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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
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`No. 23-4286
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`Plaintiff – Appellee,
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`v.
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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`OSCAR PLIEGO-PINEDA,
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`Defendant – Appellant.
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`Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
`Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:20-cr-00272-CCE-1)
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`Argued: November 1, 2024
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`Decided: February 24, 2025
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`Before WYNN and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and Mary Geiger LEWIS, United States
`District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.
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`Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Lewis wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wynn and
`Judge Rushing joined.
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`ARGUED: Seth Allen Neyhart, LAW OFFICE OF SETH A. NEYHART, Durham, North
`Carolina, for Appellant. Randall Stuart Galyon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
`ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Sandra J. Hairston,
`United States Attorney, Julie C. Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
`THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
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`MARY GEIGER LEWIS, District Judge:
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`Oscar Pliego-Pineda (Pliego-Pineda), who pled guilty to two counts of conspiracy,
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`appeals the 120-month sentence imposed by the district court. On appeal, Pliego-Pineda
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`argues (1) the district court clearly erred in applying a three-level managerial role
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`enhancement under the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual
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`(Guidelines) and (2) his sentence is substantively unreasonable given the district court’s
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`error. For the following reasons, we affirm.
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`I.
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`In 2019, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Drug Enforcement
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`Administration (DEA), in cooperation with local law enforcement agencies, commenced
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`an investigation into a Mexican drug trafficking organization, which was operating in
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`Mexico, California, Georgia, and North Carolina. Early in the investigation, they identified
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`Pliego-Pineda, of Atlanta, Georgia, as the organization’s “drug connection” in Atlanta.
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`J.A. at 169.
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`During the investigation, Pliego-Pineda coordinated the logistics for several multi-
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`kilogram methamphetamine deliveries to a confidential source from the FBI (CS) and an
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`undercover employee of the DEA (UC). Pliego-Pineda also arranged for large amounts of
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`drug proceeds to be wired into a Wells Fargo bank account bearing his wife’s name.
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`In September 2019, a Mexican source offered to sell the CS up to thirty pounds of
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`methamphetamine. The parties agreed to an initial sale of one kilogram, which was to be
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`arranged by Pliego-Pineda in Atlanta. The CS traveled to Atlanta, where Pliego-Pineda
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`2
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`coordinated delivery of the methamphetamine through his courier, Francisco Yesdirguer
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`Santana Pineda (Pineda).
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`Satisfied with the quality of the drugs, the CS subsequently asked the Mexican
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`source about ordering a larger shipment. The Mexican source informed the CS the “guy
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`in Atlanta,” Pliego-Pineda, would need to trust the CS before a larger deal could be
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`arranged. J.A. at 170.
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`The CS then called Pliego-Pineda, who instructed the CS to return to Atlanta one
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`more time to make a purchase. Pliego-Pineda said he wanted to ensure the money was
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`there before sending a large shipment of drugs to North Carolina.
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`The CS and Pliego-Pineda decided to meet on October 8, 2019, at a Mexican
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`restaurant in Atlanta. The UC went with the CS to the meeting, during which Pliego-
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`Pineda delivered one kilogram of methamphetamine in exchange for $5,000. Also during
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`the meeting, Pliego-Pineda and the CS discussed future deliveries of methamphetamine to
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`Greensboro, North Carolina. They agreed upon a price of $6,000 per kilogram, and Pliego-
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`Pineda told the CS he would later instruct the CS and UC on where to wire the drug
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`proceeds.
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`The CS and Pliego-Pineda had several conversations over the next couple months
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`concerning a larger shipment to Greensboro. Pliego-Pineda informed the CS shipping
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`methamphetamine in liquid form (soap) directly from Mexico would lessen the costs of
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`transporting crystal methamphetamine from Atlanta to Greensboro. According to Pliego-
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`Pineda,
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`the soap would convert
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`to approximately
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`two kilograms of crystal
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`methamphetamine. The CS agreed.
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`3
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`On December 3, 2019, Pliego-Pineda advised the CS the soap had been shipped
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`from San Juan Del Rio, Queretaro, Mexico, to North Carolina and was ready for delivery.
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`The following day, Pliego-Pineda’s courier, co-defendant Wences Mondragon-Penaloza
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`(Mondragon-Penaloza), delivered a seventeen-kilogram package containing 170 bars to the
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`UC in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Pliego-Pineda informed the CS he would send
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`someone to Greensboro to teach the CS how to convert the soap into crystal
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`methamphetamine. Subsequently, two individuals in Mexico gave the CS step-by-step
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`conversion instructions.
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`Soon after this delivery, Pliego-Pineda asked the CS to pay Mondragon-Penaloza
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`$200 for receiving the shipment from Mexico and delivering it to North Carolina. The UC
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`later met with Mondragon-Penaloza and paid him $200. But, the CS and UC had yet to
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`pay for the actual shipment.
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`On or about December 27, 2019, Pliego-Pineda asked the UC to pay $2,000 for the
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`soap package. Pliego-Pineda provided the UC with a Wells Fargo bank account number
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`bearing his wife’s name. The UC wired $2,000 to the account on December 31, 2019.
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`In January 2020, Pliego-Pineda began discussing another multi-kilogram shipment
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`with the UC, as the UC was disappointed in the results of the soap conversion. After
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`several conversations, Pliego-Pineda agreed to sell the UC three kilograms of crystal
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`methamphetamine at $6,500 per kilogram, for a total cost of $19,500, which included
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`delivery to North Carolina.
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`Pliego-Pineda asked that a partial payment of $12,000 be made to his courier at
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`delivery. But, when his courier, co-defendant Luis Alberto Garcia-Tovar (Garcia-Tovar),
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`4
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`delivered the drugs on February 6, 2020, the UC realized there were two kilograms, rather
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`than the expected three kilograms.
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`The UC called Pliego-Pineda to report the problem. The parties subsequently
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`agreed to a partial payment of $9,000 to reflect the reduced quantity. Approximately one
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`week later, the UC wired an additional $4,000 to the Wells Fargo account.
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`On February 26, 2020, Pliego-Pineda arranged for another two-kilogram delivery
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`to the UC. The delivery was half a kilogram short, so the UC spoke with Pliego-Pineda,
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`inasmuch as he was the one who negotiated the deal. After the delivery, as per Pliego-
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`Pineda’s instructions, the UC wired a partial payment of $8,000 to the Wells Fargo account.
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`In March 2020, Pliego-Pineda, on behalf of his boss Orfael Bustos Macedo (also
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`known as Guero), arranged a ten-kilogram delivery to the UC in North Carolina. Pliego-
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`Pineda informed the UC only $10,000 would be needed at delivery, and the balance could
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`be paid later.
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`Pliego-Pineda then provided the UC with a phone number for his courier, who was
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`later identified as co-defendant Abril Bustos-Martinez (Bustos-Martinez). Bustos-
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`Martinez delivered nearly ten kilograms to the UC and the UC’s accomplice (UC2) in
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`exchange for $10,000.
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`Shortly after this delivery, law enforcement stopped Bustos-Martinez and her sister
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`in Alabama. Officers seized $287,609 from a hidden compartment in the vehicle, which
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`included $10,000 from the sale.
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`5
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`Due to the seizure, Pliego-Pineda questioned the UC about the trustworthiness of
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`the UC2. The UC then informed Pliego-Pineda the outstanding balance of the February
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`26, 2020, delivery had been wired to the Wells Fargo account.
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`On June 14, 2020, Pliego-Pineda advised the UC a shipment of liquid
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`methamphetamine from Mexico would soon be arriving in North Carolina. Pliego-Pineda
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`sent the UC a picture of the shipping label and advised he would send someone to North
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`Carolina to assist the UC in converting the liquid to crystal methamphetamine. The
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`package was ultimately intercepted, and Pliego-Pineda was arrested on a federal warrant.
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`During an interview with law enforcement, Pliego-Pineda admitted Guero was his
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`source of supply and stated he began working for Guero several years earlier.
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`A Middle District of North Carolina grand jury returned a two-count indictment,
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`charging Pliego-Pineda with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture and
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`substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
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`§§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A), and conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18
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`U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) and (h). Pliego-Pineda pled guilty to both counts, pursuant to a
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`written plea agreement, after which the United States Probation Office (USPO) prepared a
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`presentence report (PSR).
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`The PSR calculated a base offense level of thirty-eight due to the attributable
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`converted drug weight. Three levels were added under Guidelines § 3B1.1(b) based on the
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`USPO’s conclusion Pliego-Pineda was a manager or supervisor of a criminal activity
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`involving five or more participants.
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`6
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`Two levels were also added under Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(16)(C) because Pliego-
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`Pineda was directly involved in importing a controlled substance while having an
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`aggravating role. Additionally, two levels were added under Guidelines § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B),
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`as the offense involved money laundering.
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`Giving Pliego-Pineda a three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the
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`PSR calculated his total offense level as forty-two. With Pliego-Pineda’s criminal history
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`category of I, his advisory Guidelines range was 360 months to life.
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`Pliego-Pineda objected to the three-level managerial role enhancement under
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`Guidelines § 3B1.1(b) and the resulting two-level specific offense enhancement under
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`Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(16)(C). He contended the district court lacked evidence he had
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`given orders, set prices, or controlled or directed another member of the conspiracy.
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`At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted Pliego-Pineda’s objection on the
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`managerial role enhancement and heard arguments from counsel. In the district court’s
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`finding the enhancement was appropriate, it stated as follows:
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`Well, looking at these seven factors in the guidelines, 3D1.1, comment four,
`it is--seems to me, that he did exercise some decision making authority in the
`sense that he decided whether to go through- whether to arrange the deal.
`Now, that is the same kind of decision making authority any drug dealer has,
`you know, whether to sell to someone. So that, you know, that kind of
`decision making authority is fairly narrow, but of course here we are talking
`about repeat drug deals, very significant amounts of methamphetamine, and
`deciding whether to trust a seller--excuse me, buyer, and presumably a seller,
`but more the buyer here, is pretty significant decision making authority.
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`The nature of the participation, he was obviously key to all of these
`transactions. He put the buyer together with those in the organization and
`the conspiracy for bringing the drugs to the deal. He certainly was involved
`in the recruitment and approval of the [UC] as an accomplice. I don’t know
`what his right to share of the proceeds were, but the money is going into his
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`7
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`bank account, where presumably he was keeping certainly some of it, but I
`don’t think I know a lot about that.
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`But his degree of participation in planning and organizing [was] very, very
`high. He was at the center of these deals, and he had--the nature and scope
`of the illegal activity, obviously very, very significant. A wide-ranging drug
`conspiracy involving a number of players at very significant amounts, and he
`was as [the AUSA] says, the hub of this.
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`The degree of control and authority exercised over others, that’s an
`interesting point. I’m confident that if he had told the person, you know, the
`mule, the person delivering the drugs not to take them, that that person would
`have obeyed, that person would not have done it, and that, you know, was he
`able by himself to tell the person who delivered the drugs to do it? I don’t
`know.
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`There is clearly some other people involved in the chain of the command but,
`you know, there could be mutual control, and we’re not talking here joint
`control. We’re not talking here about being an organizer or a leader with the
`five level enhancement.
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`We’re talking about the manager or supervisor, and it is totally clear that he
`was supervising these operations. He had a lot of oversight. He was helping
`work through delivery problems. Quality problems involving the liquid
`meth, amounts--disputes over the amounts. He was involved in all of these
`things and he was communicating the prices to the buyer, and seems to have
`had at least some authority to negotiate a price.
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`I’m sure, you know, there may have been some constraints on that from
`others, but it seems to me, that he did have this supervisory role and this
`management role. You know, I appreciate that there is some--there is not
`direct evidence that he’s telling people, you know, specific people do this,
`do that, but he is clearly managing and supervising the operation. I have no
`doubt that if he had told these other folks, don’t do it, you know, they
`wouldn’t have done it, that he had a degree of management and supervisory
`authority and clearly somebody is telling these folks, yes, go deliver the
`drugs, and he is telling the [UC], which is an important point, take--deliver
`the money this way, put it in the bank account. He is supervising the [UC’s]
`actions, or managing them, certainly. Managing them might be a better word
`in that particular way.
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`So when I look at all of these things together, it seems to me he falls under
`the enhancement as it is defined in the guideline, and also find by a
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`8
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`preponderance of the evidence, which means I’ll overrule [Pliego-Pineda’s]
`objection.
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`J.A. at 69–71.
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`After the district court adopted the PSR as-is, it determined the advisory Guidelines
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`range was 360 months to life. Noting the downward variances given to several of Pliego-
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`Pineda’s co-defendants and the government’s motion for a downward departure, the district
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`court heard from the parties.
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`Defense counsel maintained Pliego-Pineda was entitled to a downward variance,
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`which would result in a sentence below that received by higher-level members of the
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`conspiracy. The government agreed a downward variance was appropriate and praised
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`Pliego-Pineda’s actions, as outlined in the government’s motion for downward departure.
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`Additionally, Pliego-Pineda made a statement on his own behalf.
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`Thereafter, the district court found “a very significant variance [wa]s appropriate
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`before application of the [government’s motion].” J.A. at 89. The district court explained
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`the sentence, prior to consideration of the government’s motion, would be 180 months.
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`But, granting the government’s motion, the district court sentenced Pliego-Pineda to 120
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`months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release.
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`Thereafter, Pliego-Pineda timely filed this appeal.
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`II.
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`“[C]ourts of appeals must review all sentences . . . under a deferential abuse-of-
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`discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Under the Gall
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`standard, we must first “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural
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`9
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`error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range . . . [or]
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`selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts . . . .” Id. at 51.
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`Because the question of whether a role enhancement applies is a factual
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`determination, it is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 147–
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`48 (4th Cir. 2009). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to
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`support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
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`conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333
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`U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
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`Where a sentence is free from procedural error, the Court next considers whether it
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`is substantively reasonable based on the totality of circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
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`“Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is
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`presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
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`A.
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`Pliego-Pineda first argues the district court clearly erred in applying a three-level
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`managerial role enhancement.
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`Under the Guidelines, the district court may increase a defendant’s base offense
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`level by three levels “[i]f the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer
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`or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise
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`extensive[.]” Guideline § 3B1.1(b). The parties agree there were five or more participants
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`here.
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`Although the Guidelines fail to “define ‘manager’ or ‘supervisor,’ . . . we apply
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`their common meanings.” United States v. Burnley, 988 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2021);
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`10
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`see, e.g., United States v. Slade, 631 F.3d 185, 190 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying the dictionary
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`definition of “manager”).
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`The Court has explained that a district court, in applying the common meaning of
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`these terms, “must consider” the following seven factors set forth in the commentary:
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`[1] the exercise of decision making authority, [2] the nature of participation
`in the commission of the offense, [3] the recruitment of accomplices, [4] the
`claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, [5] the degree of
`participation in planning or organizing the offense, [6] the nature and scope
`of the illegal activity, and [7] the degree of control and authority exercised
`over others.
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`Burnley, 988 F.3d at 188 (alterations in original); see Guideline § 3B1.1 cmt. 4 (setting
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`forth the same seven factors).
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`Neither party has disputed we are bound by this commentary. Cf. United States v.
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`Campbell, 22 F.4th 438, 445 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2022) (explaining the Court should defer to
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`the commentary only where the Guideline is “genuinely ambiguous . . . [after] exhaust[ing]
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`all the ‘traditional tools’ of statutory construction” (alterations in original) (quoting Kisor
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`v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 575 (2019))).
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`Under Guideline § 3B1.1(b), a three-level enhancement “is appropriate where the
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`evidence demonstrates that the defendant ‘controlled the activities of other participants’ or
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`‘exercised management responsibility.’” Slade, 631 F.3d at 190 (quoting United States v.
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`Bartley, 230 F.3d 667, 673–74 (4th Cir. 2000)). In Bartley, the Court held coordinating
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`the activities of others is sufficient to warrant the enhancement. Indeed, the Guidelines
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`make clear the management or supervision of just one participant alone renders the
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`enhancement appropriate. Guideline § 3B1.1 cmt. 2.
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`11
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`Having reviewed the record as a whole, we are unable to conclude the district court
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`clearly erred in finding Pliego-Pineda constituted a manager or supervisor of a criminal
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`activity involving five or more participants.
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`As to the exercise of decision-making authority, the organization vested Pliego-
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`Pineda with significant authority. He decided whether to trust particular buyers and
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`whether to arrange recurring deals involving large quantities of methamphetamine in
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`various forms.
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`Further, as to the nature of participation in the conspiracy, Pliego-Pineda served as
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`the organization’s primary contact in Atlanta, connecting the supplier in Mexico with
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`buyers in North Carolina.
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`Pliego-Pineda also had a high degree of participation in organizing the offense. As
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`a self-proclaimed “middle man,” J.A. at 128, Pliego-Pineda negotiated the price of large-
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`scale transactions; arranged interstate and international drug deliveries; fronted supply to,
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`and accepted partial payments from, buyers; managed, and presumably distributed,
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`thousands of dollars in drug proceeds; and oversaw issues regarding the quality and
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`quantity of drugs sold.
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`Next, as to the nature and scope of the criminal activity and the requirement it
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`involve at least five participants, the conspiracy consisted of at least ten individuals
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`trafficking large amounts of methamphetamine throughout Mexico, California, Georgia,
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`and North Carolina. Although the district court lacked direct evidence of Pliego-Pineda
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`instructing couriers to deliver drugs, this is immaterial, as an abundance of circumstantial
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`evidence indicates Pliego-Pineda, as the Atlanta hub of the organization, controlled the
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`12
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`activities of Pineda, Mondragon-Penaloza, Garcia-Tovar, Bustos-Martinez, and unnamed
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`individuals who shipped packages of liquid methamphetamine from Mexico in December
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`2019 and June 2020.
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`In explaining its decision to apply the three-level enhancement, the district court
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`stated:
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`[Pliego-Pineda] certainly was involved in the recruitment and approval of the
`[UC] as an accomplice. . . . He is telling the [UC], which is an important
`point, take -- deliver the money this way, put it in the bank account. He is
`supervising the [UC’s] actions, or managing them, certainly.
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`J.A. at 69, 70. The district court erred in this regard, inasmuch as it was improper to
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`consider Pliego-Pineda’s supervision of the UC. In doing so, the district court effectively
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`found the UC to be a participant in the criminal activity. But, “[a] person who is not
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`criminally responsible for the commission of the offense (e.g., an undercover law
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`enforcement officer) is not a participant.” Guideline § 3B1.1 cmt. 1.
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`Notwithstanding this error, as explained above, nearly all of the remaining factors
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`support the district court’s factual findings. See Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132, 137
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`(4th Cir. 2003) (explaining this Court is “entitled to affirm on any ground appearing in the
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`record”).
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`In sum, “[i]n a drug distribution case such as this one, the management enhancement
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`is appropriate for a defendant who arranges drug transactions, negotiates sales with others,
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`and hires others to work for the conspiracy.” United States v. Matthews, 168 F.3d 1234,
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`1249 (11th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s application of the three-
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`level enhancement.
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`13
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`B.
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`Pliego-Pineda next argues his sentence was substantively unreasonable due to the
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`district court’s erroneous application of the managerial role enhancement. Inasmuch as the
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`Court holds the district court properly applied the enhancement, based on Pliego-Pineda’s
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`argument, we also hold the sentence was substantively reasonable. See Louthian, 756 F.3d
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`at 306 (“Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is
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`presumptively reasonable.”).
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`III.
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`For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Pliego-Pineda’s sentence.
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`AFFIRMED
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`14
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