`
`
`
`
`
`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Seventh Circuit
`____________________
`
`No. 21-2909
`NBA PROPERTIES, INCORPORATED, et al.,
`
`HANWJH,
`
`Plaintiffs-Appellees,
`
`v.
`
`Defendant-Appellant.
`____________________
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court for the
`Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
`No. 1:20-cv-07543 — John F. Kness, Judge.
`____________________
`
`ARGUED APRIL 7, 2022 — DECIDED AUGUST 16, 2022
`____________________
`
`Before RIPPLE and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.*
`RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs in the underlying liti-
`gation are professional or collegiate sports associations who
`
`
`* Circuit Judge Kanne died on June 16, 2022, and did not participate in the
`decision of this case, which is being resolved under 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) by a
`quorum of the panel.
`
`
`
`
`Case: 21-2909 Document: 35 Filed: 08/16/2022 Pages: 24
`
`2
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`No. 21-2909
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`own, or license, trademarks related to their respective sports.
`The plaintiffs filed this action under the Lanham Act,
`15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq., against a list of defendants listed in
`Schedule A of the complaint. In the complaint, NBA Proper-
`ties, Inc. alleged that HANWJH, a China-based online retailer,
`infringed NBA Properties’ trademarks by selling counterfeit
`products in its online stores. After the deadline to answer ex-
`pired, HANWJH moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
`personal jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion
`and entered a default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
`55(a). The district court instructed the parties to file any ob-
`jections to the motion for default judgment. After the deadline
`expired without objection, the district court entered a final
`judgment. HANWJH timely appealed. For the reasons set
`forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district
`court.
`
`I
`A.
`NBA Properties is the owner and exclusive licensee of the
`trademarks of the National Basketball Association (“NBA”)
`and NBA teams. HANWJH sells products allegedly infring-
`ing on the NBA trademarks via Amazon.com. NBA Proper-
`ties filed an affidavit from its investigator asserting that
`HANWJH sold 205 infringing products, available for pur-
`chase in Illinois, on its Amazon site. HANWJH offered forty-
`one different basketball shorts in five different size options.
`On September 16, 2020, an investigator for NBA Properties
`accessed HANWJH’s online Amazon store and purchased a
`pair of shorts. In placing the order, the investigator desig-
`nated an address in Illinois as the delivery destination. The
`
`
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`Case: 21-2909 Document: 35 Filed: 08/16/2022 Pages: 24
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`No. 21-2909
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`3
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`sale went through, and the product was delivered to the Illi-
`nois address on October 6, 2020. NBA Properties has not al-
`leged any other contacts between HANWJH and Illinois other
`than the single sale to its investigator and the accessibility of
`HANWJH’s online store from Illinois. In an affidavit filed in
`the district court, HANWJH maintained that it had never sold
`any other product to any consumer in Illinois nor had it any
`“offices, employees,” “real or personal property,” “bank ac-
`counts,” or any other commercial dealings with Illinois.1
`B.
`NBA Properties filed its complaint on December 18, 2020,
`consisting of two counts: 1) trademark infringement and
`counterfeiting, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114; 2) false desig-
`nation of origin, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The com-
`plaint alleges that the “Defendants create e-commerce stores
`operating under one or more Seller Aliases that are advertis-
`ing, offering for sale and selling Counterfeit Products to un-
`knowing consumers.”2 Count I alleges that “Defendants have
`sold, offered to sell, marketed, distributed and advertised,
`and are still selling, offering to sell, marketing, distributing
`and advertising products using counterfeit or infringing re-
`productions of one or more of Plaintiffs’ Trademarks without
`Plaintiffs’ permission or consent.”3 Count II alleges that “[b]y
`using one or more of Plaintiffs’ Trademarks on the Counter-
`feit Products, Defendants create a false designation of origin
`
`
`
`1 R.56-1 ¶ 6–17.
`2 R.1 ¶ 4.
`3 Id. ¶ 80.
`
`
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`Case: 21-2909 Document: 35 Filed: 08/16/2022 Pages: 24
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`No. 21-2909
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`and a misleading representation of fact as to the origin and
`sponsorship of the Counterfeit Products.”4
`NBA Properties sought and received a temporary restrain-
`ing order and preliminary injunction, including a temporary
`asset restraint on HANWJH’s bank account. It then moved for
`a default under Rule 55(a), positing that, despite having been
`served, HANWJH had not answered or otherwise defended
`the suit. Moreover, it added that a default judgment was
`proper under Rule 55(b)(2) because, although more than
`twenty-one days had passed since service upon HANWJH,
`see Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(i), HANWJH had not filed an answer or
`responsive pleading.
`HANWJH next moved to dismiss and to lift the injunction,
`arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it be-
`cause it did not expressly aim any conduct at Illinois. It con-
`tended that it lacked any connections with Illinois other than
`the “sham” transaction initiated by NBA Properties.5 First, it
`argued that operating a website alone is not enough to estab-
`lish that it has expressly aimed its commercial activity at Illi-
`nois. Second, it submitted that a single transaction initiated by
`the plaintiff cannot constitute a sufficient basis for jurisdic-
`tion. Third, it reasoned that, even if exercising jurisdiction
`over it were otherwise appropriate, doing so would offend
`the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice be-
`cause Illinois had very little interest in resolving the matter,
`the burden on HANWJH for defending the litigation in
`
`
`
`4 Id. ¶ 87.
`5 R.56 at 1.
`
`
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`No. 21-2909
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`5
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`Illinois would be great, and Illinois courts provided no “effi-
`ciencies in resolving this matter.”6
`The district court denied HANWJH’s motion to dismiss
`and simultaneously entered a default. In its memorandum
`opinion, the district court set forth a three-part standard for
`analyzing specific personal jurisdiction:
`First, the defendant must have “minimum con-
`tacts with the forum state.” To determine
`whether the defendant has such contacts, the
`court must ask whether “the defendant should
`reasonably anticipate being haled into court in
`the forum State, because the defendant has pur-
`posefully availed itself of the privilege of con-
`ducting activities there.” Second, the plaintiff’s
`claims must “arise out of” the defendant’s con-
`tacts with the forum. Third, and finally, mainte-
`nance of the suit must not “offend traditional
`notions of fair play and substantial justice.”7
`The court concluded that these requirements were met as to
`HANWJH.
`The district court acknowledged that “specific personal ju-
`risdiction over an online retailer is not established merely be-
`cause the retailer’s website is available in the forum” but ra-
`ther it is necessary that the retailer “‘st[and] ready and willing
`to do business with’ residents of the forum and then
`
`
`
`6 Id. at 8.
`7 R.58 at 4 (citations omitted).
`
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`No. 21-2909
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`‘knowingly do … business with’ those residents.”8 This test
`was satisfied, in the district court’s view, by the fact that
`HANWJH “admit[ted] that it both offered to ship and in fact
`shipped products to Illinois.”9 Relying on our opinions in
`Curry v. Revolution Laboratories, LLC, 949 F.3d 385 (7th Cir.
`2020) and Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC, 622 F.3d 754 (7th Cir.
`2010), the district court observed that “minimum contacts
`[can be] formed even though a defendant ‘s[old] its products
`only online through its website and third-party websites’” in
`situations where the defendant “(1) included the forum in the
`‘ship-to’ options from which the customer had to choose; (2)
`sent a customer an email confirming a shipping address in the
`forum; and (3) shipped product to an address in the forum.”10
`The district court did not view the lack of a confirmation
`email as dispositive and held that jurisdiction was proper
`over HANWJH.
`The district court then rejected HANWJH’s arguments
`that be2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2011) and Ad-
`vanced Tactical Ordnance Systems, LLC v. Real Action Paintball,
`Inc., 751 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2014), required the action to be dis-
`missed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court de-
`termined these cases to be materially distinguishable because
`neither involved sales of infringing products to the forum
`state. The district court also rejected HANWJH’s contention
`
`
`8 Id. at 4–5 (quoting Illinois v. Hemi Grp. LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir.
`2010)).
`9 Id. at 5.
`10 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Curry v. Revolution Lab’ys,
`LLC, 949 F.3d 385, 399 (7th Cir. 2020)).
`
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`that our opinion in Hemi, 622 F.3d 754, should not apply.
`HANWJH had urged that “because the transactions in Illinois
`in this case were exclusively the product of ‘entrapment and
`enticement’ by Plaintiffs, Hemi should not apply.”11 The dis-
`trict court disagreed.
`Hemi’s reasoning is on point. In that case, the de-
`fendant had a website that offered Illinois as a
`“ship-to” forum and in fact shipped products to
`Illinois. As this Court sees things, Hemi did not
`impose any bar to evidence generated from a
`plaintiff’s pretextual purchase of an infringing
`product; and Defendant does not offer any au-
`thority establishing such a rule. In the absence
`of contrary authority, the Court finds that Plain-
`tiffs’ reasons for purchasing the allegedly in-
`fringing material provided by products is not
`relevant to the personal jurisdiction analysis.12
`Finally, the district court also rejected HANWJH’s conten-
`tion that “exercising personal jurisdiction would ‘offend tra-
`ditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”13 It ex-
`plained that HANWJH had offered no support for this argu-
`ment. It added that it was hardly unfair to subject HANWJH
`to jurisdiction because HANWJH “willingly shipped an alleg-
`edly infringing product to this forum.”14
`
`
`11 Id. at 7 (quoting R.56 at 6).
`12 Id. (citing Hemi, 622 F.3d at 758).
`13 Id. (quoting R.56 at 8).
`14 Id. at 8.
`
`
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`No. 21-2909
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`Following the entry of the default, the district court or-
`dered that any objections to the motion for default judgment
`be filed no later than July 26, 2021. On July 26, HANWJH ap-
`pealed the denial of the motion to dismiss. After we ordered
`supplemental briefing on the issue of appellate jurisdiction,
`HANWJH voluntarily dismissed
`its appeal. Because
`HANWJH did not object to the motion for default judgment,
`the district court then entered a final judgment on September
`20, 2021. HANWJH timely appealed that order.
`II
`A.
`We review a district court’s determination of personal ju-
`risdiction de novo. See Curry, 949 F.3d at 392. We “take the
`plaintiff’s asserted facts as true and resolve any factual dis-
`putes in its favor.” uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d
`421, 423–24 (7th Cir. 2010). When a defendant challenges per-
`sonal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
`12(b)(2), however, “the plaintiff bears the burden of demon-
`strating the existence of jurisdiction.” Purdue Rsch. Found. v.
`Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003).
`“Where, as here, the district court ruled on the defendant’s
`motion to dismiss ‘without the benefit of an evidentiary hear-
`ing, the plaintiff bears only the burden of making a prima fa-
`cie case for personal jurisdiction.’” Curry, 949 F.3d at 392–93
`(quoting uBID, Inc., 623 F.3d at 423). The district court may
`consider affidavits on the issue of personal jurisdiction; both
`parties’ affidavits are accepted as true, and where they con-
`flict, the plaintiff is entitled to resolution in its favor. Id. at 393.
`
`
`
`
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`B.
`We now turn to the issue of specific personal jurisdiction.
`“In a case involving federal question jurisdiction, ‘a federal
`court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant if either
`federal law or the law of the state in which the court sits au-
`thorizes service of process to that defendant.’” Id. (quoting
`Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Hous.
`Metroplex, P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2010)). “Because the
`Lanham Act does not have a special federal rule for personal
`jurisdiction, … we look to the law of the forum for the gov-
`erning rule.” Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 800; see also Fed. R.
`Civ. P. 4(k)(1). The Illinois long-arm statute provides that “[a]
`court may also exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now or
`hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Con-
`stitution of the United States.” 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c).15
`“The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty
`interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a fo-
`rum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts,
`ties, or relations.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
`471–72 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
`310, 319 (1945)). To be subject to specific personal jurisdiction
`in a forum state, the defendant must have “purposefully di-
`rected” its activities to the forum state, and the litigation must
`
`15 We have been unable to identify any difference between the state and
`federal standards. See Matlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 705 (7th
`Cir. 2019). We have no reason to disturb this settled consensus; in cases
`where “neither party … urges that the Illinois due process analysis differs,
`we only consider the requirements of federal due process.” Id.; see also Rios
`v. Bayer Corp., 178 N.E.3d 1088, 1094 (Ill. 2020) (same); Russell v. SNFA,
`987 N.E.2d 778, 784–86 (Ill. 2013) (detailing the development of the doc-
`trine).
`
`
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`No. 21-2909
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`relate to those activities. Id. at 472 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler
`Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).
`Over the years, the Supreme Court has refined the doc-
`trine of personal jurisdiction as the practicalities of commer-
`cial activity have changed in response to technological devel-
`opments. Initially, the “long-standing territorial-based juris-
`diction test” held that an “adjudicating court’s jurisdiction
`over persons is established only when the persons have some
`territorial presence, actual or constructive, in the forum.”
`Curry, 949 F.3d at 393–94 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
`(1877)). The “advent of automobiles,” along with “the realities
`of interstate corporate activities,” “required … moderation of
`the territorial limits on jurisdictional power.” Shaffer v. Heit-
`ner, 433 U.S. 186, 202 (1977). That moderation came in Interna-
`tional Shoe, in which the Court emphasized the modern re-
`quirement that a defendant “have certain minimum contacts
`with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does
`not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
`tice.’” 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
`463 (1940)).
`In the decades following International Shoe, the Court peri-
`odically provided further elucidation of the “minimum con-
`tacts” criterion and the cornerstone standard of “traditional
`notions of fair play and substantial justice.” As we noted in
`Curry, the Supreme Court has confirmed that these more re-
`cent cases were not intended to alter the basic approach to
`specific personal jurisdiction but to refine our understanding,
`and application, of it. 949 F.3d at 396. We previously have ex-
`amined in some depth that jurisprudential journey in Curry,
`id. at 395–98, and need not walk every step of that road again.
`It is sufficient that we stress the resulting guideposts of that
`
`
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`journey as they pertain to the case before us. First, in examin-
`ing “minimum contacts,” we must focus on the defendant’s
`own contacts with the state, not the plaintiff’s. Walden v. Fiore,
`571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). The defendant’s contacts must be
`with the forum state, not just with individuals within the
`state. See id. at 285. The defendant’s contacts with the state
`must demonstrate that the defendant purposively availed it-
`self of the laws of that jurisdiction by availing itself of the
`privilege of doing business in the state or by purposively di-
`recting activities at the state. See Lexington Ins. Co. v. Hotai Ins.
`Co., 938 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir. 2019).16
`This focus on the contacts among the defendant, the forum,
`and the litigation “protects the defendant against the burdens
`of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.” World-Wide
`Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). Achieve-
`ment of this goal is the primary purpose of the analysis. It is
`not, however, the exclusive consideration that a court may
`consider. A court may also give some weight to the “forum
`State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” “the plaintiff’s in-
`terest in securing convenient and effective relief,” and the
`shared interest of the interstate system in obtaining an effi-
`cient and effective relief that promotes shared social policies.
`
`16 Most recently, in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,
`the Supreme Court considered Ford’s contention that jurisdiction over it
`in Montana was improper where Ford’s contacts with the forum did not
`directly cause the harm. 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2021). The Supreme Court
`rejected this narrow view. “[S]pecific jurisdiction attaches in cases identi-
`cal to the ones here—when a company like Ford serves a market for a
`product in the forum State and the product malfunctions there.” Id. at
`1027.
`
`
`
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`No. 21-2909
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`Id. But, again, we must remember that the “minimum con-
`tacts” analysis is aimed principally at protecting “the liberty
`of the nonresident defendant—not the convenience of plain-
`tiffs … and the forum state.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 284.
`C.
`We have applied these principles to online retailers. In
`uBID, Inc., 623 F.3d at 424, 428, we reversed a dismissal for
`want of personal jurisdiction where defendant GoDaddy (the
`operator of the website of the same name) directed an adver-
`tising campaign at the entire Nation, including at the forum
`state, and generated significant revenue from forum custom-
`ers. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Keeton,
`465 U.S. 770, we held that “GoDaddy has thoroughly, delib-
`erately, and successfully exploited the Illinois market”
`through its use of sales and advertisements to Illinois (among
`the other forty-nine states). uBID, Inc., 623 F.3d at 427. Go-
`Daddy contended “that its sales to Illinois residents are auto-
`mated transactions unilaterally initiated by those residents,”
`but we disagreed. Id. at 428. We explained that
`GoDaddy tells us that its customers enter into
`most transactions without any human action on
`GoDaddy’s end. But of course the customers
`who buy domain names from GoDaddy are not
`simply typing their credit card numbers into a
`web form and hoping they get something in re-
`turn. GoDaddy itself set the system up this way.
`It cannot now point to its hundreds of thou-
`sands of customers in Illinois and tell us, “It was
`all their idea.”
`
`Id.
`
`
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`No. 21-2909
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`13
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`Then in Hemi, 622 F.3d 754, we affirmed the district court’s
`holding that Internet sales to the forum were sufficient to es-
`tablish personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state online ciga-
`rette retailer, Hemi. Hemi sold discount cigarettes through
`many websites. It indicated on its websites that it would sell
`cigarettes to any state in the Republic, save New York (due to
`ongoing litigation in that state). Id. at 755–56. Over the course
`of a three year-long investigation by the Illinois Department
`of Revenue, a single special senior agent purchased over 300
`packs of cigarettes from Hemi and had them shipped to Illi-
`nois. Id. at 755. The only connections alleged between Hemi
`and Illinois were these sales. We held that Hemi’s “contacts
`with Illinois were sufficient to satisfy due process.” Id. at 757.
`This holding was rooted in two key facts. First, “Hemi ex-
`pressly elected to do business with the residents of forty-nine
`states. … Hemi stood ready and willing to do business with
`Illinois residents.” Id. at 758. Second, “the fact that Hemi ex-
`cluded New York residents from
`its customer pool
`shows … that Hemi knew that conducting business with res-
`idents of a particular state could subject it to jurisdiction
`there.” Id.
`We also have held jurisdiction proper where a defendant’s
`website offered the forum state as a “ship-to” option, the de-
`fendant sent a follow-up email confirming orders and ship-
`ping addresses, and the defendant sold and shipped products
`to over 700 residents in the forum. Curry, 949 F.3d at 399.
`These contacts were sufficient, we explained, because “[t]here
`is no per se requirement that the defendant especially target
`the forum in its business activity; it is sufficient that the de-
`fendant reasonably could foresee that its product would be
`sold in the forum.” Id. If the defendant exploits the forum
`market, it is subject to the jurisdiction of the forum. Id. In
`
`
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`No. 21-2909
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`Curry we explained that allowing customers to order prod-
`ucts from a website to the forum, and then carrying out that
`order, can form the basis of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 399–
`400.
`In Matlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2019),
`however, we encountered a case that, when all circumstances
`were considered, exceeded established constitutional limita-
`tions on personal jurisdiction.17 In that case, two inventors
`sued their former company in Illinois (and its assignee) for
`royalties from their products. Id. at 703–04. The defendants
`moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2). In response, the inven-
`tors’ “counsel submitted an online purchase receipt from [the
`defendants]’ website and a declaration stating that he pur-
`chased and received a single patented product in Illinois.” Id.
`at 704. We distinguished Hemi and found jurisdiction lacking
`for three key reasons:
`The first is the scale of contact with Illinois. …
`[This case involved] a single incident conjured
`up by the plaintiffs’ attorney for the exclusive
`purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction
`over the defendants.
`…
`Second, the relationship between the defend-
`ants’ conduct and the State differs significantly.
`… [T]he plaintiffs bring claims with an attenu-
`ated relationship to Illinois and any sales that
`occurred there. In other words, this case is not
`“a suit arising out of or related to the defend-
`ant[s’] contacts with the forum.” … [T]his is not
`
`17 For Matlin’s application to the case at hand, see infra pp. 18–19.
`
`
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`15
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`the type of case where the defendants sold and
`shipped a defective product into Illinois that in-
`jured residents there.
`…
`[Third, the plaintiffs] attempted to salvage per-
`sonal jurisdiction—after the defendants moved
`to dismiss—by luring them into shipping a
`product into Illinois. Because specific personal
`jurisdiction derives from the plaintiffs’ relevant
`contacts with the forum, we cannot allow plain-
`tiffs to base jurisdiction on a contact that did not
`exist at the time they filed suit.
`Id. at 706–07 (third alteration and emphasis in original) (quot-
`ing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
`408, 414 n.8 (1984)).
`
`III
`Having set forth the relevant legal background, we now
`apply these principles to the case before us. Again, these re-
`quirements are:
`First, the defendant’s contacts with the forum
`state must show that it purposefully availed it-
`self of the privilege of conducting business in
`the forum state or purposefully directed its ac-
`tivities at the state. Second, the plaintiff’s al-
`leged injury must have arisen out of the defend-
`ant’s forum-related activities. And finally, any
`exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport
`with traditional notions of fair play and sub-
`stantial justice.
`
`
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`No. 21-2909
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`Curry, 949 F.3d at 398 (cleaned up) (quoting Lexington Ins.,
`938 F.3d at 878). As a reminder, our focus is on the contacts
`that the defendant itself created with the forum state; the de-
`fendant cannot be “haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result
`of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilat-
`eral activity of another party or a third person.” Burger King,
`471 U.S. at 475 (cleaned up).
`A. Purposeful Direction
`First, we must analyze HANWJH’s activity to determine
`whether
`it purposefully directed conduct at
`Illinois.
`HANWJH has no physical presence in Illinois. “Our cases
`make clear, however, that physical presence is not necessary
`for a defendant to have sufficient minimum contacts with a
`forum state.” Curry, 949 F.3d at 398. As in Curry, we again
`find Hemi particularly instructive. Recall that in Hemi, a single
`agent of the plaintiff purchased over 300 packs of illegal ciga-
`rettes from the defendant cigarette retailer. 622 F.3d at 755.
`The sales to the plaintiff’s agents supported a finding of per-
`sonal jurisdiction because the retailer both maintained com-
`mercial websites from which one could order goods to Illinois
`and because it then “knowingly did do business with Illinois
`residents.” Id. at 757–58; see also Curry, 949 F.3d at 399 (citing
`approvingly the same).
`Curry and Hemi make clear that this case does not require
`us to break new ground. In Curry, the defendant’s actions
`could be fairly “described as purposeful[ly]” directed where
`it “created an interactive website and explicitly provided that
`Illinois residents could purchase its products through that
`website,” “arranged for the sale of its products through third-
`party websites,” “sent written confirmation to the Illinois cus-
`tomers acknowledging their sale and including their Illinois
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`shipping address,” and then, “shipped [the product] to its
`customers who were in Illinois.” 949 F.3d at 399.
`We see the same purposeful direction here. HANWJH’s
`actions certainly can be characterized as purposeful. It estab-
`lished an online store, using a third-party retailer, Ama-
`zon.com. Through this online store, it unequivocally asserted
`a willingness to ship goods to Illinois and established the ca-
`pacity to do so. When an order was placed, it filled the order,
`intentionally shipping an infringing product to the cus-
`tomer’s designated Illinois address.
`HANWJH nevertheless argues that NBA Properties has
`manufactured jurisdiction by having its agent purchase the
`infringing product. Such an assertion simply cannot be
`squared with Hemi. In making this argument, HANWJH over-
`looks that, in assessing purposeful direction, what matters is
`its structuring of its own activities so as to target the Illinois
`market. NBA Properties’ motivations in purchasing the alleg-
`edly illegal item are in no way relevant to an assessment of
`whether HANWJH has established sufficient contacts to sell
`its products to Illinois residents.
`HANWJH also urges a bright-line rule that a single trans-
`action cannot be sufficient to establish jurisdiction. This argu-
`ment is crucial to its case because the sole difference between
`this case and Hemi is volume. In Hemi, plaintiff’s agent pur-
`chased over 300 packs of cigarettes; here we have a single or-
`der. Such a categorical rule would be unsound, and such a
`practice has been discouraged by the Supreme Court. See
`Burger King, 471 U.S. at 485–86; see also Chloé v. Queen Bee of
`Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that ju-
`risdiction was proper over a defendant who offered handbags
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`No. 21-2909
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`for sale and sold a single allegedly infringing bag to the fo-
`rum).
`By drawing a rigid numerical line as HANWJH suggests,
`we would succumb to the trap that the Supreme Court has
`warned explicitly that we must avoid. “[T]alismanic jurisdic-
`tional formulas” are not an acceptable instrument in the
`toolbox of a court assessing personal jurisdiction. Burger King,
`471 U.S. at 485. The question is not whether the plaintiff pur-
`chased enough goods to subject the defendant to personal ju-
`risdiction. The focus is whether HANWJH purposefully di-
`rected its conduct at Illinois. Cf. id. at 485–86 (“‘[T]he facts of
`each case must [always] be weighed’ in determining whether
`personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and sub-
`stantial justice.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Kulko
`v. California Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978))).
`Matlin hardly establishes a categorical rule that multiple
`online sales, as opposed to a single online sale, are required to
`establish a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction. In Matlin,
`personal jurisdiction was improper because the sale was un-
`related to the litigation and occurred after the case was filed.
`As we note below, in addition to being purposefully directed
`at the forum state, the relevant contacts must also be related
`to the litigation. It is true that Matlin found Hemi inapplicable
`to its situation in part because Matlin involved only a single
`sale. But the sale was not related to the underlying royalties
`dispute in the slightest. We explained that “this is not the type
`of case where the defendants sold and shipped a defective
`product into Illinois that injured residents there.” Matlin,
`921 F.3d at 707. We also explained that “even if we accepted
`that a single online sale provided a sufficient link to the roy-
`alty dispute, … the plaintiff-initiated contact arose after the
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`plaintiffs filed suit—solely to lure the defendants into Illinois
`to establish personal jurisdiction over them.” Id. Here, unlike
`Matlin, we are faced with a situation where an infringing
`product was shipped to Illinois, in advance of the litigation,
`and the listing for sale and shipping of that product caused a
`likelihood of confusion for the people of Illinois. The defend-
`ants in Matlin could not have foreseen that they would be
`haled into court in Illinois until after the case was filed;
`HANWJH knew it could be subject to the jurisdiction of Illi-
`nois when it shipped a counterfeit product to the forum.
`Finally, describing HANWJH’s act of filling NBA Proper-
`ties’ order as the unilateral act of the plaintiff is a mischarac-
`terization. Here, HANWJH shipped a product to the forum
`only after it had structured its sales activity in such a manner
`as to invite orders from Illinois and developed the capacity to
`fill them. It cannot now point to its “customers in Illinois and
`tell us, ‘It was all their idea.’” uBID, Inc., 623 F.3d at 428.
`B. Relatedness
`“The proper exercise of specific jurisdiction also requires
`that the defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum state
`be ‘suit-related.’” Curry, 949 F.3d at 400 (emphasis in original)
`(quoting Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 801); see also Ford Motor
`Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021)
`(explaining that the suit must “arise out of or relate to the de-
`fendant’s contacts with the forum” (emphasis in original)
`(quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of California,
`137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017))). This requirement is met when
`direct sales from the defendant in the forum state involve the
`infringing product. Curry, 949 F.3d at 401–02.
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