`United States v. Guzman
`
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
`
`SUMMARY ORDER
`
`
`
`
`
`
`RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
`SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
`BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
`WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
`MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
`NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
`COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
`
`
`At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
`Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
`22nd day of November, two thousand sixteen.
`
`Present:
`
`
`AMALYA L. KEARSE,
`RICHARD C. WESLEY,
`DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
`
`Circuit Judges,
`
`
`_____________________________________
`
`
`
`14-4707-cr
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`Appellee,
`
`
`
`ADALBERTO ARIEL GUZMAN, aka Gringo,
`
`
`
`Defendant-Appellant.
`
`
`_____________________________________
`
`For Defendant-Appellant:
`
`For Defendant-Appellee:
`
`
`
`
`
`MALVINA NATHANSON, New York, N.Y.
`
`JOHN J. DURHAM, Assistant United States Attorney
`(Susan Corkery, Carrie N. Capwell, Raymond A.
`Tierney, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the
`brief), for Robert L. Capers, United States Attorney for
`the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, N.Y.
`
`1
`
`
`
`
`Appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
`
`
`
`New York (Bianco, J.), entered December 19, 2014, sentencing Defendant to a term of
`
`imprisonment of life plus 35 years.
`
`UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF
`
`it
`
`is hereby ORDERED,
`
`ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
`
`Following a jury trial, Defendant-Appellant Adalberto Ariel Guzman was convicted of
`
`one count of conspiracy to murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5), two counts of murder, 18 U.S.C.
`
`§ 1959(a)(1), two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C.
`
`§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), and two counts of causing the death of another through the use of a firearm,
`
`18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1). Though Defendant was 17 years old at the time of the conduct at issue,
`
`the district court imposed a sentence pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines of life plus 35 years’
`
`imprisonment. Guzman now challenges that sentence as substantively unreasonable, arguing
`
`that his adolescence warranted a sentence of less than life because of the possibility of
`
`rehabilitation.
`
` We review the reasonableness of the sentence imposed by the district court for abuse of
`
`discretion. United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2008). The substantive
`
`reasonableness inquiry focuses on the sentence imposed in light of the district court’s
`
`consideration of the factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. We will set aside a sentence
`
`for substantive unreasonableness “only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision
`
`‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions,’” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d
`
`180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir.
`
`2007)), i.e., in the “rare case” where the sentence would “damage the administration of justice
`
`because the sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`as a matter of law,” United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
`
`marks omitted). Further, “we take into account the totality of the circumstances, giving due
`
`deference to the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion, and bearing in mind the institutional
`
`advantages of district courts.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190. We do not “second guess the weight
`
`(or lack thereof) that the judge accorded to a given factor or to a specific argument made
`
`pursuant to that factor.” United States v. Pope, 554 F.3d 240, 247 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting
`
`United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 34 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Kimbrough v. United
`
`States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (noting that the sentencing judge is “in a superior position to find
`
`facts and judge their import under § 3553(a)” (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
`
`(2007))).
`
`Guzman’s argument on appeal is rooted in a series of cases in which the Supreme Court
`
`articulated Eighth Amendment limits on sentences that may be imposed on juvenile offenders,
`
`i.e., those who were under 18 at the time they committed their crimes. Specifically, the Court
`
`determined that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty on any
`
`juvenile offender, see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), the imposition of life
`
`imprisonment without parole on a juvenile offender not convicted of homicide, see Graham v.
`
`Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010), and the mandating of a sentence of life imprisonment without
`
`parole for a juvenile offender convicted of homicide, see Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455,
`
`2460 (2012). The Supreme Court in Miller also identified a series of factors relevant to
`
`determining whether a life sentence is warranted, including the juvenile’s “chronological age and
`
`its hallmark features,” “the family and home environment that surrounds him,” “the
`
`circumstances of the homicide offense,” and “the possibility of rehabilitation.” 132 S. Ct. at
`
`2468.
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`With these considerations in mind, we see no basis here to set aside as substantively
`
`unreasonable the district court’s sound exercise of its discretion. Following an evidentiary
`
`hearing, the district court gave ample consideration to each of the Miller factors, together with
`
`the sometimes-overlapping § 3553(a) factors, in determining that a life sentence was appropriate.
`
`In both open court and in a written statement of reasons, the district court indicated that the
`
`sentence it imposed “reflect[ed] the seriousness of the offense[,] . . . promote[d] respect for the
`
`law[,] . . . provide[d] a just punishment,” and would foster general and specific deterrence.
`
`App’x 283, 312–13. The district court likewise based its sentence on the fact that Guzman was
`
`nearly 18 when he committed the brutal and heinous acts in question; that his acts were not
`
`“impulsive,” but rather were “calculated,” not caused by peer pressure, and followed by no
`
`remorse; that Guzman had engaged in “violent conduct in jail” and remained associated with his
`
`gang through sentencing; that nothing in his family background explained his “extremely
`
`depraved conduct”; and that, in the district court’s view, even in light of an expert’s report and
`
`testimony, the possibility of Guzman’s future rehabilitation was “remote[].” App’x 311, 314–
`
`19.
`
`Guzman contends that the district court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable
`
`because he demonstrated a “possibility of reform,” Appellant’s Br. 33, and because the district
`
`court relied on retribution and deterrence rationales that have diminished relevance when
`
`sentencing adolescent offenders, see Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (retribution); Thompson v.
`
`Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836–37 (1988). Yet, as the preceding discussion makes clear, the
`
`district court considered a broad spectrum of relevant factors in settling on an appropriate
`
`sentence, and its thoughtful consideration of—and conclusion concerning—Guzman’s chances
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`of rehabilitation was not unreasonable. The district court, accordingly, did not abuse its
`
`discretion.
`
`
`
`We have considered Defendant-Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be
`
`without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`FOR THE COURT:
`Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
`
`
`
`5
`
`