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`NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`FILED
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`JAN 17 2025
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`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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` No. 21-725
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`Agency No.
`A215-825-003
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`MEMORANDUM*
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`FRANCISCO ALEXANDER PALACIOS-
`PARADA,
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` Petitioner,
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` v.
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`MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
`General,
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` Respondent.
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`
`
`On Petition for Review of an Order of the
`Board of Immigration Appeals
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`Submitted January 15, 2025**
`Pasadena, California
`
`
`Before: RAWLINSON and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, District
`Judge.***
`
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`Petitioner Francisco Alexander Palacios-Parada, a native and citizen of El
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`*
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`This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
`except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
`
`**
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`The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
`without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
`
`***
`The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the
`Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order
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`dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision denying his motion
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`to reopen removal proceedings conducted in absentia. We have jurisdiction
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`pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review. Because the
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`parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we do not recount them here except
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`as necessary to provide context to our ruling.
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`Through his motion to reopen, Petitioner seeks the rescission of an order of
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`removal that the IJ entered in absentia after Petitioner failed to appear for a
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`mandatory removal hearing. Petitioner claims that his failure to appear is excused
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`by exceptional circumstances. See Campos-Chaves v. Garland, 602 U.S. 447, 452
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`(2024) (citing 8 U.S.C § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i)). Exceptional circumstances are
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`circumstances “beyond the control of the [noncitizen],” “such as battery or extreme
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`cruelty to the [noncitizen] or any child or parent of the [noncitizen], serious illness
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`of the [noncitizen], or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the
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`[noncitizen],” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1), and other “similarly severe impediment[s],”
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`Singh-Bhathal v. INS, 170 F.3d 943, 946–47 (9th Cir. 1999).
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`The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to
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`reopen because Petitioner did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances for
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`purposes of § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). Petitioner claims that exceptional circumstances
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`were presented because an immigration officer misinformed his aunt that his
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`21-725
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`hearing would be rescheduled, and his aunt, in turn, passed along that
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`misinformation to Petitioner. Petitioner claims that he failed to attend the hearing
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`in reliance on his aunt’s misinformation. But Petitioner presents no reason why he
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`would place particular trust in that information or fail to evaluate its accuracy
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`before relying entirely upon it. Further, “[a]lthough [Petitioner] may have received
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`poor advice, this does not alter the fact that he failed to appear at his hearing, not
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`because of illness, a death in the family, or some similarly severe impediment[.]”
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`Singh-Bhathal, 170 F.3d at 947. Instead, Petitioner’s failure to appear was the
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`result of his own voluntary conduct rather than circumstances beyond his control.
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`See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1).
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`Petitioner’s claim that he failed to appear in reliance on his aunt’s
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`misinformation is particularly unpersuasive when coupled with the fact that he was
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`repeatedly provided with notice that the hearing was proceeding as scheduled. At
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`an initial removal hearing, the IJ provided Petitioner with a written notice that
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`specified the time, date, and location of the mandatory hearing, along with the
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`requirement that Petitioner attend the hearing. Further, when Petitioner was
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`released from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) custody, DHS provided
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`Petitioner with an additional written notice containing a reminder that “[he] ha[d]
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`been told when to appear for a further hearing.” Because these written notices
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`clearly advised Petitioner about the mandatory hearing, Petitioner cannot rely on
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`21-725
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`his aunt’s alleged misinformation to excuse his own voluntary failure to appear.
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`See Sharma v. INS, 89 F.3d 545, 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1996).1
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`PETITION DENIED.
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`1 The stay of removal will remain in place until the mandate issues. The motion for
`stay of removal is otherwise denied.
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`4
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`21-725
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