FOR PUBLICATION
`
`FILED
`
`OCT 17 2022
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`
`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
`
` FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`JAIME HOYOS,
`
`Petitioner-Appellant,
`
` v.
`
`RONALD DAVIS, Warden, California
`State Prison at San Quentin,
`
`Respondent-Appellee.
`
`No. 17-99009
`
`D.C. No.
`3:09-cv-00388-L-NLS
`
`ORDER AND
`AMENDED OPINION
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Southern District of California
`M. James Lorenz, District Judge, Presiding
`
`Argued and Submitted March 23, 2022
`Pasadena, California
`
`Before: Sandra S. Ikuta, Morgan Christen, and Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges.
`
`Order;
`Opinion by Judge Christen;
`Concurrence by Judge Ikuta
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`SUMMARY*
`
`
`Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty
`
`
`The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition brought
`by Jaime Hoyos, who was sentenced to death in 1994 after a state jury convicted him
`of first-degree murder and other offenses.
`
`In the opinion, the panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Hoyos’s certified
`claim that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges violated his Fourteenth
`Amendment right to equal protection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
`(1986).
`
`Batson established a three-step framework for trial courts to evaluate claims that
`a prosecutor’s peremptory strikes were racially discriminatory. Step One: the
`defendant must make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality of the
`relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. Step Two: once
`the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State to
`explain adequately the racial exclusion by offering permissible race-neutral
`justifications for the strikes. Step Three: if a race-neutral explanation is tendered,
`the trial court must then decide whether the opponent of the strike has proved
`purposeful racial discrimination.
`
`Hoyos argued the California Supreme Court’s decision was an unreasonable
`application of Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), under 28 U.S.C.
`§ 2254(d)(1) because the state court “engaged in the prohibited exercise of reviewing
`the trial court record regarding the struck jurors and identifying colorable reasons
`why the prosecutor might have legitimately struck the three jurors.” The panel held
`that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied Johnson by doing exactly
`what this court has explained Johnson forbids: the court scanned the record,
`articulated its own race-neutral reasons why the prosecutor may have exercised his
`peremptory strikes, and denied Hoyos’s claim at Step One. Noting that the Hoyos
`cited no Supreme Court authority requiring a state court to conduct a comparative
`juror analysis at Step One, the panel held that the California Supreme Court did not
`
`
`* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been
`
`prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
`
`

`

`
`violate clearly established federal law by failing to do so.
`
`Because the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied Johnson, the panel
`reviewed de novo Hoyos’s Batson claim to determine whether he raised an inference
`of racial bias at Step One. To establish a prima facie case at Step One, Hoyos bore
`the burden to show: (1) he is a member of a cognizable group; (2) the prosecutor
`removed members of that group; and (3) the totality of the circumstances gives rise
`to an inference that the prosecutor excluded jurors based on race. The parties did
`not dispute that Hoyos—who argued that his equal protection rights were violated
`because the prosecutor struck “all three Hispanic female prospective jurors”—met
`his burden as to the first two elements: it is undisputed that Hoyos is a member of a
`cognizable group (i.e., Hispanic individuals) and that the prosecutor peremptorily
`removed members of that group. The panel noted that trial courts are often well-
`situated to decide the Step One question without conducting a formal comparative
`juror analysis, but wrote that when an appellate court must decide whether the trial
`court had denied a Batson motion should instead have drawn an inference that
`discrimination occurred, Batson supports
`the use of comparative
`juror
`analysis. Engaging in such an analysis, the panel concluded that a comparison of
`the struck jurors to the seated jurors undermines any inference of racial
`bias. Accordingly, pursuant to Batson’s three-step framework, the panel could not
`say the California Supreme Court erred by ruling that Hoyos did not make a prima
`facie showing to shift the burden to the prosecutor to explain the actual motivation
`for the peremptory challenges.
`
`The panel addressed Hoyos’s six other certified claims in a simultaneously filed
`memorandum disposition and affirmed the district court’s rulings on those
`claims. The panel declined to reach Hoyos’s uncertified claims.
`
`Judge Ikuta, joined by Judge Bumatay, concurred. Judge Ikuta wrote that the
`majority’s holding—that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of Hoyos’s
`Batson claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court
`precedent, which relieves this court of deference to the state court’s opinion under
`the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996—is untrue because there
`is, in fact, no Supreme Court case squarely on point. She wrote that there is, instead,
`a Ninth Circuit opinion, Currie v. McDowell, 825 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2016), that
`merely claims this circuit’s rule—that a trial court may not deny a Batson motion at
`step one based on evidence supporting race-neutral reasons for the challenges—is
`clearly established Supreme Court precedent. She joined the opinion’s analysis in
`full because the panel is bound by Currie to the extent it holds that a rule has been
`clearly established by Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, even if that
`
`

`

`
`precedent was plainly wrong.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`COUNSEL
`
`Mark F. Adams (argued), San Diego, California; Eric S. Multhaup (argued), Law
`Office of Eric Multhaup, Mill Valley, California; for Petitioner-Appellant.
`Anthony Da Silva (argued) and Lise S. Jacobson, Deputy Attorney General; James
`William Bilderback II, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Rob Bonta, Attorney
`General; Attorney General’s Office, California Department of Justice, San Diego,
`California; for Respondent-Appellee.
`
`
`

`

`ORDER
`
`The opinion filed on September 2, 2022, is amended as follows: on slip
`
`opinion page 25, lines 15–16, replace <to include gender> with <to include
`
`combined race-gender groups>.
`
`The Petitions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc are otherwise DENIED;
`
`no further petitions for rehearing will be accepted.
`
`

`

`CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:
`
`OPINION
`
`Jaime Hoyos was sentenced to death in 1994 after a state jury convicted him
`
`of first-degree murder and several other offenses. He appeals the district court’s
`
`denial of his federal habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
`
`Hoyos raises several certified claims on appeal and also asks us to consider three
`
`uncertified claims. We affirm the district court’s denial of Hoyos’s petition based
`
`on his claim that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges violated his
`
`Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky,
`
`476 U.S. 79 (1986). Hoyos’s Batson argument reflects a misunderstanding of our
`
`prior caselaw that warrants additional discussion, and we address it in this
`
`published opinion. We address Hoyos’s six other certified claims in a
`
`simultaneously filed memorandum disposition and affirm the district court’s
`
`rulings on those claims. We decline to reach Hoyos’s uncertified claims. See
`
`Ninth Cir. R. 22-1(e).
`
`I
`
`Hoyos and his brother-in-law and co-defendant Jorge Emilio Alvarado were
`
`found guilty of murdering Daniel and Mary Magoon in their San Diego County
`
`home in 1992. In a joint trial held in March 1994, Hoyos and Alvarado were each
`
`2
`
`

`

`convicted of two counts of first-degree murder pursuant to section 187 of the
`
`California Penal Code. They were acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of
`
`assault with a firearm for injuring the Magoons’s three-year-old son. The co-
`
`defendants were also convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery, first-degree
`
`robbery, burglary, grand theft of a firearm, and transporting over 28.5 grams of
`
`marijuana in violation of the California Health and Safety Code.
`
`The jury returned a verdict of life without the possibility of parole for
`
`Hoyos’s murder of Daniel Magoon, and death for the murder of Mary Magoon.
`
`The trial court denied Hoyos’s motions for a new trial and to modify the penalty
`
`verdict, and imposed a death sentence.
`
`A
`
`Hoyos’s Batson claim centers upon the prosecution’s use of peremptory
`
`strikes against three Hispanic prospective jurors: Margaret A., Lisa H., and
`
`Yolanda M.1 During voir dire, the judge questioned Margaret A. about her English
`
`language skills, following up on her response to the juror questionnaire, which
`
`asked whether the case was one “on which [she] would like to serve as a juror.”
`
`Margaret A. wrote, “Not enough English.” Margaret A. also selected “Yes” for
`
`1 The district court referred to each member of the jury venire by their first
`and last initials, following the California Supreme Court’s practice on direct
`appeal. We refer to each individual by her first name and last initial.
`
`3
`
`

`

`questions asking whether she had trouble understanding or speaking English and
`
`whether she spoke and understood Spanish. A subsequent question on the form
`
`asked whether Margaret A. would “be unable to set aside [her] interpretation [of
`
`testimony] and accept that of the Court translation.” Margaret A. again answered,
`
`“Yes.”
`
`Margaret A. told the judge she understood the questionnaire, but “I don’t
`
`speak English that well and I don’t understand a lot of words that you are saying.”
`
`In response to questions from Hoyos’s counsel, she responded that Spanish was her
`
`primary language, and she said she could not describe the meaning of the words
`
`“aggravating,” “mitigating,” or “evidence,” though she understood the meaning of
`
`those words. The judge asked Margaret A. whether she would be comfortable
`
`interrupting the proceedings to get clarification on the meaning of a word, to which
`
`Margaret A. responded: “I don’t know. I get real nervous when I come to English.
`
`I think I be very nervous then. I try to speak.” The trial judge later asked her if she
`
`would “be liable to just let it kind of pass” if she did not understand something, and
`
`Margaret A. said, “I probably will, yes.” Hoyos’s counsel challenged Margaret A.
`
`for cause based on her difficulty with understanding English, and the prosecutor
`
`joined defense counsel’s challenge. The trial court declined to excuse Margaret A.
`
`4
`
`

`

`for cause but told the parties that they could “deal with” Margaret A. using
`
`peremptory challenges.
`
`Prospective juror Yolanda M. wrote on her questionnaire: “I don’t feel I
`
`could be part of a jury, if they impose the death penalty.” During voir dire she
`
`explained, “What it comes down to, I just have strong religious beliefs deep down
`
`inside.” But she also told Alvarado’s counsel during voir dire questioning that she
`
`thought she could put her views aside.
`
`The prosecutor asked that Yolanda M. be removed for cause, explaining he
`
`did not believe she could impose a death sentence. Hoyos’s counsel opposed the
`
`request and argued that Yolanda M. “did change her mind to some degree” about
`
`her ability to impose the death penalty. The trial court denied the challenge for
`
`cause, reasoning: “She wouldn’t like it, but she will follow the instructions and if
`
`called upon can serve as a juror in this case.”
`
`Prospective juror Lisa H. wrote on her juror questionnaire that she
`
`“believe[d] in the death penalty (and the justice system) but only in certain
`
`instances.” She also wrote that she was “not certain what benefit [the death
`
`penalty] does for society by executing someone.” During voir dire she told the
`
`trial court that the companion of “a very very close friend, like family” was killed
`
`in a drive-by shooting less than a year before voir dire and disclosed that the
`
`5
`
`

`

`experience had “affected” her.2 In response to this disclosure, the judge asked Lisa
`
`H. whether she had any quarrel with the principles or rules of law that he had
`
`described, and Lisa H. said: “Well, I tend to side with the [sic] life in prison as
`
`opposed to death penalty,” but she also said she could “keep an open mind.” The
`
`court followed up by asking Lisa H.:
`
`Q: Do you feel that you would be capable of returning . . . a [death] verdict?
`
`A: I think I can, but I would have to be real convinced that it outweighed it
`heavily.
`
`Q: Could you keep an open mind?
`
`A: (No audible response.)
`
`Q: Now, some people have told us that they can, and some people have told
`us that they can’t. Again, I respect all opinions. Can you tell me how you
`feel about that.
`
`A: I think I can, but I would have to be real convinced that it outweighed it
`heavily.
`
`
`
`
`
`Later the prosecutor questioned Lisa H.:
`
`Q: Ms. H[], going to the same question on the death penalty, you stated to
`his honor as to questions regarding that, that [sic] in order to impose the
`death penalty, you would have to be real convinced that that was the
`
`2 It appears Lisa H. disclosed her recent experience involving a shooting on
`her questionnaire in response to the question, “Do you have any family members or
`close friends who have been the victim of a violent crime?”
`
`6
`
`

`

`appropriate punishment. Would you be placing any particular burden upon
`the prosecution, myself, or the defense to convince you one way or another?
`
`A: Prosecution.
`
`Q: So even though his honor has indicated I don’t have a burden in a
`penalty trial, you would place a burden on me to convince you that they
`should die?
`
`A: Well, I guess I answered that incorrectly. I would have to be convinced
`of the evidence, of everything all together. That’s what I mean.
`
`The record does not indicate whether Lisa H. was challenged for cause.
`
`After the court’s dismissals for hardship and for cause, it selected forty-two
`
`prospective jurors from a venire panel of seventy-nine.3 The prosecution was
`
`allowed thirty peremptory challenges, and Hoyos and Alvarado were allowed
`
`twenty joint peremptory strikes and five individual peremptory challenges each.
`
`The prosecutor used his fifth peremptory strike to remove Margaret A. Alvarado’s
`
`counsel requested a side-bar, which the court postponed until a later time. The
`
`prosecution then used its sixth peremptory challenge to strike Lisa H. After the
`
`prosecution exercised two more strikes and the defense exercised one, the parties
`
`accepted the jury, and it was sworn in. The parties then selected six alternates.
`
`Both sides exercised one peremptory challenge, and Alvarado’s counsel returned to
`
`3 There were eighty-one veniremembers remaining after dismissals for
`hardship and cause, but the court dismissed two additional jurors before the parties
`began exercising their peremptory strikes.
`
`7
`
`

`

`his objection regarding the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove
`
`Margaret A.
`
`Alvarado’s counsel cited People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978), and
`
`argued the prosecution’s peremptory strike was racially discriminatory because
`
`Margaret A. was “of Mexican ancestry,” like the defendants.4 Alvarado’s counsel
`
`also asked to “put on the record” that he “was thinking of making the same
`
`objection” for the prosecution’s strike of Lisa H. The court agreed to take up the
`
`motion “at a convenient time.”
`
`The court then brought in the remainder of the prospective jurors, and the
`
`parties jointly exercised another eighteen peremptory strikes. Eight of the eighteen
`
`prospective alternates excused on peremptory strikes were removed by the
`
`prosecution, including Yolanda M. The alternates were sworn in, and Alvarado’s
`
`counsel moved to add Yolanda M. to the Wheeler/Batson motion. It appears from
`
`4 “A Wheeler motion is considered the procedural equivalent to a challenge
`made under Batson.” Williams v. Runnels, 432 F.3d 1102, 1103 n.1 (9th Cir.
`2006); see also People v. Cornwell, 117 P.3d 622, 632 (Cal. 2005) (“Exercising a
`peremptory challenge because of group bias rather than for reasons specific to the
`challenged prospective juror violates both the California Constitution and the
`United States Constitution.” (quoting People v. Cleveland, 86 P.3d 302, 321 (Cal.
`2004))), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Doolin, 198 P.3d 11, 36 n.22
`(Cal. 2009).
`
`8
`
`

`

`the trial court’s transcript that the court granted Alvarado’s motion to include
`
`Yolanda M. in the Batson challenge.
`
`The trial court heard argument on the Wheeler/Batson motion after all the
`
`jurors and alternates had been selected. Alvarado’s counsel presented a brief
`
`argument in support of the motion:
`
`I indicated before we broke that the three jurors, [Margaret A., Lisa H., and
`Yolanda M.,] were of Mexican ancestry . . . I think the record I made before
`was also clear in that I said my client was of the [same] cognizable class.
`Batson talks a little bit later after those being part of the first prong, second
`prong showing that p[er]emptory challenges is a jury selection technique in
`which improper motives could be exercised. I don’t think I have to put on
`any proof or make an offer of proof to that.
`
`And finally, the third prong is these facts, I suppose referring to the facts I
`have just recited, and any other relevant circumstances that raise an
`inference that the prosecutor used to exclude these people from the petit jury
`on account of race.
`
`In support of that I will incorporate their statements in court, their answers to
`the questionnaire, and submit it on that.
`
`Hoyos’s counsel joined the motion but did not offer any additional reasons
`
`or arguments to support the defendants’ prima facie showing. The prosecutor
`
`briefly expressed that defense counsel had not made a prima facie showing and
`
`noted that one of the twelve jurors who was seated before the Wheeler/Batson
`
`motion, and one alternate, were Hispanic. The court denied the Wheeler/Batson
`
`motion:
`
`9
`
`

`

`I am mindful of the fact that on the jury we have [Pablo G.] who is a
`Hispanic. Other members of other minority groups are on the jury. I believe
`there are two African/American representatives on the jury. I look at the
`record of these individuals and based on what I have in front of me,
`[Margaret A.], for example, she indicated, frankly, it would be very difficult
`for her to serve as a juror in this case because of the inability that she said
`she has to speak English. . . .
`
`She was not excused statutorily as a matter of hardship. But one can
`certainly see under those circumstances such a juror may have a great degree
`of difficulty with such a complex case such as this and a case involving the
`length of trial, the number of witnesses, and the magnitude of these issues.
`She said that she wasn’t comfortable with doing it. She said she didn’t want
`to do it, in effect. And I can see based upon that the exercise of a
`peremptory.
`
`And I am not inquiring of the prosecution right now, but I can see good
`reasons why one would want to excuse such a person from service on the
`jury in view of the problems with the English language, spoken and
`understanding.
`
`As to the next juror, . . . [Yolanda M.] indicated to the court . . . in her
`questionnaire that she, in fact, had a conscientious objection to the death
`penalty. She indicated orally she would be able to keep an open mind.
`
`But the prosecution has the right to exercise peremptories as to individuals
`who have feelings pro or con so far as the death penalty is concerned. I
`didn’t see anything about . . . this juror, her being excused that causes me to
`think she was excused for purposes of race.
`
`The last juror is [Lisa H.]. . . . [She] was asked by the court if she had any
`quarrel with the principles of law that we discussed concerning capital
`punishment, and she said during the course of oral inquiry that she would
`tend to side with life in prison rather than the imposition of a death sentence
`essentially.
`
`10
`
`

`

`Observing the manner [in] which all of these jurors were questioned by the
`prosecution, the extent of the questioning, the use of these p[er]emptories,
`the presence of at least one Hispanic on the panel, . . . it seems to me that
`there really isn’t anything from which I could reasonably find the exercise of
`p[er]emptories based upon race. Some attempt to exclude Hispanics, that
`doesn’t seem to be the case at all in each of these cases.
`
`It seems to me that a reasonable individual would be inclined to perhaps
`exclude these jurors on matters solely independent of race. I just don’t see
`it. And I feel that there isn’t really any type of substantial showing at all of
`the use of p[er]emptories based upon race. So I find there is not a prima
`facie showing.
`
`The case proceeded to trial and defendants were convicted of first-degree
`
`murder and several other felonies. Hoyos raised several claims on direct appeal to
`
`the California Supreme Court, including a Batson claim alleging that the
`
`prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to strike three Hispanic prospective
`
`jurors violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. The
`
`California Supreme Court affirmed Hoyos’s conviction and sentence. See People
`
`v. Hoyos, 162 P.3d 528, 536 (Cal. 2007). As to Hoyos’s Batson claim, the state
`
`supreme court rejected Hoyos’s argument that he had established a prima facie
`
`case of racial bias. Id. at 551. The court cited Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162
`
`(2005), but also specified that it would affirm the trial court’s ruling on the Batson
`
`claim “where the record suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might
`
`reasonably have challenged the jurors in question.” Hoyos, 162 P.3d at 550.
`
`11
`
`

`

`Specifically addressing the prosecutor’s strike of Margaret A., the California
`
`Supreme Court concluded the record demonstrated that both the prosecution and
`
`defense “were reasonably concerned about the prospective juror’s English
`
`language skills and, on this basis, the prosecutor was entitled to excuse her.” Id.
`
`The state court went on to conclude the prosecutor was entitled to excuse Lisa H.
`
`because “[t]he record strongly suggests the prosecutor had grounds for concern
`
`about her possible bias against the death penalty.” Id. at 552. Last, the court
`
`explained “[t]he record suggests the prosecutor had reason for concern about
`
`[Yolanda M.’s] possible bias against the death penalty, and on this basis, he was
`
`entitled to excuse her.”5 Id.
`
`B
`
`After his first state habeas petition was summarily denied, Hoyos filed a
`
`federal habeas petition in the District Court for the Southern District of California.
`
`5 The California Supreme Court also rejected Hoyos’s argument that he
`demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination based on the cognizable class of
`Hispanic women and on Hoyos’s theory that most Hispanic women oppose the
`death penalty so disqualification of a Hispanic woman on those grounds “would
`constitute improper bias against this group.” Id. at 552. Hoyos mentions, but does
`not substantively argue, his group bias theory in his briefing before our court.
`Therefore, this argument is forfeited. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (stating that
`argument on appeal must contain “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for
`them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the
`appellant relies”).
`
`12
`
`

`

`The district court stayed proceedings to allow Hoyos the opportunity to exhaust all
`
`of his claims in state court, and the California Supreme Court summarily denied
`
`Hoyos’s second petition. Hoyos then filed a second amended habeas petition in
`
`federal court. The district court denied the State’s request to dismiss certain claims
`
`on the basis of state procedural bars, denied Hoyos’s request for an evidentiary
`
`hearing, and denied Hoyos’s petition. See Hoyos v. Davis, No. 09cv0388 L, 2017
`
`WL 4409437 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2017).
`
`The district court concluded that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of
`
`Hoyos’s Batson claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established
`
`Supreme Court precedent.6 The court explained that the state court “correctly
`
`recognized and articulated the controlling Supreme Court authority” from Johnson
`
`v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), and “determine[d] ‘whether the record supports
`
`an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race.’” The district
`
`court also rejected Hoyos’s argument that the state court’s decision was based on
`
`an unreasonable determination of the facts, and rejected Hoyos’s contention that
`
`the state court violated clearly established federal law by failing to conduct a
`
`6 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal habeas court reviews the last
`reasoned state-court decision. See Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th
`Cir. 2012). We agree with the district court that the last reasoned state-court
`decision for purposes of Hoyos’s petition is the California Supreme Court’s ruling
`on automatic direct appeal.
`
`13
`
`

`

`comparative juror analysis. The district court acknowledged that comparative juror
`
`analysis “is an established tool at step three of the Batson analysis,” and that it may
`
`be used at Batson’s first step to assess whether a prima facie showing is made. But
`
`after conducting its own comparative juror analysis, the district court concluded
`
`the comparison did “nothing to undermine the reasonableness of the California
`
`Supreme Court’s findings and conclusions.”
`
`Hoyos timely appealed the district court’s ruling. We have jurisdiction
`
`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), and we affirm the district court’s
`
`denial of Hoyos’s Batson claim. In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition,
`
`we affirm the remainder of the district court’s judgment denying Hoyos’s petition.
`
`II
`
`We review de novo a district court’s denial of habeas relief. Avena v.
`
`Chappell, 932 F.3d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 2019). Because Hoyos filed his federal
`
`habeas petition after April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
`
`Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs our review. Id.; Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
`
`1214 (1996). Pursuant to AEDPA, our review of the challenged state-court
`
`decision must apply “a statutory presumption of correctness.” Currie v. McDowell,
`
`825 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 2016). We do not defer to the state court’s decision if
`
`it was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
`
`14
`
`

`

`Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or if the
`
`state court’s decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
`
`light of the evidence presented” in the state proceedings. 28 U.S.C.
`
`§ 2254(d)(1)–(2).
`
`A Batson claim may implicate either prong of § 2254(d). McDaniels v.
`
`Kirkland, 813 F.3d 770, 775 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Hoyos argues the
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`California Supreme Court’s ruling on his Batson claim was an unreasonable
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`application of Supreme Court precedent within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1).
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`The state court’s decision results in an unreasonable application of clearly
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`established federal law when the court “correctly identifies the governing legal rule
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`but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.” Cook v.
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`Kernan, 948 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
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`362, 407–08 (2000)); see also Johnson v. Finn, 665 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir.
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`2011) (addressing “whether the state courts applied the proper standard in
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`determining whether [the petitioners] made a prima facie showing of racial
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`discrimination”). The state court’s decision is contrary to clearly established
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`federal law if it “‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in
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`[Supreme Court] cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially
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`indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives
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`

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`at a result different from [this] precedent.’” Cook, 948 F.3d at 965 (alterations in
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`original) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06). “Clearly established federal
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`law” refers to the Supreme Court’s holdings “as of the time of the relevant state-
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`court decision.” Avena v. Chappell, 932 F.3d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 2019)
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`(alterations omitted) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003)).
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`III
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`“The ‘Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a
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`discriminatory purpose.’” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 499 (2016) (quoting
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`Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008)). Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
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`(1986), established a three-step framework for trial courts to use to evaluate claims
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`that a prosecutor’s peremptory strikes were racially discriminatory, id. at 96.
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`First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by showing that the
`totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory
`purpose. Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the
`burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion by
`offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. Third, if a
`race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide whether
`the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.
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`Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005) (alterations, internal quotation
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`marks, and citations omitted). This appeal involves Step One of Batson’s three-
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`part test.
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`Batson was designed to provide “actual answers to suspicions” about racial
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`bias, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson cited with approval our court’s
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`understanding that “it does not matter that the prosecutor might have had good
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`reasons . . . [w]hat matters is the real reason [jurors] were stricken.” Id. at 172
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`(first alteration in original) (quoting Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th
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`Cir. 2004)); see also Currie v. McDowell, 825 F.3d 603, 610 (9th Cir. 2016).
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`Thus, once a defendant demonstrates an inference of racial discrimination, a trial
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`court must give the prosecutor an opportunity to explain his actual reasoning. See
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`Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168. In Hoyos’s case, the trial court found the defendants
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`had not made a prima facie showing at Step One and did not ask the prosecutor to
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`state his reasons for striking Margaret A., Lisa H., and Yolanda M.
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`Hoyos argues the California Supreme Court’s decision was an unreasonable
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`application of Johnson because the state court “engaged in the prohibited exercise
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`of reviewing the trial court record regarding the struck jurors and identifying
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`colorable reasons why the prosecutor might have legitimately struck the three
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`jurors.” The State argues the California Supreme Court’s decision was neither
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`contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, United State Supreme Court
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`precedent. The district court concluded the California Supreme Court’s ruling was
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`not “erroneous or unreasonable.”
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`The defendant bears the burden at Batson Step One to “produc[e] evidence
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`sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has
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`occurred.” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170. In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that
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`California state courts “had been wrong to require Batson claimants to show a
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`‘strong likelihood’ of discrimination at Step One” and “reiterated that a defendant
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`makes out a prima facie case if he produces evidence sufficient to support a
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`‘reasonable inference’ of discrimination.” Shirley v. Yates, 807 F.3d 1090, 1101
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`(9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson, 545 U.S. at 166–67).7
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`This court has repeatedly interpreted Johnson to mean that, at Step One, “the
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`existence of grounds upon which a prosecutor could reasonably have premised a
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`challenge does not suffice to defeat an inference of racial bias.” Currie, 825 F.3d
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`at 609 (alterations omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Finn, 665 F.3d 1063, 1069 (9th
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`Cir. 2011)); see also Williams v. Runnels, 432 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006).
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`For example, in Currie we held that the California Court of Appeal violated clearly
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`7 The state trial court denied Hoyos’s Batson motion in February 1994,
`nearly a decade before the Supreme Court decided Johnson. The last reasoned
`state-court decision is the California Supreme Court’s ruling on Hoyos’s direct
`appeal, which was entered in July 2007, after the Supreme Court decided Johnson.