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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`FILED
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`OCT 18 2023
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`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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` Plaintiff-Appellant,
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`No. 22-16575
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`D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00360-DJH
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`MEMORANDUM*
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`FAWN MICHELLE ACUNA,
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` v.
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`KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
`of Social Security,
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` Defendant-Appellee.
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the District of Arizona
`Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
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`Submitted October 16, 2023**
`Phoenix, Arizona
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`Before: IKUTA, BADE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
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`Fawn Acuna appeals from a district court decision affirming
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`the
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`Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for Social Security
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`disability benefits. “We ‘review the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial
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` This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
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`except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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`** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
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`without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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`of social security benefits de novo and will disturb the denial of benefits only if the
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`decision contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.’”
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`Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tommasetti v. Astrue,
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`533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
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`and we affirm.
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`1. The ALJ did not err in assigning less weight to the opinions of Acuna’s
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`treating physicians. Because Acuna applied for benefits before March 27, 2017, the
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`ALJ was required to evaluate the medical opinion evidence under 20 C.F.R.
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`§ 404.1527.1 Under those regulations, “[i]f a treating or examining doctor’s opinion
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`is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing
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`specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.”
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`Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
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`Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s specific and legitimate reasons for
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`determining that Acuna’s limitations were less severe than Dr. Robinson and
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`Dr. Teff indicated.
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`The ALJ concluded that Dr. Robinson’s check-box assessment was entitled to
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`little weight because of its conclusory nature and because Dr. Robinson’s sparse
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`treatment notes did not provide a sufficient explanation for his assessment.
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`1 New regulations govern claims filed after March 27, 2017, but they do not apply
`here. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c; Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 789 (9th Cir.
`2022).
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`2
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`Substantial evidence supports that determination, as an “ALJ need not accept the
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`opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief,
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`conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Thomas v. Barnhart,
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`278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
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`The ALJ also provided specific and legitimate reasons supported by
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`substantial evidence for discounting Dr. Teff’s opinion. As the ALJ explained,
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`Dr. Teff’s opinion that Acuna had “extreme limitations” was inconsistent with his
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`own exam notes and with other evidence in the record documenting Acuna’s
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`“normal motor strength, sensation, and reflexes.” Inconsistencies in the medical
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`record provide a valid basis for discounting a medical provider’s opinion. Ford v.
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`Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). Here, we conclude that the ALJ
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`reasonably weighed the medical evidence. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (“[T]he
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`ALJ is the final arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities in the medical
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`evidence.” (citation omitted)).
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`2. For substantially similar reasons, the ALJ did not err in assigning little
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`weight to the opinion of Acuna’s psychologist, Dr. Geary. The ALJ explained that
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`Dr. Geary’s assessment of Acuna’s “marked or extreme” social limitations was
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`inconsistent with evidence concerning Acuna’s demeanor, living situation, and
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`positive interactions with friends and family. The ALJ also found that Dr. Geary’s
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`opinion about Acuna’s concentration was “internally inconsistent” with his testing
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`3
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`results. As previously noted, these types of inconsistencies qualify as specific and
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`legitimate reasons for rejecting a physician’s opinion. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154.
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`Dr. Geary’s vague descriptions of Acuna’s limitations provided another appropriate
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`reason for affording less weight to his opinion. See id. at 1156 (affirming an ALJ’s
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`discounting of an examining physician’s assessment using the generic descriptions
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`of “fair” and “limited”).
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`3. The ALJ gave “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discounting
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`Acuna’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms. Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th
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`1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th
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`Cir. 2014)). We reject Acuna’s argument that the ALJ “cherry-pick[ed]” evidence
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`to discount her pain, migraines, and psychiatric conditions. The ALJ credited certain
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`aspects of Acuna’s testimony, but identified other portions of the testimony that were
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`inconsistent with Acuna’s exam records and treatment history. “When objective
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`medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective
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`testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such testimony.” Smartt v.
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`Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022).
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`In addition, the ALJ appropriately considered Acuna’s condition and
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`treatment history during the entire period at issue. The ALJ’s findings that Acuna’s
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`symptoms improved with treatment provided substantial evidence for discounting
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`Acuna’s testimony. See Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017)
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`4
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`(“[E]vidence of medical treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine
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`a claim of disability.” (citations omitted)).
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`Finally, the ALJ’s findings with respect to Acuna’s mental and social
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`disabilities are also supported by substantial evidence. Contrary to Acuna’s
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`assertions, the ALJ did not penalize her for being hospitalized only once. Rather,
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`the ALJ appropriately described Acuna’s hospitalization history in considering
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`whether her treatment matched the severity of her self-reported symptoms. The
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`ALJ’s findings that Acuna’s alleged mental and social limitations were inconsistent
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`with her attempts to find work and complete a bachelor’s degree were also supported
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`by substantial evidence. See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499–500.
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`AFFIRMED.
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`5
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