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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`FILED
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`FEB 20 2025
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`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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`No. 23-2223
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`D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05675-WHO
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`MEMORANDUM*
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` Petitioner-Appellant,
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`JABRIE BENNETT,
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`Warden JEFF LYNCH,
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` Respondent-Appellee.
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of California
`William H. Orrick, District Judge, Presiding
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`Argued and Submitted February 12, 2025
`San Francisco, California
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`Before: VANDYKE and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN,
`District Judge.**
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`Petitioner Jabrie Bennett seeks review of a district court judgment denying a
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`writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a), and we
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`affirm.
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`* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
`provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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`** The Honorable Dana L. Christensen, United States District Judge for the District
`of Montana, sitting by designation.
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`Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), we apply
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`a “highly deferential” standard when evaluating state court rulings. Woodford v.
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`Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (citation omitted). We have statutory authority to
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`grant habeas relief only if the state court’s ruling was either (1) “contrary to, or
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`involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
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`determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “based on an
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`unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
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`court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The district court’s denial of a petition for
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`habeas corpus is reviewed de novo. See Lopez v. Thompson, 202 F.3d 1110, 1116
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`(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Under AEDPA, we evaluate “the last reasoned state-court
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`decision,” which in this case is from the state appellate court, the California Court
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`of Appeal. See Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). The petitioner
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`bears the burden of proof. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
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`1. Bennett argues that we should review de novo the California Court of
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`Appeal’s decision because it erred unreasonably by upholding the trial court’s
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`decision that considered the demographic makeup of the jury at the third stage of the
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`Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986), inquiry rather than the first. But the
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`state appellate court’s determination that the trial court did not place undue weight
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`on the presence of same-race jurors was not unreasonable. Indeed, the California
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`Court of Appeal found that even if the trial court erred by “improperly inflat[ing] the
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`2
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`importance of [the presence of same-race jurors]” by finding it “‘powerful evidence’
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`of a … lack of discriminatory intent,” the court would have “reach[ed] the same
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`result under a de novo standard of review.” So in rejecting the Batson challenge the
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`California Court of Appeal did not err unreasonably. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
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`2. The state appellate court was not objectively unreasonable in upholding
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`the trial court’s determination that the prosecutor’s peremptory strike against
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`Dominique Jones was race neutral. That the prosecutor made misstatements does
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`not give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S.
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`333, 340 (2006). The California Court of Appeal reasonably found that the
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`prosecutor’s misstatement that Jones’s mother was incarcerated was minor because
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`“the record supports that [Jones] had a close relative; that [Jones] was around her
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`while she went through the court process; that she was incarcerated for a significant
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`period on drug trafficking charges; and that he visited her multiple times during her
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`incarceration.” This concern is a race-neutral reason to strike a juror. See People v.
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`Cruz, 187 P.3d 970, 987 n.3 (Cal. 2008); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360
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`(1991). Additionally, because the California Court of Appeal found Jones’s
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`experience visiting his aunt to be a “serious disqualifying issue,” it was not
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`unreasonable for the court, examining the totality of the circumstances, to conclude
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`that the prosecutor was not “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.”
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`3
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`Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 303 (2019) (quoting Foster v. Chatman, 578
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`U.S. 488, 513 (2016)).
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`3. Bennett also argues that a comparative juror analysis demonstrates pretext.
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`Here again, the state court’s conclusion that these other jurors were not comparable
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`was not unreasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). None of the other jurors Bennett
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`identifies visited a close relative while she was incarcerated.
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`AFFIRMED.
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`4
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