USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 37 Filed: 02/22/2021 Pg: 1 of 81
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`Case No. 20-1776 (L)
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`
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`In the United States Court of Appeals
`for the Fourth Circuit
`
`
`PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, INC.; CENTER
`FOR FOOD SAFETY; ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND; FARM
`SANCTUARY; FOOD & WATER WATCH; GOVERNMENT
`ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT; FARM FORWARD; and AMERICAN
`SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS,
`Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants
`
`
`v.
`
`NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, INC.,
`Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,
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`and
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`JOSH STEIN, in his official capacity as Attorney General of North Carolina, and
`DR. KEVIN GUSKIEWICZ, in his official capacity as Chancellor of the
`University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill,
`Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.
`__________________________
`
`On Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Middle District of North Carolina
`__________________________
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`OPENING AND RESPONSE BRIEF OF APPELLEES
`___________________________
`
`David S. Muraskin
`Public Justice, P.C.
`1620 L St. NW, Suite 630
`Washington, DC 20036
`(202) 861-5245
`dmuraskin@publicjustice.net
`Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants
`(additional counsel listed on inside cover)
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`Matthew Strugar
`3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2910
`Los Angeles, CA 90010
`(323) 696-2299
`matthew@matthewstrugar.com
`Counsel for People for the Ethical
`Treatment of Animals, Inc.
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`Cristina Stella
`Kelsey Eberly
`Animal Legal Defense Fund
`525 East Cotati Avenue
`Cotati, CA 94931
`(707) 795-7533
`cstella@aldf.org
`keberly@aldf.org
`Counsel for Animal Legal Defense
`Fund
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`
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`Daniel K. Bryson
`N.C. Bar Number: 15781
`Jeremy Williams
`N.C. Bar Number: 48162
`Whitfield Bryson
`900 W. Morgan Street
`Raleigh, NC 27603
`(919) 600-5000
`dan@whitfieldbryson.com
`jeremy@whitfieldbryson.com
`Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees,
`Cross-Appellants
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`Gabriel Walters
`PETA Foundation
`1563 16th St. NW
`Washington, DC 20036
`(202) 483-7382
`gabew@peta.org
`Counsel for People for the Ethical
`Treatment of Animals, Inc.
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`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
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`Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants (“Plaintiffs”) do not issue stock and
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`have no parent corporations.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
`I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT. ............................................................... 1
`II.
`ISSUES PRESENTED. .................................................................................. 1
`III. INTRODUCTION. ......................................................................................... 2
`IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. .................................................................... 5
`A. Section 99A-2’s plain text directly regulates speech. .................................. 5
`B. The law directly regulates Plaintiffs’ speech. .............................................. 8
`C. The law’s legislative history makes clear it is aimed at public advocacy. ...
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` ........................................................................................................................10
`D. The district court correctly recognized the law restricts speech and
`rejected Defendants’ efforts to limit the First Amendment............................13
`V. STANDARD OF REVIEW. ............................................................................16
`VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. ..................................................................16
`VII. ARGUMENT. ...............................................................................................20
`A. Section § 99A-2 targets protected First Amendment activities. ...............20
`B. That some of the regulated speech occurs on private property does not
`remove the First Amendment’s protections. ....................................................24
`i. Defendants’ authority does not identify any instance in which
`regulations of speech are free from First Amendment review. ......................28
`C. Defendants wrongly characterize § 99A-2 as a “generally applicable
`law,” but even if they were correct, that would not free the law from First
`Amendment review. ............................................................................................34
`i. Section 99A-2 is not a “generally applicable law.” ..................................34
`ii. Even “generally applicable laws” that restrict speech are subject to the
`First Amendment. .............................................................................................37
`D. Food Lion is entirely consistent with the binding precedent on which
`Plaintiffs rely. ......................................................................................................38
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`E. The challenged provisions are subject to strict scrutiny that Defendants
`do not even seek to satisfy, but also fail intermediate scrutiny. .....................43
`i. Section 99A-2 is content based, and Defendants concede they cannot
`defend such a law. .............................................................................................44
`a. Defendants’ counterarguments fail. .........................................................47
`ii. The law also fails intermediate scrutiny. ...................................................50
`a. The law fails as it lacks evidence supporting its restrictions on speech. 51
`b. The law is over- and under-inclusive, and therefore not tailored. ..........54
`c. The law does not further a significant governmental interest. ................56
`F. Because the challenged provisions fail every application of First
`Amendment scrutiny they should be held facially invalid. .............................58
`G. The challenged provisions are also unconstitutionally overbroad,
`providing an independent basis to hold them facially invalid. .......................61
`VIII. CONCLUSION. .........................................................................................64
`IX. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT. .....................................................64
`X. ADDENDUM OF STATUTORY TEXT. ......................................................67
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`6th Cong. Dist. Republican Comm. v. Alcorn, 913 F.3d 393 (4th Cir. 2019) .........59
`Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) ...... 22, 35
`ALDF v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193 (D. Utah 2017) ....................... 3, 23, 25, 28
`ALDF v. Kelly, 434 F. Supp. 3d 974 (D. Kan. 2020) ................................... 7, 22, 44
`ALDF v. Reynolds, 297 F. Supp. 3d 901 (S.D. Iowa 2018) .............................. 35, 38
`ALDF v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) ....................................... 22, 23, 27
`Am. Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995) ....................................38
`Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) ...............................................................33
`Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999) ............................................ 31. 32
`Billups v. City of Charleston, 961 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2020) ..................................51
`Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) ...............................................................31
`Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) .................................................21
`Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2016) ........................................59
`Buehrle v. City of Key W., 813 F.3d 973 (11th Cir. 2015) ............................... 21, 57
`Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988) .....................................26
`Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2015) ......................................... 44, 49, 50
`Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) ....................23
`Cent. Radio Co. Inc. v. City of Norfolk, 811 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2016) ...................44
`Child Evangelism Fellowship of MD, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Schs.,
`457 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................45
`Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).................................................. passim
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`City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) ......................56
`City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988) ......................24
`Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) ..................................................31
`Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC,
`518 U.S. 604 (1996) ..............................................................................................17
`Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach,
`657 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................55
`Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
`473 U.S. 788 (1985) ..............................................................................................33
`Coves Darden, LLC v. Ibanez,
`2016 WL 4379419 (S.C. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2016) ...............................................39
`Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2015) .....................27
`Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704 (N.C. 2001) .................................................. 39, 53
`Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). ..........................................30
`Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) .......................... 58, 59
`Doe v. Cooper, 842 F.3d 833 (4th Cir. 2016) .................................................. passim
`Food Lion Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc.,
`194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) ............................................................... 4, 39, 40, 41
`Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) ................................57
`Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) .............................. 3, 4, 37
`Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) ...............33
`Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017) ................................................. 19, 60
`Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) ............................................ 28, 29
`Lucero v. Early, 873 F.3d 466 (4th Cir. 2017) ........................................................49
`McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013) ........................................................ 29, 30
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`McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014) ..................................................... passim
`McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) ................................................................46
`Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) ..........................................30
`Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue,
`460 U.S. 575 (1983) ....................................................................................... 24, 46
`NLRB v. Bluefield Hosp. Co., LLC, 821 F.3d 534 (4th Cir. 2016) ..........................48
`Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) ...............54
`North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) ..........................................10
`Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2010) ............................................32
`Overbey v. Mayor of Balt., 930 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2019) .......................................17
`Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) ..................................................................31
`PETA v. Stein, 737 F. App’x 122 (4th Cir. 2018) ....................................................16
`Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) ................................................50
`R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) ................................................ 57, 63
`Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) ................................................ passim
`Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 2015) ................................ 18, 51, 54
`Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) .......................................................................10
`Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1997) ..................................................50
`Ross v. Early, 746 F.3d 546 (4th Cir. 2014) ......................................... 37, 38, 51, 53
`Rowan v. U.S. Post Off. Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) .............................................29
`S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cnty.,
`499 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2007) ......................................................................... 26, 27
`Showtime Ent., LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2014) ..................56
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`Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
`502 U.S. 105 (1991) ..............................................................................................54
`Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) ............................................. passim
`Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) ................................... passim
`United States v. Kaczynski, 551 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) .....................................38
`United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2000). ............................... 32, 39
`United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020) ......................................20
`United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) ....................................................5, 61
`United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) ......................................................61
`Varner v. Roane, 981 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2020) .......................................................16
`Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton,
`536 U.S. 150 (2002) ................................................................................... 3, 25, 57
`W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2017) .............. passim
`White Coat Waste Project v. Greater Richmond Transit Co.,
`2018 WL 4610089 (E.D. Va. Sept. 25, 2018) ......................................... 45, 46, 47
`Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) ............................................................40
`Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) ............................................................................29
`STATUTES
`16 U.S.C. § 1533 ......................................................................................................62
`28 U.S.C. § 1291 ........................................................................................................ 1
`28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................................................................ 1
`28 U.S.C. § 1343 ........................................................................................................ 1
`31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33...............................................................................................62
`42 U.S.C. § 1983 ........................................................................................................ 1
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`N.C. Gen. Stat § 99A-2 .................................................................................... passim
`N.C. Gen. Stat § 122C-66 ........................................................................................62
`N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-84 ............................................................................................ 8
`N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-85 ............................................................................................ 8
`REGULATIONS
`40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 ...................................................................................................62
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`Fed. R. App. P. 4 ........................................................................................................ 1
`Nicholas Kristof, The Ugly Secrets Behind the Costco Chicken, N.Y. Times (Feb.
`6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/06/opinion/sunday/costco-chicken-
`animal-welfare.html.................................................................................................11
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`I.
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`JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.
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`Plaintiffs agree with the State-Defendants’ (“the State’s”) and Intervening-
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`Defendant’s (“Intervenor’s”) (collectively “Defendants’”) jurisdictional statements
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`concerning the bases for jurisdiction and that the notices of appeal were timely filed.
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`Defs.’ Br. 1. Plaintiffs brought claims under the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
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`providing the district court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Joint
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`Appendix (“J.A.”) 5 (Complaint). The district court entered a final order and
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`judgment on June 12, 2020. J.A. 481-86. Intervenor timely filed a notice of appeal
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`on July 10, 2020, followed by a timely notice of appeal by the State on July 13, 2020,
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`followed by a timely cross-appeal by Plaintiffs on July 23, 2020, J.A. 487-95; see
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`also Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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`For the reasons stated in Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss Intervenor from this
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`appeal, carried with the case, Intervenor lacks the necessary standing to have filed
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`the lead notice of appeal and to proceed further in this matter. It should be dismissed.
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`II.
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`ISSUES PRESENTED.
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`1. Whether statutory provisions that all parties and the district court agree
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`directly regulate speech are subject to the First Amendment.
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`2. Whether those provisions fail constitutional scrutiny, particularly when all
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`parties and the district court agree that the State failed to produce any evidence
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`justifying the provisions’ infringements on speech.
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`3. Whether provisions that lack any justification for their infringements on
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`speech should be held facially invalid.
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`4. Whether the challenged provisions are also overbroad, providing a separate
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`and independent basis to hold them facially invalid.
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`III.
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`INTRODUCTION.
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`Defendants obfuscate and rationalize, but the fact remains, North Carolina
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`General Statute § 99A-2 directly regulates “protected speech.” J.A. 394, 399 (State’s
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`briefs below). Elements of § 99A-2(b)(1)-(3) and (5), the provisions at issue, are met
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`by a person collecting information for the purpose of communicating it (a protected
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`predicate to speech), or actually engaging in expression (protected speech).
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`Indeed, far from creating a “general bar against” activities in “nonpublic
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`areas” as Defendants pretend, Defs.’ Br. 13, subsections (b)(1)-(3) and (5) prohibit
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`the specific activities Plaintiffs pursue to advance their political “agendas.” J.A. 396
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`(Intervenor’s brief below). A “central tenet” of Plaintiffs People for the Ethical
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`Treatment of Animals’ (“PETA’s”) and Animal Legal Defense Fund’s (“ALDF’s”)
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`missions is to facilitate undercover investigations, which enables them to document
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`misconduct at factory farms, laboratories and the like, “expose cruelty to animals”
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`that is otherwise hidden, and thereby “build public pressure for change.” J.A. 137-
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`39, 143-44; J.A.148-50 (organizational declarations). The State admitted below that
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`§ 99A-2 is designed to punish such “undercover investigat[ions].” J.A. 133
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`(Governor Pat McCrory’s statement describing the law); J.A. 111-12 (State
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`representing that Governor McCrory accurately identified the “governmental
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`interest” the law was designed to address, including stopping “undercover
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`investigat[ions]”).
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`Section 99A-2 is thus part of a “novel,” nationwide trend in which states
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`“restrict[] speech” as a response to “high profile undercover investigations” that had
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`“devastating consequences” due to “boycotts” and heightened regulation. ALDF v.
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`Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1196-97 (D. Utah 2017). The investigated entities
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`and their legislative allies responded by seeking to keep the motivating speech from
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`recurring. See id. at 1198.
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`Defendants’ arguments to sustain this law are fanciful. Defendants initially
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`direct the Court to the law’s other components, suggesting they enable it to overlook
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`that § 99A-2 also targets speech. This is the exact opposite of what the First
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`Amendment requires. Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, the government cannot
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`link a restriction on entering “nonpublic areas” to a restriction on speech and evade
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`First Amendment review. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v.
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`Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165-66 (2002); W. Watersheds Project v. Michael,
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`869 F.3d 1189, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 2017) (Defendants’ authority). Nor does the fact
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`that Defendants claim the law’s elements make it “generally applicable” hold the
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`Constitution at bay. Defs.’ Br. 24. “Generally applicable laws” that restrict speech
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`are subject to the First Amendment. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S.
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`1, 26 (2010). And, § 99A-2 cannot be labeled “generally applicable” because it
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`“single[s] out” First Amendment activities among its elements. Turner Broad. Sys.,
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`Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640 (1994). The First Amendment is implicated when a
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`law restricts speech, and cannot be eluded through bells and whistles.
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`Food Lion Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999), does
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`not alter this rule, nor could it. It simply holds that a law that only regulates non-
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`expressive conduct does not require First Amendment review. Hence, Defendants
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`work to recast § 99A-2 as exclusively aimed at unwanted entry, but to do so they
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`must omit key text. Food Lion is inapplicable to § 99A-2 as it is actually written.
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`When Defendants turn to applying the First Amendment to § 99A-2, they ask
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`this Court to disregard numerous layers of Supreme Court precedent so the law can
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`stand. They request the Court reject what the Supreme Court has said renders a law
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`content based and subject to strict scrutiny, which they concede if applied here
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`establishes a standard they cannot meet. Defs.’ Br. 51-61 (solely defending the law
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`against intermediate scrutiny). They also craft a never-before-heard-of exception to
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`the government’s evidentiary burden under intermediate scrutiny because they
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`cannot satisfy that standard either. Defs.’ Br. 55-59 (failing to adduce any evidence);
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`see also J.A. 410 (conceding in district court hearing such evidence is required). To
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`narrow the relief to which Plaintiffs are entitled, Defendants—similar to the district
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`court—intermix scrutiny with overbreadth, when the Supreme Court has
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`distinguished the two. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481-82 (2010). In fact,
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`Plaintiffs are entitled to facial relief because the challenged provisions wholly fail
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`First Amendment scrutiny, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010), and
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`separately because they are overbroad.
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`Put simply, the amount of briefing does not reflect the difficulty of the issues,
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`but the lengths to which Defendants must go to try to avoid the dictated result. The
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`Court should affirm the district court’s conclusion the challenged provisions violate
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`the First Amendment. Although the district court held that some of the provisions
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`were only unconstitutional as-applied, this Court should conclude each is facially
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`invalid; as-applied relief only perpetuates the law’s unconstitutional chilling effect.
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`IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
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`A. Section 99A-2’s plain text directly regulates speech.
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`Although § 99A-2(a) frames the law as focused on preventing “access to []
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`nonpublic areas” and “engag[ing] in an act that exceeds the person’s authority to
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`enter those areas,” § 99A-2(b) goes on to define the “act[s] that exceed[] a person’s
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`authority” in “nonpublic areas” to mean engaging in speech, both in “nonpublic
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`areas” and in public. Per subsection (b) the law can only be violated if a person
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`engages in one of five acts, four of which are challenged here. Each of the challenged
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`acts is defined to include speech, particularly the speech necessary for undercover
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`investigations and related political advocacy. Subsection (b) also makes clear that
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`breaching the “duty of loyalty”—a term Defendants fixate on, but is only referenced
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`in subsections (b)(1) and (2), and left undefined—is but one element of the law’s
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`restrictions.
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`Specifically, subsections (b)(1) and (2) prohibit: (i) an employee “enter[ing]
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`the nonpublic areas of an employer’s premises for a reason other than a bona fide
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`intent of seeking or holding employment or doing business with the employer”;
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`(ii) gathering information; and (iii) “us[ing] the information to breach the person’s
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`duty of loyalty to the employer.” The provisions differ slightly with regard to what
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`information they prohibit gathering: subsection (b)(1) prohibits gathering any sort
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`of “data, paper, records or any other documents”; subsection (b)(2) prohibits
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`gathering any information through making a recording. With both provisions, the
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`term “nonpublic” is not defined to mean private, as Defendants suggest, e.g., Defs.’
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`Br. 29, but any area “not accessible to or not intended to be accessed by the general
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`public,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2(a). It covers areas open to employees, contractors,
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`and delivery personnel. The term “use[]” is undefined, but standard dictionary
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`definitions provide this element is met by “publishing” information or “creating an
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`expressive work based on it[].” J.A. 440 (district court decision providing dictionary
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`definitions). Thus, subsections (b)(1) and (2) are violated if a person sets out to
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`gather information in “nonpublic areas” in order to communicate it, actually
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`communicates it publicly, and that communication “breach[es] the person’s duty of
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`loyalty.”
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`Subsection (b)(3) prohibits “[k]nowingly or intentionally placing on the
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`employer’s premises an unattended camera or electronic surveillance device and
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`using that device to record images or data.” It makes no reference to a “duty of
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`loyalty.” It also does not only prohibit recording in “nonpublic areas,” but applies to
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`the entire “premises.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2(b)(3). It prohibits selecting and
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`capturing photos or videos regardless of their content or whether they be for the
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`media or any other purpose.
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`Subsection (b)(5) is a “catch-all.” Defs.’ Br. 8. It too makes no reference to a
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`“duty of loyalty,” but states any “act that substantially interferes with the ownership
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`or possession of real property” is prohibited. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2(b)(5).
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`Interfering with “ownership”—as opposed to “property,” on which Defendants
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`focus, Defs.’ Br. 41—has been interpreted to mean creating “reputational … harm”
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`through releasing truthful information to the public. ALDF v. Kelly, 434 F. Supp. 3d
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`974, 990 (D. Kan. 2020), appeal docketed No. 20-3082 (10th Cir. May 1, 2020).
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`Beyond subsections (b)’s direct prohibitions on speech, subsection (e) further
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`limits communications. Per subsection (e), a person is not liable under the law if they
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`fall within the “protections provided to employees under Article 21 of Chapter 95 or
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`Article 14 of Chapter 126 of the General Statutes”—the former applies to all
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`employees, the later only to State employees. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2(e). Those
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`provisions allow employees to report certain types of information through official
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`channels, but they do not allow for public disclosures. In fact, while subsection (e)
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`allows State employees to report information to the State legislature, N.C. Gen. Stat.
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`§§ 126-84, 126-85, it provides no such exemption for private employees. Subsection
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`(e) provides no protection for any employee reporting information to Congress or to
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`the media.
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`Violating § 99A-2 can result in equitable relief, compensatory damages,
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`exemplary damages of $5,000 “for each day, or portion thereof, that a defendant has
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`acted in violation” of the act, and attorneys’ fees and costs. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-
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`2(d). The law also holds “jointly liable” anyone who “directs, assists, compensates
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`or induces” a violation. Id. § 99A-2(c).
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`B. The law directly regulates Plaintiffs’ speech.
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`Subsection (b)’s definitions make the law perfectly crafted to restrict
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`Plaintiffs’ advocacy. PETA and ALDF seek to provide “truthful information” to the
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`public about “illegal, unethical, and inhumane practices.” J.A. 143-44, 153-54
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`(organizational declarations). They do this by having investigators gain employment
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`at animal facilities, where the investigators fulfill all lawfully assigned job functions
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`and rely on their access to identify misconduct, “chiefly by making notes.” J.A. 143,
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`151. The investigators may also record conduct with a “minute camera” on their
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`person, or, in certain circumstances, leave a camera behind, so as to capture images
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`of animals or their treatment that demonstrates abuse. J.A. 139-40, 151-52. PETA
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`and ALDF alert government officials to their findings and release the information to
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`the public. J.A. 143, 149. In doing so, they hope the public will repudiate the conduct
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`and this will lead to change, either through economic pressure or legislative action.
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`J.A. 143-44, 149-50. Put simply, PETA and ALDF’s investigatory techniques are
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`what is described by subsections (b)(1)-(3), and (5).
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`Similarly, Plaintiff American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
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`(“ASPCA”) relies on “undercover investigations” for its media and “to inform its
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`members, the public, and the government about the inhumane treatment” of animals.
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`J.A. 161, 163 (ASPCA declaration). Although it does not conduct investigations
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`itself, it provides “grant funding for investigations” by others. J.A. 163. Thus,
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`subsection (c)’s joint liability keeps ASPCA from developing its desired information
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`and communications regarding North Carolina. See id.
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`Further, Plaintiff Government Accountability Project (“GAP”) works with the
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`media to highlight “the important evidence that whistleblowers” of all sorts provide
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`and thereby enhance protections for their disclosures. J.A. 168 (GAP declaration).
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`In GAP’s experience, whistleblowers gather information in the ways described by
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`§ 99A-2, and release information to the public and media. See J.A. 167, 169-71.
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`Because of § 99A-2, news organizations in North Carolina will no longer work with
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`GAP to document whistleblowers’ stories, as they too fear joint liability. J.A. 171-
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`72.
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`C. The law’s legislative history makes clear it is aimed at public advocacy.
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`The law’s legislative history confirms its aim is to squelch public
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`whistleblowing. Where, as here, the legislature did not create committee reports in
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`support of the law, the legislative record of the law’s sponsors’ statements are the
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`“‘authoritative guide to the statute’s construction.’” Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713,
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`728 (1983) (quoting Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 832 (1983)