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`NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`FILED
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`OCT 18 2023
`
`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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` No. 21-958
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`Agency No.
`A206-340-923
`
`
`MEMORANDUM*
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`PARTAP SINGH,
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` Petitioner,
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` v.
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`MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
`General,
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` Respondent.
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`
`
`On Petition for Review of an Order of the
`Board of Immigration Appeals
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`Submitted October 16, 2023**
`San Francisco, California
`
`
`Before: BEA, CHRISTEN, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.
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`
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`Petitioner Partap Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of
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`the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) order denying his time-barred motion
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`to reopen to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
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`Convention Against Torture.
`
`*
`
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`This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
`except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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`**
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`The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
`without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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`
`
`
`
`
`
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`We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s denial of
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`a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983,
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`986 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition.
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`1. The BIA denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen because it determined that
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`the motion was time-barred and that no exception to the timeliness requirement
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`applied because Petitioner failed to produce material evidence of changed country
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`conditions in India. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). To prevail on a motion to reopen
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`based on changed country conditions, a movant must produce previously
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`unavailable, material evidence of changed conditions in the country of removal,
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`and must demonstrate that the new evidence, considered together with the evidence
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`presented at the merits hearing below, would establish prima facie eligibility for
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`relief. Silva v. Garland, 993 F.3d 705, 718 (9th Cir. 2021).
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`2. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to
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`reopen without considering evidence of changed conditions in India regarding the
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`persecution of Sikhs. Petitioner neither stated a fear of persecution on account of
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`his Sikh religion in his motion, nor submitted a religion-based application for relief
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`along with his motion. “A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of
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`submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate
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`application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)
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`(emphasis added); see Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008). The
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`2
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`21-958
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`
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`
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`BIA did not err in not addressing a claim Petitioner did not properly raise.
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`3. The BIA, in denying Petitioner’s time-barred motion to reopen, properly
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`considered whether Petitioner’s new political affiliation, a change in his personal
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`circumstances, established a material change in country conditions.
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`4. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in characterizing Petitioner’s new
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`application for relief as arising from the same basis as his initial application.
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`Notwithstanding Petitioner’s observation that his “new claim was poorly
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`articulated in his motion to reopen,” the BIA’s characterization was not “arbitrary,
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`irrational, or contrary to law.” Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir.
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`2011) (quoting Ontiveros-Lopez v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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`5. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s time-barred
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`motion to reopen without evaluating whether Petitioner established prima facie
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`eligibility for relief. The BIA determined that Petitioner failed to produce material
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`evidence of changed country conditions in India. That determination gave the BIA
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`grounds to deny Petitioner’s motion. See, e.g., Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 989
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`(9th Cir. 2009). It was unnecessary for the BIA to evaluate whether Petitioner
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`established prima facie eligibility for relief. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d
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`532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004).
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`PETITION DENIED.
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`
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`3
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`21-958
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`
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