RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
`Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
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`File Name: 21a0077p.06
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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. DAVID FELTEN,
`M.D., Ph.D.,
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`Plaintiff-Appellant,
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`v.
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`WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL,
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`Defendant- Appellee.
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`
`
`No. 20-1002
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`┘
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
`No. 2:10-cv-13440—Stephen J. Murphy, III, District Judge.
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`Argued: October 20, 2020
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`Decided and Filed: March 31, 2021
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`Before: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
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`_________________
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`COUNSEL
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`ARGUED: Julie Bracker, BRACKER & MARCUS LLC, Marietta, Georgia, for Appellant.
`Michael R. Turco, BROOKS WILKINS SHARKEY & TURCO, Birmingham, Michigan, for
`Appellee. ON BRIEF: Julie Bracker, Jason Marcus, BRACKER & MARCUS LLC, Marietta,
`Georgia, for Appellant. Michael R. Turco, Jason D. Killips, Steven M. Ribiat, BROOKS
`WILKINS SHARKEY & TURCO, Birmingham, Michigan, for Appellee.
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`BUSH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which McKEAGUE, J., joined.
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`GRIFFIN, J. (pp. 11–18), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
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`

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`No. 20-1002
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`United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp.
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`Page 2
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`_________________
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`OPINION
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`_________________
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`JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. David Felten appeals the district court’s partial
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`dismissal of his first amended complaint alleging that William Beaumont Hospital (“Beaumont”)
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`violated the anti-retaliation provision of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
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`Felten claims that Beaumont blacklisted him after he filed a qui tam complaint, in which he
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`alleged that the hospital violated certain federal and state laws. Notably, the alleged blacklisting
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`occurred after Felten’s termination from Beaumont, and Felten’s anti-retaliation claim challenges
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`only Beaumont’s post-termination actions. The district court dismissed the claim because it held
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`that the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision covers only retaliatory actions taken during the course
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`of a plaintiff’s employment. The district court certified for interlocutory appeal the question
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`whether the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision protects a relator from a defendant’s retaliation after
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`the relator’s termination. That question is an issue of first impression in our circuit. Because we
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`hold that the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision protects former employees alleging post-
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`termination retaliation, we vacate the district court’s dismissal order and remand for further
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`proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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`I.
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`On August 30, 2010, Felten filed a qui tam complaint alleging that his then-employer,
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`Beaumont, was violating the FCA and the Michigan Medicaid False Claims Act. He alleged that
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`Beaumont was paying kickbacks to various physicians and physicians’ groups in exchange for
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`referrals of Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE patients. Felten also alleged that Beaumont had
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`retaliated against him in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) and Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.610c by
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`threatening and “marginaliz[ing]” him for insisting on compliance with the law. After the
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`United States and Michigan intervened and settled the case against Beaumont, the district court
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`dismissed the remaining claims, except those for retaliation and attorneys’ fees and costs.
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`Felten subsequently amended his complaint to add allegations of retaliation that took
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`place after he filed his initial complaint. He alleged that he was terminated after Beaumont
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`No. 20-1002
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`United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp.
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`Page 3
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`falsely represented to him that an internal report suggested that he be replaced and that his
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`position was subject to mandatory retirement. Felten further alleged that he had been unable to
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`obtain a comparable position in academic medicine. This, he alleged, was because Beaumont
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`“intentionally maligned [him] . . . in retaliation for his reports of its unlawful conduct,”
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`undermining his employment applications to almost forty institutions.
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`The district court granted Beaumont’s motion to partially dismiss Felten’s first amended
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`complaint. In relevant part, the district court dismissed the allegations of retaliatory conduct
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`occurring after Felten’s termination, holding that the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision does not
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`extend to retaliation against former employees. The district court interpreted the qualifier “in the
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`terms and conditions of employment” in § 3730(h)(1) to mean that the provision’s coverage
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`encompasses only conduct occurring during the course of a plaintiff’s employment.
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`Upon Felten’s request to amend the dismissal order, the district court certified for
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`interlocutory appeal the question whether § 3730(h) applies to allegations of post-employment
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`retaliatory conduct. We granted Felten’s petition for permission to appeal.
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`We review de novo a district court’s order regarding a motion to dismiss. Binno v. Am.
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`Bar Ass’n, 826 F.3d 338, 346 (6th Cir. 2016). We accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true
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`without presuming the truth of conclusory or legal assertions; then we determine whether the
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`allegations state a facially plausible claim for relief. Id. at 345–46.
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`II.
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`
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`At issue here is the temporal meaning of the word “employee” and the prohibited
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`employer conduct in the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1). That
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`subsection states:
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`Any employee, contractor, or agent shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make
`that employee, contractor, or agent whole, if that employee, contractor, or agent is
`discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner
`discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment because of
`lawful acts done by the employee, contractor, agent or associated others in
`furtherance of an action under this section or other efforts to stop 1 or more
`violations of this subchapter.
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`

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`No. 20-1002
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`United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp.
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`Page 4
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` §
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` 3730(h)(1). When this provision refers to an “employee” and proscribes certain employer
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`conduct, does it refer only to a current employment relationship, or does it also encompass one
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`that has ended?
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`To answer that question, we start with the statutory text. See Binno, 826 F.3d at 346. We
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`first “determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard
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`to the particular dispute in the case,” relying on “the language itself, the specific context in which
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`that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil
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`Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1997). That analysis ends our inquiry “if the statutory language is
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`unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’” Id. at 340 (quotation
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`omitted). But if the text is unclear, we may look at the “[t]he broader context” of the statute and
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`statutory purpose together to resolve the ambiguity. Id. at 345–46.
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`
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`The FCA does not explicitly say whether it pertains only to current employment.
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`However, Beaumont argues that the plain text of the FCA, when read according to relevant
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`canons of statutory interpretation, unambiguously excludes post-termination retaliation. It urges
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`us to adopt the approach of the Tenth Circuit—the only other court of appeals to decide the
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`issue—in Potts v. Center for Excellence in Higher Education, Inc., 908 F.3d 610, 614 (10th Cir.
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`2018). We respectfully disagree with Beaumont and our sister circuit’s conclusion that the
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`answer to the issue presented is clear. As explained below, the statutory text is in fact
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`ambiguous.
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`We usually interpret a statute according to its plain meaning, without inquiry into its
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`purpose. We also acknowledge the Supreme Court’s recent reminders to stay away from extra-
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`textual tools when ascertaining legislative intent. See Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct.
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`1804, 1814 (2019); Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019). But
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`Robinson v. Shell Oil provides guidelines for determining when a statute’s meaning is not plain
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`in the context of protections for employees and what to do in the face of ambiguity, and we are
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`bound to follow Robinson. See McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 550 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir.
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`2008) (explaining that Robinson “laid out a roadmap for statutory interpretation”).
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`No. 20-1002
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`United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp.
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`Page 5
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`In Robinson, the Supreme Court held that the term “employees” in § 704(a) of Title VII
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`of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is ambiguous and could be read to refer to both current and
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`former employees. 519 U.S. at 345. That conclusion flowed from three considerations. First,
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`Congress added “no temporal qualifier” to Title VII to clarify whether the statute includes only
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`current employees or both current and former employees. Id. at 341. Second, Title VII’s
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`definition of “employee” itself has no temporal qualifier and “is consistent with either current or
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`past employment.” Id. at 342. Third, Title VII includes other provisions that use the term
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`“employees” to encompass “something more inclusive or different than ‘current employees,’”
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`such as a provision authorizing “reinstatement or hiring of employees” as a remedy. Id. The
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`Court acknowledged that some sections of Title VII use “employee” to unambiguously mean a
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`“current employee,” but it reasoned that that fact shows only that the term “‘employees’ may
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`have a plain meaning in the context of a particular section—not that the term has the same
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`meaning in all other sections and in all other contexts.” Id. at 343.
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`Robinson’s reasoning applies with equal force to the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision,
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`31 U.S.C. §3730(h)(1). We address each consideration in turn.
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`First, there is no temporal qualifier accompanying the term “employee” in § 3730(h)(1),
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`and that provision’s explicit reference to “[a]ny employee,” id. (emphasis added), could mean
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`that it applies to any person who has ever been employed. Beaumont points to the noscitur a
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`sociis canon to argue that the list of actionable conduct in § 3730(h)(1) constitutes the temporal
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`limitation that distinguishes § 704(a) of Title VII from the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision.
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`True, the first three operative words on that list—“discharged, demoted, suspended”—refer to
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`harm against only current employees. A person cannot be discharged, demoted, or suspended
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`unless he or she first has a job to lose. However, current employment is not necessary for a
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`person to be “threatened,” “harassed,” or “discriminated” against—the last three types of
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`misconduct specified on the list. Thus, half of the terms on the list can refer to former
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`employees, thereby reducing the value of the noscitur a sociis canon in this case. Congress may
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`have included “threatened,” “harassed,” and “discriminated” in the statute to expand the
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`temporal scope of the anti-retaliation provision because the three terms are, by their plain
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`meaning, not restricted to a current employment relationship.
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`No. 20-1002
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`United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp.
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`Page 6
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`Beaumont also argues that the qualifier “in the terms and conditions of employment” at
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`the end of the list of sanctionable conduct eliminates any reading that § 3730(h)(1) could provide
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`relief to a former employee. In support, Beaumont notes that the Tenth Circuit held that the
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`qualifier modified the word “discriminated” to make “discriminated in the terms and conditions
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`of employment” a “catch-all phrase” that, under the ejusdem generis canon, restricted the
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`meaning of all listed misconduct in § 3730(h)(1) to only activities that occurred while the
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`plaintiff was still employed. See Potts, 908 F.3d at 615. With due respect to our sister circuit,
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`we are not convinced. Even if the phrase “terms and conditions of employment” is a catch-all
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`that applies to each listed type of misconduct in § 3730(h)(1), it does not necessarily restrict
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`misconduct to occurrences that take place only while the plaintiff is still employed. There are
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`many terms and conditions of employment that can persist after an employee’s termination. See,
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`e.g., Lantech.com v. Yarbrough, 247 F. App’x 769, 771–72 (6th Cir. 2007) (referencing a non-
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`compete agreement and confidentiality agreement); Hall v. Edgewood Partners Ins. Ctr., Inc.,
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`878 F.3d 524, 528–29 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding non-solicitation provisions enforceable against
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`employees terminated without cause); E.E.O.C. v. Cosmair, Inc., L’Oreal Hair Care Div.,
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`821 F.2d 1085, 1088–89 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a former employee was protected from his
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`employer’s discontinuance of severance pay under the ADEA’s anti-retaliation provision).
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`Moreover, straightforward application of the ejusdem generis canon cuts in favor of finding
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`ambiguity, not clarity, because the terms “threatened” and “harassed”—which can both occur
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`post-employment—are still specific terms that control that general catchall phrase. As in
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`Robinson, here, no temporal qualifier indicates that the statute applies only to current employees.
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`The second Robinson consideration—which directs our review to the statutory and
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`dictionary definition of “employee”—also shows that the FCA could cover former employees.
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`The FCA does not define “employee,” but in this case, dictionary definitions suffice. See Vander
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`Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 772 F.3d 1056, 1060 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that an applicant
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`was not an “employee” under § 3730(h)’s plain meaning). Beaumont contends that the
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`dictionary definitions cited in Vander Boegh confine the plain meaning of “employee” to current
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`employees. But the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Robinson:
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`The argument that the term “employed” . . . is commonly used to mean
`“[p]erforming work under an employer-employee relationship,” Black’s Law
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`No. 20-1002
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`United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp.
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`Page 7
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`Dictionary 525 (6th ed. 1990), begs the question by implicitly reading the word
`“employed” to mean “is employed.” But the word “employed” is not so limited
`in its possible meanings, and could just as easily be read to mean “was
`employed.”
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`519 U.S. at 342.1 Also, that the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision excludes applicants—framed in
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`Vander Boegh as “potential employees”—does not mean that former employees are likewise
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`excluded from its purview. 772 F.3d at 1062. In order to be either a current or former employee,
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`an employment relationship must have formed. A job applicant has never performed work as an
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`employee for the employer; both current and former employees, by definition, have.
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`Third, here, as in Robinson, other aspects of the statutory framework also support a
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`reading that the FCA covers former employees. The FCA’s remedial provision allows former
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`employees to seek relief for post-termination retaliation.2 For example, a former employee can
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`obtain “reinstatement” as one type of relief under the statute. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2)
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`(“Relief under paragraph (1) shall include reinstatement . . . .”). A plaintiff, by definition, must
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`be a former employee; after all, only someone who has lost a job can be reinstated.
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`
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`Likewise, the provision for special damages can provide relief to former employees.
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`That provision explicitly remedies “discrimination”—misconduct that is not dependent on
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`whether
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`the plaintiff
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`is
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`still an employee.
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` See § 3730(h)(2)
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`(“Relief . . . shall
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`include . . . compensation
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`for any
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`special damages
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`sustained as a
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`result of
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`the
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`discrimination . . . .”).3
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`1This Court in Vander Boegh and the Supreme Court in Robinson were using different editions of Black’s
`Law Dictionary, but the principle applies equally to both editions.
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`2The dissent notes that the term “employee” elsewhere in the FCA seems to refer only to current
`employees. Dissent at 14. That possibility does not remove the ambiguity of the term as used in § 3730(h),
`especially as Robinson acknowledges that the context of different sections of a statute can indicate that “the term
`‘employee’ refers unambiguously to a current employee” without necessarily showing “that the term has the same
`meaning in all other sections and in all other contexts.” 519 U.S. at 343. Ambiguity requires only “that the term
`‘employees’ includes former employees in some sections, but not in others.” Id.
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`3Indeed, courts have held that the provision for special damages under the FCA is broad and, therefore, can
`include unlisted remedies such as front pay or noneconomic compensatory damages—remedies that are not
`necessarily restricted to current employees. E.g., Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., Ltd., 277 F.3d 936,
`944 (7th Cir. 2002); Hammond v. Northland Counseling Ctr., Inc., 218 F.3d 886, 893 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Damages for
`emotional distress caused by an employer’s retaliatory conduct plainly fall with this category of ‘special
`damages.’”); Wilkins v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1091 (E.D. Mo. 2001) (awarding front pay “to
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`No. 20-1002
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`United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp.
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`Page 8
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`Also, the catch-all wording of the relief provision can support application of the FCA to
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`former employees. The use of “shall include,” especially in combination with an employee’s
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`“entitle[ment] to all relief necessary to make that employee . . . whole,” demonstrates that the list
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`of remedies is not exhaustive. § 3730(h)(1), (2); see Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 317
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`(2010) (“It is true that use of the word ‘include’ can signal that the list that follows is meant to be
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`illustrative rather than exhaustive.”).4 This expansive catch-all language further shows that
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`remedies exist regardless of whether the plaintiff is still employed.
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`Beaumont argues that those remedies do not necessarily establish that former employees
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`are entitled to relief. It contends, for example, that reinstatement should be limited to people
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`who were employees when the wrongful conduct occurred. But the text does not contain that
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`limitation. Under § 3730(h)(1), a person out of a job can get the job back as a remedy for the
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`proscribed conduct, regardless of when the wrongful act occurred. Furthermore, the fact that the
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`FCA explicitly creates a cause of action for wrongful discharge, while Title VII prohibits
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`employment discrimination more broadly, is not a meaningful difference in this context. True,
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`reinstatement can be a remedy for wrongful discharge, but that does not change the fact that it
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`could be a remedy for post-termination retaliation as well. The Supreme Court in Robinson
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`explicitly invoked the likelihood of a former employee alleging wrongful discharge as support
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`for the proposition that Title VII encompasses former employees, recognizing that because the
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`remedy of reinstatement necessarily applied to former employees, former employees were
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`covered under Title VII whether they were suing in response to a discriminatory discharge or
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`post-employment retaliation. 519 U.S. at 342–43.
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`In short, we could read the statute in two ways: applying only to current employees or
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`reaching those who have lost their jobs. We think the latter is the more accurate reading.
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`effect the express Congressional intention that a claimant under § 3730(h) be made whole” even though “the FCA
`does not specifically include front pay as a remedy”).
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`4See also BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 669 F.3d 704, 713 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing
`Samantar); Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 682 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Courts have repeatedly
`indicated that ‘shall include’ is not equivalent to ‘limited to.’”). Courts of Appeals have also held that similar
`language in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act precedes a non-exhaustive list of available relief, empowering courts to award
`relief for emotional distress. See Jones v. Southpeak Interactive Corp., 777 F.3d 658, 672 (4th Cir. 2015);
`Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., 771 F.3d 254, 264–65 (5th Cir. 2014); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Admin.
`Review Bd., 717 F.3d 1121, 1138 (10th Cir. 2013).
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`No. 20-1002
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`United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp.
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`Page 9
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`
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`But given the Supreme Court’s guidance in Robinson, we ultimately hold that the term
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`“employee,” as used in the statute, is ambiguous.
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`When confronted with similar ambiguity, the Robinson Court looked to the “broader
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`context of Title VII and the primary purpose of § 704(a)” to hold that former employees were
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`covered by Title VII’s anti-retaliation protections. 519 U.S. at 345–46. The lack of statutory
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`clarity here compels an analogous approach. As discussed, the FCA’s remedial provision
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`indicates that former employees may sue under § 3730(h). And Robinson found it relevant that
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`excluding former employees from the protections of Title VII would “effectively vitiate much of
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`the protection afforded by [the statute]” because it would deter reporting to the government and
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`“provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might bring Title VII
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`claims.” Id. So too here. The FCA is designed to “discourage fraud against the government,”
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`Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1994), and the purpose of
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`the Act’s anti-retaliation provision is to encourage the reporting of fraud and facilitate the federal
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`government’s ability to stymie crime by “protect[ing] persons who assist [in its] discovery and
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`prosecution,” Neal v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 861 (7th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other
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`grounds by Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson,
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`545 U.S. 409 (2005)). If employers can simply threaten, harass, and discriminate against
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`employees without repercussion as long as they fire them first, potential whistleblowers could be
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`dissuaded from reporting fraud against the government. See Haka v. Lincoln Co., 533 F. Supp.
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`2d 895, 917 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (holding that the reasoning in Robinson applied equally to the
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`FCA and that including former employees “was necessary to effectuate the provision’s primary
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`purpose: ‘[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.’” (quoting
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`Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346)). We therefore hold that the anti-retaliation provision of the FCA
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`may be invoked by a former employee for post-termination retaliation by a former employer.
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`We acknowledge that our decision creates a circuit split. Our analysis differs from that of
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`the Tenth Circuit primarily with regard to Robinson’s first and third factors: whether the statute
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`includes a temporal qualifier and whether other provisions envision both current and former
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`employees. We deem it a better fit with all of Robinson’s considerations to construe
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`§ 3730(h)(1) to effectuate the statute’s broader context and purpose.
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`

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`No. 20-1002
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`United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp.
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`Page 10
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`Finally, Felten argues for the first time on appeal that the “terms and conditions of
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`III.
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`employment” provision of § 3730(h) includes blacklisting. Although the district court invoked
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`the “terms and conditions of employment” qualifier as a reason why post-employment retaliatory
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`action did not fall within the FCA’s ambit, it did not address whether blacklisting is included as a
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`form of prohibited retaliatory action. Thus, we do not address the issue; instead, we remand for
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`the district court to consider the issue in the first instance. See Child Evangelism Fellowship of
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`Ohio, Inc. v. Cleveland Metro. Sch., 600 F. App’x 448, 453 (6th Cir. 2015) (“We generally do
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`not consider issues left unaddressed by the district court.”).
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`IV.
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`We vacate the district court’s order granting Beaumont’s motion to partially dismiss
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`Felten’s first amendment to his complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent with
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`this opinion.
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`No. 20-1002
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`United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp.
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`Page 11
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`_________________
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`DISSENT
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`_________________
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`GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
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`This case asks if the word “employee,” when used in the False Claims Act (“FCA”),
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`refers to someone who is not an employee. To ask the question is to answer it. Instead of
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`applying tried-and-true tools of statutory interpretation to their logical end, the majority rushes to
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`find ambiguity then divines congressional intent from its own perception of which reading would
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`best serve the FCA’s “broader context and purpose.” As a result, the majority’s opinion creates a
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`circuit split and contradicts the decision of nearly every other federal court that has considered
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`whether the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision extends to former employees. Because the FCA
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`unambiguously reserves retaliation claims for only those plaintiffs who were employees when
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`they were retaliated against, I respectfully dissent.
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`I.
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`The only question before us is whether the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision prohibits
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`retaliation against former employees. “A matter requiring statutory interpretation is a question of
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`law requiring de novo review, and the starting point for interpretation is the language of the
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`statute itself.” Roberts v. Hamer, 655 F.3d 578, 582 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
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`and citation omitted). “If the words are plain, they give meaning to the act, and it is neither the
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`duty nor the privilege of the courts to enter speculative fields in search of a different meaning.”
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`Id. at 583 (citation omitted). The FCA’s anti-retaliation provision provides:
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`Any employee, contractor, or agent shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make
`that employee, contractor, or agent whole, if that employee, contractor, or agent is
`discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner
`discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment because of
`lawful acts done by the employee, contractor, agent or associated others in
`furtherance of an action under this section or other efforts to stop 1 or more
`violations of this subchapter.
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`31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1). This is not the first time that we have examined the plain meaning of
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`“employee,” as used in this provision. We have said that, for the purposes of the FCA’s anti-
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`No. 20-1002
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`United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp.
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`Page 12
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`retaliation provision, an employee is “[s]omeone who works in the service of another person (the
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`employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under which the employer has the right
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`to control the details of work performance,” Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 772 F.3d
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`1056, 1060 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 639 (10th ed. 2014)), or “‘[a]
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`person working for another person or a business firm for pay,’” id. (quoting Random House
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`Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 638 (2001)). Id. at 1062.
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`Thus, under our precedent and the plain language of the statute, whether a former
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`employee falls within the definition of “employee” is a straightforward inquiry: does a former
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`employee work in the service of his former employer under a contract of hire or for pay? The
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`answer is “no,” otherwise he would not be a former employee. This alone mandates affirming
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`the district court.1
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`If our precedent and the statute’s plain language were not enough, the specific context in
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`which “employee” is used also compels the conclusion that former employees are beyond the
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`anti-retaliation provision’s scope. To have a cause of action, a plaintiff must have been
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`“discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated
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`against in the terms and conditions of employment.” 31 U.S.C. 3730(h)(1). Of these six
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`categories of retaliatory acts, four can be committed only during employment: only a current
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`employee can be discharged, demoted, suspended, or discriminated against in the terms and
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`conditions of employment.
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`True, a former employer could harass or threaten a former employee. But the canon of
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`noscitur a sociis requires us to temporally limit the scope of these undefined terms. This canon
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`instructs that “the meaning of an undefined term may be deduced from nearby words.” United
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`1Felten argues that Vander Boegh supports his position that former employees may bring retaliation claims
`based on post-employment conduct because there we observed that one portion of the FCA’s legislative history
`“suggest[ed] that ‘employee’ extends to former employees, as well as present employees.” 772 F.3d at 1063. But
`Felten concedes that this observation is dicta, and therefore nonbinding on this panel. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of
`Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 493 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover, even if Vander Boegh’s observation regarding the FCA’s
`legislative history is accurate, it is irrelevant. A court may look to legislative history only when “a plain reading
`leads to ambiguous or unreasonable results.” United States v. Vreeland, 684 F.3d 653, 662 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation
`omitted); see also Chrysler Corp. v. C.I.R., 436 F.3d 644, 654 (6th Cir. 2006). Here, a plain reading of the FCA
`merely reserves retaliation claims for plaintiffs who were employees when they were retaliated against.
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`No. 20-1002
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`United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp.
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`Page 13
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`
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`States v. Miller, 734 F.3d 530, 541 (6th Cir. 2013). This “associated-words” canon provides that,
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`when words “are associated in a context suggesting that the words have something in common,
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`they should be assigned a permissible meaning that makes them similar.” Antonin Scalia &
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`Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 195 (2012). Specifically, this
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`canon holds that “words grouped in a list should be given related meanings.” Id. (quoting Third
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`Nat’l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977)).
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`The meanings of “threatened” and “harassed” must therefore be consistent with their
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`neighbors, all of which are temporally limited to current employment. Thus, “threatened” and
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`“harassed” are likewise limited to existing employer-employee relationships, which places post-
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`employment retaliation against former employees beyond the reach of the anti-retaliation
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`provision.
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`A second canon of statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis, further confirms this
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`temporal limitation. Ejusdem generis dictates that “where general words follow specific words
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`in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in
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`nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” Miller, 734 F.3d at 541
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`(citation omitted). “[W]hen a drafter has tacked on a catchall phrase at the end of an enumeration
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`of specifics,” ejusdem generis implies the addition of the word “similar” between the last
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`specific and the catchall phrase. Scalia & Garner, supra., at 199.
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`The FCA’s anti-retaliation provision lists five specific categories of retaliatory conduct,
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`then includes a catchall phrase that applies to employees who have been “in any other manner
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`discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1).
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`Ejusdem generis limits the catchall phrase’s scope to discriminations that are similar to
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`discharges, demotions, suspensions, threats, and harassment. And these general discriminations
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`are actionable only if they occur in the terms and conditions of employment. Id. To comply
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`with ejusdem generis, threats and harassment must also be prohibited only if they occur during
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`the employment relationship.
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`No. 20-1002
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`United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp.
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`Page 14
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`We should also look to other portions of the FCA. “A standard principle of statutory
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`construction provides that identical words . . . within the same statute should normally be given
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`the same meaning.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007).
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`The FCA is not a particularly long statute, and it uses the word “employee” in only a few other
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`provisions. None of these other uses can be reasonably read as “former employee.” For
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`example, the FCA provides that “[n]o court shall