USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 38-1 Filed: 03/01/2021 Pg: 1 of 47
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`No. 20-1776 (L)
`
`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Fourth Circuit
`
`PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, INC.; CENTER
`FOR FOOD SAFETY; ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND; FARM
`SANCTUARY; FOOD & WATER WATCH; GOVERNMENT
`ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT; FARM FORWARD; and AMERICAN
`SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS,
`Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants
`
`v.
`
`JOSH STEIN, in his official capacity as Attorney General of North Carolina; and
`DR. KEVIN GUSKIEWICZ, in his official capacity as Chancellor of the
`University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill,
`Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees
`
`and
`
`NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, INC.,
`Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee
`
`On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
`Carolina
`
`
`
`BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-
`APPELLEES AND IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMATION IN PART AND
`REVERSAL IN PART
`
`
`(Counsel listed on inside cover)
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`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 38-1 Filed: 03/01/2021 Pg: 2 of 47
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`Clare R. Norins
`FIRST AMENDMENT CLINIC
`University of Georgia School of Law
`P.O. Box 388
`Athens, Georgia 30603
`Telephone: (706) 542-1419
`Email: cnorins@uga.edu
`
`Counsel for Amici Curiae*
`
`
`
`*Counsel would like to thank law students Mark Bailey and Michael Sloman
`for their significant contributions to this brief.
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`
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`

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`USCA4 Appeal: 20-1776 Doc: 38-1 Filed: 03/01/2021 Pg: 3 of 47
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii
`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................................................................... 1
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................................. 1
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 7
`I.
`“No Set of Circumstances” Describes an Outcome, Not a Test ................... 7
`A. The Supreme Court eschews “no set of circumstances” when adjudicating
`facial challenges ............................................................................................ 8
`B. A statute’s failure to survive the appropriate constitutional standard means
`there are “no set of circumstances” under which the statute can
`constitutionally be applied .......................................................................... 12
`II. Sections (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3) & (b)(5) Fail Strict and Intermediate Scrutiny
`and Therefore are All Facially Invalid .................................................................. 14
`A. Sections (b)(1), (b)(2) & (b)(5) fail strict scrutiny for lack of compelling
`interest ......................................................................................................... 15
`B. Sections (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3) & (b)(5) fail intermediate scrutiny for lack of
`narrow tailoring ........................................................................................... 19
`III. Section 99A-2 is Unconstitutionally Overbroad ......................................... 21
`A. It is dubious whether 99A-2 has a plainly legitimate sweep ....................... 23
`B. In an overbreadth challenge, the court may properly consider the potential
`unlawful applications of the statute to parties not currently before it ........ 24
`C. Section 99A-2 penalizes a wealth of protected speech ............................... 25
`1.
`Undercover investigations and dissemination of their findings will
`be squelched by 99A-2 .................................................................... 25
`Undermining state and federal regulatory schemes, 99A-2 creates
`civil liability for whistleblowing and speech pursuant to government
`reporting statutes .............................................................................. 28
`Section 99A-2 burdens individuals seeking to protect their rights
`through petitioning the government or the courts for grievances ... 30
`
`2.
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`3.
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`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 32
`APPENDIX A .......................................................................................................... 34
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 36
`CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE ........................................................ 37
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`ii
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
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`Cases
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`ACLU v. Alvarez,
`
`679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................ 27
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` Page
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`Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert,
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`263 F.Supp.3d 1193 (D. Utah 2017) ............................................................ 22
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`Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Kelly,
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`434 F.Supp.3d 974 (D. Kan. 2020) .............................................................. 17
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`Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter,
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`44 F.Supp.3d 109 (D. Idaho 2014) ........................................................... 4, 27
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`Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds,
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`353 F.Supp.3d 812 (S.D. Iowa 2019) ........................................................... 22
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`Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds,
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`297 F.Supp.3d 901 (S.D. Iowa 2018) ....................................................... 4, 27
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`Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden,
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`878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) ............................................................... passim
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`Billups v. City of Charleston,
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`961 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2020) .................................................................. 11, 20
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`Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,
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`564 U.S. 786 (2011)...................................................................................... 10
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`Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh,
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`824 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2016) ......................................................................... 13
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`Buehrle v. City of Key West,
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`813 F.3d 973 (11th Cir. 2015) ...................................................................... 28
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`
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`iii
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`Chemimetals Processing, Inc. v. McEneny,
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`476 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. App. 1996) ................................................................ 17
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`Circuit City Shores, Incorporated v. Adams,
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`532 U.S. 105 (2001)...................................................................................... 18
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`Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
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`558 U.S. 310 (2010).......................................................................... 10, 17, 28
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`City of Los Angeles v. Patel,
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`576 U.S. 409 (2015).............................................................................. 6, 9, 10
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`City of Chicago v. Morales,
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`527 U.S. 41 (1999) .......................................................................................... 9
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`Dalton v. Camp,
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`548 S.E.2d 704 (N.C. 2001) ................................................................... 25, 26
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`Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, Incorporated,
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`44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) ........................................................................ 26
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`Doe v. City of Albuquerque,
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`667 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) ............................................................. passim
`
`Doe v. Cooper,
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`842 F.3d 833 (4th Cir. 2016) ........................................................................ 24
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`Ezell v. City of Chicago,
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`651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) ........................................................................ 12
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`Fields v. City of Philadelphia,
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`862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017) ............................................................... 5, 16, 18
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`Food Lion, Incorporated v. Capital Cities/ABC, Incorporated,
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`194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) .................................................................. 25, 26
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`Fusaro v. Cogan,
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`930 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2019) ........................................................................ 11
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`iv
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`Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Associates, Inc.,
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`450 S.E.2d 912 (N.C. App. 1994) ................................................................ 17
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`Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic,
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`517 U.S. 1174 (1996) ................................................................................. 6, 9
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`Johnson v. United States,
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`576 U.S. 591 (2015)...................................................................................... 12
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`Keyzer v. Amerlink, Ltd.,
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`618 S.E.2d 768 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) ........................................................... 15
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`Kolbe v. Hogan,
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`849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017) .................................................................. 11, 12
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`Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,
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`508 U.S. 384 (1993)...................................................................................... 12
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`Legend Night Club v. Miller,
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`637 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2011) ........................................................................ 11
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`Liverman v. City of Petersburg,
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`844 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 2016) ........................................................................ 11
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`McCullen v. Coakley,
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`573 U.S. 464 (2014)...................................................................................... 20
`
`National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
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`524 U.S. 569 (1998)................................................................................ 13, 14
`
`Packingham v. North Carolina,
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`137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) .................................................................................. 10
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`Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
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`576 U.S. 155 (2015).......................................................................... 15, 17, 19
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`Reynolds v. Middleton,
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`779 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 2015) ........................................................................ 19
`
`v
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`Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,
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`515 U.S. 819 (1995)...................................................................................... 17
`
`Rothe Development Corporation v. Department of Defense,
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`413 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .............................................................. 12, 13
`
`Simon & Schuster, Incorporated v.
`Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board,
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`502 U.S. 105 (1991)...................................................................................... 28
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`Sons of Confederate Veterans, Incorporated v.
`Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles,
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`288 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2002) .................................................................. 17, 19
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`Sorrell v. IMS Health Incorporated,
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`564 U.S. 552 (2011).......................................................................... 10, 27, 28
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`Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,
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`535 U.S. 357 (2002)...................................................................................... 18
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`United States v. Miselis,
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`972 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2020) .................................................................. 21, 24
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`United States v. Salerno,
`
`481 U.S. 739 (1987)........................................................................................ 9
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`United States v. Stevens,
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`559 U.S. 460 (2010).................................................................................. 7, 21
`
`United States v. Williams,
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`553 U.S. 285 (2008)...................................................................................... 23
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`Western Watersheds Project v. Michael,
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`869 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2017) .................................................................... 16
`
`Whitehill v. Elkins,
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`389 U.S. 54 (1967) ........................................................................................ 30
`
`
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`vi
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`Statutes
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`15 U.S.C. § 2087 ..................................................................................................... 30
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`16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) ...................................................................................... 30
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`29 U.S.C. § 218c ..................................................................................................... 29
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`29 U.S.C. § 660(c) .................................................................................................. 29
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`31 U.S.C. § 3729 ..................................................................................................... 29
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`31 U.S.C. § 3730 ..................................................................................................... 29
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`31 U.S.C. § 3731 ..................................................................................................... 29
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`31 U.S.C. § 3732 ..................................................................................................... 29
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`31 U.S.C. § 3733 ..................................................................................................... 29
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`42 U.S.C. § 7622 ..................................................................................................... 30
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`49 U.S.C. § 20109(b) .............................................................................................. 29
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`N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 66-154 .......................................................................................... 17
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`N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-1 .......................................................................................... 23
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`N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2 ................................................................................... passim
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`N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-66 ...................................................................................... 29
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`
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`Other Authorities
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`40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(5) ........................................................................................... 30
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`40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(d) ............................................................................................. 30
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`
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`vii
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`Scott A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin, Applying Constitutional Decision Rules Versus
`Invalidating Statutes in Toto,
`
`98 VA. L. REV. 301 (2012) ........................................................................ 8, 14
`
`Nicholas Kristof, The Ugly Secrets Behind the Costco Chicken,
`N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2021),
`https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/06/opinion/sunday/
`Costco-chicken-animal-welfare.html ....................................................... 4, 27
`
`Brooke Kroeger, Undercover Reporting: The Truth About Deception (2012) ...... 26
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`Brooke Kroeger, Deception for Journalism’s Sake: A Database,
`
`NYU Libraries, http://undercoverreporting.org ..................................... 26, 27
`
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`viii
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`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
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`By consent of all the parties, amici curiae law professors submit this brief in
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`support of the Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants. Amici are legal scholars
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`whose teaching and scholarship focus on the First Amendment and who have an
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`interest in safeguarding freedoms of speech and press against laws that
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`unconstitutionally regulate expressive activity.1 Respectfully offering their
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`expertise in aid of the Court’s resolution of this case, amici urge this Court to
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`declare N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2 facially unconstitutional because it fails strict and
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`intermediate scrutiny and because the statute is substantially overbroad.
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`
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`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
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`In 2015, over the governor’s veto, the North Carolina legislature passed the
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`Property Protection Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2, which prohibits vast swaths of
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`protected speech based on information obtained from the nonpublic premises of a
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`property owner. Extending far beyond similar laws passed in other states that apply
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`only to agricultural enterprises (so called “ag-gag” statutes) and which have been
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`struck down, 99A-2 broadly empowers all property owners of any kind to sue for
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`compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, and civil penalties any person who
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`1 Amici law professors are individually named in Appendix A.
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`1
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`“exceeds [their] authority to enter the nonpublic areas of another’s premises” by
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`doing any of the following:
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`(b)(1) An employee who enters the nonpublic areas of an employer’s
`premises for a reason other than a bona fide intent of seeking or
`holding employment or doing business with the employer and
`thereafter without authorization captures or removes the employer's
`data, paper, records, or any other documents and uses the information
`to breach the person's duty of loyalty to the employer.
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`(b)(2) An employee who intentionally enters the nonpublic areas of an
`employer’s premises for a reason other than a bona fide intent of
`seeking or holding employment or doing business with the employer
`and thereafter without authorization records images or sound
`occurring within an employer's premises and uses the recording to
`breach the person’s duty of loyalty to the employer.
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`(b)(3) Knowingly or intentionally placing on the employer’s premises
`an unattended camera or electronic surveillance device and using that
`device to record images or data.
`
`***
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`(b)(5) An act that substantially interferes with the ownership or
`possession of real property.
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`N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2(b)(1) - (5).
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`Effectively, the statute shields all property owners in North Carolina from
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`third-party documentation and disclosure of misconduct, abuse, or illegality
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`occurring on their nonpublic premises. This restriction applies to whistleblowers,
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`undercover reporters, employees petitioning the government or the courts for
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`redress of workplace grievances, and anyone seeking to report malfeasance
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`pursuant to numerous state and federal regulatory statutes. Meanwhile, 99A-2 also
`2
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`imposes joint liability on any party who intentionally directs, assists, compensates,
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`or induces another to violate the Act. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2(c). This means
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`that media companies and advocacy groups who report on misconduct and
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`malfeasance also risk liability if their employees, agents, or other human sources of
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`information could be civilly prosecuted under 99A-2. In sum, the scope and
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`breadth of 99A-2 is simply jaw-dropping.
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`The government, in defending the statute, argues that it does no more than
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`codify the generally applicable common law tort of trespass, claiming there is no
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`First Amendment right to engage in speech or expressive activity while trespassing
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`(i.e., while exceeding one’s authority to enter nonpublic areas of another’s
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`premises). See Opening Br. of Defs.-Appellants 3-4, 21. This argument fails for
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`two reasons.
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`First, 99A-2 does not mirror the elements of common law trespass but
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`instead defines the prohibited conduct, in novel fashion, as unauthorized-presence
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`+ speech-activity. The speech activity, which is a codified element of the
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`prohibited conduct, consists of: (1) capturing information (e.g., photographing or
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`note-taking) and then using it against the interest of the property owner; (2)
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`recording images or sounds and then using the recording against the interest of the
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`property owner; (3) recording images or data via an unattended camera or
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`electronic surveillance device; or (4) any act that “substantially interferes with the
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`3
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`ownership or possession of real property,” which as the district court notes,
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`necessarily “ensnares” speech. J.A. 451; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2(b)(1) - (3) & (5).
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`By virtue of incorporating speech as an element of each of its enumerated offenses,
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`99A-2 in no way resembles a generally applicable trespass law. Rather, 99A-2 is a
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`civil liability statute that directly targets speech and is therefore subject to
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`heightened scrutiny. Because the statute fails to meet this rigorous constitutional
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`standard, it must be struck down.
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`The Government’s defense of 99A-2 further fails for the second reason that
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`exceeding one’s authority to enter nonpublic premises (i.e., what the Government
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`refers to as trespass) does not render all resulting speech activity unprotected.
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`Indeed, undercover journalism has a long and venerable history in our
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`democracy—still being written today—of shedding much-needed light on matters
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`of public concern that would otherwise go undetected and without accountability.2
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`Courts have therefore recognized that undercover investigations give rise to high-
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`value, protected speech. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1184
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`(9th Cir. 2018); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 297 F.Supp.3d 901, 909-10
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`(S.D. Iowa 2018); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 44 F.Supp.3d 1009, 1023 (D.
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`Idaho 2014). Yet, if allowed to stand, 99A-2 will greatly muffle, if not silence, the
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`2 See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, The Ugly Secrets Behind the Costco Chicken, N.Y.
`TIMES (Feb. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/06/opinion/sunday/
`Costco-chicken-animal-welfare.html.
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`4
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`sunshine-producing speech of undercover investigators, whistleblowers, concerned
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`employees, and persons seeking to comply with statutory reporting schemes, while
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`allowing all manner of abuses – e.g., animal welfare, labor, environmental, to
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`name a few – to persist with greatly reduced fear of public exposure. This is a
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`disastrous, upside-down result for First Amendment freedoms as well as for
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`general public policy. It is therefore imperative that this Court affirm the district
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`court’s holding that 99A-2(b)(2) and (b)(3) are facially invalid; correctly apply
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`heightened scrutiny to similarly strike down 99A-2(b)(1) and (b)(5) as applied to
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`anyone; and declare 99A-2 substantially overbroad in its entirety or else remand to
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`the district court to conduct the proper overbreadth analysis.
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`The district court correctly reached some of these same conclusions, but fell
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`critically short on others. It properly applied strict scrutiny to facially invalidate
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`99A-2(b)(2) & (b)(3) because those two provisions explicitly prohibit making
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`recordings, which is a recognized form of protected speech. See, e.g., Wasden, 878
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`F.3d at 1203; Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2017). As the
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`Government failed to argue any compelling reason for (b)(2) and (b)(3)’s direct
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`speech restrictions, the district court properly struck down both provisions on their
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`face.
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`However, the district court incorrectly used the so-called “no set of
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`circumstances” test to determine that 99A-2(b)(1) & (b)(5) were not likewise
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`5
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`facially invalid, but only invalid as applied to Plaintiffs-Appellees. See J.A. 442,
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`444-45. This was error because the Supreme Court has moved away from “no set
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`of circumstances” as the proper diagnostic for statutory facial challenges. City of
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`L.A. v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 415 (2015); Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux
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`Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996). Properly understood, “no set of
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`circumstances” describes, not the test to be applied, but the outcome when a statute
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`fails to meet the relevant constitutional standard – in this case, First Amendment
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`heightened scrutiny – and as a result cannot be constitutionally applied in any
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`circumstance. See Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1123 (10th Cir.
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`2012).
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`Here, the district court properly determined that subsections (b)(1) and (b)(5)
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`are subject to heightened scrutiny because they target and burden speech: (b)(1)
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`because it prohibits capturing (e.g., photographing or note-taking) and then using
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`information, and (b)(5) because it prohibits any act, including speech or
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`expression, that “substantially interferes with the ownership or possession of real
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`property.” The district court also correctly held that (b)(1) and (b)(5) fail
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`heightened scrutiny due to, without limitation, lack of narrow tailoring. Thus, as
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`neither subsection survives constitutional scrutiny, there is no set of circumstances
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`under which either subsection could be lawfully applied. The subsections are
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`6
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`therefore facially invalid in any application, and not just as concerns Plaintiffs-
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`Appellees.
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`Finally, the district court failed to properly consider the substantial
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`overbreadth of 99A-2. On an overbreadth challenge, a statute may be struck down
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`if “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation
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`to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460,
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`473 (2010). The district court correctly referenced the Stevens standard, but then
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`did not apply it. Namely, the court ignored that enforcing 99A-2 would create risk
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`of civil liability for huge expanses of high-value speech including news reporting,
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`whistleblowing, petitioning the government or the courts for grievances, and
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`reporting of misconduct pursuant to multiple state and federal regulatory statutes.
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`The court further neglected to weigh this vast amount of protected speech that is
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`burdened by 99A-2 against the statute’s purportedly legitimate sweep. It is
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`therefore appropriate for this Court to either conduct the proper overbreadth
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`analysis to strike down 99A-2 or to remand to the district court to do so.
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`ARGUMENT
`“No Set of Circumstances” Describes an Outcome, Not a Test
`
`I.
`
`The district court erred in holding that Property Protection Act, N.C. Gen.
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`Stat. §§ 99A-2(b)(1) & (b)(5), are unconstitutional only as-applied to Plaintiffs-
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`Appellees when, in fact, the provisions fail to survive heightened scrutiny, rendering
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`7
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`them facially invalid in any application. In rejecting the facial challenge, the lower
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`court applied what it referred to as the “no set of circumstances” test. See J.A. 442,
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`444-45. The “no set of circumstances” language has caused confusion among the
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`lower courts when deciding facial, as-applied, and overbreadth challenges. See Scott
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`A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin, Applying Constitutional Decision Rules Versus
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`Invalidating Statutes in Toto, 98 VA. L. REV. 301, 312-314 (2012) (discussing the
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`array of approaches courts have taken to applying the “no set of circumstances”
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`language). However, “no set of circumstances” is best understood, not as a test for
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`facial validity, but rather as a description of the outcome when a statute fails the
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`relevant constitutional standard—in this case intermediate and strict scrutiny—and
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`therefore can no longer lawfully be applied in any circumstance. See City of
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`Albuquerque, 667 F.3d at 1124. Because the district court properly found that (b)(1)
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`does not satisfy strict scrutiny,3 and that neither (b)(1) nor (b)(5) satisfy intermediate
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`scrutiny, the provisions should be struck down as facially invalid.
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`A. The Supreme Court eschews “no set of circumstances” when
`adjudicating facial challenges
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`The Supreme Court has moved away from using “no set of circumstances” as
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`a test of facial validity, instead using the appropriate constitutional standard to
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`invalidate a law in its totality. The phrase “no set of circumstances” originates from
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`3As discussed in Section II, strict scrutiny should also apply to (b)(5).
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`U.S. v. Salerno, where the Court described “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act
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`[as], of course, the most difficult to challenge successfully, since the challenger must
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`establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”
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`481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). However, the Supreme Court has since clarified, most
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`pointedly in Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, that “the dicta in
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`Salerno does not accurately characterize the standard for deciding facial challenges.”
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`517 U.S. at 1175 (internal quotations omitted); see also Patel, 576 U.S. at 415
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`(rejecting Salerno as the only test for facial invalidity and recognizing that “the Court
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`has allowed [facial] challenges to proceed under a diverse array of constitutional
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`provisions”); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999) (plurality
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`opinion) (“To the extent we have consistently articulated a clear standard for facial
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`challenges, it is not the Salerno formulation, which has never been the decisive factor
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`in any decision of this Court, including Salerno itself.”).
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`Rather, the Salerno declaration was a “rhetorical flourish . . . unsupported by
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`citation or precedent.” Janklow, 517 U.S. at 1175. Noting that “Salerno’s rigid and
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`unwise dictum has been properly ignored in subsequent cases,” the Supreme Court
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`subsequently warned lower courts against “ignor[ing] the appropriate principle and
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`appl[ying] the draconian ‘no circumstance’ dictum to deny relief in a case in which
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`a facial challenge would otherwise be successful.” Id. at 1175-76.
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`Consistent with the reasoning in Janklow, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
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`decided statutory facial challenges post-Salerno by applying the relevant
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`constitutional standard, not the so-called “no set of circumstances” test. See Patel,
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`576 U.S. at 415 (collecting cases that apply the appropriate constitutional standard
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`to strike down a challenged statute rather than “no set of circumstances”); Sorrell v.
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`IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011) (applying First Amendment heightened
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`scrutiny to facially invalidate a state statute without reference to “no set of
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`circumstances”); see also City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d at 1124 (“the idea that the
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`Supreme Court applies the ‘no set of circumstances’ test to every facial challenge is
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`simply a fiction.”).
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`Indeed, in the context of First Amendment challenges, the Court has
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`repeatedly applied the relevant constitutional standard to determine whether a law is
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`facially valid. See, e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017)
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`(finding statute that prohibited registered sex offenders from accessing commercial
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`social networks failed to meet intermediate scrutiny and thus was constitutionally
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`invalid); Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (“Because the
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`Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless
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`California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny.”); Citizens United v. Fed.
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`Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (applying strict scrutiny to hold part of the
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`Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 facially unconstitutional).
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`Similarly, the Fourth Circuit mirrors the Supreme Court’s application of the
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`appropriate constitutional standard when considering facial challenges, rather than
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`using the so-called “no set of circumstances” test. See, e.g., Billups v. City of
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`Charleston, 961 F.3d 673, 690 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding an ordinance that prescribed
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`tour guide licensing requirements was unconstitutional for failure to survive
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`intermediate scrutiny); Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 263-64 (4th Cir. 2019)
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`(analyzing a facial challenge t