Case: 22-15103, 08/05/2022, ID: 12510069, DktEntry: 37, Page 1 of 95
`
`Nos. 22-15103 and 22-15104
`
`IN THE
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Ninth Circuit
`
`JOHN DOE #1 AND JOHN DOE #2,
`
`Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants,
`
`v.
`
`TWITTER, INC.,
`
`Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`
`for the Northern District of California Case No. 21-CV-0485
`
`BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
`(SECOND BRIEF ON CROSS-APPEAL)
`
`Lisa D. Haba
`Adam A. Haba
`The Haba Law Firm, P.A.
`1220 Commerce Park Dr., Suite 207
`Longwood, FL 32779
`Telephone: (844) 422-2529
`
`Paul A. Matiasic (SBN 226448)
`The Matiasic Firm, P.C.
`4 Embarcadero Center, Suite 1400
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 675-1089
`
`Benjamin W. Bull
`Peter A. Gentala
`Danielle Bianculli Pinter
`Christen M. Price
`NATIONAL CENTER
`ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
`1201 F ST NW, Suite 200
`Washington, D.C., 20004
`Telephone: (202) 393-7245
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants
`
`

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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................ i
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
`JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ............................................................... 4
`ISSUES PRESENTED (TWITTER’S APPEAL) .......................................... 5
`ISSUES PRESENTED (PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-APPEAL) ......................... 5
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................................................................... 6
`I.
`Statutory Background .......................................................................... 6
`A.
`Congress Authorizes Civil Claims for Child Victims of CSAM 6
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`Congress Enacts CDA 230 amid concerns about materials that
`are inappropriate for children on the internet ............................ 7
`
`Congress Criminalizes Trafficking ............................................ 8
`
`Congress Authorizes Civil Claims Against Traffickers ............ 9
`
`Congress Confirms Internet Companies Do Not Have Section
`230 Immunity from Civil Sex-Trafficking Claims .................. 10
`
`II.
`
`Factual Background ........................................................................... 12
`A.
`The Twitter Platform and Sexual Exploitation ........................ 12
`
`B.
`
`The Sex Trafficking of John Doe # 1 and John Doe # 2 ......... 14
`
`Procedural Background ...................................................................... 18
`III.
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................... 19
`STANDARD OF REVIEW ......................................................................... 24
`ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO TWITTER’S PRINCIPAL BRIEF ...... 24
`Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged beneficiary trafficking violations against
`I.
`Twitter, and the District Court’s ruling should be affirmed. ............. 25
`Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Twitter knowingly received a
`A.
`benefit ...................................................................................... 26
`
`B.
`
`Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that Twitter participated in a venture
` ................................................................................................. 30
`
`Error! Unknown document property name.
`
`i
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`C.
`
`D.
`
`Twitter knew or should have known that Plaintiffs were victims
`of sex trafficking ...................................................................... 33
`
`The distribution of CSAM for value is a “commercial sex act”
` ................................................................................................. 35
`
`II.
`
`The District Court correctly interpreted the FOSTA amendment to
`CDA 230. ........................................................................................... 44
`ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL ..................................................................... 49
`Plaintiffs’ CSAM claims against Twitter are not barred by CDA 230
`I.
`immunity and should not have been dismissed .................................. 49
`A.
`Twitter knew the video of Plaintiffs was CSAM .................... 50
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`Twitter received, transported, advertised, presented, distributed,
`and possessed the CSAM ........................................................ 51
`
`CDA 230 does not give civil immunity for personal injuries
`sustained through violations of involving CSAM ................... 53
`
`Plaintiffs’ 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A and 2255 claims do not treat
`Twitter as a publisher or speaker ............................................. 54
`
`therefore
`is not “information” or speech and
`CSAM
`publisher/speaker status does not apply ................................... 55
`
`The District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs § 2252A claim lacks
`persuasive authority ................................................................. 57
`
`II.
`
`Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a direct sex-trafficking violation against
`Twitter, and the claim should not have been dismissed with prejudice.
` ............................................................................................................ 63
`Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Twitter knowingly
`A.
`obtained, provided, maintained, and advertised them. ............ 63
`
`CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 68
`ADDENDUM: ........................................................................................................ 72
`TEXT OF STATUTORY AUTHORITIES ............................................................ 72
`
`
`
`
`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`A.B. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 455 F.Supp.3d 171 (E.D. Pa. 2020) ...................... 27, 33
`Ardolf v. Weber, 332 F.R.D. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ................................................ 38
`B.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 2020 WL 4368214 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ... 26
`Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) ........................ 8
`Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) ................................. 64
`Doe #1 v. MG Freesites, LTD, No. 7:21-CV-00220-LSC, 2022 WL 407147, at *19
`(N.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 2022) ......................................................................... 41, 62
`Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714 (11th Cir. 2021) ................................ 34
`Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F. 3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) ........................... 11
`Doe S.W. v. Lorain-Elyria Motel, Inc., 2020 WL 1244192 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2020)
` ...................................................................................................................... 27
`Doe v. Bates, 2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. 2006) ......................................... 61, 62
`Doe v. Kik, 482 F. Supp. 3d 1242 (S.D. Fl. 2020) ............................................ 31, 32
`Doe v. Mindgeek USA Inc., 558 F. Supp. 3d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2021) ....................... 41
`Doe v. Twitter, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 3d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2021) ............................ passim
`Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485
`U.S. 568 (1988) ............................................................................................ 48
`Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 946 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir.
`2019) ............................................................................................................ 55
`Ernst & Haas Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Hiscox, Inc., 23 F.4th 1195 (9th Cir. 2022) ....... 24
`Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.c..om, LLC, 521 F.3d
`1157 (9th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................................... 54
`Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018) .............................................. 24
`Garnett By & Through Smith v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.
`1993) ............................................................................................................ 48
`Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156 (S.D. N.Y. 2019) 27, 31
`Gonzalez v. Google LLC, et al., 2 F.4th 871 , 886 (9th Cir. 2021) ............ 59, 60, 61
`
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`J.C. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 2020 WL 6318707 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2020) .... 27
`Khachatryan v. Blinken, 4 F.4th 841 (9th Cir. 2021) ....................................... 24, 30
`Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) ....................................................... 67
`M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959 (S.D. Ohio 2019)
` ............................................................................................................... passim
`Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). .............................................................. 59
`Nat’l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) .................................. 47
`New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ................................................. 62
`New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) .................................................. 43, 55, 56
`Noble v. Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504 (S.D. N.Y. 2018) ....................... 27, 31, 38
`Obsidian Financial Group, LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 2014) ............... 62
`Olympic Forest Coal. v. Coast Seafoods Co., 884 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2018) ......... 24
`Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) ................................................................... 56
`Owner-Operators Indep. Drivers Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 582 (9th
`Cir. 1991) ............................................................................................... 23, 59
`Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) ............................................... 43, 56
`Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., 35 F.4th 1159 (9th Cir. 2022) ........................... 47
`S. Y. v. Naples Hotel Co., 476 F.Supp.3d 1251 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2020) ............. 27
`Scarborough v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 178 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1949) ................... 44
`Sharkey v. O'Neal, 778 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2015) ................................................... 67
`Tanzin v. Tanvir, ___ U.S.___, 141 S.Ct. 486 (2020) ............................................ 64
`U.S. v. Afyare, 632 F. App’x 272 (6th Cir. 2016) ............................................ 31, 32
`U.S. v. Bazar, 747 Fed. Appx. 454 (9th Cir. 2018) ................................................ 37
`U.S. v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2010) ....................................................... 39
`U.S. v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740 (1st Cir. 1997) ......................................................... 51
`U.S. v. Cook, 782 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 2015) ............................................................ 36
`U.S. v. Cox, 963 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2020) .............................................................. 64
`U.S. v. Croghan, 973 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2020). ..................................................... 52
`U.S. v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2014) .................................................. 42
`U.S. v. Haas, 986 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2021) ...................................................... 24, 39
`
`
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`U.S. v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 2013) ...................................................... 63
`U.S. v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006) ..................................................... 51
`U.S. v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) .................................... 38, 40
`U.S. v. Richardson, 713 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2013) .................................................. 51
`U.S. v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006) .......................................................... 52
`U.S. v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................................................ 38
`U.S. v. Tollefson, 367 F. Supp. 3d 865 (E.D. Wis. 2019) ........................... 38, 41, 42
`U.S. v. Wasson, 426 F. Supp. 3d 822 (D. Kan. 2019) ............................................ 51
`U.S. v. Wearing, 865 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2017) ....................................................... 39
`United Cook Inlet Drft Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Erv., 837 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir.
`2016) ............................................................................................................ 45
`Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981) ...................................................................... 59
`Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009) ....................... 55
`Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). ...................................... 62
`Statutes
`
`18 U.S.C. § 1591 ............................................................................................. passim
`18 U.S.C. § 1595 ............................................................................................. passim
`18 U.S.C. § 2252A .......................................................................................... passim
`18 U.S.C. § 2255 ............................................................................................. passim
`18 U.S.C. § 2256 .................................................................................................... 40
`18 U.S.C. § 2258A ................................................................................................. 60
`2252A’s .................................................................................................................. 12
`47 U.S.C. § 230 ............................................................................................... passim
`Other Authorities
`
`H.R. Rep. No. 115-572 (2018) ............................................................................... 18
`Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com ................................... 71, 73
`Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Child., Child Sex Abuse Material,
`https://www.missingkids.org/theissues/csam ............................................... 13
`
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`Online Sex Trafficking and the Communications Decency Act: Written Test. of
`Chris Cox Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of
`the H. Comm. on the Jud., 115th Cong., 1 Sess. (Oct. 3, 2017) ............ 52, 60
`S. Rep. No. 115-199 (2018) .................................................................................... 18
`The American Heritage Dictionary of
`the English Language, 5th ed.,
`https://ahdictionary.com ............................................................................... 71
`U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Child Pornography, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
`ceos/child-pornography (last visited Aug. 3, 2022) ..................................... 12
`Rules
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ..................................................................................................... 74
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 ..................................................................................................... 73
`Congressional Enactments
`
`Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, PL 109–248, July 27, 2006,
`120 Stat 587 .................................................................................................. 13
`Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. Law.
`No. 115-164 (Apr. 11, 2018) ................................................................. passim
`Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act
`Of 2003 (PROTECT ACT), PL 108–21, 117 Stat 650 (2003) ..................... 64
`Protection of Children from Sex Predators Act of 1998, PL 105-314, 112 Stat 2974
`(1998) ........................................................................................................... 64
`Telecommunications Act of 1996, PL 104–104, February 8, 1996, 110 Stat 56. .. 14
`Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, PL 108–193, Dec. 19,
`2003, 117 Stat 2875 .......................................................................... 16, 18, 52
`Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, PL 106–386, October
`28, 2000, 114 Stat 1464 .................................................................... 15, 16, 46
`William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
`PL 110–457, Dec. 23, 2008, 122 Stat 5044 ................................................. 17
`
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`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`“We’ve reviewed the content, and didn’t find a violation of our policies, so no
`
`action will be taken at this time.” That is what Twitter wrote to a 16-year-old boy
`
`who was begging for help. Twitter’s refusal to help came after it reviewed child sex
`
`abuse material (“CSAM”) depicting the boy and another child that was being viewed
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`hundreds of thousands of times on its platform.1
`
`“What do you mean you don’t see a problem?” the boy responded. “We both
`
`are minors right now and were minors at the time these videos were taken. We both
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`were 13 years of age. We were baited, harassed, and threatened to take these videos
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`that are now being posted without our permission.”2
`
`Seven days earlier, the boy—John Doe #1—had written to Twitter in
`
`desperation. A sexually graphic video of him and another child—John Doe #2—
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`were being widely distributed on Twitter.
`
`The video was being viewed and shared, or “re-tweeted,” at an astronomical
`
`rate and everyone they knew—peers, school administrators, teachers, parents—saw
`
`the video. Isolated with the anguish, embarrassment, and pressure of facing others
`
`who might know about the video, John Doe #1 became suicidal and John Doe #2
`
`
`
`1 2-ER-152 at ¶ 120.
`2 2-ER-154—55 at ¶123.
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`Error! Unknown document property name.
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`stopped going to school. John Doe #1 and his mother, Jane Doe, turned to the most
`
`likely place to remove the CSAM – after all, under federal law, Twitter was supposed
`
`to voluntarily take good faith steps to remove this type of material. See 47 U.S.C. §
`
`230(c).
`
`John Doe #1 and Jane Doe were horrified when after several days of delays,
`
`after age and identity verification, and after conducting an internal investigation into
`
`the video, Twitter refused to remove the video and the CSAM continued to circulate
`
`on Twitter. Just two days after John Doe #1 first contacted Twitter, the following
`
`screenshot was taken:
`
`
`
`At that moment, the CSAM of the boys had been viewed 167,000 times, re-
`
`tweeted 2,223 times, and “liked” over 6,640 times. Of course, this picture doesn’t
`
`show how many times it was screen captured, downloaded, or otherwise shared
`
`beyond Twitter. It remained on Twitter another seven days—so the full extent of its
`
`circulation and distribution is much higher than these numbers.
`
`The boys and their families were desperate.
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`Eventually help came, but not from Twitter. They were able to connect with
`
`an agent with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The agent confirmed that
`
`
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`2
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`

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`the images were CSAM, contacted Twitter, and directed that they be removed.
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`Finally, only after the intervention of law enforcement, the illegal CSAM was
`
`removed from Twitter and reported to the National Center for Missing and Exploited
`
`Children (“NCMEC”).
`
`This case is about whether technology corporations should be able to
`
`knowingly profit from CSAM and sex-trafficking with impunity. It is not about
`
`whether liability should attach for failure to detect harmful content or a good-faith
`
`screening mistake, because neither situation is present in the facts of this case.
`
`Twitter knew the CSAM was on its platform, not because it attempted to screen for
`
`it, but because Plaintiff John Doe #1 and his mother told Twitter about it, and it was
`
`apparent upon review.
`
`Congress has expressly directed that Section 230 of the Communications
`
`Decency Act (“CDA 230”) shall not be construed to limit or impair sex-trafficking
`
`claims brought under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and 1595. At this stage, Plaintiffs have
`
`alleged enough to plausibly state sex-trafficking claims against Twitter. There is no
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`Section 230 immunity for CSAM as it is not content over which online
`
`intermediaries make editorial decisions. It is contraband and knowing possession is
`
`illegal. Twitter knowingly received, possessed, and distributed CSAM of the
`
`Plaintiffs in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A.
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`3
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`Twitter argues that Plaintiffs, who have suffered tremendously, can never
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`move to discovery on any claims. But Section 230 does not give Twitter carte
`
`blanche for violating child pornography and sex trafficking laws. This appeal and
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`cross-appeal are about whether Plaintiffs can have the chance to prove their claims
`
`in federal court.
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`
`
`JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
`
`The District Court has jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1331, and
`
`1367, as well as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1595(a) and 2255.
`
`On August 19, 2021, the District Court entered an order granting in part and
`
`denying in part Twitter’s Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”). 1-ER-57. On October 26,
`
`2021, the District Court granted Twitter’s motion for certification of an interlocutory
`
`appeal. 1-ER-59. On November 5, 2021, Twitter petitioned this Court for
`
`interlocutory review. On November 15, 2021, Plaintiffs cross-petitioned for
`
`interlocutory review. On January 21, 2022, this Court granted both the petition and
`
`cross-petitions for permission to appeal. 2-ER-223. This Court has jurisdiction based
`
`on 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
`
`
`
`
`
`4
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`ISSUES PRESENTED (TWITTER’S APPEAL)
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`(1) Have Plaintiffs stated a plausible beneficiary-liability sex-trafficking
`
`claim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(2) and 1595(a) when they allege actual knowledge
`
`because Twitter knew—and confirmed it knew—every aspect of the abuse of the
`
`Plaintiffs on its platform, allowed the abuse to continue, and benefited from the
`
`abuse?
`
`(2) Congress amended CDA 230 with FOSTA directing that nothing in the
`
`section “shall be construed to impair or limit “any claim in a civil action brought
`
`under [18 U.S.C. § 1595] if the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a violation
`
`of section 1591. . . .” Was the District Court correct that this language facilitates
`
`and does not limit the ability of victims of online trafficking to pursue civil remedy
`
`claims against internet companies under 1595?
`
`
`ISSUES PRESENTED (PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-APPEAL)
`
`(1) Does Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act immunize
`
`Twitter’s knowing violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A’s prohibitions relating to CSAM
`
`when the alleged violative conduct does not attempt to treat Twitter as the publisher
`
`or speaker of the child pornography?
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`5
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`(2) Have Plaintiffs stated a plausible claim for direct sex-trafficking liability
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`under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) when they alleged that Twitter knowingly obtained,
`
`maintained, provided, and advertised the Plaintiffs through CSAM?3
`
`
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE
`Statutory Background
`
`I.
`
`A. Congress Authorizes Civil Claims for Child Victims of CSAM
`In 1986, Congress created a private right of action for children who were
`
`victims of CSAM.4 The cause of action, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2255, (also referred
`
`to as “Masha’s Law”), has been expanded to include violations of 18 U.S.C. §
`
`2252A. In 2006, Congress noted:
`
`The illegal production, transportation, distribution, receipt, advertising
`and possession of child pornography [] as well as the transfer of custody
`of children for the production of child pornography, is harmful to the
`physiological, emotional, and mental health of the children depicted in
`
`
`
`3 Statutory authorities are presented as an addendum to this brief.
`4 This brief refers to “child pornography” as “child sex abuse material” or “CSAM”
`because it better captures the harmful nature of the material. See generally U.S.
`Dep’t of Justice, Child Pornography, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/child-
`pornography (last visited Aug. 3, 2022) (noting that the statutory term “fails to
`describe the true horror that is faced by countless children every year.”); see also
`Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Child., Child Sex Abuse Material,
`https://www.missingkids.org/theissues/csam (last visited 08/04/22) (the term
`CSAM “most accurately reflect[s] what is depicted – the sexual abuse and
`exploitation of children.”).
`
`
`
`6
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`child pornography and has a substantial and detrimental effect on
`society as a whole.5
`
`Congress also noted that “technological advances have had the unfortunate result of
`
`greatly increasing the interstate market in child pornography.” Id. at § 501(1)(C).
`
`Finally, Congress declared that “[t]he government has a compelling State interest in
`
`protecting children from those who sexually exploit them, and this interest extends
`
`to stamping out the vice of child pornography at all levels in the distribution chain.”
`
`Id. at § 501(2)(C) (emphasis added).
`
`Importantly, § 2255 allows victims to pursue claims against anyone who has
`
`violated a federal law concerning CSAM when the victim has suffered a resulting
`
`personal injury. It does not matter if the defendant is the original producer of the
`
`CSAM, a distributor, or a simple possessor. Id. Victims have a right of action against
`
`the direct perpetrators of their exploitation, but also against anyone who violated
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`CSAM laws—including internet companies.
`
`B. Congress Enacts CDA 230 amid concerns about materials that are
`inappropriate for children on the internet
`In 1996, Congress enacted CDA 230.6 The title of the provision announces its
`
`focus: “Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material”. Id. at
`
`
`
`5 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, PL 109–248, July 27,
`2006, 120 Stat 587 at § 501(1)(A).
`6 See generally, Telecommunications Act of 1996, PL 104–104, February 8, 1996,
`110 Stat 56.
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`7
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`§ 509, and section (c), titled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ Blocking and
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`Screening of Offensive Material,” provides a civil immunity to internet service
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`providers who voluntarily and in good faith take action to restrict access to or
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`availability of a variety of harmful material. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
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`This language demonstrates that Congress’s priority, even during the
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`internet’s early development, was ensuring that there would also be ongoing
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`advances of the ability to protect children from harmful material. See also Carafano
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`v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that Congress
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`enacted § 230 in part “to encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or obscene
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`material.”).
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`C. Congress Criminalizes Trafficking
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`In 2000, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”).
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`Congress also specifically included image-based sexual exploitation within its
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`findings, expressing concern about the “sexual exploitation of persons, … involving
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`activities related to prostitution, pornography, sex tourism, and other commercial
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`sexual services.”7 The TVPA enhanced existing criminal punishments for certain
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`
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` 7
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` Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, PL 106–386,
`October 28, 2000, 114 Stat 1464 at § 102(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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`forms of human trafficking, and also created new criminal provisions to prohibit
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`forced labor (section 1589), trafficking as to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude,
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`or forced labor (section 1590), and sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or
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`coercion (section 1591). Id.
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`D. Congress Authorizes Civil Claims Against Traffickers
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`Through the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003,
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`Congress both reauthorized the TVPA’s criminal provisions, and created a new civil
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`remedy—section 1595—to allow victims of certain crimes to sue their abusers for
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`damages in federal court.8 Under the newly authorized section 1595, victims could
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`sue “the perpetrator” of criminal violations of the previously enacted sections 1589
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`(forced labor), 1590 (trafficking as to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or
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`forced labor), or 1591 (sex trafficking). Id.
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`In response to the growing epidemic of trafficking over the internet, Congress
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`again amended the TVPA in 2008, to become the TVPRA in its current form.
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`Through the 2008 amendment, Congress substantially enhanced victims’ civil
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`recourse by expanding civil actions beyond perpetrators to include claims against
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`anyone who “knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from
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`
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`8 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, PL 108–193,
`December 19, 2003, 117 Stat 2875 § 3.
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`participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged
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`in” trafficking (i.e., third-party beneficiaries of trafficking).9
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`E. Congress Confirms Internet Companies Do Not Have Section 230
`Immunity from Civil Sex-Trafficking Claims
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`In 2018, Congress amended Section 230 of the CDA, to directly address the
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`nexus between the internet and sex trafficking. The legislation, known as the Allow
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`States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (“FOSTA”), directly states
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`its purpose:
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`It is the sense of Congress that—
`(1) section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230;
`commonly known as the “Communications Decency Act of 1996”) was
`never intended to provide legal protection to websites that unlawfully
`promote and facilitate prostitution and websites that facilitate
`traffickers in advertising the sale of unlawful sex acts with sex
`trafficking victims;
`(2) websites that promote and facilitate prostitution have been reckless
`in allowing the sale of sex trafficking victims and have done nothing to
`prevent the trafficking of children and victims of force, fraud, and
`coercion; and
`(3) clarification of such section is warranted to ensure that such section
`does not provide such protection to such websites.10
`
`
`
`
`9 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
`PL 110–457, December 23, 2008, 122 Stat 5044 at § 221 (“Enhancement of Civil
`Action”)
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`10 Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub.
`Law. No. 115-164 (Apr. 11, 2018) § 1 (emphasis added).
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`10
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`Among other things, Congress was concerned about a recent decision by the
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`First Circuit that dismissed the civil claims of victims who were trafficked on the
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`website backpage.com under § 230(c)(1).11 Congress chose to address the
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`backpage.com holding by amending § 230: “Nothing in this section … shall be
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`construed to impair or limit [ ]any claim in a civil action brought under section 1595
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`of Title 18, if the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a violation of section 1591
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`of that title. . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A).
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`As its name suggests, FOSTA was enacted to address the scourge of sex
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`trafficking online. The legislation therefore directly singled out TVPRA claims that
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`redressed sex trafficking (i.e. § 1591) from CDA 230 immunity. 47 U.S.C. §
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`230(e)(5)(A). FOSTA does not mention or affect other forms of trafficking that are
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`prohibited by the TVPRA. See generally, Chapter 77 of Title 18 “Peonage, Slavery,
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`and Trafficking in Persons.”
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`11 See H.R. Rep. No. 115-572 at 4-5 (2018); S. Rep. No. 115-199 at 2, n. 6 (2018)
`(both referencing Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F. 3d 12, 19-22 (1st Cir.
`20