FOR PUBLICATION
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`JAIME HOYOS,
`
`Petitioner-Appellant,
`
`v.
`
`RONALD DAVIS, Warden, California
`State Prison at San Quentin,
`Respondent-Appellee.
`
`No. 17-99009
`
`D.C. No.
`3:09-cv-00388-
`L-NLS
`
`OPINION
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Southern District of California
`M. James Lorenz, District Judge, Presiding
`
`Argued and Submitted March 23, 2022
`Pasadena, California
`
`Filed September 2, 2022
`
`Before: Sandra S. Ikuta, Morgan Christen, and
`Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges.
`
`Opinion by Judge Christen;
`Concurrence by Judge Ikuta
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`JAIME HOYOS,
`
`Petitioner-Appellant,
`
`v.
`
`RONALD DAVIS, Warden, California
`State Prison at San Quentin,
`Respondent-Appellee.
`
`No. 17-99009
`
`D.C. No.
`3:09-cv-00388-
`L-NLS
`
`OPINION
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Southern District of California
`M. James Lorenz, District Judge, Presiding
`
`Argued and Submitted March 23, 2022
`Pasadena, California
`
`Filed September 2, 2022
`
`Before: Sandra S. Ikuta, Morgan Christen, and
`Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges.
`
`Opinion by Judge Christen;
`Concurrence by Judge Ikuta
`
`
`
`2
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`SUMMARY*
`
`Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty
`
`The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a habeas
`corpus petition brought by Jaime Hoyos, who was sentenced
`to death in 1994 after a state jury convicted him of first-
`degree murder and other offenses.
`
`In the opinion, the panel affirmed the district court’s
`denial of Hoyos’s certified claim that the prosecutor’s use of
`peremptory challenges violated his Fourteenth Amendment
`right to equal protection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476
`U.S. 79 (1986).
`
`Batson established a three-step framework for trial courts
`to evaluate claims that a prosecutor’s peremptory strikes were
`racially discriminatory. Step One: the defendant must make
`out a prima facie case by showing that the totality of the
`relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory
`purpose. Step Two: once the defendant has made out a
`prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State to explain
`adequately the racial exclusion by offering permissible race-
`neutral justifications for the strikes. Step Three: if a race-
`neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then
`decide whether the opponent of the strike has proved
`purposeful racial discrimination.
`
`Hoyos argued the California Supreme Court’s decision
`was an unreasonable application of Johnson v. California,
`
`* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
`been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
`
`
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`3
`
`545 U.S. 162 (2005), under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) because
`the state court “engaged in the prohibited exercise of
`reviewing the trial court record regarding the struck jurors
`and identifying colorable reasons why the prosecutor might
`have legitimately struck the three jurors.” The panel held that
`the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied Johnson
`by doing exactly what this court has explained Johnson
`forbids: the court scanned the record, articulated its own
`race-neutral reasons why the prosecutor may have exercised
`his peremptory strikes, and denied Hoyos’s claim at Step
`One. Noting that Hoyos cited no Supreme Court authority
`requiring a state court to conduct a comparative juror analysis
`at Step One, the panel held that the California Supreme Court
`did not violate clearly established federal law by failing to do
`so.
`
`Because the California Supreme Court unreasonably
`applied Johnson, the panel reviewed de novo Hoyos’s Batson
`claim to determine whether he raised an inference of racial
`bias at Step One. To establish a prima facie case at Step One,
`Hoyos bore the burden to show: (1) he is a member of a
`cognizable group; (2) the prosecutor removed members of
`that group; and (3) the totality of the circumstances gives rise
`to an inference that the prosecutor excluded jurors based on
`race. The parties did not dispute that Hoyos—who argued
`that his equal protection rights were violated because the
`prosecutor struck “all three Hispanic female prospective
`jurors”—met his burden as to the first two elements: it is
`undisputed that Hoyos is a member of a cognizable group
`(i.e., Hispanic
`individuals) and
`that
`the prosecutor
`peremptorily removed members of that group. The panel
`noted that trial courts are often well-situated to decide the
`Step One question without conducting a formal comparative
`juror analysis, but wrote that when an appellate court must
`
`
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`4 d
`
`ecide whether the trial court that denied a Batson motion
`should instead have drawn an inference that discrimination
`occurred, Batson supports the use of comparative juror
`analysis. Engaging in such an analysis, the panel concluded
`that a comparison of the struck jurors to the seated jurors
`undermines any inference of racial bias. Accordingly,
`pursuant to Batson’s three-step framework, the panel could
`not say the California Supreme Court erred by ruling that
`Hoyos did not make a prima facie showing to shift the burden
`to the prosecutor to explain the actual motivation for the
`peremptory challenges.
`
`The panel addressed Hoyos’s six other certified claims in
`a simultaneously filed memorandum disposition and affirmed
`the district court’s rulings on those claims. The panel
`declined to reach Hoyos’s uncertified claims.
`
`Judge Ikuta, joined by Judge Bumatay, concurred. Judge
`Ikuta wrote that the majority’s holding—that the California
`Supreme Court’s rejection of Hoyos’s Batson claim was an
`unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme
`Court precedent, which relieves this court of deference to the
`state court’s opinion under the Antiterrorism and Effective
`Death Penalty Act of 1996—is untrue because there is, in
`fact, no Supreme Court case squarely on point. She wrote
`that there is, instead, a Ninth Circuit opinion, Currie v.
`McDowell, 825 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2016), that merely claims
`this circuit’s rule—that a trial court may not deny a Batson
`motion at step one based on evidence supporting race-neutral
`reasons for the challenges—is clearly established Supreme
`Court precedent. She joined the opinion’s analysis in full
`because the panel is bound by Currie to the extent it holds
`that a rule has been clearly established by Federal law as
`
`
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`5
`
`determined by the Supreme Court, even if that precedent was
`plainly wrong.
`
`COUNSEL
`
`Mark F. Adams (argued), San Diego, California; Eric S.
`Multhaup, Mill Valley, California; for Petitioner-Appellant.
`
`Anthony Da Silva (argued) and Lise S. Jacobson, Deputy
`Attorney General; James William Bilderback II, Senior
`Assistant Attorney General; Rob Bonta, Attorney General;
`Attorney General’s Office, California Department of Justice,
`San Diego, California; for Respondent-Appellee.
`
`OPINION
`
`CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:
`
`Jaime Hoyos was sentenced to death in 1994 after a state
`jury convicted him of first-degree murder and several other
`offenses. He appeals the district court’s denial of his federal
`habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
`Hoyos raises several certified claims on appeal and also asks
`us to consider three uncertified claims. We affirm the district
`court’s denial of Hoyos’s petition based on his claim that the
`prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges violated his
`Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection pursuant to
`Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Hoyos’s Batson
`argument reflects a misunderstanding of our prior caselaw
`that warrants additional discussion, and we address it in this
`published opinion. We address Hoyos’s six other certified
`claims in a simultaneously filed memorandum disposition and
`
`
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`6 a
`
`ffirm the district court’s rulings on those claims. We decline
`to reach Hoyos’s uncertified claims. See Ninth Cir. R. 22-
`1(e).
`
`I
`
`Hoyos and his brother-in-law and co-defendant Jorge
`Emilio Alvarado were found guilty of murdering Daniel and
`Mary Magoon in their San Diego County home in 1992. In
`a joint trial held in March 1994, Hoyos and Alvarado were
`each convicted of two counts of first-degree murder pursuant
`to section 187 of the California Penal Code. They were
`acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of assault with
`a firearm for injuring the Magoons’s three-year-old son. The
`co-defendants were also convicted of conspiracy to commit
`robbery, first-degree robbery, burglary, grand theft of a
`firearm, and transporting over 28.5 grams of marijuana in
`violation of the California Health and Safety Code.
`
`The jury returned a verdict of life without the possibility
`of parole for Hoyos’s murder of Daniel Magoon, and death
`for the murder of Mary Magoon. The trial court denied
`Hoyos’s motions for a new trial and to modify the penalty
`verdict, and imposed a death sentence.
`
`A
`
`Hoyos’s Batson claim centers upon the prosecution’s use
`of peremptory strikes against three Hispanic prospective
`jurors: Margaret A., Lisa H., and Yolanda M.1 During voir
`
`1 The district court referred to each member of the jury venire by their
`first and last initials, following the California Supreme Court’s practice on
`
`
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`7
`
`dire, the judge questioned Margaret A. about her English
`language skills, following up on her response to the juror
`questionnaire, which asked whether the case was one “on
`which [she] would like to serve as a juror.” Margaret A.
`wrote, “Not enough English.” Margaret A. also selected
`“Yes” for questions asking whether she had trouble
`understanding or speaking English and whether she spoke and
`understood Spanish. A subsequent question on the form
`asked whether Margaret A. would “be unable to set aside
`[her] interpretation [of testimony] and accept that of the Court
`translation.” Margaret A. again answered, “Yes.”
`
`the
`judge she understood
`the
`told
`Margaret A.
`questionnaire, but “I don’t speak English that well and I don’t
`understand a lot of words that you are saying.” In response
`to questions from Hoyos’s counsel, she responded that
`Spanish was her primary language, and she said she could not
`describe
`the meaning of
`the words “aggravating,”
`“mitigating,” or “evidence,” though she understood the
`meaning of those words. The judge asked Margaret A.
`whether she would be comfortable
`interrupting
`the
`proceedings to get clarification on the meaning of a word, to
`which Margaret A. responded: “I don’t know. I get real
`nervous when I come to English. I think I be very nervous
`then. I try to speak.” The trial judge later asked her if she
`would “be liable to just let it kind of pass” if she did not
`understand something, and Margaret A. said, “I probably will,
`yes.” Hoyos’s counsel challenged Margaret A. for cause
`based on her difficulty with understanding English, and the
`prosecutor joined defense counsel’s challenge. The trial court
`declined to excuse Margaret A. for cause but told the parties
`
`direct appeal. We refer to each individual by her first name and last
`initial.
`
`
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`8 t
`
`hat they could “deal with” Margaret A. using peremptory
`challenges.
`
`Prospective juror Yolanda M. wrote on her questionnaire:
`“I don’t feel I could be part of a jury, if they impose the death
`penalty.” During voir dire she explained, “What it comes
`down to, I just have strong religious beliefs deep down
`inside.” But she also told Alvarado’s counsel during voir dire
`questioning that she thought she could put her views aside.
`
`The prosecutor asked that Yolanda M. be removed for
`cause, explaining he did not believe she could impose a death
`sentence. Hoyos’s counsel opposed the request and argued
`that Yolanda M. “did change her mind to some degree” about
`her ability to impose the death penalty. The trial court denied
`the challenge for cause, reasoning: “She wouldn’t like it, but
`she will follow the instructions and if called upon can serve
`as a juror in this case.”
`
`Prospective juror Lisa H. wrote on her juror questionnaire
`that she “believe[d] in the death penalty (and the justice
`system) but only in certain instances.” She also wrote that
`she was “not certain what benefit [the death penalty] does for
`society by executing someone.” During voir dire she told the
`trial court that the companion of “a very very close friend,
`like family” was killed in a drive-by shooting less than a year
`before voir dire and disclosed that the experience had
`“affected” her.2 In response to this disclosure, the judge
`asked Lisa H. whether she had any quarrel with the principles
`
`2 It appears Lisa H. disclosed her recent experience involving a
`shooting on her questionnaire in response to the question, “Do you have
`any family members or close friends who have been the victim of a violent
`crime?”
`
`
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`9
`
`or rules of law that he had described, and Lisa H. said:
`“Well, I tend to side with the [sic] life in prison as opposed to
`death penalty,” but she also said she could “keep an open
`mind.” The court followed up by asking Lisa H.:
`
`Q: Do you feel that you would be capable of
`returning . . . a [death] verdict?
`
`A: I think I can, but I would have to be real
`convinced that it outweighed it heavily.
`
`Q: Could you keep an open mind?
`
`A: (No audible response.)
`
`Q: Now, some people have told us that they
`can, and some people have told us that they
`can’t. Again, I respect all opinions. Can you
`tell me how you feel about that.
`
`A: I think I can, but I would have to be real
`convinced that it outweighed it heavily.
`
`Later the prosecutor questioned Lisa H.:
`
`Q: Ms. H[], going to the same question on the
`death penalty, you stated to his honor as to
`questions regarding that, that [sic] in order to
`impose the death penalty, you would have to
`be real convinced that that was the appropriate
`punishment. Would you be placing any
`particular burden upon
`the prosecution,
`myself, or the defense to convince you one
`way or another?
`
`
`
`10
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`A: Prosecution.
`
`Q: So even though his honor has indicated I
`don’t have a burden in a penalty trial, you
`would place a burden on me to convince you
`that they should die?
`
`A: Well, I guess I answered that incorrectly.
`I would have to be convinced of the evidence,
`of everything all together. That’s what I
`mean.
`
`The record does not indicate whether Lisa H. was challenged
`for cause.
`
`After the court’s dismissals for hardship and for cause, it
`selected forty-two prospective jurors from a venire panel of
`seventy-nine.3
` The prosecution was allowed
`thirty
`peremptory challenges, and Hoyos and Alvarado were
`allowed twenty joint peremptory strikes and five individual
`peremptory challenges each. The prosecutor used his fifth
`peremptory strike to remove Margaret A. Alvarado’s counsel
`requested a side-bar, which the court postponed until a later
`time. The prosecution then used its sixth peremptory
`challenge to strike Lisa H. After the prosecution exercised
`two more strikes and the defense exercised one, the parties
`accepted the jury, and it was sworn in. The parties then
`selected six alternates. Both sides exercised one peremptory
`challenge, and Alvarado’s counsel returned to his objection
`
`3 There were eighty-one veniremembers remaining after dismissals for
`hardship and cause, but the court dismissed two additional jurors before
`the parties began exercising their peremptory strikes.
`
`
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`11
`
`regarding the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to
`remove Margaret A.
`
`Alvarado’s counsel cited People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748
`(Cal. 1978), and argued the prosecution’s peremptory strike
`was racially discriminatory because Margaret A. was “of
`Mexican ancestry,” like the defendants.4 Alvarado’s counsel
`also asked to “put on the record” that he “was thinking of
`making the same objection” for the prosecution’s strike of
`Lisa H. The court agreed to take up the motion “at a
`convenient time.”
`
`The court then brought in the remainder of the
`prospective jurors, and the parties jointly exercised another
`eighteen peremptory strikes.
` Eight of the eighteen
`prospective alternates excused on peremptory strikes were
`removed by the prosecution, including Yolanda M. The
`alternates were sworn in, and Alvarado’s counsel moved to
`add Yolanda M. to the Wheeler/Batson motion. It appears
`from the trial court’s transcript that the court granted
`Alvarado’s motion to include Yolanda M. in the Batson
`challenge.
`
`The trial court heard argument on the Wheeler/Batson
`motion after all the jurors and alternates had been selected.
`
`4 “A Wheeler motion is considered the procedural equivalent to a
`challenge made under Batson.” Williams v. Runnels, 432 F.3d 1102, 1103
`n.1 (9th Cir. 2006); see also People v. Cornwell, 117 P.3d 622, 632 (Cal.
`2005) (“Exercising a peremptory challenge because of group bias rather
`than for reasons specific to the challenged prospective juror violates both
`the California Constitution and the United States Constitution.” (quoting
`People v. Cleveland, 86 P.3d 302, 321 (Cal. 2004))), abrogated on other
`grounds by People v. Doolin, 198 P.3d 11, 36 n.22 (Cal. 2009).
`
`
`
`12
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`Alvarado’s counsel presented a brief argument in support of
`the motion:
`
`I indicated before we broke that the three
`jurors, [Margaret A., Lisa H., and Yolanda
`M.,] were of Mexican ancestry . . . I think the
`record I made before was also clear in that I
`said my client was of the [same] cognizable
`class. Batson talks a little bit later after those
`being part of the first prong, second prong
`showing that p[er]emptory challenges is a jury
`selection
`technique
`in which
`improper
`motives could be exercised. I don’t think I
`have to put on any proof or make an offer of
`proof to that.
`
`And finally, the third prong is these facts, I
`suppose referring to the facts I have just
`recited, and any other relevant circumstances
`that raise an inference that the prosecutor used
`to exclude these people from the petit jury on
`account of race.
`
`In support of that I will incorporate their
`statements in court, their answers to the
`questionnaire, and submit it on that.
`
`Hoyos’s counsel joined the motion but did not offer any
`additional reasons or arguments to support the defendants’
`prima facie showing. The prosecutor briefly expressed that
`defense counsel had not made a prima facie showing and
`noted that one of the twelve jurors who was seated before the
`Wheeler/Batson motion, and one alternate, were Hispanic.
`The court denied the Wheeler/Batson motion:
`
`
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`13
`
`I am mindful of the fact that on the jury we
`have [Pablo G.] who is a Hispanic. Other
`members of other minority groups are on the
`jury.
`
`I believe
`there are
`two
`African/American representatives on the jury.
`I look at the record of these individuals and
`based on what I have in front of me,
`[Margaret A.], for example, she indicated,
`frankly, it would be very difficult for her to
`serve as a juror in this case because of the
`inability that she said she has to speak
`English. . . .
`
`She was not excused statutorily as a matter of
`hardship. But one can certainly see under
`those circumstances such a juror may have a
`great degree of difficulty with such a complex
`case such as this and a case involving the
`length of trial, the number of witnesses, and
`the magnitude of these issues. She said that
`she wasn’t comfortable with doing it. She
`said she didn’t want to do it, in effect. And I
`can see based upon that the exercise of a
`peremptory.
`
`And I am not inquiring of the prosecution
`right now, but I can see good reasons why one
`would want to excuse such a person from
`service on the jury in view of the problems
`with the English language, spoken and
`understanding.
`
`As to the next juror, . . . [Yolanda M.]
`indicated to the court . . . in her questionnaire
`
`
`
`14
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`that she, in fact, had a conscientious objection
`to the death penalty. She indicated orally she
`would be able to keep an open mind.
`
`But the prosecution has the right to exercise
`peremptories as to individuals who have
`feelings pro or con so far as the death penalty
`is concerned. I didn’t see anything about . . .
`this juror, her being excused that causes me to
`think she was excused for purposes of race.
`
`The last juror is [Lisa H.]. . . . [She] was asked
`by the court if she had any quarrel with the
`principles of law that we discussed concerning
`capital punishment, and she said during the
`course of oral inquiry that she would tend to
`side with life in prison rather than the
`imposition of a death sentence essentially.
`
`Observing the manner [in] which all of these
`jurors were questioned by the prosecution, the
`extent of the questioning, the use of these
`p[er]emptories, the presence of at least one
`Hispanic on the panel, . . . it seems to me that
`there really isn’t anything from which I could
`reasonably find the exercise of p[er]emptories
`based upon race. Some attempt to exclude
`Hispanics, that doesn’t seem to be the case at
`all in each of these cases.
`
`It seems to me that a reasonable individual
`would be inclined to perhaps exclude these
`jurors on matters solely independent of race.
`I just don’t see it. And I feel that there isn’t
`
`
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`15
`
`really any type of substantial showing at all of
`the use of p[er]emptories based upon race. So
`I find there is not a prima facie showing.
`
`The case proceeded to trial and defendants were convicted
`of first-degree murder and several other felonies. Hoyos
`raised several claims on direct appeal to the California
`Supreme Court, including a Batson claim alleging that the
`prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to strike three
`Hispanic prospective
`jurors violated his Fourteenth
`Amendment right to equal protection. The California
`Supreme Court affirmed Hoyos’s conviction and sentence.
`See People v. Hoyos, 162 P.3d 528, 536 (Cal. 2007). As to
`Hoyos’s Batson claim, the state supreme court rejected
`Hoyos’s argument that he had established a prima facie case
`of racial bias. Id. at 551. The court cited Johnson v.
`California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), but also specified that it
`would affirm the trial court’s ruling on the Batson claim
`“where the record suggests grounds upon which the
`prosecutor might reasonably have challenged the jurors in
`question.” Hoyos, 162 P.3d at 550.
`
`the prosecutor’s strike of
`Specifically addressing
`Margaret A., the California Supreme Court concluded the
`record demonstrated that both the prosecution and defense
`“were reasonably concerned about the prospective juror’s
`English language skills and, on this basis, the prosecutor was
`entitled to excuse her.” Id. The state court went on to
`conclude the prosecutor was entitled to excuse Lisa H.
`because “[t]he record strongly suggests the prosecutor had
`grounds for concern about her possible bias against the death
`penalty.” Id. at 552. Last, the court explained “[t]he record
`suggests the prosecutor had reason for concern about
`
`
`
`16
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`[Yolanda M.’s] possible bias against the death penalty, and
`on this basis, he was entitled to excuse her.”5 Id.
`
`B
`
`After his first state habeas petition was summarily denied,
`Hoyos filed a federal habeas petition in the District Court for
`the Southern District of California. The district court stayed
`proceedings to allow Hoyos the opportunity to exhaust all of
`his claims in state court, and the California Supreme Court
`summarily denied Hoyos’s second petition. Hoyos then filed
`a second amended habeas petition in federal court. The
`district court denied the State’s request to dismiss certain
`claims on the basis of state procedural bars, denied Hoyos’s
`request for an evidentiary hearing, and denied Hoyos’s
`petition. See Hoyos v. Davis, No. 09cv0388 L, 2017 WL
`4409437 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2017).
`
`The district court concluded that the California Supreme
`Court’s rejection of Hoyos’s Batson claim was not an
`unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme
`
`5 The California Supreme Court also rejected Hoyos’s argument that
`he demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination based on the
`cognizable class of Hispanic women and on Hoyos’s theory that most
`Hispanic women oppose the death penalty so disqualification of a
`Hispanic woman on those grounds “would constitute improper bias
`against this group.” Id. at 552. Hoyos mentions, but does not
`substantively argue, his group bias theory in his briefing before our court.
`Therefore, this argument is forfeited. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A)
`(stating that argument on appeal must contain “appellant’s contentions and
`the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the
`record on which the appellant relies”).
`
`
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`17
`
`Court precedent.6 The court explained that the state court
`“correctly recognized and articulated the controlling Supreme
`Court authority” from Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162
`(2005), and “determine[d] ‘whether the record supports an
`inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of
`race.’” The district court also rejected Hoyos’s argument that
`the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable
`determination of the facts, and rejected Hoyos’s contention
`that the state court violated clearly established federal law by
`failing to conduct a comparative juror analysis. The district
`court acknowledged that comparative juror analysis “is an
`established tool at step three of the Batson analysis,” and that
`it may be used at Batson’s first step to assess whether a prima
`facie showing is made. But after conducting its own
`comparative juror analysis, the district court concluded the
`comparison did “nothing to undermine the reasonableness of
`the California Supreme Court’s findings and conclusions.”
`
`Hoyos timely appealed the district court’s ruling. We
`have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a),
`and we affirm the district court’s denial of Hoyos’s Batson
`claim. In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, we
`affirm the remainder of the district court’s judgment denying
`Hoyos’s petition.
`
`6 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal habeas court reviews the
`last reasoned state-court decision. See Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d
`1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012). We agree with the district court that the last
`reasoned state-court decision for purposes of Hoyos’s petition is the
`California Supreme Court’s ruling on automatic direct appeal.
`
`
`
`18
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`II
`
`We review de novo a district court’s denial of habeas
`relief. Avena v. Chappell, 932 F.3d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir.
`2019). Because Hoyos filed his federal habeas petition after
`April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
`Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs our review. Id.; Pub. L. No.
`104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Pursuant to AEDPA, our
`review of the challenged state-court decision must apply “a
`statutory presumption of correctness.” Currie v. McDowell,
`825 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 2016). We do not defer to the
`state court’s decision if it was “contrary to, or involved an
`unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
`as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or
`if the state court’s decision “was based on an unreasonable
`determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented”
`in the state proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2).
`
`A Batson claim may implicate either prong of § 2254(d).
`McDaniels v. Kirkland, 813 F.3d 770, 775 (9th Cir. 2015) (en
`banc). Hoyos argues the California Supreme Court’s ruling
`on his Batson claim was an unreasonable application of
`Supreme Court precedent within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1).
`
`The state court’s decision results in an unreasonable
`application of clearly established federal law when the court
`“correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it
`unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.”
`Cook v. Kernan, 948 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting
`Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407–08 (2000)); see also
`Johnson v. Finn, 665 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011)
`(addressing “whether the state courts applied the proper
`standard in determining whether [the petitioners] made a
`prima facie showing of racial discrimination”). The state
`
`
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`19
`
`court’s decision is contrary to clearly established federal law
`if it “‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set
`forth in [Supreme Court] cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of
`facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of
`[the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result
`different from [this] precedent.’” Cook, 948 F.3d at 965
`(alterations in original) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at
`405–06). “Clearly established federal law” refers to the
`Supreme Court’s holdings “as of the time of the relevant
`state-court decision.” Avena v. Chappell, 932 F.3d 1237,
`1247 (9th Cir. 2019) (alterations omitted) (quoting Lockyer
`v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003)).
`
`III
`
`“The ‘Constitution forbids striking even a single
`prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.’” Foster v.
`Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 499 (2016) (quoting Snyder v.
`Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008)). Batson v. Kentucky,
`476 U.S. 79 (1986), established a three-step framework for
`trial courts to use to evaluate claims that a prosecutor’s
`peremptory strikes were racially discriminatory, id. at 96.
`
`First, the defendant must make out a prima
`facie case by showing that the totality of the
`relevant facts gives rise to an inference of
`discriminatory purpose. Second, once the
`defendant has made out a prima facie case, the
`burden shifts
`to
`the State
`to explain
`adequately the racial exclusion by offering
`permissible race-neutral justifications for the
`strikes. Third, if a race-neutral explanation is
`tendered, the trial court must then decide
`
`
`
`20
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`whether the opponent of the strike has proved
`purposeful racial discrimination.
`
`Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005) (alterations,
`internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). This appeal
`involves Step One of Batson’s three-part test.
`
`Batson was designed to provide “actual answers to
`suspicions” about racial bias, and the Supreme Court’s
`decision in Johnson cited with approval our court’s
`understanding that “it does not matter that the prosecutor
`might have had good reasons . . . [w]hat matters is the real
`reason [jurors] were stricken.” Id. at 172 (first alteration in
`original) (quoting Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1090
`(9th Cir. 2004)); see also Currie v. McDowell, 825 F.3d 603,
`610 (9th Cir. 2016). Thus, once a defendant demonstrates an
`inference of racial discrimination, a trial court must give the
`prosecutor an opportunity to explain his actual reasoning. See
`Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168. In Hoyos’s case, the trial court
`found the defendants had not made a prima facie showing at
`Step One and did not ask the prosecutor to state his reasons
`for striking Margaret A., Lisa H., and Yolanda M.
`
`Hoyos argues the California Supreme Court’s decision
`was an unreasonable application of Johnson because the state
`court “engaged in the prohibited exercise of reviewing the
`trial court record regarding the struck jurors and identifying
`colorable reasons why the prosecutor might have legitimately
`struck the three jurors.” The State argues the California
`Supreme Court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an
`unreasonable application of, United State Supreme Court
`precedent. The district court concluded the California
`Supreme Court’s ruling was not “erroneous or unreasonable.”
`
`
`
`HOYOS V. DAVIS
`
`21
`
`The defendant bears the burden at Batson Step One to
`“produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to
`draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”
`Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170. In Johnson, the Supreme Court
`held that California state courts “had been wrong to require
`Batson claimants
`to show a ‘strong
`likelihood’ of
`discrimination at Step One” and “reiterated that a defendant
`makes out a prima facie case if he produces evidence
`sufficient
`to support a
`‘reasonable
`inference’ of
`discrimination.” Shirley v. Yates, 807 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th
`Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson, 545 U.S. at 166–67).7
`
`This court has repeatedly interpreted Johnson to mean
`that, at Step One, “the existence of grounds upon which a
`prosecutor could reasonably have premised a challenge does
`not suffice to defeat an inference of racial bias.” Currie,
`825 F.3d at 609 (alterations omitted) (quoting Johnson v.
`Finn, 665 F.3d 1063, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011)); see also Williams
`v. Runnels, 432 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006). For
`example, in Currie we held that the California Court of
`Appeal violated clearly established federal law when it
`affirmed a trial court’s Step One denial of a Batson motion
`because the trial court only scanned the record for “grounds
`upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged
`
`7 The state trial court denied Hoyos’s Batson motion in February
`1994, nearly a decade before the Supreme Court decided Johnson. The
`last reasoned state-court decision is the California Supreme Court’s ruling
`on Hoyos’s direct appeal, which was entered in July 2007, after the
`Supreme Court decided Johnson. We consider the Supreme Court’s
`decision in Johnson relevant for purposes of deciding whether the state
`court’s decision violated clearly established federal law. See Styers v.
`Ryan, 811 F.3d 292, 297 (9th Cir. 2015) (“When a new constitutio
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