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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`FILED
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`JAN 22 2025
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`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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`No. 24-803
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`D.C. No. 6:20-cv-1938
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`MEMORANDUM**
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` Plaintiff-Appellant,
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`DIRK DUNNING,
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` v.
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`CAROLYN W. COLVIN*, Acting
`Commissioner of Social Security,
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` Defendant-Appellee.
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the District of Oregon
`Michael W. Mosman, Presiding
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`Submitted January 16, 2025***
`San Francisco, California
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`*
`Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for her predecessor Martin O’Malley,
`Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, as Acting Commissioner of
`the Social Security Administration, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
`Procedure 43(c).
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`** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
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`except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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`*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
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`without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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`Before: H.A. THOMAS, MENDOZA, Circuit Judges, and BOLTON, District
`Judge.****
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`Dirk Dunning appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
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`Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance
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`benefits under the Social Security Act. On appeal, Dunning argues the ALJ
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`improperly discredited (1) certain medical opinions, (2) his testimony, and (3) lay
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`witness statements. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review a
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`district court’s judgment de novo and set aside a denial of benefits only if it is not
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`supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Smartt v. Kijakazi,
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`53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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`Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means—and means only—
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`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
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`conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (cleaned up). We
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`affirm.
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`1.
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`To the extent that Dunning argues that the ALJ improperly discounted
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`the medical opinions of Dr. Pedersen and Dr. Baer, he failed to raise these
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`arguments before the district court and these arguments are therefore forfeited.
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`Bastidas v. Chappell, 791 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that
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`**** The Honorable Susan R. Bolton, United States District Judge for the
`District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
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`2
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`ordinarily “a party who does not complain of an issue in the district court forfeits
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`his right to review of that issue on appeal”).
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`Even if we considered these arguments, the ALJ provided specific reasons
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`for discounting their testimony. The ALJ determines the persuasiveness of medical
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`opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). The most important factors when
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`evaluating persuasiveness of medical opinions are supportability and consistency.
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`Id. The ALJ found that part of Dr. Pedersen’s opinion was not persuasive because
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`certain opinions, specifically those related to LED light sensitivity, were not
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`supported by objective evidence and were inconsistent with other evidence in the
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`record. The ALJ also found that Dr. Baer’s opinion was vague and therefore only
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`somewhat persuasive. These determinations are supported by substantial evidence.
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`Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Blattner’s
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`medical opinion was mostly persuasive. The ALJ discounted Dr. Blattner’s
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`testimony that Dunning could only stand for ten to fifteen minutes because this
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`opinion was inconsistent with other evidence. For example, Dunning said he could
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`walk for one to two miles at a time and occasionally volunteers at political
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`gatherings where he stands and hold signs. In addition, the ALJ found that the
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`opinion was not supported by objective medical evidence, as Dr. Blattner
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`performed no actual testing and appeared to base his opinions solely on Dunning’s
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`subjective complaints.
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`3
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`2.
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`The ALJ provided specific reasons for discounting Dunning’s
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`testimony. The ALJ considers “all of the available evidence” when “evaluating the
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`intensity and persistence of [the alleged] symptoms,” including whether the “pain
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`or other symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs
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`and laboratory findings and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). Here, the
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`ALJ discounted Dunning’s testimony regarding the extent of his pain and
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`symptoms because he continues to engage in a wide range of daily activities, his
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`uveitis episodes responded well to topical steroids, and he was not currently taking
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`any medications.
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`3.
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`Lastly, the ALJ did not err by discounting the lay witness statements
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`describing Dunning’s LED sensitivity. The ALJ concluded that the lay witness
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`testimony was contradicted by other evidence—namely that Dunning continued to
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`work from December 2016 to July 2017 and participated in many daily activities—
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`and noted that the testimony “appear[ed] to be based on [Dunning’s] subjective
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`complaints rather than on objective medical evidence.”
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`AFFIRMED.
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`4
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