20-1569
`Williams v. Galligan
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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
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`SUMMARY ORDER
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`RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
`SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
`FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
`WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
`CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
`“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT
`ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
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`At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
`Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
`3rd day of February, two thousand twenty-one.
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`Present:
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`DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
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`Chief Judge,
`JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
`GERARD E. LYNCH,
`Circuit Judges.
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`_____________________________________
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`Plaintiff-Appellee,
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`Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee,
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`ROCK WILLIAMS,
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`KRISTIN NORTON,
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`v.
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`20-1569
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`Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant,
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`Defendant-Counter-Claimaint-3rd Party Plaintiff,
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`MATTHEW B. GALLIGAN, Town Manager,
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`TOWN OF SOUTH WINDSOR,
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`1
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`Defendant-Counter-Claimant,
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`KEITH YAGALOFF,
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`THOMAS DELNICKI, MICHELE R. LIPE, Director of Planning,
`PAMELA OLIVA, Zoning Enforcement Officer, DR. M. SAUD ANWAR,
`BILLY MITCHELL, AKA WILLIAM MITCHELL, ENVIRONMENTAL
`SERVICES, INC., JOHN DOES 1–10,
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`Defendants.
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`_____________________________________
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`For Defendant-Appellant:
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`KATHERINE E. RULE (Thomas R. Gerarde on the brief),
`Howd & Ludorf, LLC, Hartford, CT
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`EDWARD C. TAIMAN, JR., Sabia Taiman, LLC, Hartford,
`CT
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`For Plaintiff-Appellee:
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`Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
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`(Bolden, J.).
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`UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
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`DECREED that the order of the district court is REVERSED in part, and the case is
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`REMANDED with instructions to enter summary judgment for Defendant Matthew Galligan.
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`Defendant Matthew Galligan (“Galligan”) appeals from a March 6, 2020 order of the
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`district court denying in part and granting in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
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`Plaintiffs Rock Williams and Kristin Norton (together, “Plaintiffs”) assert that Galligan (as well
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`as other defendants not involved in this appeal) violated their Fourth Amendment rights by
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`entering their residential property without a warrant in order to remove items in the backyard that
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`they had recovered from foreclosed properties and were keeping for sale. Galligan contends that
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`Plaintiffs were operating a junkyard that posed an immediate danger to the community and that,
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`accepting Plaintiffs’ version of the facts, he is entitled to qualified immunity. Appellant’s Br. at
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`32–33. The district court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because there are genuine
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`2
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`issues of fact material to the qualified immunity determination that must be resolved by a jury. We
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`assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and
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`the issues on appeal.
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`*
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`“State executive officials ‘are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they
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`violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was
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`clearly established at the time.’” Simon v. City of N.Y., 893 F.3d 83, 92 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting
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`District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018)). “A right is clearly established when
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`its ‘contours . . . are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that
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`what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
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`U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). Galligan contends that the undisputed facts entitle him to qualified
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`immunity because a reasonable official could have believed that warrantless entry onto Plaintiffs’
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`property was permissible to address an immediate hazard created by Plaintiffs’ use of their
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`property for commercial purposes. See Anobile v. Pelligrino, 303 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2002)
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`(noting that the Supreme Court and this Court have “permitted warrantless administrative searches
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`of a person’s residence [when] exigent circumstances exist [or] business was conducted in the
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`home”). For the reasons that follow, we agree.
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`Galligan argues that Plaintiffs’ backyard storage of material recovered from foreclosed
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`properties for later sale at flea markets, auctions, and the like created dangerous conditions such
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`that a reasonable official could have concluded that his actions were justified based, in turn, on the
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`exigent circumstances exception, the community caretaking exception and, also significant, the
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`“Immediate Action” provision of the Town of South Windsor’s anti-blight ordinance. We have
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`previously said that the “enforcement of a presumptively valid statute creates a heavy presumption
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`3
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`in favor of qualified immunity.” Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 104 (2d
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`Cir. 2003). To be sure, this presumption can be overcome where a law is “plainly unconstitutional”
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`or an enforcement action is “clearly unlawful.” Id. This standard, however, is not met on the
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`undisputed facts here.
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`South Windsor’s anti-blight ordinance authorized Galligan to take immediate action in the
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`face of conditions representing “an immediate danger . . . to [the] health, safety or welfare of the
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`residents of the town.” J. App’x at 480. This authority is akin to the exception to the warrant
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`requirement that allows officials to enter without warrant, even on residential property, where “the
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`facts, as they appeared at the moment of entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced officer to
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`believe that there was an urgent need to render aid or take action.” United States v. Caraballo, 831
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`F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2008)).
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`We express no opinion on the constitutionality of South Windsor’s “Immediate Action” ordinance
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`but, because it resembles the well-established exigent exception to the warrant requirement
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`described in Caraballo, we cannot say that any reasonable official would have realized that this
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`ordinance is plainly unconstitutional.
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`Nor can we say that Galligan’s enforcement action was clearly unlawful. The undisputed
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`facts of this case demonstrate that Plaintiffs kept a variety of unusual objects in their backyard,
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`causing it to resemble a junkyard. The question is not whether the Plaintiff’s activities actually
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`created an emergency, but whether a reasonable official could have perceived one. We therefore
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`need not resolve the contested questions of fact the district court identified to conclude that, even
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`assuming arguendo that all such questions are resolved in Plaintiffs’ favor, a reasonable official
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`could have concluded that Plaintiffs’ activities posed an urgent threat to the community and, as a
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`result, that action under the relevant provision of the anti-blight ordinance was appropriate.
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`4
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`We have considered Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
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`Accordingly, the order of the district court is REVERSED in part, and the case is REMANDED
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`to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for Galligan.
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`FOR THE COURT:
`Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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`5
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