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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`FILED
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`OCT 18 2019
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`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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`No. 17-55467
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`D.C. No.
`2:16-cv-04610-MWF-PLA
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`MEMORANDUM*
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` Plaintiff-Appellant,
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`KRISTINE ANN BISTILINE,
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` v.
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`JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., a
`California Corporation; et al.,
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` Defendants-Appellees.
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Central District of California
`Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
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`Submitted October 16, 2019**
`San Diego, California
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`Before: HURWITZ, OWENS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
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`Kristine Ann Bistline1 appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing her
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`claims related to the foreclosure proceeding against her home. We have jurisdiction
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` This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
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`except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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`** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
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`without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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`1
`Though the caption reads “Kristine Bistiline,” the appellant’s name is
`“Kristine Bistline,” as indicated by the district court documents.
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`under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo the district court’s dismissal under
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d
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`892, 897 (9th Cir. 2011). We AFFIRM.2
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`1.
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`The district court did not err in concluding that Bistline lacked standing
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`under California law to challenge the validity of assignments of the beneficial
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`interest in her deed of trust in a pre-foreclosure action.
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`Contrary to Bistline’s arguments, the California Supreme Court in Yvanova v.
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`New Century Mortgage Corp. expressly limited its holding to post-foreclosure sale
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`situations only. 365 P.3d 845, 848 (Cal. 2016) (“We do not hold or suggest that a
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`borrower may attempt to preempt a threatened nonjudicial foreclosure by a suit
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`questioning the foreclosing party’s right to proceed.”); see also id. at 855
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`(“disallowing the use of a lawsuit to preempt a nonjudicial foreclosure, is not within
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`the scope of our review, which is limited to a borrower’s standing to challenge an
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`assignment in an action seeking remedies for wrongful foreclosure” (emphasis in
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`original)).
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`The California Court of Appeal has refused to extend Yvanova to pre-
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`foreclosure cases. See, e.g., Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 245 Cal. App.
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`4th 808, 815 (2016). Because “there is no convincing evidence that the state
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`2
`This disposition does not address claims against Ditech Financial LLC
`or Ditech’s motion for judicial notice. The appeal as to Ditech has been closed for
`administrative purposes because it has filed for bankruptcy.
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`2
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`supreme court would decide differently, a federal court is obligated to follow the
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`decisions of the state’s intermediate appellate courts.” Vestar Dev. II, LLC v. Gen.
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`Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Lewis v. Tel. Emps.
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`Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545 (9th Cir. 1996)). 3
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`2.
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`The district court also properly dismissed Bistline’s claim for slander
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`of title based on the defendants-appellees’ recordations of the beneficial interest
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`assignments. The recordation of assignments is covered by the litigation privilege
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`in California Civil Code Section 2924(d), which states that “[p]erformance of the
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`procedures set forth in this article” “shall constitute privileged communications
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`pursuant to Section 47.” Although this privilege might not apply if a party acted
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`with malice, Schep v. Capital One, N.A., 12 Cal. App. 5th 1331, 1337 (2017),
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`Bistline did not plausibly allege malice.
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`3.
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`Bistline argues that the district court improperly dismissed her
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`complaint without leave to amend because she could have added a claim under the
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`Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. But Bistline did not raise this issue below, nor
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`did she present new facts or explain why she had failed to include the new claim in
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`her earlier complaints. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in
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`3 We need not consider Bistline’s argument that California Civil Code
`Section 2924.17 allows for a pre-foreclosure action because she did not raise the
`assignments as a basis for a violation of that provision in the district court. See
`Baccei v. United States., 632 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011).
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`3
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`dismissing without leave to amend. See Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal,
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`10 F.3d 667, 677 (9th Cir. 1993).
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`4.
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`Finally, Bistline moves the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that
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`a foreclosure allegedly occurred, proffering a letter from her own trial attorney. We
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`deny the motion. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (allowing judicial notice of facts that can be
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`determined from sources “whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”).
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`Moreover, the documents do not show beyond a reasonable dispute that a foreclosure
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`occurred. ECF No. 66 (letter noting that the foreclosure notice “had been ‘canceled’
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`by Freddie Mac” and that “if Freddie Mac decides to restart the process you will
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`contact me”).
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`AFFIRMED.
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`4
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