UNPUBLISHED
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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
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`No. 23-4633
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`Plaintiff – Appellee,
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`v.
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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`JOSHUA O’KEITH BELCHER,
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`Defendant – Appellant.
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`Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
`Danville. Michael F. Urbanski, Senior District Judge. (4:19-cr-00025-MFU-1)
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`Argued: September 26, 2024
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`Decided: February 19, 2025
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`Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, RUSHING, Circuit Judge, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit
`Judge.
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`Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge
`Diaz and Senior Judge Keenan joined.
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`ARGUED: Erin Margaret Trodden, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
`Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Jonathan Patrick Jones, OFFICE OF THE
`UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mary
`Maguire, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
`Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United States
`Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for
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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`No. 23-4633
`
`Plaintiff – Appellee,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
`
`
`
`
`
`JOSHUA O’KEITH BELCHER,
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`
`
`
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`Defendant – Appellant.
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`Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
`Danville. Michael F. Urbanski, Senior District Judge. (4:19-cr-00025-MFU-1)
`
`
`Argued: September 26, 2024
`
`
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`Decided: February 19, 2025
`
`
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`Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, RUSHING, Circuit Judge, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit
`Judge.
`
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`Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge
`Diaz and Senior Judge Keenan joined.
`
`
`
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`ARGUED: Erin Margaret Trodden, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
`Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Jonathan Patrick Jones, OFFICE OF THE
`UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mary
`Maguire, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
`Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United States
`Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for
`
`
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`
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`Appellee.
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`Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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`2
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`RUSHING, Circuit Judge:
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`A jury convicted Joshua Belcher of illegally possessing a firearm as a felon. Belcher
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`appeals his conviction, challenging two evidentiary rulings and the district court’s refusal
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`to give one jury instruction Belcher requested. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
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`I.
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`In April 2019, Officer Jayme Clark stopped Belcher for driving a truck with a
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`broken taillight. Officer Clark’s body camera and dashboard camera recorded the incident.
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`At the truck, Officer Clark smelled marijuana and asked to search the vehicle. Belcher
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`consented. Upon searching, Officer Clark discovered a stolen pistol under the truck’s
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`bench seat. Belcher was arrested.
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`The truck was registered to Belcher’s father, Roy Lynwood Hairston, Jr. Instead of
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`towing the truck, Officer Clark allowed Belcher to call Hairston so he could retrieve it.
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`When Hairston arrived, Officer Clark told him Belcher wanted to talk to him, but Hairston
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`declined to speak with his son.
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`Officer Clark then took Belcher to the police station and questioned him about the
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`gun. Explaining the potential charges, Officer Clark urged Belcher to reveal where he
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`obtained the gun if he didn’t steal it. Belcher responded that there was a “dilemma” in
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`answering those questions. J.A. 806, at 4:30–4:45. Eventually, however, Belcher
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`confessed to buying the gun, saying: “Yeah, but I don’t even know who the person was I
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`got it from. That’s why I said you wouldn’t even believe it; if I tell you, you won’t believe
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`it.” J.A. 806, at 5:17–5:27.
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`3
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`Belcher was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
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`§ 922(g)(1). At trial in July 2022, the jury found Belcher guilty. The district court
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`sentenced him to forty-eight months in prison.
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`II.
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`On appeal, Belcher first challenges the exclusion of proffered defense evidence. At
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`trial, Belcher sought to introduce a certified copy of his father’s 1980 felony conviction.
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`According to Belcher, this evidence would support a defense theory that the gun belonged
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`to his father, who was not legally allowed to possess it, and that Belcher falsely confessed
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`to protect his father from being criminally charged as a felon in possession of a firearm.
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`Belcher further argued that the prior conviction explained Hairston’s reluctance to talk to
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`Belcher when he retrieved the truck and “why [Hairston] has never come forward in the
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`interim to say that the gun was his.” J.A. 530.
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`The district court reasoned that Hairston’s prior conviction was irrelevant absent
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`evidence Belcher knew about it and evidence Hairston’s right to possess a firearm had not
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`been restored. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 104(b). Belcher did not provide such evidence, so
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`the court excluded the conviction records.
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`After the verdict, Belcher moved for a new trial on the ground that Hairston’s
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`conviction was relevant and its exclusion inhibited Belcher’s ability to present a complete
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`defense. The district court disagreed. As the court explained, even without a prior felony
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`conviction, “it was illegal for Hairston to knowingly receive a stolen firearm, and the
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`defense was able to argue that Hairston’s possession of the firearm explained both
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`Belcher’s and Hairston’s conduct.” United States v. Belcher, No. 4:19-CR-25, 2023 WL
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`4
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`1423754, at *6 (W.D. Va. Jan. 30, 2023). In particular, Belcher had the opportunity to
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`argue—and did argue—to the jury that he falsely confessed because he was concerned his
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`father may have stolen the gun and that Hairston’s unlawful possession of the gun
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`motivated his conduct when he retrieved the truck. In reaching its verdict, however, “the
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`jury necessarily rejected Belcher’s theory that Hairston owned the gun.” Id. “Under these
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`circumstances,” the district court reasoned, its decision to exclude Hairston’s court records
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`“could not have affected the jury’s verdict.” Id.
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`We review the district court’s decision to exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.
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`United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 2007). Yet, evidentiary rulings are
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`subject to harmless error review, so even if the ruling was in error, we will “leav[e] the
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`judgment intact where we are able to conclude, after pondering all that happened without
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`stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially
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`swayed by the error.” United States v. Garcia-Lagunas, 835 F.3d 479, 492 (4th Cir. 2016)
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`(internal quotation marks omitted).
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`Evidence is relevant if it “has any tendency” to make a fact of consequence “more
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`or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. As we have
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`often observed, “relevance typically presents a low bar to admissibility.” United States v.
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`Hart, 91 F.4th 732, 742 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). Belcher
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`persuasively argues that Hairston’s conviction was relevant to his defense because it could
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`explain why Hairston did not claim the gun or testify on Belcher’s behalf. That remains
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`so even if Belcher was unaware of his father’s 1980 conviction and even if Belcher did not
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`produce evidence proving the negative that Hairston’s firearm rights had not been restored.
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`5
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`But even assuming the district court abused its discretion by excluding Hairston’s
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`conviction records, any error was harmless.
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`As the district court correctly explained when denying Belcher’s motion for a new
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`trial, even without evidence of Hairston’s prior conviction, Belcher was able to argue to
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`the jury that Hairston’s conduct and Belcher’s confession were explained by the fact that
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`the gun belonged to Hairston and possessing it was illegal—not because Hairston was a
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`felon, but because the gun was stolen. The defense made this exact argument during
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`closing. By convicting Belcher, the jury rejected his assertion that he lied about owning
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`the gun to protect his father from being charged with possessing a stolen firearm. It stands
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`to reason that the jury would not be swayed by the additional argument that Belcher was
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`(perhaps unknowingly) protecting Hairston from being charged with possessing a firearm
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`as a felon. We therefore conclude any error in excluding this evidence was harmless.
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`III.
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`Next, Belcher contends the district court erred in excluding certain cross-
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`examination evidence. Before trial, the Government disclosed information to the defense
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`regarding Officer Clark. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–155 (1972).
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`Specifically, the Government produced body camera footage of an April 2020 traffic stop
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`in which Officer Clark used his stun gun against a man for allegedly resisting arrest.
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`Records produced with the footage showed that Officer Clark was disciplined for this
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`incident and transferred to the police department’s animal control unit.
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`The Government moved pretrial to exclude the video and disciplinary records,
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`arguing they were irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and improper character evidence. See
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`6
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`Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403, 404(b), 608(b). Belcher disagreed, arguing the evidence showed
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`Clark’s bias, untruthfulness, motive or intent, and “modus operandi” in “interacting with
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`young black men.” J.A. 92. The district court granted the Government’s motion, excluding
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`evidence related to the 2020 traffic stop but allowing Belcher to cross-examine Officer
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`Clark about his transfer from patrol officer to animal control and his ambition to be
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`promoted outside that unit.
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`In a written opinion, the court examined the criteria for admitting evidence of a
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`witness’s character or other acts under Federal Rules of Evidence 404, 608, 402, and 403.
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`The court reasoned that evidence about the April 2020 traffic stop was “not relevant to any
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`issue in Belcher’s prosecution.” J.A. 193 (citing United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991,
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`997 (4th Cir. 1997)). The stop was a year after Belcher’s, and “the two episodes could not
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`be more different.” J.A. 194. “The Belcher traffic stop involved a defective tail light, the
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`odor of marijuana, and the discovery of a stolen handgun in which the parties remained
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`calm throughout, while the [2020] stop concerned a violent, physical encounter during
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`which Clark discharged an electrical stun device.” J.A. 194.
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`Having reviewed the video and disciplinary records, the court also concluded that
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`the 2020 incident and disciplinary investigation did not “bear[] upon or relate[] to Clark’s
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`character for truthfulness,” nor did they “suggest any propensity of Clark’s to falsify his
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`testimony or indicate a lack of candor.” J.A. 195–196. The court further determined that
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`the evidence was unfairly prejudicial, as it “undoubtedly” would “inflame the jury and
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`confuse and mislead them as to the issues material to the criminal prosecution of Belcher.”
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`J.A. 197; see also J.A. 193 (finding any probative value “‘substantially outweighed by
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`7
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`confusion or unfair prejudice in the sense that it tends to subordinate reason to emotion in
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`the factfinding process’” (quoting Queen, 132 F.3d at 997)). Finally, the court found
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`Belcher’s argument—that the video and disciplinary records were “evidence of bias by
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`Clark” providing him “with a motive to plant evidence and testify falsely at the trial of this
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`case”—“entirely speculative” and “belied by the relevant body camera video of the April
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`20, 2019, traffic stop involving Belcher.” J.A. 197.
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`Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see Delfino, 510 F.3d at 470, we find none. The
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`district court carefully considered the relevant criteria for admission under Rules 404 and
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`608, and Belcher has identified no factual or legal error in the court’s analysis. Nor did the
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`court transgress its “wide discretion . . . to determine admissibility under Rule 403.”
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`United States v. Miller, 61 F.4th 426, 430 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks
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`omitted). Finally, as the district court rightly observed, the jury could fully assess Officer
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`Clark’s actions in arresting Belcher by viewing the body camera and dashboard camera
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`footage from Belcher’s own traffic stop.
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`IV.
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`Lastly, Belcher argues the district court erred by not instructing the jury about his
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`“theory of defense.” Specifically, Belcher proposed the following instruction: “Mr.
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`Belcher’s defense is that he did not ‘knowingly’ possess any weapon, and that the
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`government has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Belcher knew any weapon
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`was in his father’s truck.” J.A. 439.
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`“We review the district court’s decision to give or deny a proposed jury instruction
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`for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Hicks, 64 F.4th 546, 556 (4th Cir. 2023). “When
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`8
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`a trial court has rejected a proposed instruction, we will reverse only if that instruction
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`‘(1) was correct; (2) was not substantially covered by the court’s charge to the jury; and
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`(3) dealt with some point in the trial so important, that failure to give the requested
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`instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to conduct his defense.’” United
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`States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 449 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Passaro, 577
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`F.3d 207, 221 (4th Cir. 2009)).
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`The district court did not abuse its discretion. As the court correctly explained, its
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`charge to the jury adequately covered the relevant concepts, including knowledge,
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`reasonable doubt, and the Government’s obligation to prove all the elements of the crime.
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`Denial of the requested instruction did not impair Belcher’s ability to present his theory of
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`defense to the jury.
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`The district court’s judgment is
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`* * *
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`AFFIRMED.
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`9
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