Case: 21-16281, 01/25/2023, ID: 12638960, DktEntry: 63, Page 1 of 44
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`No. 21-16281
`
`IN THE
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Ninth Circuit
`
`
`
`
`
`CARA JONES, ET AL.,
`Plaintiffs-Appellants,
`
`v.
`GOOGLE LLC, ET AL.,
`Defendants-Appellees.
`
`
`
`
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of California,
`No. 5:19-cv-07016-BLF
`District Judge Beth Labson Freeman
`
`
`
`
`
`PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING OR REHEARING EN BANC
`
`
`
`
`
`Edith Ramirez
`Jessica L. Ellsworth
`Adam A. Cooke
`Jo-Ann Tamila Sagar
`HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
`555 Thirteenth Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20004
`Telephone: (202) 637-5600
`Facsimile: (202) 637-5910
`edith.ramirez@hoganlovells.com
`jessica.ellsworth@hoganlovells.com
`adam.a.cooke@hoganlovells.com
`jo-ann.sagar@hoganlovells.com
`Counsel for Defendants-Appellees
`Google LLC and YouTube LLC
`
`January 25, 2023
`
`
`(Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover)
`
`
`
`
`

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`Case: 21-16281, 01/25/2023, ID: 12638960, DktEntry: 63, Page 2 of 44
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`
`
`Jordan D. Segall
`Ariel T. Teshuva
`MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
`350 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071-3426
`Telephone: (213) 683-9100
`Facsimile: (213) 687-3702
`jordan.segall@mto.com
`ariel.teshuva@mto.com
`
`Jeffrey Landis (pro hac vice)
`Adya Baker (pro hac vice)
`ZWILLGEN LAW LLP
`1900 M Street NW, Suite 250
`Washington, DC 20036
`Telephone: (202) 296-3585
`Facsimile: (202) 706-5298
`jeff@zwillgen.com
`adya@zwillgen.com
`
`
`
`
`Jonathan H. Blavin
`MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
`560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94105-2907
`Telephone: (415) 512-4000
`Facsimile: (415) 512-4077
`jonathan.blavin@mto.com
`
`
`
`Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
`Mattel, Inc.
`
`
`Anna Hsia
`ZWILLGEN LAW LLP
`369 Pine Street, Suite 506
`San Francisco, CA 94104
`Telephone: (415) 590-2335
`Facsimile: (415) 636-5965
`anna@zwillgen.com
`
`
`
`Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
`DreamWorks Animation L.L.C. and
`DreamWorks Animation Television, LLC
`
`
`Christopher Chorba
`Jeremy S. Smith
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`333 South Grand Avenue
`Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
`Telephone: (213) 229-7000
`Facsimile: (213) 229-7520
`cchorba@gibsondunn.com
`jssmith@gibsondunn.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
`The Cartoon Network, Inc. and Cartoon
`Network Studios, Inc.
`
`
`
`
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`

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`Case: 21-16281, 01/25/2023, ID: 12638960, DktEntry: 63, Page 3 of 44
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`
`
`Angel A. Garganta
`VENABLE LLP
`101 California Street, Suite 3800
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 653-3750
`Facsimile: (415) 653-3755
`aagarganta@venable.com
`
`
`David E. Fink
`Sarah E. Diamond
`VENABLE, LLP
`2049 Century Park East, Suite 2300
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`Telephone: (310) 229-9900
`Facsimile: (347) 229-9901
`defink@venable.com
`sediamond@venable.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant-Appellees
`PocketWatch, Inc.
`
`
`Jeremy S. Goldman
`FRANKFURT KURNIT KLEIN &
`SELZ P.C.
`2029 Century Park East, Suite 2500N
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`Telephone: (310) 579-9600
`Facsimile: (347) 438-2156
`jgoldman@fkks.com
`alawrence@fkks.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
`Hasbro, Inc. and Hasbro Studios, LLC
`
`
`Michael J. Saltz
`Elana R. Levine
`JACOBSON, RUSSELL, SALTZ,
`NASSIM & DE LA TORRE LLP
`1880 Century Park East, Suite 900
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`Telephone: (310) 446-9900
`Facsimile: (310) 446-9909
`msaltz@jrsnd.com
`lani@jrsnd.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
`Remka, Inc.; RTR Production, LLC; and
`RFR Entertainment, Inc
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`
`
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`

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`Case: 21-16281, 01/25/2023, ID: 12638960, DktEntry: 63, Page 4 of 44
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
` INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35(b) STATEMENT....................................... 1
`
`BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 3
`
`REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING .................................................... 7
`
`I.
`
`THE PANEL’S PREEMPTION ANALYSIS IS
`FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED........................................................ 7
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`The Panel Ignored Central Tenets of Statutory
`Interpretation ............................................................................. 7
`
`The Panel’s Analysis Conflicts With Prior
`Decisions .................................................................................. 12
`
`The Panel’s Analysis Conflicts With The Third
`Circuit’s Decision in Nickelodeon .......................................... 16
`
`II.
`
`THE PANEL’S FLAWED INTERPRETATION OF
`COPPA’s PREEMPTION PROVISION WILL HAVE
`SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS ........................................................... 17
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 19
`
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`
`
`
`i
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`

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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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` Page(s)
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`CASES
`Att’ys Liab. Prot. Soc’y, Inc. v. Ingaldson Fitzgerald, P.C.,
`838 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2016) ................................................................................ 8
`Bank of Am. v. City & Cnty. of S.F.,
`309 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................ 7
`Beffa v. Bank of West,
`152 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1998) ................................................................ 12, 14, 15
`Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm.,
`531 U.S. 341 (2001) ...................................................................................... 11, 15
`Connell v. Lima Corp.,
`988 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2021) .............................................................................. 8
`Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc.,
`575 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ 11
`H.K. v. Google, LLC,
`595 F. Supp. 3d 702 (C.D. Ill. 2022) .................................................................. 18
`Ishikawa v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
`343 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir.), as amended on denial of rh’g, 350 F.3d
`915 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................. 12, 13, 14
`Manigault-Johnson v. Google LLC,
`2019 WL 3006646 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2019) ........................................................ 18
`Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
`518 U.S. 470 (1996) ........................................................................................ 2, 11
`Metrophones Telecomms., Inc. v. Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc.,
`423 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) ................................................................ 10, 12, 13
`In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig.,
`827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016) ..................................................................... 3, 15, 16
`
`ii
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`Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust,
`136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) .......................................................................................... 2
`United States v. Mohrbacher,
`182 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir.1999) ............................................................................... 8
`In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prod. Liab. Litig.,
`959 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2020) .............................................................................. 7
`STATUTES
`15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i) ..................................................................................... 4
`15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii) .................................................................................... 5
`15 U.S.C. § 6502(c) ..................................................................................... 2, 5, 9, 10
`15 U.S.C. § 6502(d) ..........................................................................................passim
`15 U.S.C. § 6504(a)(1) ........................................................................................... 5, 9
`15 U.S.C. § 6504(a)(2) ............................................................................................... 9
`15 U.S.C. § 6504(b) ................................................................................................... 9
`15 U.S.C. § 6504(d) ................................................................................................... 9
`15 U.S.C. § 6505(a) ............................................................................................... 5, 9
`15 U.S.C. § 6505(b) ............................................................................................... 5, 9
`15 U.S.C. § 6505(d) ........................................................................................... 2, 5, 9
`47 U.S.C. § 223(f)(2) ........................................................................................... 5, 10
`47 U.S.C. § 276(c) ................................................................................................... 13
`REGULATIONS:
`16 C.F.R. § 312.11(g) .............................................................................................. 17
`
`iii
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`

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`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`Rachael Malkin, How the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
`Affects Online Businesses and Consumers of Today and
`Tomorrow, 14 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 153, 165-68 (2002) .............................. 17
`
`iv
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`INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35(b) STATEMENT
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`Plaintiffs-Appellants seek to use state law as a vehicle for enforcing the
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`federal Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”). But, as the District
`
`Court found, COPPA expressly preempts such state law claims. The Panel erred in
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`reversing the District Court’s ruling, deviating from well-established U.S. Supreme
`
`Court and Ninth Circuit preemption principles, and creating a split of authority. The
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`decision will upset the careful balance Congress struck in COPPA and have
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`profound consequences for creators and businesses nationwide.
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`Enacted to enhance parental control over children’s online activities and to
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`protect children’s online privacy, COPPA requires website operators that collect
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`personal information from children under 13 to act in accordance with regulations
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`promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). There is nothing in
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`Plaintiffs’ state law claims that is comparable to the detailed requirements set forth
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`in COPPA and its implementing regulations, and, although COPPA has no private
`
`right of action, an alleged violation of COPPA’s requirements is at the core of each
`
`of Plaintiffs’ claims.
`
`COPPA contains an express preemption clause that, as the Panel
`
`acknowledged, “appears unique.” Panel Op. 11. Congress prohibits states from
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`imposing “any liability for commercial activities or actions . . . in connection with
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`an activity or action described in” COPPA “that is inconsistent with the treatment of
`
`1
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`

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`those activities or actions under this section.” 15 U.S.C. § 6502(d) (emphasis added).
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`The referenced section includes a detailed description of the way Congress intended
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`COPPA to be enforced and any violations remedied. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6502(c),
`
`6505(d). Congress granted the FTC primary oversight and enforcement authority.
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`And rather than including a private right of action, COPPA gives states through their
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`attorneys general the ability to bring actions on behalf of their citizens, subject to
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`coordination with the FTC. Private plaintiffs therefore cannot pursue private
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`remedies under state law for COPPA violations. To permit claims like those
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`Plaintiffs assert here would leave defendants facing potential liability, including
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`private damages, that is inconsistent with COPPA’s treatment of how activities and
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`actions that allegedly violate the statute are to be redressed.
`
`In a decision at odds with the Supreme Court’s admonition that the plain
`
`wording of a preemption clause “necessarily contains the best evidence of
`
`Congress’[s] pre-emptive intent,” Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust,
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`136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016) (citation omitted), the Panel reversed the District
`
`Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint. The Panel also overlooked that, in
`
`interpreting a statute’s preemptive scope, a court must also look to “the structure and
`
`purpose of the statute as a whole.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)
`
`(internal quotation marks omitted). In short, the Panel ignored the full statutory text
`
`and its structure and purpose, failing even to discuss the detailed remedial scheme
`
`2
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`

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`referenced in COPPA’s preemption provision. Because of that error, the Panel’s
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`analysis is fundamentally flawed.
`
`The Panel’s decision also conflicts with the only other federal appellate
`
`decision interpreting COPPA’s preemptive reach. In In re Nickelodeon Consumer
`
`Privacy Litigation, the Third Circuit permitted state law claims to proceed only
`
`because the state law claims addressed a different harm than the one targeted by
`
`COPPA. 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016). Underpinning that holding was the
`
`recognition that state law claims based on conduct allegedly violating COPPA are
`
`preempted. Yet the Panel neither discusses nor even cites the Third Circuit’s
`
`decision.
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`The Panel’s decision will have far-reaching consequences. COPPA
`
`established a uniform nationwide standard governing the personal information
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`online service providers can legally collect from children under 13, a standard
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`critical to parents, children, and organizations that create and deliver online content
`
`and services for children. The proper interpretation of COPPA’s preemption
`
`provision is thus exceptionally important, including to the many technology
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`companies that operate nationwide. Further review is appropriate, and this Court
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`should grant panel rehearing or rehearing en banc.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`1. YouTube, a subsidiary of Google (collectively, “Google”), is an online
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`3
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`video-sharing platform that allows users to upload, share, and view video content.
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`See 2-ER-160; 2-ER-168; 2-ER-170. Creators who upload and provide content
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`range from individuals to large organizations, and that content is organized into
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`channels. When users access content on YouTube channels, they are subject to
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`YouTube’s Terms of Service (“Terms”), which incorporate Google’s Privacy Policy.
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`SER-105. The Terms emphasize that YouTube is only for users “over the age of 13,
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`as the Service is not intended for children under 13.” SER-117-118; see also 2-ER-
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`180. The Terms caution: “If you are under 13 years of age, then please do not use
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`the Service. There are lots of other great web sites for you. Talk to your parents
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`about what sites are appropriate for you.” SER-118. The Privacy Policy, in turn,
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`explains that Google collects the following types of information from users when
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`they use Google services: “information about the apps, browsers, and devices you
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`use to access Google services” (e.g., operating system); “information about your
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`activity in our services” (e.g., videos watched); and “information about your location
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`when you use our services” (e.g., IP address). SER-72-75; see also 2-ER-170-173.
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`2. Through COPPA, Congress regulates the personal information online
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`service providers can legally collect from children. COPPA requires operators of
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`websites or online services directed to children under the age of 13 to provide notice
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`of the information they collect, the use of that information, and the operator’s
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`information disclosure practices. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i). The operator must
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`4
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`also obtain parental consent for the collection, use, or disclosure of certain personal
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`information from children under 13. Id. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii).
`
`Congress placed the FTC in charge of implementing and enforcing these
`
`requirements, specifying that it would have primary enforcement authority over
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`COPPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6502(c), 6505(d), with other federal agencies retaining
`
`authority over entities they oversee, id. §§ 6505(a), (b), and state attorneys general
`
`permitted to bring “parens patriae” actions in cooperation with the FTC, id.
`
`§ 6504(a)(1). Notably, COPPA does not include a private right of action.
`
`3. COPPA also has a preemption provision that protects the federal scheme.
`
`It provides that:
`
`No State or local government may impose any liability for commercial
`activities or actions by operators in interstate or foreign commerce in
`connection with an activity or action described in this chapter that is
`inconsistent with the treatment of those activities or actions under this
`section.
`
`Id. § 6502(d). The referenced section includes enforcement provisions. Id.
`
`§ 6502(c). Congress did not include a “savings clause” preserving any state law
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`claims in COPPA, although it has done so in other statutes. Compare 15 U.S.C.
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`§ 6502(d) with Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223(f)(2).
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`4. In September 2019, the FTC, together with the New York Attorney General
`
`(“NYAG”), brought an enforcement action against Google for alleged violations of
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`COPPA (the “FTC Action”). See SER-154-172. Without admitting liability, Google
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`5
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`agreed to a permanent injunction and civil penalty of $170 million, embodied in a
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`stipulated order that was approved and entered by the court. See SER-121-152. The
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`injunction imposed several detailed obligations, including that Google would
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`(1) notify channel owners their content may be subject to COPPA; (2) provide notice
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`about data collection practices and obtain verifiable parental consent before
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`collecting personal information from children; and (3) not disclose, use, or benefit
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`from information collected prior to the injunction. Id.
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`5. Shortly after the court entered the stipulated injunction in the FTC Action,
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`Plaintiff Nichole Hubbard, as parent of minor child C.H., filed a putative class action
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`against Google and an assortment of channel owners. The complaint, relying heavily
`
`on allegations in the FTC Action, asserted that Google violated state laws by
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`collecting and using, without parental consent, the information of C.H. and other
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`putative class members when they allegedly viewed videos on YouTube (i.e., alleged
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`COPPA violations). SER-255-257; SER-290-295. The complaint was amended
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`multiple times to add new Plaintiffs and more state law claims. SER-178-179; SER-
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`225-230; SER-231-243; 3-ER-348-423.
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`The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that COPPA expressly
`
`preempted Plaintiffs’ state law claims. 1-ER-10; 1-ER-12. The court recognized
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`that COPPA’s preemption clause “establishes that state laws are preempted if they
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`impose liability ‘inconsistent with the treatment of those activities or actions under
`
`6
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`this section,’” and that “treatment” includes “enforcement by the FTC and state
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`attorneys general.” 1-ER-12 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6502(d)). Because Plaintiffs fail
`
`to adequately allege “deceptive conduct that places Defendants’ behavior outside of
`
`what is regulated by COPPA,” the court found that their suit “is ‘inconsistent with
`
`the treatment’ and thus preempted.” 1-ER-12-13.
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`A Panel of this Court reversed, finding that Plaintiffs’ claims were neither
`
`explicitly nor impliedly preempted by COPPA.1
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`REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING
`
`I.
`
`THE PANEL’S PREEMPTION ANALYSIS IS FUNDAMENTALLY
`FLAWED
`A. The Panel Ignored Central Tenets of Statutory Interpretation
`
`As the Panel recognized, “[e]xpress preemption is a question of statutory
`
`construction, requiring a court to look to the plain wording of the statute and
`
`surrounding statutory framework to determine whether Congress intended to
`
`preempt state law.” Panel Op. 10 (citing In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg.,
`
`
`1 The Panel held that “express and conflict preemption . . . effectively collapse into
`one when the preemption clause uses the term ‘inconsistent,’” and relied on its
`reasoning regarding express preemption in concluding there was no implied
`preemption. Panel Opp. at 11, 14. This petition therefore focuses on the flaws in the
`Panel’s express preemption analysis. Implied preemption principles also support
`granting rehearing here because Plaintiffs’ state law claims “stan[d] as an obstacle
`to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
`Congress.” Bank of Am. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 2002)
`(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
`7
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`

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`Sales Pracs., & Prod. Liab. Litig., 959 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2020)). The Panel
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`acknowledged that COPPA’s preemption clause “appears unique.” Panel Op. 11-
`
`12. But it did not treat the clause as unique and was “not persuaded” that the different
`
`text—including the word “treatment”—“chang[ed] the scope” of COPPA’s
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`preemption clause, as compared to other, more narrow preemption clauses that bar
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`only inconsistent state law “requirements.” Id. On that basis, the Panel reversed the
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`District Court and held that Plaintiffs’ claims are not preempted.
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`By reading out of the statute several key aspects of COPPA’s preemption
`
`provision, the Panel’s reasoning broke with basic precepts of statutory interpretation.
`
`A court “must interpret a statute to give effect to all of its parts.” Att’ys Liab. Prot.
`
`Soc’y, Inc. v. Ingaldson Fitzgerald, P.C., 838 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2016)
`
`(emphasis added) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). This includes
`
`“giv[ing] effect, if possible, to every word Congress used, without rendering words
`
`superfluous, void, or insignificant,” Connell v. Lima Corp., 988 F.3d 1089, 1097
`
`(9th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted),
`
`considering “the purpose of the statute ‘in its entirety,’” and examining “whether the
`
`proposed interpretation would frustrate or advance that purpose.” United States v.
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`Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 1999).
`
`Read in full, COPPA’s preemption clause expressly prohibits “any liability
`
`for commercial activities . . . described in this chapter that is inconsistent with the
`
`8
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`treatment of those activities or actions under this section.” 15 U.S.C. § 6502(d)
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`(emphasis added). The referenced “section”—Section 6502—includes four
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`subsections, one of which is titled “Enforcement,” which sets forth precisely how
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`Congress envisioned COPPA violations would be treated. Id. § 6502(c). The
`
`enforcement subsection provides that “[s]ubject to section[] … 6505 of this title,” a
`
`violation of COPPA “shall be treated as a violation of a rule defining an unfair or
`
`deceptive act or practice” under the FTC Act. Id. § 6502(c). And the cross-
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`referenced section—section 6505—makes clear that the FTC has primary
`
`enforcement authority over COPPA’s provisions, id. §§ 6505(a), 6505(d), with
`
`certain other federal agencies retaining authority over entities they oversee, id.
`
`§ 6505(b).
`
`As part of COPPA’s detailed remedial scheme, Congress also carved out a
`
`role for the states. State attorneys general may bring actions on behalf of their
`
`citizens, id. § 6504(a)(1), but before proceeding they must give the FTC notice, id.
`
`§ 6504(a)(2), and the FTC has a statutory right to intervene in the state’s suit. Id.
`
`§ 6504(b). The statute ensures the lead role of the FTC by preventing states from
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`“institut[ing]” duplicative actions during the “pendency” of a parallel FTC
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`proceeding. Id. § 6504(d). There is no private right of action under COPPA, or
`
`under the FTC Act, the statute under which COPPA violations are to “be treated.”
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`9
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`Notably, unlike other statutory preemption provisions—including the only
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`other preemption provision Google is aware of containing language similar to that
`
`found in COPPA—COPPA’s preemption clause does not contain a “savings clause”
`
`permitting states to impose “complementary” enforcement. Compare 15 U.S.C.
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`§ 6502(d) with 47 U.S.C. § 223(f)(2) (“savings clause” included in preemption
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`provision).
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`The word “treatment” is thus not the only difference between COPPA’s
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`preemption clause and the preemption clauses that this Court has examined in the
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`past.
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` COPPA’s preemption clause explicitly
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`references
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`the statute’s
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`“[e]nforcement” provisions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6502(c), (d) (emphasis added). By the
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`provision’s plain terms, inconsistent treatment extends to inconsistent enforcement,
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`too. Because of the preemption clause’s express reference to “enforcement,”
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`COPPA’s preemption provision requires an analysis of both the substantive
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`requirements of state law as compared to COPPA and the remedial approach under
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`each scheme. COPPA’s preemption provision therefore cannot be equated with
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`preemption provisions that refer only to inconsistent “requirements” or that include
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`other language narrowing the statute’s preemptive scope. See, e.g., Metrophones
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`Telecomms., Inc. v. Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc., 423 F.3d 1056, 1072 (9th
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`Cir. 2005) (“Metrophones”) (analyzing preemption clause barring “state
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`requirements that are inconsistent with the [FCC’s] regulations,” where the
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`regulations themselves “contemplate[d]” that state contract law would apply
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`(emphasis added)). To do so impermissibly reads the word “treatment” out of the
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`statute.
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`Reading COPPA’s preemption clause as encompassing the enforcement
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`scheme aligns with the statutory framework Congress put in place. In analyzing a
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`statute’s preemptive scope, courts must consider “the structure and purpose of the
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`statute as a whole . . . as revealed not only in the text, but through the reviewing
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`court’s reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute
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`and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law.”
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`Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal quotations marks
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`omitted); Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009)
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`(preemption analysis requires consideration of the “structure and purpose of the
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`statute as a whole” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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`With COPPA, Congress created a new and uniform federal standard
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`governing the online collection and use of personal information from children under
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`13. Recognizing the need for flexibility in an evolving digital landscape, Congress
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`tasked the FTC with promulgating and updating rules to account for changing
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`practices and required state attorneys general to coordinate with the FTC when
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`bringing enforcement actions. Because private plaintiffs have no corresponding
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`obligation to inform or involve the FTC, private enforcement would undermine the
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`FTC’s role in the statutory scheme and could well lead to different requirements and
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`remedies, including private damages, for children’s privacy in different states. C.f.
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`Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349-50 (2001) (state law
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`claims seeking to enforce the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act impliedly preempted
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`because they “inevitably conflict with FDA’s responsibility to police fraud
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`consistently with the Agency’s judgment and objectives,” including by seeking
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`injunctions, civil penalties, and criminal prosecutions). The Panel failed altogether
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`to take such considerations into account.
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`The Panel’s failure to engage with the statute’s text, structure, and purpose
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`resulted in a decision that wholly fails to carry out Congress’s preemptive intent.
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`B.
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`The Panel’s Analysis Conflicts With Prior Decisions
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`In failing to give effect to COPPA’s plain text and statutory framework, the
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`Panel’s analysis conflicts with the very cases it cites. The Panel held that Plaintiffs’
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`suit is not preempted by COPPA because, in “Metrophones, Ishikawa, and Beffa,”
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`the Panel “read the statutory term ‘inconsistent’ . . . to refer to contradictory state
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`law requirements, or to requirements that stand as obstacles to federal objectives.”
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`Panel Op. 11 (citing Metrophones, 423 F.3d 1056; Ishikawa v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
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`343 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir.), as amended on denial of rh’g, 350 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2003);
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`Beffa v. Bank of West, 152 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1998)). From that, the Panel
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`concluded that “state laws that ‘supplement’ or ‘require the same thing’ as federal
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`law, do not ‘stand[] as an obstacle,’ to Congress’s objectives, and so are not
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`‘inconsistent.’” Id. at 12 (internal citations omitted). But nothing in Metrophones,
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`Ishikawa, or Beffa supports the Panel’s view that the use of the term “inconsistent”
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`in a preemption clause must refer to “contradictory state law requirements.” To the
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`contrary, these cases hold that the controlling factor in preemption analysis is the
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`plain language, read in the context of the statute as a whole. The Panel’s ruling
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`failed to do that.
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`In Metrophones, for example, the federal telecommunications statute at issue
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`preempted “[s]tate requirements” that were “inconsistent with the [FCC’s]
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`regulations.” 423 F.3d at 1072 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 276(c)). In addition to the
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`explicit reference to “state requirements,” as opposed to the treatment of the
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`regulated activity, the relevant regulations “contemplate[d]” that “state contract law,
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`not the federal regulations, would govern the resolution of” certain questions related
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`to contracts between telecommunications companies. Id. at 1076. This Court thus
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`held that state law claims for quantum meruit and breach of implied contract were
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`not preempted, id. at 1075-78, while the state law claim that did not sound in
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`contract—negligence—was preempted. Id. at 1078. In contrast, nothing in either
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`COPPA or its implementing regulations explicitly preserves state law claims like
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`Plaintiffs’.
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`Similarly, in Ishikawa, the federal preemption provision at issue was limited
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`to state laws that were “inconsistent with regulations” related to drug testing. The
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`regulations in question expressly provided that employees could “not be required to
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`waive liability with respect to negligence” concerning “the collection, handling, or
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`analysis of” specimens. 343 F.3d at 1132-33 (internal quotations omitted). It is thus
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`unsurprising that the Court held that the plaintiff’s negligence claim against a drug
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`testing laboratory was not preempted. Id. at 1131, 1133. Again, no equivalent
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`language in COPPA suggests that Plaintiffs’ state law claims fall outside its
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`preemptive scope.
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`Beffa also conflicts with the Panel’s reasoning. The statute at issue there, the
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`Expedited Funds Availability Act (“EFAA”), required that deposited funds be
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`available for withdrawal by the next business day. Id. at 1176. The plaintiff sued
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`the defendant bank—not for delayed deposit availability—but because the bank had
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`deposited the plaintiff’s money into the wrong account. This Court held that the
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`plaintiff’s state law negligence claim was not preempted by EFFA. As this Court
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`explained: “Clearly, EFAA preempts state law pertaining to the timing of availability
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`of deposited funds. Beffa’s negligence claim, however, addresses a separate wrong,
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`negligent deposit to the wrong account . . . . [S]uch claims are not inconsistent with
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`the purposes of EFAA.” Id. at 1177. The same was true of the plaintiff’s intentional
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`and negligence misrepresentation claims, which “involve[d] elements that [were]
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`beyond the scope of the EFFA.” Id. at 1178.
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`Plaintiffs’ claims here do not “address a separate wrong” that is “beyo