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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`FILED
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`
`FEB 19 2025
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`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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` No. 24-3324
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`D.C. No.
`1:23-cv-00222-JAO-WRP
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`
`
`MEMORANDUM*
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`
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`HUNTER BANTA, Individually and on
`behalf of his minor son, I.B.,
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` Plaintiff - Appellant,
`
` v.
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`KEITH HAYASHI; KENNETH S. FINK,
`M.D.; JOHN AND JANE DOES, 1-
`25; DOES, Entities 1-10,
`
` Defendants - Appellees.
`
`
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the District of Hawaii
`Jill Otake, District Judge, Presiding
`
`Submitted February 14, 2025**
`Honolulu, Hawaii
`
`
`Before: S.R. THOMAS, BRESS, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.
`
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`Plaintiffs I.B. and his father Hunter Banta (collectively, Banta) claim that
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`Hawaii’s Department of Education failed to provide I.B. with a free appropriate
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`*
`
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`This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
`except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
`
`**
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`The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
`without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
`
`
`
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`public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
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`(IDEA).
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` The district court affirmed the administrative hearing officer’s
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`determinations that the Department of Education’s failure strictly to comply with
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`I.B.’s individualized education program (IEP) was not material, and that placement
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`in a residential treatment facility was not an appropriate remedy. We have
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`jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
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`“The question of whether a school district’s IEP provided a FAPE is reviewed
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`de novo.” Crofts v. Issaquah Sch. Dist. No. 411, 22 F.4th 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2022).
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`“Courts must, however, give ‘“due weight” to judgments of education policy’ when
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`reviewing state administrative hearing decisions.” L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. A.O.,
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`92 F.4th 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811
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`F.2d 1307, 1311 (9th Cir. 1987)). “Administrative findings that are thorough and
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`careful,” as they are in this case, “are entitled to ‘particular deference.’” Id. (quoting
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`JG v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 552 F.3d 786, 793 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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`1.
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`The district court did not err in concluding that I.B. was not denied a
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`FAPE. “To determine whether a student was denied a [FAPE], the court assesses
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`first ‘whether the IDEA’s procedures were complied with and second whether the
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`district met its substantive obligation to provide a FAPE.’” Id. at 1169 (quoting
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`Crofts, 22 F.4th at 1054). As to procedure, there is no basis for Banta’s assertion
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`that the hearing officer was biased or precluded from serving in that role under 20
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`24-3324
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`U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i). As to substance, we discern no error in the district court’s
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`conclusion that I.B. was not denied a FAPE when his registered behavior technician
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`was out on maternity leave. This discrepancy with the IEP was not material because
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`during this time, I.B. received individualized support from other staff members and
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`continued to make academic progress. See L.A. Unified, 92 F.4th at 1170 (“Only
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`‘material’ failures to implement an individualized education program violate the
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`statute.” (quoting Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811,
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`822 (9th Cir. 2007))).
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`2.
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`Even assuming a material failure of I.B.’s IEP, the district court
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`properly found that placement in a residential treatment facility would not be an
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`appropriate remedy. When determining whether a residential placement is
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`appropriate, we “must focus on whether the residential placement may be considered
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`necessary for educational purposes, or whether the placement is a response to
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`medical, social, or emotional problems that is necessary quite apart from the learning
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`process.” Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student E.H., 587 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th
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`Cir. 2009) (brackets omitted) (quoting Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Off. of
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`Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir. 1990)). The latter types of problems
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`do not justify residential placement under the IDEA. See id.
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`In this case, the district court and hearing officer reasonably relied on the
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`testimony of I.B.’s special education teacher that I.B.’s educational needs could be
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`3
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`24-3324
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`met in the current school setting, and that his aggressive episodes were more
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`uncontrollable at home rather than at school, where his behavior and coping skills
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`were improving. The district court and hearing officer likewise reasonably
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`discounted the testimony of Drs. Carlton and Brownstein because they were less
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`familiar with I.B.’s educational experience. Banta’s reliance on the hearing officer
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`decision in Student v. Dep’t of Ed., Department of Education-SY2324-026 (Dep’t of
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`Att’y Gen. Mar. 18, 2024), is misplaced because the student there displayed
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`extensive aggressive and self-injurious behavior at school, which is not the case
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`here.1
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`3.
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`There is no merit to Banta’s argument that the district court committed
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`procedural error in its resolution of this case. The district court did not deny Banta
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`the opportunity to conduct discovery or present evidence. Banta’s other allegations
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`of procedural error are likewise unfounded.
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`AFFIRMED.
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`1 To the extent Banta argues that I.B. was not provided with mental health services,
`the argument is both unexhausted and unsupported. In addition, because we affirm
`the district court’s decision that I.B. was not denied a FAPE, we do not reach
`defendant Fink’s arguments that he is not a proper party to this case, or, in the
`alternative, that Banta failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against Fink and
`the Department of Health. Finally, Banta’s claim under Section 504 of the
`Rehabilitation Act fails “[b]ecause a school district’s provision of a FAPE under the
`IDEA meets Section 504 FAPE requirements.” K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified
`Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir. 2013).
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`24-3324
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