`
`RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
`Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
`
`File Name: 25a0176p.06
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`
`FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`TAMMY LIVINGSTON, individually and as beneficiary
`and Co-Trustee of the Livingston Music Interest Trust
`and as beneficiary of the Tammy Livingston Music
`Interest Trust,
`Plaintiff-Appellant,
`
` v.
`
`JAY LIVINGSTON MUSIC, INC., a Tennessee
`corporation; TRAVILYN LIVINGSTON, in her individual
`capacity,
`Defendants-Appellees.
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`No. 24-5263
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
`No. 3:22-cv-00532—Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge.
`
`Argued: December 12, 2024
`Decided and Filed: July 7, 2025
`Before: SILER, CLAY, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
`_________________
`COUNSEL
`ARGUED: Jonathan M. Wolf, JONATHAN M. WOLF, PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for
`Appellant. Tim Warnock, LOEB & LOEB LLP, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
`ON BRIEF: Jonathan M. Wolf, JONATHAN M. WOLF, PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for
`Appellant. Tim Warnock, Keane Barger, LOEB & LOEB LLP, Nashville, Tennessee, for
`Appellee.
` READLER, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which SILER and CLAY, JJ.,
`concurred. READLER, J. (pp. 13–16), also delivered a separate concurring opinion.
`>
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`No. 24-5263 Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc., et al. Page 2
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`_________________
`OPINION
`_________________
`CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. In all its many forms, music is a powerful
`influence. One of music’s great gifts is its knack for soothing the mind. Think of the way
`listening to your favorite song takes you to a place where, at least temporarily, life’s frustrations
`are quickly set aside. Music’s perhaps most endearing quality is its ability to unite. Whether it
`be a song, an artist, or an ensemble, each has its own way of joining those of different
`backgrounds in a shared passion. See generally Raymond MacDonald, The Social Functions of
`Music, in Routledge International Handbook of Music Psychology in Education and Community
`5–21 (Andrea Creech, Donald A. Hodges & Susan Hallam eds., 2021). In the words of one
`enduring performer, “music seems to be the common denomination that brings us all together.
`Music cuts through all boundaries and goes right to the soul.” Id. at 5 (quoting Willie Nelson).
`Today’s case, however, offers at least one example of how music has the power to
`divide—even a family: a copyright suit in which heirs to a music composer’s fortune squabble
`over copyright assignments and associated royalties. Travilyn and Tammy Livingston (mother
`and daughter) each claim a right to royalties tied to certain songs authored by Jay Livingston
`(Travilyn’s father and Tammy’s grandfather). Between 1984 and 2000, Jay assigned his
`copyright interests in several songs to a music publishing company. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). In
`recent years, Travilyn invoked her statutory right to “terminat[e]” those copyright grants. Id. §
`203(a). To do so, she filed termination notices with the United States Copyright Office, seeking
`to undo her father’s assignments to the company and recapture his interests in the copyrights
`for herself. Travilyn’s daughter Tammy, a beneficiary of her grandfather’s assignments, sued
`her mother, challenging the terminations. The district court dismissed Tammy’s complaint,
`holding that it failed to state a claim. We affirm.
`
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`No. 24-5263 Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc., et al. Page 3
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`I.
`Starting in the early 1940s, Jay Livingston (and his co -writer Ray Evans) churned out
`super-hits: “Que Sera, Sera,” “Mona Lisa,” “I’ll Always Love You,” and “Silver Bells.” And
`they were performed by many stars, including Doris Day, Nat King Cole, Dean Martin, and Bob
`Hope. To say the many songs Jay and Evans composed were a success understates matters.
`Their productions appeared in several classic films (including Alfred Hitchcock’s The Man Who
`Knew Too Much) and earned a slew of Academy Awards. They also generated more than $400
`million in sales. For their enduring contributions to the music world, Jay and Evans are
`remembered as the “last great of the great songwriters of Hollywood.” Jay Livingston: Top Film
`and TV Composer Won Three Oscars , Songwriters Hall of Fame, https://perma.cc/P7EL-JZ2U
`(last visited June 5, 2025).
`As described next, Jay’s rights to those compositions are governed by a series of
`transactions involving Jay, an affiliated company, and his family. And their ownership is at the
`heart of this litigation.
`The July 1984 Agreement. On July 15, 1984, Jay, in keeping with federal copyright law,
`promised to transfer his copyright interests in several of his songs to a music publishing
`company, Jay Livingston Music, owned by his daughter, Travilyn. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)
`(explaining that the “ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part”). How
`would Jay assign those interests to Jay Livingston Music? “With respect to each musical
`composition assigned to Jay Livingston Music by Jay Livingston,” the July 15, 1984 Agreement
`explained, “the parties shall enter into a separate popular songwriters agreement.” R. 39-4,
`PageID 806. In keeping with this promise, between 1984 and 2000, Jay executed at least 248
`“popular songwriters agreement[s].” Id. As a result, Jay assigned his copyright interests in at
`least 248 songs to Jay Livingston Music. Each popular songwriters agreement had the same
`terms.
`For example, on July 15, 1984, Jay executed a popular songwriters agreement for the hit
`song “Que Sera, Sera.” Under the agreement, Jay Livingston Music would possess Jay’s interest
`in that song’s copyright for 28 years from the date the copyright’s original term expired.
`
`
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`No. 24-5263 Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc., et al. Page 4
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`Because the original term of the copyright for “Que Sera, Sera” expired on December 31, 1983,
`Jay Livingston Music, per the terms of the agreement, would own Jay’s interest in it from July
`15, 1984 (the day Jay assigned it) to December 31, 2011 (28 years from the date of the
`copyright’s original expiration). (It bears mentioning that, according to Tammy, Jay had
`renewed the copyright for “Que Sera, Sera” for the statutory maximum term of 67 years shortly
`before he assigned it to Travilyn in 1984. See 17 U.S.C. § 304.)
`The popular songwriters agreements had other important terms. Jay, for example, held a
`reversionary interest in the copyright, meaning that it would “re -vest in Jay” once the company’s
`interest expired in 2011. R. 46, PageID 878. For the time Jay Livingston Music owned the
`copyright, it would keep a portion of its royalties and pay the rest to Jay himself.
`The Family Trust . On August 28, 1985, Jay and his wife established a trust called the
`Family Trust, transferring to it “all right, title and interest” in “their assets, whether real or
`personal.” R. 39 -1, PageID 714. At least two specific copyright interests in the broader bundle
`of assets transferred to the Family Trust deserve mention. One, the Family Trust received Jay’s
`right to receive royalties under each of the popular songwriters agreements. As beneficiaries of
`the Family Trust, Travilyn, Tammy, and other members of the Livingston family have long
`received a percentage of these royalties. Two, as Tammy alleges in her complaint, the Family
`Trust also held Jay’s reversionary interest in each of the copyrights he assigned to Jay Livingston
`Music. That meant that once the popular songwriters agreements held by Jay Livingston Music
`expired—2011 for “Que Sera, Sera,” for example —Jay’s interests in the underlying copyrights
`would revert to the Family Trust.
`Jay Livingston Music, Inc. In March 2000, Jay Livingston Music, Inc. was established.
`Owned by Travilyn and her husband, Jay Livingston Music, Inc. is the legal successor to Jay
`Livingston Music, meaning that it possesses all the rights and interests held by Jay Livingston
`Music.
`The May 2000 Agreement. On May 18, 2000, Jay agreed with Jay Livingston Music, Inc.
`to extend the time period that Jay Livingston Music (and thus Jay Livingston Music, Inc.) would
`possess his copyright interests. Specifically, he amended “each and every” popular songwriters
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`No. 24-5263 Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc., et al. Page 5
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`agreement “to replace the fixed term of years as set forth in each . . . with a term equal to the
`entire term of [the] copyright, including all renewals and extensions.” R. 39 -5, PageID 821. In
`effect, then, under the May 2000 Agreement, Jay Livingston Music, Inc. would own Jay’s
`copyright interests, not for 28 years from the date of the copyrights’ original expirations, but for
`the copyrights’ entire terms. (Tammy alleges in her complaint that this latter period amounted to
`“another 50 years” from the time Jay signed the May 2000 Agreement, suggesting Jay
`Livingston Music, Inc. would possess Jay’s copyrights until around 2050. R. 46, PageID 881.)
`Jay’s death . Jay died on October 17, 2001. His death sparked debate over what
`copyright interests, if any, the Family Trust continued to hold. A copyright lawyer retained by
`Jay’s estate “gave the opinion that all of Jay’s copyrights . . . had been effectively sold [to Jay
`Livingston Music, Inc.] and that nothing remained [in the Family Trust] other than the
`songwriter royalties.” R. 24 -2, PageID 465 –66. In other words, the May 2000 Agreement
`accomplished what it sought to accomplish —Jay Livingston Music, Inc. would own Jay’s
`interests in the assigned copyrights until their terms expired. But, of course, in keeping with the
`popular songwriters agreements, Jay Livingston Music, Inc. would continue to pay the Family
`Trust royalties for each assigned song.
`With this opinion in hand, Travilyn proceeded to make a claim against the Family Trust,
`asserting that “all copyright interests in every song ever owned by Jay” had been “transferred” to
`“Jay Livingston Music, Inc.” R. 24 -1, PageID 455 (emphasis added). Gary Kress, trustee of the
`Family Trust, agreed with Travilyn. So he filed a petition in California probate court seeking an
`order that the Family Trust held “no interest in property claimed by another.” R. 39 -3,
`PageID 776 (citation modified). Kress’s petition made clear that the Family Trust did “not
`dispute [Travilyn’s] claim and request[ed] an Order of the Court that the FAMILY TRUST holds
`. . . no copyright interests, and that all such interests ever owned by JAY . . . are now owned by
`Jay Livingston Music, Inc.” Id. at 793. The probate court later approved Kress’s petition,
`entering an order stating: “The FAMILY TRUST holds . . . no copyright interests and all such
`interests ever owned by JAY . . . are now owned by Jay Livingston Music, Inc.” R. 28 -1,
`PageID 490. Attorneys for both Travilyn and Tammy signed the court’s order, acknowledging
`that their respective clients “APPROVED” its content. R. 28-1, PageID 490.
`
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`No. 24-5263 Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc., et al. Page 6
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`May 2015 terminations. To understand further copyright -related developments in 2015,
`consider first the relevant statutory background. Federal copyright law allows a songwriter (or
`his statutory successor) to terminate the songwriter’s “grant” (i.e., assignment) of a copyright to
`another party. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). The termination right, we have explained, “allows an author
`[or his successor] to undo a prior transfer of his copyright and recapture all interests in the
`copyright for himself.” Brumley v. Albert E. Brumley & Sons, Inc. , 822 F.3d 926, 928 (6th Cir.
`2016). If the author transferred his copyright to a third party in 1978 or later, he (or his
`successor) can terminate the transfer between 35 and 40 years after the copyright was assigned.
`17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). Exercising that right requires the author (or his successor) to send a
`termination notice to the grantee and file the notice with the U.S. Copyright Office. Id. §
`203(a)(4). “Upon the effective date of termination,” the statute explains, “all rights” under
`federal copyright law “that were covered by the terminated grants revert to the . . . persons
`owning termination interests.” Id. § 203(b).
`With Jay and his wife deceased, Travilyn, as Jay’s only child, possessed Jay’s
`termination right. Id. § 203(a)(2)(B) (explaining that an “author’s surviving children” “own the
`author’s entire termination interest” if there is no “widow”). Seeking to exercise that power,
`Travilyn, in May 2015, served a termination notice for the song “Que Sera, Sera” on Jay
`Livingston Music, Inc., the grantee of the copyright’s assignment. The termination purported to
`undo the 1984 popular songwriters agreement through which Jay had granted Jay Livingston
`Music (now, Jay Livingston Music, Inc.) his interests in “Que Sera, Sera.” The notice stated that
`the grant’s “effective date of termination” was July 15, 2019, with all rights under the “Que Sera,
`Sera” popular songwriters agreement then immediately reverting to Travilyn. See 17 U.S.C.
`§ 203(a)(3). After serving the notice on her company, Travilyn recorded it with the U.S.
`Copyright Office. She proceeded to serve termination notices for 31 other copyright grants on
`her company.
`Federal court litigation. In July 2022, Tammy sued her mother Travilyn in federal court,
`seeking a declaration that the termination notices Travilyn filed with the U.S. Copyright Office
`were ineffective, defective, or invalid. If the district court found the notices were effective,
`Tammy sought an alternative declaration that she continues to have a state law right to receive
`
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`No. 24-5263 Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc., et al. Page 7
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`royalties produced by the songs covered in the notices. The district court dismissed Tammy’s
`complaint under Civil Rule 12(b)(6), holding that it failed to state a claim. Tammy timely
`appealed.
`II.
`Fresh review applies to the district court’s decision to dismiss Tammy’s complaint under
`Civil Rule 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 376 (6th Cir. 2007). Accepting all well -
`pleaded factual allegations as true, we ask whether Tammy’s complaint alleges sufficient facts to
`support a plausible theory of relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 669, 678 (2009).
`Tested by that familiar standard, both of Tammy’s requests for declaratory relief fail.
`A. Tammy offers five reasons why she has adequately alleged that Travilyn’s
`termination notices were ineffective, defective, or invalid. Not one does the job.
`1. Tammy first argues that Travilyn’s 2015 termination notices were ineffective because,
`at the time they were issued, no active copyright assignments existed for Travilyn to terminate.
`Section 203(a) allows a songwriter’s statutory successor to terminate the songwriter’s “grant” (in
`other words, the assignment) of a copyright to another party. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). The
`termination right, however, presupposes the existence of a copyright grant to be terminated. And
`Tammy says no such grants existed. To her mind, Travilyn’s termination notices covered
`popular songwriters agreements (i.e., copyright grants) that had already expired.
`Here, Tammy trains her sights on the legal effect of the May 2000 Agreement. She
`claims that the agreement failed to validly extend the popular songwriters agreements beyond
`their 28-year terms because Jay signed the agreement as an “individual.” Only Jay as a “trustee,”
`Tammy asserts, could have extended the popular songwriters agreements beyond their original
`terms, given that the Family Trust held Jay’s reversionary interest in the copyrights at that time.
`That means that when the agreements expired —around 2011, according to Tammy —Jay’s
`interests in the underlying copyrights reverted to the Family Trust. At that point, Tammy
`concludes, Travilyn no longer had any copyright grants to terminate, with the Family Trust
`instead owning the copyright interests underlying those grants.
`
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`No. 24-5263 Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc., et al. Page 8
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`In resolving Tammy’s argument, however, we do not write on a clean slate. Rather, we
`must consider the preclusive effect of the 2003 California probate court order, which held that
`the Family Trust owned no interests in Jay’s copyrights. As a federal court, we respectfully give
`state court judgments the same preclusive effect they would receive under state law. 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1738; Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). Here, we thus
`look to California law to identify the effect, if any, that the California probate judgment has on
`Tammy’s federal copyright suit.
`Like most States, California follows the well -known doctrine of claim preclusion. As
`that doctrine is formulated in the Golden State, it prevents parties from litigating “matters which
`were raised or could have been raised” in an earlier suit. Busick v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals
`Bd., 500 P.2d 1386, 1392 (Cal. 1972) (citation omitted). A claim preclusion inquiry prompts
`three questions: (1) Whether there was final judgment on the merits in a prior action, (2)
`whether the subsequent action is between the same parties, and (3) whether the claim asserted in
`the second action is identical to a claim raised in the first action, or could have been raised in the
`first action. Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. , 230 P.3d 342, 348 (Cal. 2010); Thompson v.
`Ioane, 218 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501, 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). Because we answer “yes” across the
`board, we must give preclusive effect to the California probate court order.
`First, the 2003 California probate order qualifies as a final judgment on the merits. The
`probate court had jurisdiction to enforce Kress’s petition because it concerned the “internal
`affairs of a trust” administered in California. R. 24-1, PageID 438; see also Harnedy v. Whitty, 2
`Cal. Rptr. 3d 798, 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Cal. Prob. Code § 17000 (West 2025). The court
`issued a final judgment, which ordered that Jay Livingston Music, Inc. owned all of Jay’s
`interests in the copyrights at issue because of the May 2000 Agreement. And California courts
`have long treated probate orders as final judgments on the merits for preclusion purposes. See
`Horan v. Roan (In re Est. of Redfield), 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402, 408 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
`Second, today’s action and the California probate case involve the same parties. Travilyn
`(a claimant against the Family Trust) and Tammy (a beneficiary of the Family Trust) were
`parties to the California litigation. In fact, each of them (via their counsel) signed the probate
`court’s order, signaling that they “APPROVED” its “CONTENT.” R. 28-1, PageID 490.
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`No. 24-5263 Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc., et al. Page 9
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`Third, Tammy’s federal court action involves a claim that, at the very least, could have
`been raised in the earlier probate case. Kim v. Reins Int’l Cal., Inc. , 459 P.3d 1123, 1135 (Cal.
`2020). For preclusion purposes, California courts define “claim” by identifying the “primary
`right” decided in the first case and asserted in the subsequent one. Boeken, 230 P.3d at 348 –49.
`The term “primary right,” in turn, is defined as the specific “harm” that the plaintiff has claimed
`to have “suffered.” Id. In her copyright lawsuit, Tammy contends that, because Jay failed to
`validly extend the popular songwriters agreements when he signed the May 2000 Agreement, the
`Family Trust owns Jay’s interests in the underlying copyrights in full. The specific “harm” that
`Tammy purportedly has “suffered,” in other words, is that the Family Trust, of which she is a
`beneficiary, has been deprived of its rightful ownership of the copyrights. Yet that “claim” is
`“identical” to the one decided in the 2003 California probate order. That order, again, declared
`that the Family Trust held no ownership interests in copyrights to Jay’s compositions and that
`Jay Livingston Music, Inc. owned the copyrights through the popular songwriters agreements.
`R. 28-1, PageID 490. All of this means that —contrary to Tammy’s assertion—the Family Trust
`did not hold the copyright interests in Jay’s songs at the time Travilyn filed her termination
`notices. Those interests were held by Jay Livingston Music, Inc. through the popular
`songwriters agreements. So there existed active popular songwriters agreements for Travilyn to
`terminate in 2015.
`2. Tammy next claims that, even if the Family Trust did not own the copyright interests
`at issue, Travilyn nonetheless filed invalid termination notices in 2015 because the copyright
`grants they covered were not executed in accordance with federal copyright law. To understand
`the point, turn to § 203(a) of the Copyright Act, which authorizes an author (or his statutory
`successor) to terminate an author’s copyright grant if, but only if, the grant had been “executed
`by the author.” 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). According to Tammy, because Jay signed the May 2000
`Agreement as a “trustee,” he never “executed” any copyright “grant” as an “author,” rendering
`the termination notices Travilyn filed ineffective. Appellant Br. 53. We can make quick work of
`this argument because, as already explained, Jay signed the May 2000 agreement as an
`individual. R. 39, PageID 829.
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`No. 24-5263 Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc., et al. Page 10
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`3. Tammy next claims that Travilyn filed an invalid termination notice for the specific
`copyright grant covering “Que Sera, Sera” because Jay never assigned his interests in that
`copyright to a third party. Section 203(a), the now -familiar termination provision, allows a
`songwriter’s descendant to terminate the songwriter’s “grant of a transfer . . . of any right under
`a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. 203(a) (emphasis added). As Tammy reads the statute, the word
`“transfer” means that a songwriter’s descendant may terminate only the songwriter’s assignment
`of a copyright to a third party. That matters here, Tammy believes, because when Jay assigned
`the specific copyright for “Que Sera, Sera” to Jay Livingston Music on July 15, 1984, he really
`assigned it to himself, not a third party, as he owned Jay Livingston Music, a sole proprietorship.
`Even if a songwriter’s descendant cannot terminate a songwriter’s assignment of a
`copyright to his own sole proprietorship —a point we need not decide —Tammy’s argument still
`fails due to a flawed factual premise. Tammy presumes that Jay owned Jay Livingston Music
`when he assigned “Que Sera, Sera” to the company. Not so. The record shows that Travilyn
`owned Jay Livingston Music at that point. The 1984 Agreement in which Jay promised to assign
`his copyright interests to Jay Livingston Music stated that, as of “July 15, 1984,” “TRAVILYN
`LIVINGSTON” was the “sole owner of the music publishing company” known as “‘JAY
`LIVINGSTON MUSIC.’” R. 39-4, PageID 806.
`Tammy responds that Travilyn failed to prove her ownership interest. But remember
`today’s posture: evaluating Travilyn’s motion -to-dismiss. At that stage, Tammy must allege
`facts that plausibly state a claim for relief. And as Tammy attached to her complaint the 1984
`Agreement, which, again, shows that Travilyn owned Jay Livingston Music at the time Jay
`assigned the copyrights to the company, her argument depends on a factual premise her
`pleadings refute. See Gavitt v. Born , 835 F.3d 623, 640 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining that a court
`“may consider exhibits attached to the complaint”).
`4. Switching gears, Tammy contends that the district court committed reversible error
`when it observed that Travilyn became the owner of Jay Livingston Music “sometime before
`July 15, 1984,” when, according to Tammy, the record supports only that Travilyn became the
`company’s owner on (not before) July 15, 1984. Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc. , No.
`22-cv-00532, 2024 WL 713780, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 21, 2024). Even accepting Tammy’s
`
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`No. 24-5263 Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc., et al. Page 11
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`clarification of the record, however, it still does not warrant reversal. Generally speaking, what
`matters more is not what the district court said, but what the district court did. We “review[]
`judgments,” after all, “not statements in opinions.” Camreta v. Greene , 563 U.S. 692, 704
`(2011). And as the district court never relied on its assertion that Travilyn owned Jay Livingston
`Music before July 15, 1984 in issuing its judgment, there is no basis to remand.
`5. In a final effort to convince the district court that Travilyn’s termination notices were
`ineffective, Tammy argued that the notices violated copyright law. To understand Tammy’s last
`argument, consider first some further aspects of federal copyright law. Federal law, remember,
`prescribes several requirements of a termination notice. See 17 U.S.C. § 203; see also 37 C.F.R.
`§ 201.10(b)(2). Termination notices, for example, must “state the effective date of the [grant’s]
`termination” (a date prescribed by law), and they must “comply” “in form” and “content” with
`“requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation.” 17 U.S.C.
`§ 203(a)(4)(A)-(B).
`In her complaint, Tammy alleged that each of Travilyn’s 32 termination notices violated
`the Register’s prescribed requirements. R. 46, PageID 888 –97. The notices, she claimed, did
`not reasonably identify the grants to which they applied, did not correctly identify the dates of
`publication, and did not contain a complete statement of the facts. See 37 C.F.R.
`§ 201.10(b)(2)(iii), (b)(2)(v), (b)(3). The district court rejected these arguments as applied to the
`termination notice for “Que Sera, Sera” —a conclusion Tammy does not challenge here. See
`Livingston, 2024 WL 713780, at *6 –8. Tammy instead argues that the district court committed
`reversible error when it held that she failed to plead specific factual allegations for the other 31
`termination notices, especially the one for “Give It All You Got.” See Appellant Br. 50.
`The district court did not err. Look back at Tammy’s complaint: Tammy, it is true, did
`broadly allege that all of Travilyn’s termination notices failed to comply with federal
`requirements. But she otherwise focused exclusively on why the termination notice for “Que
`Sera, Sera” failed to comply with federal law; she made no specific factual allegations regarding
`the substance or content of any other termination notice. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550
`U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (explaining that although a complaint need not have “detailed factual
`allegations,” it must have “enough” well-pleaded factual allegations to support a plausible theory
`
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`of relief (emphasis added)). Reflecting on this shortcoming, the district court held that the
`“notice-specific allegations raised for the first time in Tammy’s [response brief to Travilyn’s
`motion to dismiss] [could] not be considered.” Livingston, 2024 WL 713780, at *7. In other
`words, Tammy forfeited her arguments regarding the termination notices —including the one for
`“Give It All You Got”—for which she did not plead factual allegations in her complaint. See id.
`(holding that arguments regarding “Give It All You Got” were “dependent” on facts not alleged
`in the complaint, which “cannot win the day”). We see no basis for undermining that holding. It
`is well understood that Tammy may not “cure [a pleading] deficiency by inserting the missing
`allegations in a document that is not either a complaint or an amendment to a complaint.” Bates
`v. Green Farms Condo. Ass’n, 958 F.3d 470, 484 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
`In sum, Tammy has not plausibly alleged that Travilyn’s termination notices were
`ineffective, defective, or invalid. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed her first
`declaratory judgment request.
`B. That leaves Tammy’s second declaratory judgment request. Tammy argues that, even
`if the termination notices were valid, that reality does not affect her state law right to receive
`royalties tied to the now -terminated popular songwriters agreements. But Tammy has not
`identified a state law basis for this theory of relief. She points us to neither a state law cause of
`action nor a specific state law right. At best, she repeats that some unmentioned aspect of “state”
`law authorizes her to receive royalties produced by songs covered in the now -terminated
`agreements. Because that barebones allegation does not satisfy Civil Rule 12(b)(6)’s pleading
`standards, Tammy’s complaint fails to articulate a plausible claim for relief under state law.
`Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
`* * * * *
`We affirm the district court’s judgment.
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`No. 24-5263 Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc., et al. Page 13
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`_________________
`CONCURRENCE
`_________________
`CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge, concurring. Neither party in this case addressed
`what cause of action underlies the declaratory relief Tammy asserted to invalidate Travilyn’s
`termination notices. As that question does not bear on our jurisdiction, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
`Better Env’t , 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998), the panel fairly left the issue aside, United States v.
`Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (explaining that parties, not courts, frame the
`issues for decision). At the same time, it is not obvious how it would be answered.
`All agree that Tammy sought a declaratory judgment announcing that Travilyn’s
`termination notices were ineffective or invalid, consistent with the conditions set forth in § 203
`of the Copyright Act. When a plaintiff seeks to sue someone for violating federal law, she of
`course must assert a cause of action. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). She can
`do so by showing that (1) her legal rights have been violated and (2) the law authorizes her to
`seek judicial relief. Id.
`What cause of action entitled Tammy to declare Travilyn’s termination notices invalid?
`Not the Declaratory Judgment Act, for starters. That statute “does not create an independent
`cause of action.” Davis v. United States , 499 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
`Instead, it serves the limited purpose of authorizing federal courts to declare the rights of a party
`in a case without granting any other traditional remedies such as damages or an injunction. 28
`U.S.C. § 2201(a). The “point” of the Declaratory Judgment Act, in other words, was to create a
`new “remedy for a preexisting right enforceable in federal court.” Mich. Corr. Org. v. Mich.
`Dep’t of Corr. , 774 F.3d 895, 902 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). The availability of
`declaratory relief thus presupposes “the existence of a judicially remediable right.” Schilling v.
`Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677 (1960); see, e.g., City of Reno v. Netflix, Inc. , 52 F.4th 874, 878 (9th
`Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (“The Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide a cause of action when
`a party . . . lacks a cause of action under a separate statute and seeks to use the Act to obtain
`affirmative relief.”); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining that a group
`of plaintiffs “have not alleged a cognizable cause of action and therefore have no basis upon
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`which to seek declaratory relief” because the Declaratory Judgment Act does not “provide a
`cause of action”). In short, when a plaintiff sues someone for violating federal law and seeks a
`declaratory judgment, the plaintiff’s “underlying cause of action” is the thing “actually” being
`“litigated.” Collin County v. Homeowners Ass’n for Values Essential to Neighborhoods , 915
`F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1990).
`In search of that underlying cause of action, could the Copyright Act fit the bill?
`Looking first to § 203, the termination provision at issue, the statute allows an author (or his
`statutory successor) to terminate a prior transfer of his copyright and recapture all interests in the
`copyright for himself. 17 U.S.C. § 203. To terminate a copyright grant, the author (or his
`successor) must send a termination notice to the copyright grantee and file the notice with the
`U.S. Copyright Office. Id. § 203(a)(4). Nothing