`
`In the United States Court of Appeals
`for the Fourth Circuit
`
`
`No. 20-1776
`
`
`
`PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL
`TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, INC.;
`CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY; ANIMAL
`LEGAL DEFENSE FUND; FARM
`SANCTUARY; FOOD & WATER
`WATCH; GOVERNMENT
`ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT; FARM
`FORWARD; and AMERICAN SOCIETY
`FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY
`TO ANIMALS
`
` Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants
`
` v.
`
`JOSH STEIN, in his official capacity as
`Attorney General of North Carolina, and
`DR. KEVIN GUSKIEWICZ, in his official
`capacity as Chancellor of the University of
`North Carolina-Chapel Hill,
`
` Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees
`
` And
`
`NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU
`FEDERATION, INC.,
`
` Intervenor-Defendant-Appellants, Cross-
` Appellees
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 14-1 Filed: 08/07/2020 Pg: 2 of 14
`
`Motion To Dismiss Intervenor’s Appeal For Lack Of Jurisdiction
`
`
`
`“Plaintiffs brought this action, alleging that [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2]
`
`interferes with their plans to conduct undercover investigations of government
`
`facilities in North Carolina for the purpose of gathering evidence of unethical and
`
`illegal animal practices and to disseminate this information to the public, in
`
`violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
`
`… . Plaintiffs sought an order declaring the Act unconstitutional and enjoining
`
`[North Carolina governmental] Defendants from enforcing the Act.” People for the
`
`Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Stein, 737 Fed. App’x 122, 126 (4th Cir.
`
`2018). This Court held Plaintiffs pled standing against the named State Defendants,
`
`the Chancellor of the University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill and the North
`
`Carolina Attorney General. Id. at 131-132. On remand, the district court held the
`
`challenged provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2 were unconstitutional on their
`
`face or as-applied to Plaintiffs, and enjoined the State Defendants from enforcing
`
`the law. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Stein, --- F. Supp. 3d -
`
`--, 2020 WL 3130158, at *25 (M.D.N.C. June 12, 2020) (also attached as Exhibit
`
`A pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(2)(B)(iii)).
`
`Between this Court’s remand for consideration of the merits, and the district
`
`court’s determination on the merits, the district court exercised its discretion to
`
`allow the North Carolina Farm Bureau Federation, Inc. (“Farm Bureau”) to
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 14-1 Filed: 08/07/2020 Pg: 3 of 14
`
`intervene. It explained it was exercising its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil
`
`Procedure 24(b) to allow the Farm Bureau to enter the case because the Farm
`
`Bureau would assist the State’s defense, “arguing the same question[s]” as the
`
`State Defendants. Dkt. No. 92, at 7.
`
`The Farm Bureau has now filed the lead notice of appeal in this matter. Dkt.
`
`No. 143 (Farm Bureau Notice of Appeal), appeal docketed No. 20-1776. The Farm
`
`Bureau’s appeal is separate and apart from the State Defendants’ Notice of Appeal,
`
`which the Farm Bureau did not join. Dkt. No. 145 (State Defendants’ Notice of
`
`Appeal), appeal docketed No. 20-1777.
`
`Controlling Supreme Court precedent makes clear the Farm Bureau lacks
`
`standing to prosecute an independent appeal of this matter. See, e.g., Hollingsworth
`
`v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013). The district court’s injunction does not run
`
`against the Farm Bureau or any of its members, only the State Defendants. The
`
`Farm Bureau’s only interest in this matter is its generalized grievance that it
`
`believes N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2 should be held constitutional. Such a concern has
`
`never provided standing. While the Farm Bureau conceivably could have
`
`proceeded with the State Defendants, as only one party to an action must have
`
`standing, that is not how it or the State Defendants chose to docket their appeals.
`
`See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2
`
`(2006) (“the presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 14-1 Filed: 08/07/2020 Pg: 4 of 14
`
`case-or-controversy requirement”). As described below, the Farm Bureau chose to
`
`proceed on its own to disrupt Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ efforts to resolve this
`
`matter without appeal. This Court lacks jurisdiction over that independent action
`
`and it should be dismissed.1
`
`I.
`
`For An Intervenor To Appeal It Must Have Standing.
`
`Article III’s standing requirements apply to appellants just as they apply to
`
`district court plaintiffs. As the Supreme Court has explained, while “[m]ost
`
`standing cases consider whether a plaintiff has satisfied the requirement when
`
`filing suit, [] Article III demands that an actual controversy persist throughout all
`
`stages of litigation. That means that standing must be met by persons seeking
`
`appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first
`
`instance.” Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 705 (internal citations omitted). Thus, where
`
`a district court allows individuals who are not the named defendants “to intervene
`
`to defend” the challenged law, if those intervenors subsequently appeal, the court
`
`of appeals “must decide whether [they] ha[ve] standing to appeal the District
`
`Court’s order.” Id. at 702, 705.
`
`
`1 Pursuant to Local Rule 27(a), Plaintiffs informed counsel for both the Farm
`Bureau and State Defendants of their intent to file this motion. The Farm Bureau
`indicated it will oppose this motion. The State Defendants indicated they did not
`wish to take a position without seeing and considering the motion.
`4
`
`
`
`
`
`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 14-1 Filed: 08/07/2020 Pg: 5 of 14
`
`Indeed, the Supreme Court, sitting as a court of appeals, relied on this
`
`principle to dismiss an appeal by state legislators who intervened to defend a law
`
`they passed. The Court explained the legislators “carried the laboring oar in urging
`
`the constitutionality of the challenge [law] at a bench trial.” Va. House of
`
`Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1950 (2019). Nonetheless, “‘[m]erely
`
`because a party appears in the district court proceedings does not mean that the
`
`party automatically has standing to appeal the judgment rendered by that court.’”
`
`Residences at Bay Point Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 641 Fed.
`
`App’x 181, 183 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (quoting Rohm & Hass Tex., Inc. v.
`
`Ortiz Bros. Insulation, 32 F.3d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1994)). Therefore, when
`
`intervenors “seek[] to invoke” a court of appeals’ jurisdiction, they must establish
`
`they have standing “in [their] own right” to proceed. Virginia House of Delegates,
`
`139 S. Ct. at 1951.
`
`II. The Farm Bureau Lacks Standing To Appeal On Its Own.
`
`Supreme Court authority also provides intervenors like the Farm Bureau
`
`lack standing to appeal. In Hollingsworth, like here, the district court allowed the
`
`private “proponent of [an] initiative [] to intervene to defend it” on the merits.
`
`Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 702 (internal citation omitted). There, like here, the
`
`plaintiffs prevailed, but the “District Court had not ordered [intervenors] to do or
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 14-1 Filed: 08/07/2020 Pg: 6 of 14
`
`refrain from doing anything,” it solely “enjoined the state officials named as
`
`defendants from enforcing” the law. Id. at 705. There, like here, the intervenor’s
`
`“only interest in having the District Court order reversed was to vindicate the
`
`constitutional validity of” the law. Id. at 706.
`
`On this basis, the Supreme Court held the intervenors lacked standing to
`
`appeal. Their “generalized grievance” regarding the lower court’s legal analysis,
`
`“no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer standing.” Id. A party cannot
`
`“state an Article III case or controversy” where their claimed injury is their
`
`“interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws.” Id.
`
`The Farm Bureau did not seek to establish its standing in the summary
`
`judgment proceedings, and its earlier filings, as best, put forward a “generalized
`
`grievance” for participating in this litigation. In fact, it represented to the district
`
`court it “need not establish Article III standing” and merely addressed the issue in
`
`a footnote to its motion to intervene. Dkt. No. 83, at 7 n.2. Therefore its separately
`
`docketed appeal must be dismissed.
`
`Lest there be any doubt, that footnote suggested that because the Farm
`
`Bureau’s members—like every other business owner or operator in North
`
`Carolina—could potentially wield the cause of action created by N.C. Gen. Stat.
`
`§ 99A-2, its members had standing to try to preserve the law. Id. However, the
`
`Supreme Court has explained that when a purported injury is “shared in
`6
`
`
`
`
`
`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 14-1 Filed: 08/07/2020 Pg: 7 of 14
`
`substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone
`
`normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction” because it is the very definition
`
`of a “generalized grievance.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). Indeed,
`
`the Farm Bureau’s member declarants made clear they had no specific reason to
`
`believe they would ever use the law, but rather sought to defend it so that they and
`
`“farmers like” them can have another tool to use against advocacy groups. Dkt.
`
`No. 83-2 ¶ 7; see also Dkt. No. 83-3 ¶ 6 (same). Therefore, the Farm Bureau did
`
`not establish standing to proceed on behalf of its members because it did not
`
`establish its members had standing.
`
`The Farm Bureau also asserted in a single sentence that it had standing on
`
`behalf of itself, because Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, if successful, would cause
`
`the organization to “expend[] resources,” but that contention is unsubstantiated.
`
`Dkt. No. 83, at 7 n.2. The Farm Bureau’s declaration in support of its
`
`organizational standing merely stated the organization “supported” the law when it
`
`was enacted and subsequently “educated” its members about its existence, without
`
`stating the Farm Bureau was engaged in any ongoing efforts regarding the law, or
`
`that the Farm Bureau would undertake efforts regarding the law if it were struck
`
`down. Dkt. No. 83-1 ¶¶ 6-7. As this Court has made clear, where an organization
`
`asserts standing based on the organization’s diversion of resources in a case
`
`seeking forward looking relief, the organization must establish some “burden” it
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 14-1 Filed: 08/07/2020 Pg: 8 of 14
`
`“would face going forward” if it failed to obtain its desired outcome. Benham v.
`
`City of Charlotte, 635 F.3d 129, 139 (4th Cir. 2011); see also Nnebe v. Daus, 644
`
`F.3d 147, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2011) (Farm Bureau’s authority in support of its
`
`organizational standing, which held standing existed if there were ongoing
`
`expenditures that would continue if the requested relief were denied). Therefore,
`
`the Farm Bureau failed to establish standing on behalf of itself.
`
`The Farm Bureau was allowed to intervene merely because it claimed a
`
`general interest in defending the law. This is because it had no other basis on
`
`which to intervene, never establishing any sort of standing to defend the law.
`
`Nonetheless, the Farm Bureau noticed an appeal in this matter, No. 20-1776, on its
`
`own, Dkt. No. 143. Because the Farm Bureau lacks standing, that appeal cannot
`
`proceed.
`
`III. The Facts Of This Case Do Not Warrant A Different Outcome.
`
`The Farm Bureau is certain to point out that after it filed its notice of appeal,
`
`the State Defendants appealed, and courts have allowed appeals to proceed where
`
`one party has standing. But, the State Defendants’ independent appeal does not
`
`allow the Farm Bureau’s separate action. This is particularly true, as the Farm
`
`Bureau strategically chose not to join the State Defendants’ separate appeal. The
`
`Farm Bureau is seeking to litigate its own case, which this Court has no
`
`jurisdiction to entertain.
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 14-1 Filed: 08/07/2020 Pg: 9 of 14
`
`To the extent intervenors like the Farm Bureau have been allowed to appeal
`
`that is because they have proceeded with a party who had standing. If, like here, an
`
`intervenor lacks standing, it can only appeal if it employs “piggyback standing.”
`
`Kane Cty. v. United States, 950 F.3d 1323, 1324-25 (10th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
`
`That is, it can only proceed to the extent it does not “seek[] additional relief
`
`beyond” that requested by the party with standing. Town of Chester v. Laroe
`
`Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017). Solely if a “party with appellate
`
`standing asserts each challenge to the district court’s decision” can an intervenor
`
`without standing pursue that claim by joining that challenge. Freedom From
`
`Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d
`
`1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2018).2
`
`Here, in contrast, the Farm Bureau improperly seeks to create its own
`
`vehicle, distinct from that of the State Defendants, to appeal the decision below.
`
`Ore. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 860 F.3d
`
`1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 2017) (“This ineluctable requirement [of appellant standing]
`
`is not vitiated simply because an intervenor is raising a new or different claim for
`
`
`2 For these reasons, to the extent the Farm Bureau notes Plaintiffs have separately
`cross-appealed, Dkt. No. 149, that is irrelevant to the analysis. As described above,
`Plaintiffs prevailed below and merely believe there are additional bases on which
`they could have prevailed. The Farm Bureau is seeking to independently raise
`bases to reverse the district court. A party with standing must pursue those claims,
`and the Farm Bureau lacks standing.
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 14-1 Filed: 08/07/2020 Pg: 10 of 14
`
`relief in the context of an existing case rather than bringing an original suit.”). By
`
`appealing independently from the State Defendants, the Farm Bureau has asserted
`
`a right to request distinct relief, a right it does not have.
`
`This is not mere formalism. Plaintiffs and the State Defendants were in talks
`
`to resolve this matter without appeal when the Farm Bureau filed its notice, doing
`
`so ahead of the deadline to appeal. That notice successfully disrupted those
`
`discussions. Moreover, below, the Farm Bureau litigated theories the State
`
`Defendants did not genuinely prosecute. Compare Dkt. No. 110, at 19-22 (Farm
`
`Bureau summary judgment brief) with Dkt. No. 108, at 26 (State Defendants
`
`summary judgment brief). Throughout this case, and particularly now on appeal,
`
`the Farm Bureau has sought to direct this litigation when the true State Defendants
`
`should be charged with doing so. Its separately docketed appeal, for which it lacks
`
`standing, should be dismissed.
`
`IV. Conclusion.
`
`For the foregoing reasons the Court should dismiss appeal No. 20-1776, the
`
`Farm Bureau’s action, for lack of standing.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 14-1 Filed: 08/07/2020 Pg: 11 of 14
`
`August 7, 2020
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ David S. Muraskin
`By:
`David S. Muraskin
`PUBLIC JUSTICE, P.C.
`1620 L St. NW, Suite 630
`Washington, DC 20036
`(202) 861-5245
`dmuraskin@publicjustice.net
`Counsel for Plaintiffs
`
`Daniel K. Bryson
`N.C. Bar Number: 15781
`Jeremy Williams
`N.C. Bar Number: 48162
`Whitfield Bryson & Mason LP
`900 W. Morgan Street
`Raleigh, NC 27603
`(919) 600-5000
`dan@wbmllp.com
`jeremy@wbmllp.com
`Counsel for Plaintiffs
`
`the Ethical
`
`Matthew Strugar
`3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2910
`Los Angeles, CA 90010
`(323) 696-2299
`matthew@matthewstrugar.com
`Counsel
`for People
`for
`Treatment of Animals, Inc.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 14-1 Filed: 08/07/2020 Pg: 12 of 14
`
`Cristina Stella
`Kelsey Eberly
`Animal Legal Defense Fund
`525 East Cotati Avenue
`Cotati, CA 94931
`(707) 795-7533
`cstella@aldf.org
`keberly@aldf.org
`Counsel for Animal Legal Defense Fund
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 14-1 Filed: 08/07/2020 Pg: 13 of 14
`
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMIT
`
`This brief or other document complies with type-volume limits because this
`
`brief or other document contains 2,138 words.
`
`This brief or other document complies with the typeface and type style
`
`requirements because: this brief or other document has been prepared in a
`
`proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 with Times New
`
`Roman 14 point font.
`
`
`Date: August 7, 2020
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ David S. Muraskin
`
`
`
`David S. Muraskin
`Public Justice, P.C.
`1620 L St. NW, Suite 630
`Washington, DC 20036
`(202) 861-5245
`dmuraskin@publicjustice.net
`Counsel for Plaintiffs
`
`13
`
`
`
`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 14-1 Filed: 08/07/2020 Pg: 14 of 14
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the August 7, 2020, the foregoing document
`
`was served on all parties or their counsel of record through CM/ECF system.
`
`Dated: August 7, 2020
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ David S. Muraskin
`David S. Muraskin
`Public Justice, P.C.
`1620 L St. NW, Suite 630
`Washington, DC 20036
`(202) 861-5245
`dmuraskin@publicjustice.net
`Counsel for Plaintiffs
`
`14
`
`