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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`FILED
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`DEC 9 2020
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`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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`JENNIFER REITMAN; et al.,
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`Plaintiffs-Appellants,
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` v.
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`CHAMPION PETFOODS USA, INC.;
`CHAMPION PETFOODS LP,
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`Defendants-Appellees.
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` No. 19-56467
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`D.C. No.
`2:18-cv-01736-DOC-JPR
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`MEMORANDUM*
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Central District of California
`David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
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`Argued and Submitted November 10, 2019
`Pasadena, California
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`Before: PARKER,** CHRISTEN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
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`*
`This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
`except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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`
`**
`The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., United States Circuit Judge
`for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
`1
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`Plaintiffs-Appellants (“Reitman”)1 filed this putative class action on behalf
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`of themselves and other consumers in California who purchased allegedly
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`mislabeled dog food products sold by Defendants-Appellees (“Champion”).2 They
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`appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for class certification. See Fed. R.
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`Civ. P. 23. We review a district court’s refusal to certify a class for abuse of
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`discretion. Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 939 (9th Cir.
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`2009). We see none and we affirm.
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`The district court concluded that Reitman had failed to satisfy Rule
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`23(b)(3)’s predominance requirements. Specifically, the district court found that,
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`although all dog food packages may have a common message, whether that
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`message is misleading could only be determined by separately examining each bag
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`because the packaging of each bag contains different information. Reitman argues
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`that the district court erred by focusing its predominance analysis only on
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`affirmative misrepresentations and failing to consider allegedly uniform and
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`material omissions from the dog food bag packaging. We disagree.
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`1
`Plaintiffs-Appellants are Jennifer Reitman, Carol Shoaff, and Erin
`Grant. We refer to them collectively as “Reitman.”
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`2
`Similarly, we refer to Defendants-Appellants Champion Petfoods
`USA, Inc. and Champion Petfoods LP collectively as “Champion.”
`2
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`The district court’s conclusion that individualized inquiries requiring bag-to-
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`bag determinations predominate over common questions applies whether the
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`misrepresentations are based on affirmative statements on, or omissions from, the
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`packaging. And Reitman does not explain how creating subclasses based on diets
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`would cure the need for individualized bag-to-bag inquiries. Accordingly, the
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`district court correctly held that the predominance requirement had not been
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`satisfied and that creating subclasses would be futile.
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`The district court also properly found that Reitman’s damages models failed
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`to satisfy the standard set out in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013).
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`Reitman’s “price premium” model failed to measure the price difference
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`attributable to misleading statements on, or omissions from, the packaging. In
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`other words, the model measured only the differing customer expectations based
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`on various corrective statements in the abstract and failed to measure the
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`“difference between what the plaintiff paid and the value of what the plaintiff
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`received.” In re Vioxx Class Cases, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 83, 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009);
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`see also Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir.
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`2015).
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`Moreover, the district court correctly found that a full refund model was
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`inappropriate for Reitman’s proposed pentobarbital subclass because there were
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`3
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`potential class members who never purchased bags with contaminant.
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`Additionally, “[a] full refund may be available . . . when the plaintiffs prove the
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`product had no value to them.” In re Tobacco Cases II, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 881, 895
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`(Cal. Ct. App. 2015). Thus, Reitman’s failure to explain why a risk of
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`contamination renders the product completely valueless for even those class
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`members who did purchase a contaminated bag was a sufficient basis for rejecting
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`the subclass they posited.
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`Finally, the district court applied the correct standard in denying Reitman’s
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`request to create a liability-only class or issue classes under Rule 23(c)(4). The
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`district court concluded, while acknowledging that predominance was not required
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`for certifying a class under Rule 23(c)(4), that numerous individualized issues
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`affecting determinations of liability make Rule 23(c)(4) certification inefficient.
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`Indeed, Rule 23(c)(4) enables a district court to certify an issue class “[w]hen
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`appropriate,” but a court does not abuse its discretion when it declines to do so
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`because certifying a class does not “materially advance[] the disposition of the
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`litigation as a whole.” William B. Rubenstein, 2 Newberg on Class Actions 4:90
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`(5th ed. 2012); see also Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th
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`Cir. 1996) (finding that the “district court abused its discretion by not adequately
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`considering the predominance requirement before certifying the [issue] class”).
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`4
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`Because Reitman failed to show that Rule 23(c)(4) certification was “appropriate,”
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`the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied certification.
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`We have considered the remainder of Reitman’s arguments and find them to
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`be without merit. Thus, the district court’s denial of class certification is
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`AFFIRMED.
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`5
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