`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Seventh Circuit
`____________________
`Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378
`EDDIE RICHARDSON,
`Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,
`v.
`KARIM KHARBOUCH,
`Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.
`____________________
`Appeals from the United States District Court for the
`Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
`No. 1:19-cv-02321 — Nancy L. Maldonado, Judge.
`____________________
`ARGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2024 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2025
`____________________
`Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI and
`PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
`JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge . Eddie Richardson sued
`Karim Kharbouch for infringement under the Copyright Act,
`alleging that Kharbouch illegally used his beat in a chart -
`topping song. See 17 U.S.C. § 501. The district court, following
`two rounds of summary judgment briefing during which
`both sides repeatedly violated the court’s local rules, granted
`summary judgment on the merits in Kharbouch’s favor.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2 Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378
`Kharbouch then moved for statutory attorney’s fees and costs
`as the prevailing party . The court granted his request for
`costs, but not fees.
`Richardson appeals the district court’s decision to not en-
`force the local rules against Kharbouch and its grant of sum-
`mary judgment. Kharbouch separately cross- appeals the de-
`nial of fees. Having consolidated the two appeals, we affirm
`the district court’s judgment on each issue.1
`As to summary judgment specifically, Richardson has not
`presented sufficient evidence to show that Kharbouch in-
`fringed his copyrighted work. The class of copyright Richard-
`son obtained protects against duplication of the digital track
`but permits imitation of the underlying musical composition.
`Because Richardson has not presented evidence that Khar-
`bouch duplicated his work as opposed to merely imitating it,
`we must affirm the district court’s grant of summary judg-
`ment in Kharbouch’s favor.
`I
`In 2012, sixteen -year-old Eddie Lee Richardson enjoyed
`making instrumental hip -hop beats and uploading them to
`the internet under the moniker Hotwire the Producer. One
`beat Richardson crafted is titled “*Hood* Pushin Weight”
`(HPW). The track has all the trappings of a successful hip-hop
`instrumental: deep percussion, rhythmic snare, and melodic
`detailing. Richardson made sure to identify himself as the cre-
`ator of the bea t by placing digital vocalizations of his
`
`1 We have elected to decide Kharbouch’s appeal of the district court’s
`denial of attorney’s fees without oral argument. The briefs and record ad-
`equately present ed the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument
`would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378 3
`professional moniker on the recording. But he did not copy-
`right the track before uploading it to a music sharing website.
`Months after creating HPW, Richardson unexpectedly rec-
`ognized it in the background of a chart- topping hit. That hit
`was “Ain’t Worried About Nothin” (AWAN) by rapper Ka-
`rim Kharbouch, whose stage name is French Montana. Believ-
`ing the rapper had copied his song, Richardson contacted him
`on social media and demanded credit for AWAN’s beat.
`Kharbouch responded only to tell Richardson to speak with
`Kharbouch’s producer, Rico Love. Richardson ostensibly ex-
`changed messages with Rico Love but has not presented a rec-
`ord of those communications.
`The day after Richardson first heard AWAN, he registered
`a sound recording copyright of his creation, HPW, with the
`United States Copyright Office. He did not obtain a musical
`composition copyright. Meanwhile, over time, AWAN be-
`came a hit, ultimately ranking number one on the Billboard
`charts.
`Richardson sued Kharbouch under the Copyright Act in
`2019. He alleged two counts of copyright infringement and
`sought proceeds from Kharbouch’s live performances of the
`song and as well as to permanently enjoin Kharbouch from
`performing the song.
`2 See 17 U.S.C. § 501.
`There were two rounds of summary judgment briefing in
`the district court. The arguments presented in the initial
`
`2 Richardson no longer argues that Kharbouch is liable for infringe-
`ment based on Kharbouch’s alleged distribution of AWAN. Richardson
`also concedes that he may only seek proceeds from Kharbouch’s live per-
`formances that post -date April 5, 2016, based upon th e applicable three-
`year statute of limitations.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4 Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378
`round are irrelevant to the present appeal, but certain aspects
`of the motions practice during that initial round are central to
`our decision.
`For one, neither party complied with the l ocal rules gov-
`erning summary judgment practice. Local Rule 56.1 requires
`parties moving for summary judgment to provide a “state-
`ment of material facts that complies with LR 56.1(d) and that
`attaches the cited evidentiary material.” N.D. Ill. L.R.
`56.1(a)(2). Non-movants must “file a response” to this state-
`ment of material facts “that complies with LR 56.1(e) and that
`attaches any cited evidentiary material not attached ” to the
`movant’s statement. N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(2). Parties who fail
`to properly dispute an asserted fact run the risk of the district
`court deeming the uncontroverted fact admitted at summary
`judgment. N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.l(e)(3).
`During the initial round of summary judgment briefing,
`Richardson failed to respond to all but one alleged fact in
`Kharbouch’s statement of material facts. Similarly, Khar-
`bouch failed to respond to Richardson’s statement of material
`facts and statement of additional facts. Despite having the dis-
`cretion to do so, the district court declined to penalize the par-
`ties by deeming all the undisputed facts admitted. On the
`merits, the court denied Richardson’s motion for summary
`judgment while granting in part and denying in part Khar-
`bouch’s motion for partial summary judgment.
`Another aspect of the initial round of summary judgment
`briefing worth mentioning is Kharbouch’s reply brief. In his
`reply brief, Kharbouch made what the district court later de-
`scribed as a “passing comment” that pointed to a potentially
`dispositive issue—the nature of Richardson’s copyright. Be-
`cause neither party had developed the issue, the court
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378 5
`ordered a second round of summary judgment briefing sua
`sponte.
`During the second round of briefing, the operative ques-
`tion was whether Richardson had presented evidence that
`Kharbouch, when creating AWAN, duplicated or sampled
`HPW’s digital recording as opposed to merely imitating it. As
`evidence of duplication, Richardson primarily relied on the
`tracks’ striking similarity and on testimony from an expert
`witness who was a music producer, writer, and teacher . The
`expert opined that digital sampling was common in the hip-
`hop industry and, separately, that the two tracks were “shock-
`ingly similar,” shared many common motifs, and were “ex-
`tremely unlikely” to have had a common public source. The
`expert did not state whether AWAN actually sampled any
`portion of HPW’s digital track.
`When the second round of briefing concluded, the district
`court issued its opinion. Before reaching the merits, the court
`noted the parties’ continued failure to adhere to the l ocal
`rules. Indeed, despite the court’s prior warning, neither Khar-
`bouch nor Richardson had filed any response to the other
`party’s statement of facts. Nevertheless, the court once again
`declined to deem all facts admitted for prudential reasons.
`As for the merits, the question before the district court was
`whether Richardson presented qualifying evidence that Khar-
`bouch had digitally sampled HPW. The court discussed the
`differences in protections conferred by sound recording cop-
`yrights and musical composition copyrights. Assessing the
`factual record in its entirety, the court found that Richard-
`son’s two factual assertions—that the songs sound alike and
`sampling was common practice—could not prove duplication
`or sampling as opposed to imitation. The court explained that
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`6 Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378
`because Richardson only had a copyright to HPW’s digital
`sound recording and not to its musical composition, to sur-
`vive summary judgment, Richardson would have had to pre-
`sent evidence of how AWAN was produced and whether
`Kharbouch’s producer Rico Love duplicated HPW’s digital
`track. Because Richardson did not present any such evidence,
`the court awarded judgment to Kharbouch as a matter of law.
`Meanwhile, after winning at summary judgment, Khar-
`bouch moved for attorney’s fees and costs under the Copy-
`right Act. The district court awarded costs but denied fees.
`Richardson now appeals, challenging the district court’s
`handling of the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements and its grant of
`summary judgment to Kharbouch. Kharbouch cross-appeals
`the denial of fees. We address each challenge in turn.
`II
`Richardson argues the district court abused its discretion
`by declining to treat Richardson’s unopposed factual allega-
`tions as admitted under the district court’s local rules. See
`N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.l(e)(3).
`We review the enforcement of local rules for abuse of dis-
`cretion. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 562 (7th
`Cir. 2002). “[L]itigants have no right to demand strict enforce-
`ment of local rules by district judges.” Modrowski v. Pigatto ,
`712 F.3d 1166, 1169 (7th Cir. 2013). “[T]he decision to overlook
`any transgression of the local rules is left to the district court’s
`discretion.” Id. (citation modified).
`There was no abuse of discretion here. Both parties failed
`to adhere to the applicable rules and ran the substantial risk
`of their opponent’s proposed facts being deemed admitted.
`The district court refrained from enforcing the local rules
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378 7
`against Richardson and Kharbouch. As such, the court’s deci-
`sion benefitted Richardson as much as it did Kharbouch.
`Yet, Richardson does not ask us to deem both statements
`of fact admitted. He only asks that his own Local Rule 56.1
`statement receive such treatment without providing any sup-
`port for this type of outcome. Cf. Stevo, 662 F.3d at 887 (finding
`no abuse of discretion where, among other things, the “dis-
`trict court did not enforce (or relax) the rules unequally as be-
`tween the parties”). We affirm the district court’s approach.
`III
`We review a grant of summary judgment de novo . Thomp-
`son Corrugated Sys., Inc. v. Engico, S.R.L., 111 F.4th 747, 751 (7th
`Cir. 2024). Summary judgment is appropriate only where
`“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
`movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
`Civ. P. 56(a). We construe all facts and reasonable inferences
`drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to Richard-
`son as the nonmoving party. Poer v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 433, 438–
`39 (7th Cir. 2010).
`We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
`in Kharbouch’s favor. Because th e question of what types of
`evidence suffice to make out a sound recording copyright in-
`fringement claim is a matter of first impression for our court,
`we walk through our reasoning. We first lay out the elements
`of a copyright infringement claim. Then, w e discuss the dif-
`fering protections conferred by the classes of copyrights at is-
`sue in this case—musical composition copyrights and sound
`recording copyrights. Finally, we review the district court’s
`decision.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8 Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378
`A. Elements of a Copyright Infringement Claim
`To make out a copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff
`must show: (1) “ownership of a valid copyright, ” and (2)
`“copying of constituent elements of the work that are origi-
`nal.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361
`(1991). Here, the parties do not contest that Richardson owns
`a valid copyright for HPW . See Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol
`Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 1994) (“A certificate
`of registration from the U.S. Register of Copyrights consti-
`tutes prima facie evidence of the validity of a copyright.”).
`Therefore, our inquiry focuses only on the second element.
`The second element of a copyright infringement claim in-
`volves two questions: (1) “whether, as a factual matter, the
`defendant copied the plaintiff’s protected work (as opposed
`to independently creating a similar work),” and (2) “whether
`the copying ‘went so far as to constitute an improper appro-
`priation.’” Design Basics, LLC v. Signature Constr., Inc., 994 F.3d
`879, 887 (7th Cir. 2021) [hereinafter Signature Construction]
`(quoting Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672
`F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982)).
`To answer the first question, a plaintiff may prove copying
`either by direct or indirect evidence. Id. “[D]irect evidence,
`such as an admission of copying,” is rarely available. Peters v.
`West, 692 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2012). So many cases turn on
`indirect evidence . See Signature Constr. , 994 F.3d at 887. To
`make out a case based on indirect evidence, a plaintiff must
`present: ( 1) “evidence that the defendant had access to the
`plaintiff’s copyrighted work (enough to support a reasonable
`inference that the defendant had an opportunity to copy)”; and
`(2) “evidence of a substantial similarity between the plaintiff’s
`work and the defendant’s work (enough to support a
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378 9
`reasonable inference that copying in fact occurred).” Id. (citing
`Design Basics, LLC v. Lexington Homes, Inc., 858 F.3d 1093, 1099
`(7th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Lexington Homes]). While “proof of
`access may not be required” where the works at issue bear an
`“uncanny resemblance” to one another, such cases are ex-
`ceedingly rare. Lexington Homes, 858 F.3d at 1100. More com-
`monly, a plaintiff “must separately prove both access and
`similarity.” Id.
`Signature Construction outlines the steps for a plaintiff to
`prove copying has taken place. But the decision does not tell
`us what conduct qualifies as copying —the facts in that case
`did not require as much. 994 F.3d at 887. The answer depends
`on the type of copyright at issue, our next topic.
`B. Musical Composition Copyrights & Sound Record-
`ing Copyrights
`Different types of copyrights confer different kinds and
`amounts of power to the holder. Therefore, plaintiffs alleging
`infringement must present evidence of copying that is at-
`tuned to the class of copyright at issue.
`Relevant in this case are the musical composition and
`sound recording variants of copyrights.
`Holders of musical composition copyrights enjoy rather
`expansive powers. Such copyrights grant the owner the ex-
`clusive right:
`(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies
`or phonorecords;
`(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the
`copyrighted work;
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`10 Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378
`(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
`copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
`transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
`lending;
`(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
`choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion
`pictures and other audiovisual works, to per-
`form the copyrighted work publicly; [and]
`(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
`choreographic works, pantomimes, and picto-
`rial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
`individual images of a motion picture or other
`audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
`work publicly[.]
`17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5).
`On the other hand, sound recording copyrights only pro-
`tect those sounds “that directly or indirectly recapture the ac-
`tual sounds fixed in the recording” from infringement. 17
`U.S.C. § 114(b). This type of copyright’s protections “do not
`extend to the making or duplication of another sound record-
`ing that consists entirely of an independent fixation of other
`sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the
`copyrighted sound recording.” Id. (emphasis added). The right
`to prepare derivative works from copyrighted sound record-
`ings is limited to “actual sounds fixed in the sound record-
`ing.” Id. And the right to bar others from performing copy-
`righted sound recordings extends only to “perform[ances of]
`the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
`transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(6); see also id. § 114(a).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378 11
`In light of this statutory text, the district court held that a
`plaintiff holding a sound recording copyright must present
`evidence that a defendant actually copied the specific digital
`sound elements in the work at issue. Other courts in our cir-
`cuit have held the same. See, e.g., Capitol Recs., Inc. v. Koyate ,
`No. 2:06-CV-395 JVB, 2008 WL 2857237, at *7 (N.D. Ind. July
`22, 2008); Janky v. Farag , No. 3:05- CV-217-PRC, 2006 WL
`8441604, at *11 (N.D. Ind. May 15, 2006).
`We agree with this analysis. To make out a claim of copy-
`right infringement, a sound recording copyright holder must
`present evidence that the defendant duplicated the specific
`digital sounds employed in the copyrighted material. Evi-
`dence that the works contained the same generic sounds with-
`out specific facts about those sounds’ origins may be suffi-
`cient to show infringement of a musical composition copy-
`right, but not a sound recording copyright. Said another way,
`“a band play[ing] and record[ing] its own ve rsion of [a track
`with a sound recording copyright] in a way that sounded very
`similar to the copyrighted recording” does not violate the law
`“so long as there was no actual copying of the recorded
`[track].” VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone , 824 F.3d 871, 883 (9th
`Cir. 2016).
`The Copyright Act’s legislative history supports our inter-
`pretation. A congressional report discussing the statute
`“makes clear” that copyright protection for “sound record-
`ings extends only to the particular sounds of which the re-
`cording consists” and does not prevent “imitation of a rec-
`orded performance.” H.R. REP. 94- 1476, at 106 (1976), as re-
`printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5721. A sound recording
`copyright, the report states, “would not prevent a separate
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`12 Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378
`recording of another performance in which those sounds are
`imitated.” Id.
`Our conclusion also comports with the dominant treat-
`ment of sound recording copyrights around the country. In
`the Ninth Circuit, “[a] new recording that mimics the copy-
`righted recording is not an infringement, even if the mimick-
`ing is very well done, so long as there was no actual copying.”
`VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883. The Fifth Circuit has held that
`plaintiffs with a sound recording copyright must “show that
`the defendants sampled his songs—not that the songs ‘sound’
`similar.” Batiste v. Lewis, 976 F.3d 493, 505 (5th Cir. 2020). The
`Sixth Circuit has found that the statutory language describing
`sound recording copyrights in 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) leaves “the
`world at large … free to imitate or simulate the creative work
`fixed in the recording so long as an actual copy of the sound
`recording itself is not made.” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimen-
`sion Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005).
`C. Analysis
`With this understanding of sound recording copyrights in
`mind, our infringement analysis in this case must center on
`whether, when producing AWAN, Kharbouch duplicated
`Richardson’s digital recording of HPW or imitated HPW’s
`musical content.
`We agree with Richardson that HPW’s beat, to the naked
`ear, seems indistinguishable from the beat in AWAN. Yet,
`opinions and allegations unsupported by facts are not enough
`to create a genuine factual dispute about whether AWAN du-
`plicated HPW’s digital tra ck. And, as the district court
`properly concluded, Richardson failed to supply facts that
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378 13
`would permit a jury to find that his sound recording copy-
`right was infringed.
`As we explained earlier, Richardson could have presented
`either direct or indirect evidence to succeed in his claim that
`Kharbouch duplicated HPW in producing AWAN. See Signa-
`ture Constr., 994 F.3d at 887. Richardson has presented neither.
`As for direct evidence, Kharbouch does not admit to sampling
`HPW. Cf. Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 800 (allowing infringe-
`ment claim where the defendants admitted sampling the
`plaintiff’s digital recording). And the record lacks any other
`evidence about how AWAN was produced. Despite having
`the opportunity to gather evidence probative of duplication
`by, for example, deposing Kharbouch, deposing the song’s
`producer Rico Love, or presenting expert testimony suggest-
`ing that sampling occurred, Richardson failed to do so.
`Richardson also failed to provide indirect evidence of in-
`fringement—that is, evidence that Kharbouch had access to
`HPW such that it is reasonable to infer that he had an oppor-
`tunity to duplicate the track and evidence of substantial simi-
`larity between AWAN and HPW such that it is reasonable to
`infer that sampling actually occurred. Signature Constr. , 994
`F.3d at 887. As to access, Richardson presents no facts about
`Kharbouch or Rico Love’s retrieval of HPW’s digital track be-
`yond stating that he (Richardson) posted it on the internet.
`This does not permit an inference that AWAN’s producers
`duplicated or sampled, as opposed to merely imitated, HPW.
`See Lexington Homes, 858 F.3d at 1108 (“[T] he existence of the
`plaintiff's copyrighted materials on the Internet, even on a
`public and ‘user-friendly’ site, cannot by itself justify an infer-
`ence that the defendant accessed those materials.”). And as to
`substantial similarity, a lthough Richardson’s expert witness
`
`
`
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`14 Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378
`discussed the two tracks’ similarities and the widespread use
`of sampling in the industry, he did not offer an opinion on
`AWAN’s digital production. This expert testimony is unlike
`the expert testimony presented in cases like VMG Salsoul, LLC
`v. Ciccone, where the expert opined that the defendant directly
`copied and modified the copyrighted sound recording . 824
`F.3d at 879.
`In sum, the mere evidence Richardson provided of the two
`tracks’ similarity is not enough to create a dispute of material
`fact as to whether AWAN is or contains a digital copy of
`HPW.
`In so holding, we express no view on whether any amount
`of digital sampling, however slight, is sufficient to establish a
`claim for copyright infringement. Compare Bridgeport Music,
`410 F.3d at 800–01 (holding that the reproduction of any
`amount of a sound recording is sufficient to prove infringe-
`ment), with VMG Salsoul , 824 F.3d at 886–87 (requiring evi-
`dence that the defendant duplicated a substantial portion of
`the sound recording) . We will not consider the issue where,
`as here, a plaintiff has not presen ted any evidence of digital
`sampling to begin with.
`Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of sum-
`mary judgment to Kharbouch on Richardson’s copyright in-
`fringement claim. And because Richardson cannot succeed on
`the merits of his copyright infringement claims, we must also
`deny his request for a permanent injunction . See Chathas v.
`Loc. 134 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers , 233 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir.
`2000).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378 15
`IV
`The final issue for us to resolve is Kharbouch’s request that
`we overturn the district court’s denial of his motion for attor-
`ney’s fees. We review denials of fee awards under the Copy-
`right Act for abuse of discretion. Live Face on Web, LLC v. Cre-
`mation Soc'y of Ill., Inc., 77 F.4th 630, 631 (7th Cir. 2023).
`District courts have discretion under the Copyright Act to
`award fees to the prevailing party. 17 U.S.C. § 505. D istrict
`courts consider the four non-exhaustive Fogerty factors when
`evaluating such requests: “(1) the frivolousness of the suit; (2)
`the losing party’ s motivation for bringing or defending
`against a suit; (3) the objective unreasonableness of the claims
`advanced by the losing party; and (4) the need to advance
`considerations of compensation and deterrence.” Live Face on
`Web, 77 F.4th at 631 (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517,
`534 n.19 (1994)).
`There is a strong presumption in favor of granting fees in
`copyright infringement cases. Id. at 632 (“[P]revailing defend-
`ants in copyright cases are presumptively entitled (and
`strongly so) to recover attorney fees .” (quoting Woodhaven
`Homes & Realty, Inc. v. Hotz, 396 F.3d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 2005))).
`This is because, “[w]ithout an award of attorney’ s fees, a de-
`fendant faces pressure to abandon his meritorious defenses
`and throw in the towel because the cost of vindicating his
`right (his attorney’s fees) will exceed the private benefit he re-
`ceives from succeeding (a non -excludable right to continue
`doing what he has already done).” Id.
`Nevertheless, “our caselaw has never held that the strong
`presumption was insurmountable; rather, we have consist-
`ently required a fact -specific, case -by-case inquiry ” by the
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`16 Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378
`district court to affirm a decision on appeal. Timothy B.
`O'Brien LLC v. Knott, 962 F.3d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 2020). The fees
`inquiry is, after all, a “fact -intensive” one, “and the district
`court’s proximity to the litigation” provides it with a superior
`vantage point. Live Face on Web , 77 F.4th at 631. To that end,
`our court has affirmed the denial of fees in a case where the
`district court “properly performed a fact -specific analysis of
`the case and reached a reasonable conclusion. ” Timothy B.
`O'Brien LLC, 962 F.3d at 352.
`Kharbouch, by his own admission, filed his request for
`fees late, by one day. Despite having the authority to deny the
`motion as untimely (as Richardson urged), the district court
`excused Kharbouch’s tardiness and addressed the merits of
`his motion. The court then analyzed the Fogerty factors, con-
`cluded that each of them weighed against an award, and de-
`nied Kharbouch’s motion.
`As for the first three factors, the court found that Richard-
`son’s lawsuit was not frivolous, he did not have an improper
`motivation in filing it, and the claims were not objectively un-
`reasonable. The court explained that Richardson’s testimony
`demonstrated that he genuinely believed, after hearing
`AWAN, that the track copied HPW, and that he “failed to ap-
`preciate the technical differences between a sound recording
`and music composition copyright.” Furthermore, the court
`found that Kharbouch’s own failure to raise or develop the
`sound recording copyright argument in his initial motion for
`summary judgment undermined his argument that Richard-
`son should have known that his suit was frivolous. A s to the
`fourth Fogerty factor, the court found that a fee award, rather
`than encouraging defendants to pursue meritorious defenses,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378 17
`would have awarded Kharbouch’s lack of diligence and in-
`vited future defendants to do the same.
`The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
`Kharbouch’s motion. The district court, which is closest to the
`factual record and the litigating parties, explicitly acknowl-
`edged the strong presumption in favor of fees and thoroughly
`explained why it concluded that the Fogerty factors disfa-
`vored an award in this case. Each of the court’s conclusions as
`to the Fogerty factors was well supported by the record.
`A denial of fees in this case also does not undermine the
`purpose of the Copyright Act’s fee -shifting arrangement, the
`purpose of which is to “encourage parties to stand on their
`rights.” Live Face on We b, 77 F.4th at 631. Despite alluding in
`passing to Richardson’s sound recording copyright in his sec-
`ond reply brief at summary judgment, Kharbouch otherwise
`ignored a meritorious issue until the district court requested
`supplemental briefing sua sponte. I t was the district court’s
`assiduousness, not Kharbouch’s diligent development of the
`record or his defense, that ensured the dispositive argument
`was addressed at summary judgment . Accordingly, the dis-
`trict court was within its discretion to find that granting Khar-
`bouch fees would do little to encourage the exercise of rights
`or deter frivolous litigation.
`In summary, in Richardson’s appeal (24-1119), we
`AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in fa-
`vor of Kharbouch, including its manner of enforcing the local
`rules during the parties’ litigation , and DENY Richardson’s
`request for injunctive relief. In Kharbouch’s cross-appeal (24-
`2378), we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees.
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