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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
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`No. 24-4405
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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`Plaintiff - Appellee,
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`v.
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`LITEEF HUGHES,
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`Defendant - Appellant.
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`Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
`Beckley. Frank W. Volk, Chief District Judge. (5:22-cr-00105-1)
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`Submitted: February 20, 2025
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`Before AGEE, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
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`Decided: February 25, 2025
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`Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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`ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Clint Carte, Assistant Federal
`Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
`Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy Doyle Boggess, Assistant United States
`Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Beckley, West Virginia, for
`Appellee.
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`Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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`PER CURIAM:
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`Lifteef Hughes pled guilty to distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
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`§ 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced Hughes below the advisory Sentencing
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`Guidelines range to 96 months of imprisonment followed by a three-year term of
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`supervised release. On appeal, Hughes’ attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
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`California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal
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`but questioning the reasonableness of Hughes’ sentence. Hughes was informed of his right
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`to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so. The Government has moved to
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`dismiss the appeal pursuant to the appellate waiver included in Hughes’ plea agreement.
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`We affirm in part and grant the Government’s motion and dismiss in part.
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`Hughes’s waiver of appellate rights does not prevent our review of the validity of
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`the plea itself. See United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 2018). We
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`therefore deny, in part, the Government’s motion to dismiss and review the adequacy of
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`the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 plea colloquy for plain error. See United States v. Williams, 811
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`F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016) (stating standard of review); see also Henderson v. United
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`States, 568 U.S. 266, 272 (2013) (describing plain error standard). Before accepting a
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`guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant
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`of, and determines that the defendant understands, the rights he is relinquishing by pleading
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`guilty, the nature of the charge to which he is pleading, and the applicable maximum and
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`mandatory minimum penalties he faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United States v.
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`DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). The district court also must ensure that the
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`plea was voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises not contained in the plea
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`agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and “that there is a factual basis for the plea,” Fed.
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`R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). Here, the district court conducted a thorough and complete Rule 11
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`hearing. We therefore conclude that Hughes entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily,
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`and that a factual basis supported the plea.
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`With respect to Hughes’s waiver of his appellate rights, “[w]e review an appellate
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`waiver de novo to determine whether the waiver is enforceable” and “will enforce the
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`waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls within the scope of the waiver.”
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`United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks
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`omitted). An appellate waiver is valid if the defendant enters it “knowingly and
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`intelligently, a determination that we make by considering the totality of the
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`circumstances.” Id. “Generally though, if a district court questions a defendant regarding
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`the waiver of appellate rights during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the
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`defendant understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” McCoy, 895
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`F.3d at 362 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`Our review of the record confirms that, with limited exceptions not applicable here,
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`Hughes knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence.
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`We therefore conclude that the waiver is valid and enforceable and that the sentencing issue
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`counsel raises in the Anders brief falls squarely within the scope of the waiver.
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`In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
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`found no potentially meritorious grounds for appeal that are outside the scope of the
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`appellate waiver. We therefore grant in part the Government’s motion to dismiss in part
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`and dismiss the appeal as to all issues covered by the appellate waiver. We affirm the
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`remainder of the judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Hughes, in writing, of
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`the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Hughes
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`requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
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`then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
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`motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Hughes. We dispense with oral
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`argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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`before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
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`AFFIRMED IN PART,
`DISMISSED IN PART
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