents that he “had to do it” because “black
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`people are killing white people every day” and “rap[ing] white women.” (J.A. at 4269,
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`4282.) The agents asked whether he was trying to start a revolution. Roof responded, “I’m
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`not delusional, I don’t think that[,] you know, that something like what I did could start a
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`race war or anything like that.” (J.A. at 4284.) Later in the interview, however, he agreed
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`that he was trying to “bring . . . attention to this cause” and “agitate race relations” because
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`“[i]t causes friction and then, you know, it could lead to a race war.” (J.A. at 4301, 4329-
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`30.) Roof explained that he targeted Charleston for his attack because of its historic
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`importance and, after researching African American churches in Charleston on the internet,
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`he chose to attack parishioners at Mother Emanuel because of the church’s historic
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`significance. At one point in the interview, he said, “I regret doing it a little bit” because
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`“I didn’t really know what I had, exactly what I’ve done.” (J.A. at 4302-03.) But his
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`meticulous planning for the murder spree contradicts that statement. During his pre-attack
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`planning, in addition to researching Mother Emanuel on the internet, Roof visited Mother
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`Emanuel and learned from a parishioner that a Bible-study group met on Wednesday
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`nights.
`
`7
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`

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`
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`He also used the internet to propagate his racist ideology. In a journal that the police
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`found in Roof’s home, Roof had written the name of a website he had created. The website
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`was hosted by a foreign internet server, to which Roof made monthly payments. Hours
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`before the shootings, Roof uploaded racist material to the website. The website included
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`hyperlinks to text and photos. The text linked to a document where Roof expressed his
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`virulent racist ideology, claimed white superiority, and called African Americans “stupid
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`and violent.” (J.A. at 4623-27.) He discussed black-on-white crime, claiming it was a
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`crisis the media ignored. He issued a call to action, explaining that it was not “too late” to
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`take America back and “by no means should we wait any longer to take drastic action.”
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`(J.A. at 4625.) He stated that nobody was “doing anything but talking on the internet,” that
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`“someone has to have the bravery to take it to the real world,” and “I guess that has to be
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`me.” (J.A. at 4627.)
`
`C.
`
`Indictment and Trial
`
`The day after the shootings, the state of South Carolina charged Roof with nine
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`counts of murder, three counts of attempted murder, and one weapon-possession count.
`
`About a month later, Roof was indicted in the United States District Court for the District
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`of South Carolina with the crimes at issue in this case: Counts 1 through 9, racially
`
`motivated hate crimes resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1); Counts 10
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`through 12, racially motivated hate crimes involving an attempt to kill, in violation of 18
`
`U.S.C. § 249(a)(1); Counts 13 through 21, obstructing religious exercise resulting in death,
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`in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 247(a)(2) and (d)(1); Counts 22 through 24, obstructing
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`religious exercise involving an attempt to kill and use of a dangerous weapon, in violation
`
`8
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`

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`of 18 U.S.C. § 247(a)(2), (d)(1), and (d)(3); and Counts 25 through 33, use of a firearm to
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`commit murder during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
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`§ 924(c) and (j). Both the state and the federal governments gave notice of their intention
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`to seek the death penalty.
`
`The district court appointed an attorney with extensive capital-case experience as
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`lead counsel for Roof. Before trial, Roof moved to dismiss the indictment on several
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`grounds. He argued that the religious-obstruction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 247(a)(2), exceeds
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`Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, and that the hate-crime statute, 18 U.S.C.
`
`§ 249(a)(1), exceeds Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment power. He also argued that
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`neither is a predicate “crime of violence” under the federal firearm statute, 18 U.S.C.
`
`§ 924(c), and that the Attorney General had erroneously certified Roof’s prosecution under
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`18 U.S.C. § 249. The court denied the motion and rejected Roof’s alternative argument
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`that the religious-obstruction charges were improper because he did not act in interstate
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`commerce.
`
`Roof offered to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of life without parole. The
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`federal government declined. The court entered a not guilty plea on Roof’s behalf and set
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`trial for November 7, 2016.3 As trial approached, the court ruled on a number of issues,
`
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`3 The plea was entered pursuant to this colloquy:
`DEFENSE COUNSEL: Mr. Roof has told us that he wishes to plead guilty.
`However, the Government has not yet decided whether it is going to seek the
`death penalty. And we understand that that process takes some time, takes
`some time for the Government to make that determination. Until we know
`whether the Government will be asking for the death penalty, we are not able
`
`
`
`9
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`described below. Trial began on December 7, 2016, and lasted until December 15, 2016,
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`when the jury rendered its verdict, finding Roof guilty on all counts.
`
`D.
`
`Appeal
`
`Roof now appeals four broad categories of issues: (1) his competency to stand trial
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`and issues relating to his competency hearings; (2) his self-representation; (3) alleged
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`errors in the penalty phase of the trial; and (4) alleged errors in the guilt phase of the trial,
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`including whether the charging statutes are unconstitutional. We must “address all
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`substantive and procedural issues raised on the appeal of a sentence of death, and shall
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`consider whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
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`prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and whether the evidence supports the special
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`finding of the existence of an aggravating factor required to be considered under section
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`3592.”4 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(1).
`
`III.
`
`ISSUES RELATED TO COMPETENCY
`
`
`
`We first address Roof’s challenges to his competency to stand trial and issues
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`relating to his competency hearings. Specifically, Roof argues: first, that the district
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`court erred in finding him competent to stand trial; second, that the district court abused
`
`
`to advise Mr. Roof to enter a plea of guilty. And for that reason, we
`understand that the Court will enter a plea on his behalf.
`THE COURT: I’ll just direct that a plea of not guilty be entered at this time
`for the defendant, based on your comment to the Court.
`(J.A. at 77.)
`
`4 The aggravating factors found by the jury are described infra note 34 and Section
`V.A.3. We agree that the evidence supports the jury’s findings.
`
`10
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`its discretion by refusing to grant a continuance ahead of the first competency hearing;
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`and third, that the district court abused its discretion by limiting evidence allowed at the
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`second competency hearing. We disagree and discern no merit in Roof’s contentions.
`
`A.
`
`Competency Background
`
`Before trial, defense counsel gave notice of their intent to call an expert on Roof’s
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`mental health at the penalty phase. The government then obtained permission to have its
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`own expert, Dr. Park Dietz, examine Roof. During a visit with Dr. Dietz, Roof learned for
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`the first time that his lawyers intended to call an autism expert to say that Roof was on the
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`autism spectrum. The news upset him. He underwent a “substantial mood change” and
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`became “oppositional.” (J.A. at 538, 544.) Soon after, he sent a letter to the prosecution,
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`accusing his attorneys of misconduct. He said, “what my lawyers are planning to say in
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`my defense is a lie and will be said without my consent or permission.” (J.A. at 587.) He
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`believed that his lawyers were “extremely moralistic about the death penalty” and that they
`
`“have been forced to grasp at straws” because he “ha[s] no real defense,” or at least “no
`
`defense that my lawyers would present or that would be acceptable to the court.” (J.A. at
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`589.)
`
`Learning of the letter shortly before trial, defense counsel requested an ex parte
`
`hearing. The next day, defense counsel requested a competency hearing. On November
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`7, before ruling on competency, the court held the requested hearing and questioned Roof
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`about the letter. Roof explained that he was unwilling to allow mental health mitigation
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`evidence because “if the price is that people think I’m autistic, then it’s not worth it” and
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`“[i]t discredits the reason why I did the crime.” (J.A. at 629, 632.) Defense counsel stated
`
`11
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`that they had considered Roof’s perspective but determined, in their professional judgment,
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`that presenting the evidence was in Roof’s best interest.
`
`1. First Competency Hearing
`
`Following the ex parte hearing, the court delayed the first day of individual voir dire
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`and ordered a competency hearing. To conduct a competency evaluation, it appointed Dr.
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`James C. Ballenger—“one of the nation’s most renowned and respected psychiatrists,” and
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`the chair of the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at the Medical
`
`University of South Carolina for seventeen years. (J.A. at 2068.) Although Dr. Ballenger
`
`had extensive experience as a psychiatrist, this was his first pretrial competency
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`examination. Dr. Ballenger submitted his report on November 15. Defense counsel asked
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`that the court postpone the competency hearing, scheduled for November 17, until
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`November 28, for three primary reasons: (1) defense counsel was “utterly unprepared to
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`engage on such short notice the factual, ethical, legal, and forensic science issues raised by
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`92 pages of psychiatric and psychological reports”; (2) Roof disagreed with defense
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`counsel’s mental health mitigation defense, which led to a breakdown in the attorney-client
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`relationship, especially on competency issues; and (3) the mental health experts lacked
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`sufficient time to reliably evaluate Roof’s competency. (J.A. at 773.) They also argued
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`that Dr. Ballenger’s report failed to address a central issue—autism spectrum disorder
`
`(“ASD”). Furthermore, the defense’s autism expert, Dr. Rachel Loftin, was out of the
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`country until November 28 and could not finalize her report in time.
`
`To provide adequate time for the defense to prepare, the court rescheduled the
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`competency hearing for November 21. On the first day of the hearing, defense counsel
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`12
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`moved for another week’s continuance because they still felt “unprepared to proceed” and
`
`several of their witnesses were unavailable to testify in person. (J.A. at 894-95.) The court
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`denied the request, finding it “not credible” that they were not prepared. (J.A. at 895-96.)
`
`It offered to allow the defense experts to appear remotely.
`
`Dr. Ballenger testified first. He had met with Roof three times for a total of eight
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`hours. Dr. Ballenger also spoke with the defense team for one hour and forty-five minutes
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`to listen to their experience working with Roof. He opined that Roof was competent to
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`stand trial, noting that “he does not have difficulty in understanding the procedures that he
`
`is involved in” and that “there is evidence that he can” assist counsel. (J.A. at 908-09.) He
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`noted that Roof’s full-scale IQ of 125 and verbal IQ of 141 placed him in the 96th and
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`99.7th percentile of the population, respectively. 5 Dr. Ballenger believed that Roof
`
`understood the proceedings better than the average defendant and that it was “very clear”
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`he had the ability to cooperate with his attorneys, should he so desire. (J.A. at 908-09,
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`915.) According to Dr. Ballenger, Roof’s unwillingness to cooperate was not the result of
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`“widespread psychosis,” but rooted in “a deep seated racial prejudice” that Roof did not
`
`want “blurred” by a mental health defense. (J.A. at 909, 913-15, 1346.) Dr. Ballenger
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`testified that Roof likely suffers from social anxiety disorder and schizoid personality
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`disorder and that Roof might have some autistic spectrum traits but does not suffer from a
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`psychotic process. Defense counsel pressed Dr. Ballenger on what the defense perceived
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`to be his failure to fully consider the effects of Roof’s alleged ASD. Dr. Ballenger
`
`
`5 The record indicates that Roof’s full-scale IQ score is in the 95th percentile.
`
`13
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`explained that the pertinence of any ASD diagnosis was already captured in his evaluation
`
`of Roof’s mental state and ability to assist counsel as required under the competency
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`standard.
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`After Dr. Ballenger, the court heard live testimony from three defense witnesses: an
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`examining forensic psychiatrist, Donna S. Maddox, M.D.; a psychologist, William J.
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`Stejskal, Ph.D.; and an autism expert, Laura Carpenter, Ph.D. The court also accepted
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`affidavits from three other defense witnesses: an autism expert who had examined Roof,
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`Rachel Loftin, Ph.D.; a professor diagnosed with ASD who had met with Roof and defense
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`counsel, Mr. John Elder Robison; and a psychologist who had commented on the
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`limitations of personality testing, John F. Edens, Ph.D.
`
`The forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Maddox, had met with Roof nine times for a total of
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`about twenty-five hours (seven times before Roof complained of his attorneys’ supposed
`
`misconduct and two times after). Referencing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
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`Mental Disorders, 5th Edition (DSM-5), Dr. Maddox believed that Roof suffers from
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`“autism spectrum disorder,” “other specified schizophrenia spectrum disorder and other
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`psychotic disorder,” and “other specified anxiety disorder.” (J.A. at 1486, 5243.) She
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`based those opinions on her observations that Roof used pedantic speech, which she
`
`associated with ASD;
`
`that
`
`he
`
`exhibited
`
`“disorganized
`
`thinking”
`
`and
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`inappropriate/constricted affect; that he lacked “insight that he has a psychotic thought
`
`process”; that he has a history of somatic delusions that cause him to believe that his head
`
`is lopsided, that his hair is falling out, and that all of his testosterone pooled to the left side
`
`of his body; that he exhibited “paranoid beliefs” about defense counsel, such as trying to
`
`14
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`discredit him and ultimately have him killed; and that he displayed “transient symptoms of
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`psychosis.” (J.A. at 1491, 1497, 1500-01, 1503-06, 1514-15, 1537.) Dr. Maddox stated
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`that she did not believe Roof had the capacity to understand the proceedings or assist
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`counsel because he had stated multiple times that even if he were sentenced to death, he
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`would not be executed. In sum, she concluded that Roof was not competent to stand trial.
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`Dr. Stejskal, a psychologist, had met with Roof for about one hour and forty-six
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`minutes over two days. He opined that Roof was “in the prodromal phase of an emerging
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`schizophrenic spectrum disorder,” 6 but was “not yet fully possessed of a delusional
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`disorder.” (J.A. at 1690-91.) Dr. Stejskal offered no “settled conclusion” as to how that
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`diagnosis affected Roof’s competency, stating only “I certainly have concerns.” (J.A. at
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`1668-69, 1690.) Although he did not have firsthand information about Roof’s beliefs,
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`Stejskal was concerned that Roof might make decisions based on “potentially delusional
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`beliefs” that he would be liberated from prison. (J.A. at 1698-1700.) He believed that
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`Roof was motivated and intelligent enough to mask his irrational beliefs by telling the court
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`that he believed his chance of liberation was low. Dr. Stejskal testified that Roof was
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`“trying to look bad” by selecting antisocial features during personality testing while also
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`“denying psychopathology.” (J.A. at 1701, 1709-10.) But he acknowledged that Roof
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`scored within the normal range on the Positive Impression Management Scale, which
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`detects whether a person is trying to portray themselves in an unrealistically positive way.
`
`
`6 Prodrome is “[a]n early or premonitory manifestation of impending disease before
`the specific symptoms begin.” Prodrome, McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and
`Technical Terms (6th ed. 2003).
`
`15
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`

`

`He did not opine on Roof’s competency. He also noted that Roof exhibited reduced
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`processing speed and a low working memory index.
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`Dr. Carpenter, an autism expert, had not examined Roof and did not opine on his
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`competency. She testified instead about common traits associated with ASD, including
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`how it affects social communication and the ability to form relationships and understand
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`social rules. Dr. Carpenter was unable to offer an opinion on whether ASD would disrupt
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`Roof’s ability to assist counsel. Referencing the affidavit of Professor Robison, Dr.
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`Carpenter noted that Roof’s supposed belief that he was going to be pardoned was
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`concerning and “those types of irrational beliefs are not necessarily just due to autism and
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`might suggest that something else was going on here as well.” (J.A. at 1638.)
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`Dr. Loftin, an autism expert, had met with Roof three times. Testifying by affidavit,
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`she opined that Roof has ASD. He had told her that he was “not afraid of receiving a death
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`sentence” because he anticipated being “rescued by white nationalists after they take over
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`the government.” (J.A. at 1774.) She also noted that Roof had psychiatric symptoms not
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`explained by ASD, including anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation, obsessive-compulsive
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`symptoms, disordered thinking, and, as manifestations of psychosis, delusions of grandeur
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`and somatic delusions. She believed that his symptoms were “consistent with the
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`schizophrenia spectrum” but that it was “too early to predict his psychiatric trajectory.”
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`(J.A. at 1774.) Dr. Loftin did not opine directly on Roof’s compet