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`In the United States Court of Appeals
`for the Sixth Circuit
`
`

`

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`MATTHEW A. BRILL
`ROMAN MARTINEZ
`MATTHEW T. MURCHISON
`CHARLES S. DAMERON
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`555 11th Street NW,Suite 1000
`Washington, DC 20004
`(202) 637-2200
`
`Counselfor Ohio Cable
`Telecommunications Association,
`NCTA — The Internet & Television
`Association, Florida Internet &
`Television Association, MCTA — The
`Missouri Internet & Television
`Association, and Texas Cable
`Association
`
`JEFFREY A. LAMKEN
`RAYINER I. HASHEM
`JENNIFER E. FISCHELL
`MOLOLAMKEN LLP
`600 New Hampshire Avenue NW,
`Suite 500
`Washington, DC 20037
`(202) 556-2000
`
`Counselfor ACA Connects —
`America’s Communications
`Association
`
`MAXWELLF.. GOTTSCHALL
`SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
`125 Broad Street
`New York, NY 10004
`(212) 558-4000
`
`Counselfor Ohio Telecom
`Association, USTelecom — The
`Broadband Association, and
`NCTA — The Internet & Television
`Association
`
`THOMAS M. JOHNSON,JR.
`JOSHUA S. TURNER
`JEREMY J. BROGGI
`BOYD GARRIOTT
`WILEY REIN LLP
`2050 M Street NW
`Washington, DC 200386
`(202) 719-7000
`
`STEPHEN E.. CORAN
`LERMAN SENTER PLLC
`2001 L Street NW,Suite 400
`Washington, DC 200386
`(202) 429-8970
`
`Counselfor WISPA — The
`Associationfor Broadband Without
`Boundaries
`
`

`

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`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
`
`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and Sixth Circuit
`
`Rule 26.1, movants make the following disclosures:
`
`ACA Connects — America’s Communications Association has no parent
`
`company, and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or moreofits stock.
`
`CTIA —- The Wireless Association has no parent company, and no
`
`publicly held corporation owns 10% or moreofits stock.
`
`Florida Internet & Television Association has no parent company, and
`
`no publicly held corporation owns 10% or moreofits stock.
`
`MCTA - The Missouri Internet & Television Association has no parent
`
`company, and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or moreofits stock.
`
`NCTA- The Internet & Television Association has no parent company,
`
`and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or moreofits stock.
`
`Ohio Cable Telecommunications Association has no parent company,
`
`and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or moreofits stock.
`
`The Ohio Telecom Association has no parent company, and no publicly
`
`held corporation owns 10% or moreofits stock.
`
`Texas Cable Association has no parent company, and no publicly held
`
`corporation owns 10% or moreofits stock.
`
`

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`USTelecom — The Broadband Association has no parent company, and
`
`no publicly held corporation owns 10% or moreof its stock.
`
`WISPA- The Association For Broadband Without Boundaries has no
`
`parent company, and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more ofits
`
`stock.
`
`

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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT..............cccssssssscsssseccsssenesessecenees i
`
`INTRODUCTION 0... ccssscessssseceessctsccasscesccassncsessseassessnsacsacsetscsacsarsceseaseesseeases 1
`
`BACKGROUND w.......ccecssssssccsccccscesseecsossnsacsocsscsesacsassceacensecssceaseassesaeeaesscacsacsacnenses 4
`
`ARGUMENT. 1... esscsesssscsscescessssscsecsscessscescsessoesssassscsccacsacessacsesssscsacesssesacesssasaceass 8
`
`I.
`
`PETITIONERS ARE LIKELY TO PREVAIL ON THE
`MERITS... cssssscssssccecsscsscscssssesscescsassoessccsacsesecsacsssessacesssessceassascesseassececees 9
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
` Reclassifying Broadband UnderTitle II Is A Major
`QUESTION. ........ccsceescesscectectscesscsescotsacsacsaesocesceaceasecetscessceesoceseceeseatensees 10
`
`The Commission Lacks Clear Congressional
`AUthOYiZation..........cccscsscescsecssccssssssscsscesessssscssessscesssessecenssessncsecssseeses 13
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`The plain text makes broadband an “information
`SEYVICC.” .....escsscccsscescceecsassssecssceseecesccesesetscessessssassessaceaseseseceaees 14
`
` Thestatutory structure confirms that broadband
`must be an “information SCIrViCe.”.........scssescsssssescssceseetesees 17
`
`Other statutory provisions confirm that broadbandis
`an “Information SCLVICE.”.........csssccscesesscsesecsecsecsscssssecseees 19
`
`Il.
`
`THE EQUITIES SUPPORTA STAY...cecseeesececsencssceessecsscenees 19
`
`A.
`
`The Commission’s Order Will Cause Irreparable Harm............. 19
`
`1._—Petitioners’ memberswill incur atypical and non-
`recoverable Compliance COStS.........scscccssescessesrsesscsecsscesceeee 20
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`Petitioners’ memberswill be forced to delay or forgo
`new Offerings and expansion plans...........scccccccssecssccersesseeees 21
`
`Petitioners’ memberswill face increased capital costs......23
`
`Petitioners’ memberswill be disadvantaged in
`Interconnection NEGOTIATIONS.............sscccsccesessesssesssessscesnceens 23
`il
`
`

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`B.
`
`The Public Interest Supports A Stay...........csccsscssccsscssrsesssseeseeenee24
`
`III.
`
`IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT SHOULD
`EXPEDITE BRIEFING AND ARGUMENT...........cccsccstssseesesseeneeees 26
`
`CONCLUSION... cscssssssscsssessesesscestestsseessesscensscesacenseaeseeseaeestssetaceseseneseesscenees 27
`
`iv
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`

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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott,
`973 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1992)...........ccescsssssccsscsscsssesscsscescesseescesseesssentcscesseesseeses 22
`
`Biden v. Nebraska,
`143 S. Ct. 2355 (2028).........sccsccscceccsssssssssccsssssccscscseessessseessesssseecseessesencserenss 11,12
`
`Chamber of Commerce v. SEC,
`85 F Ath 760 (Sth Cir. 2028)..........scccssssscssesssessssscescccsscssescsesssesseseesseseeeseesseees 20
`
`Gonzales v. Oregon,
`BAG U.S. 243 (2006).........ccsccsscesscsssssscsccescesscssscsesesssscsessescessesecesssesessesscssecencense 13
`
`Iowa Utilities. Board v. FCC,
`109 F.3d 418 (8th Cir. 1996)...........ccccssssscessssssscessesssssseseestesesseesscesccsseenss 22, 23
`
`Kentucky v. Biden,
`23 F Ath 585 (6th Cir. 2022) ..........csccsscsscesccercssssscsssesscssssscsessssccecesssessssssseseass 24
`
`Kentucky v. Biden,
`57 F Ath 545 (6th Cir. 2028)..........cccsscssscsssssessesccesscsnscecesssescesssesseesseeseeases 20, 23
`
`Labradorv. Poe,
`144 S. Ct. 921 (2024) ......ecescsscsssesccecccsrcsscssscsssesscencceseesessesssesscsseceneeessseeeseees 22
`
`Mozilla Corporation v. FCC,
`940 F.8d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019) oo...essccseseeecsescesssesscessestecsescesssessesaeeesesaseses 7,13
`
`National Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
`BAB U.S. 967 (2005)........ cc csceccccscccsssccsscsseccssccsccsssccceccsescsssccsscssessssessscosseess passim
`
`Ohio v. Becerra,
`87 F Ath 759 (Gth Cir. 2028).........cssccsccsscesscercsssssccscesscsssssesessesccesesssesscesees 20, 23
`
`Tennessee v. Becerra,
`No.24-5220 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 2024) ............cscccssscssssesssssecessstesssescesseeseesssesses 26
`
`

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`U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,
`825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016)..........cccccssessssscscsscesstsssssssssssssscessesssesscesesseessesees 6
`
`U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,
`855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en bane)..........ccccccsccscccsscccsssscessceesesees passim
`
`Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,
`573 U.S. 802 (2014)...csecssssscescssssccecessecscsesssesseessesassarseesteassacsessssseeecensass 10, 17
`
`West Virginia v. EPA,
`597 U.S. 697 (2022)...ccsscssccccscsssccccssssceeccesssecccessscsscceeccssccesccenscsecerssees passim
`
`Statutes and Legislative History
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1657 wcccccccccccccsccssecsssscesscsscossssseccssscesscsnscsssccesscsscessccsacecsceessccnsceuseussens 26
`
`47 U.S.C.
`$158...ccccccsccsssccsssccesssscsssccssecsssscsssecssscessccsscecssessesessssscosssssssescssssecess 4,5, 14,15
`$160... cccscccsssccssesecsscccssccsscccsssesesescssscessecsssesscsecsssscssssessesscessssensscesssesssessesscoess 8
`§ QOL eeecccssccssscescessssesccseccssccessseussessscesscssccsssecsseessscasscssesscessscassssussenssecasens 10, 20
`§ 202... csccsscssscsssscsscerscsssccssccsscesscesssessscesscssccsssecsccessscasecsscssessscasscsuscenssecasens 10, 20
`§ QA ccesccscccccssccessccssccssccesscesscsscecssccnscessccescscteesssccesececesssousecaceeasccasceescnesenses 10
`§ 227 ....cscccssccsscccsseccssccssssccsssccssecssecsssecessscsssscssssccssessecscscsssossscsssscessscessessssssseec ces 17
`§ 228... ..cccscccssccssseccscccssssccsssccssecssecsssecsssscessscssssccsssssceesessssossscssassceessccasscesssssseec ees 17
`§ 280......ccccccsssccssccssccssssccsssccssecssessssecesssccssscssssccessssecssessssossscsssscessscasscesesesseeo ses 19
`§ ZBL eecicccccsssccsscsscecsssssccsccsscssscscsssesssesscsccscscssecuscessccssessecesseesseaecensscsssessseeses 19
`§ 27B .uccccsscesccsssscessseccsssscssccssccesscesscsssecssccnscessccascecnessusecesececeusscusecececaascsnnsenscuesenses 17
`§ BBQ. ecscssccsssscecsseccsssccssccasccesscesscsnsecsscenscessccascecnessusccasecsceesssusececccaascsnceescuesenses 18
`§ 12D... cesccccsssccssscesssccssccsscccscssccssecessecssssscssscssscscseesssscesessssssessssessscssesscsessoens 18
`
`Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)... cccccestccssteccstssecsccssscesssescseseceees4
`
`H.R. Rep. No. 108-213 (1998) .........ssscssssscsssssessesscesecssssssessesseessesseessesnseseseaeseees 18
`
`Rules and Regulatory Materials
`
`Gth Cir. R. 27........ccssscsssessccssccesccesscesscesscesssesccessccssccasscesscesseesseesceesacencenseeesseesseessees 26
`
`Pred. R. App. P. 18 uu... eesssccssescssccscsssssctsctscesscsesscesaceeseassecsaceaseececeaseaeseetseeseeneeass 8
`
`vi
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`

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`Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service,
`13 FCC Red. 11501 (1998)... csccssccsssscsscssscssscsesssssssscsssssssscssesssessseesees 5, 12
`
`Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over
`Cable and Other Facilities,
`17 FCC Red. 4798 (2002)..........cssscsccsssscescecsecsscsesscesccessccscsacsecssesesecensacsacsasseteces 5
`
`Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet,
`30 FCC Red. 5601 (2015)... sessscsecsssscssccsseccsccsssesssssssacseesssecsacsasecsacsesesseeas 6
`
`Restoring Internet Freedom,
`33 FCC Red. 311 (2018)... ccscesssssecsesscssccssccscceseeceesssseseessnsaceacsersees 6, 18, 25
`
`Other Authorities
`
`James K. Willcox, How You'll Know Net Neutrality Is Really
`Gone, Consumer Reports (June 11, 2018),
`https://www.consumerreports.org/net-neutrality/end-of-net-
`neutrality-what-to-watch-fOr/.........cssscssccsscssccsssssssessscssscsnccstscsssserseetscceacenss 25
`
`Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. & Ian Heath Gershengorn, Title IT “Net
`Neutrahty” Broadband Rules Would Breach Major
`Questions Doctrine,
`76 Fed. Comme’ns LJ. 321 (2024) ou... cssccsssesssessscssnsensenecssscensceessceussaeees 9,11
`
`vii
`
`

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`INTRODUCTION
`
`In its “Open Internet” Order, the Federal Communications Commission
`
`has asserted total authority over how Americansaccess the Internet. Thatis
`
`not hyperbole. The Commission claims the power to regulate Internet service
`
`providers, or ISPs, as commoncarriers underthe 90-year-old regime built for
`
`the old Ma Bell telephone monopoly. That regime, called “Title II” as
`
`shorthand for Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, includes the power
`
`to set prices, dictate terms and conditions, require or prohibit investment or
`
`divestment, and more. Asthe dissenting Commissioners explained, the Order
`
`subjects ISPs to “one of the most comprehensivesuites of regulatory authority
`
`known to any agency in this country,” Simington Dissent, App. 508-509, and
`
`covers “virtually every aspect of how an ISP does business,” Carr Dissent,
`
`App. 484.
`
`The Orderis only the latest jolt in a decade of regulatory whiplash for
`
`ISPs. After nearly 20 years of applying a light-touch approach to the
`
`Internet—an approach the Supreme Court blessed in National Cable &
`
`Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)—the
`
`Commission reversed course in 2015. Forthefirst time, it asserted plenary
`
`authority to regulate high-speed Internet access service (called “broadband”)
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`

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`under Title II, and used that authority to impose so-called “net neutrality”
`
`rules. Before the Supreme Court could weigh in, a new Administration
`
`reverted to the traditional light-touch approach. Now, after another change
`
`in Administration, the Commissionis back to a heavy hand, promising to make
`
`even more aggressive use of its claimed powers.
`
`This Court should stay the Commissionslatestflip-flop pending judicial
`
`review. Petitioners are overwhelmingly likely to succeed on the merits.’
`
`Under the major-questions doctrine, a “decision of such magnitude and
`
`consequences” as public-utility-style regulation of the Internet “rests with
`
`Congress itself, or an agency acting pursuant to a clear delegation.” West
`
`Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 735 (2022). It should be “indisputable”that the
`
`major-questions doctrine applies here. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d
`
`381, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
`
`en bane). And because the Commission cannotpoint to clear congressional
`
`authorization for applying common-carrier regulation to the Internet, the
`
`Orderis unlawful. Indeed, the Order fails even an ordinary plain-text analysis
`
`of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
`
`1 Someof the movantsfiled petitions for review that are pending transfer
`to this Court pursuant to the multi-circuit lottery.
`
`

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`The Order’s consequencesare as stark as its legal shortcomings. Far
`
`more thanin the typical administrative challenge, we know that the Orderwill
`
`impose significant, unrecoverable costs on petitioners’ members. That is
`
`exactly what happened from 2015 to 2017, when the Commission last claimed
`
`plenary authority over Internet access underTitle II. Just like last time, the
`
`Order will force ISPs to incur atypical compliance costs, delay or forgo
`
`services and expansions, pay more to raise money, and negotiate on worse
`
`terms.
`
`The public interest also favors a stay. When the Commission repealed
`
`the 2015 “net neutrality” rules, opponents predicted the endof the Internet as
`
`we know it. That did not happen. See Carr Dissent, App. 479. So this time,
`
`the Commission defends the Order as prophylaxis:
`
`it could not “wait for the
`
`flood to arrive before we start to build the levee.” Gomez Statement, App.511.
`
`That vague concern cannotjustify diminishing investment in broadband and
`
`saddling a critical sector of the economy with sweeping new costs, while a
`
`flawed Order awaits judicial review.
`
`The Order’seffective date is July 22; petitioners respectfully request a
`
`ruling on this motion by July 15. If the Court cannot rule by then,petitioners
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`

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`request an administrative stay. At the very least, petitioners request
`
`expedited briefing and argument.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`1.
`
`Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 “to promote
`
`competition and reduce regulation” in the communications industry. Pub. L.
`
`No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. The Act established two mutually exclusive
`
`categories of interstate communications services:
`
`“information service[s],”
`
`which are subject to limited oversight, and “telecommunications service[s],”
`
`which are subject to the onerous common-carrier regulations found in Title II.
`
`ATU.S.C.
`
`§ 153(24),
`
`(53).
`
`Title II gives the Commission near-plenary
`
`authority to require preapproval for new services, dictate where providers can
`
`deploy their services, and even regulate prices based on the Commission’s
`
`view of what is “just and reasonable.” See, e.g., id. $$ 201(b), 202, 214.
`
`The 1996 Act defines “telecommunications service” as “the offering of
`
`telecommunications for a fee directly to the public.”
`
`47 U.S.C. § 153(58).
`
`“Telecommunications” means “transmission, between or among points
`
`specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in
`
`the form or content.” Jd. § 153(50). An “information service,” by contrast,is
`
`“the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
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`

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`processing,
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`retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
`
`telecommunications.”
`
`Jd. § 153(24).
`
`In a nutshell, a telecommunications
`
`service offers pure data transmission,like a dumbpipe; an information service
`
`offers the capability to process, store, and manipulate information.
`
`2._For nearly theentire history of the Internet, the Commission has
`
`recognized that services providing Internet access are “information services.”
`
`In a report issued shortly after the 1996 Act, the Commission explained that
`
`the key statutory question was “whether Internet access providers merely
`
`offer transmission” of data, like a telephone service. Federal-State Joint
`
`Board on Universal Service, 18 FCC Red. 11501, 11536 (1998).
`
`The
`
`Commission easily answered no. It explained that “Internet access” does not
`
`“merely offer transmission” of data but “gives users a variety of advanced
`
`capabilities” to manipulate information. Jd. at 11536-11539.
`
`A few yearslater, the Commission confirmed that cable broadbandis an
`
`information service.
`
`See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
`
`Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Red.4798, 4802 (2002). The
`
`Supreme Court upheld that classification in Brand X, 545 U.S. 967. The
`
`Commission likewise found that other forms of broadband are information
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`

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`services, and treated them accordingly for the next decade. See Carr Dissent,
`
`App. 447.
`
`In 2015, the Commission reversed course,reclassifying broadband as a
`
`telecommunications service subject
`
`to Title II utility regulation.
`
`See
`
`Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Red. 5601, 5647-5658
`
`(2015). As it does today, the Commission claimed that it needed Title II to
`
`promulgate “net neutrality” rules—that
`
`is, rules forbidding ISPs from
`
`blocking content, slowing access to content, or allowing content providers to
`
`pay for preferential treatment. See id. at 5626-5645. A divided panel of the
`
`D.C. Circuit upheld the order, deferring to it under Chevron as a reasonable
`
`construction of an ambiguous statute.
`
`See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,
`
`825 F.3d 674, 704-706 (2016). Then-Judge Kavanaugh dissented from the
`
`denial of rehearing en banc. In his view,the rule triggered—and flunked—
`
`the major-questions doctrine. 855 F.3d 381, 417-418 (2017).
`
`While a petition for Supreme Court
`
`review was pending,
`
`the
`
`Commission restored broadband’s information-service classification and
`
`accompanying light-touch regulatory framework. See Restoring Internet
`
`Freedom, 33 FCC Red. 311, 312 (2018) (RIF Order). The D.C. Circuit largely
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`

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`upheld that order, too, under the same Chevron framework. See Mozilla Corp.
`
`v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 35 (2019).
`
`Atthe time, opponents lamented “the endof the Internet as we knowit,”
`
`and speculated that without “net neutrality” rules, ISPs would interfere with
`
`online content in harmful ways. Carr Dissent, App. 452. But the past six years
`
`disproved those claims. See NCTAet al. Letter, App. 1585-1587. Meanwhile,
`
`investment in broadbandhasflourished. See NCTA Comments, App. 912-917;
`
`Israel Decl., 11 27-28, 31-35, 61-62, App. 943-944, 947-951, 962-963; USTelecom
`
`Comments, App. 1141-1150; CTIA Comments, App. 657-669.
`
`3.
`
`Now,after another change in Administration, the Commission has
`
`reversed itself again. In the challenged Order, the Commission voted 3-2 to
`
`classify broadband as a telecommunications service subject to Title II.
`
`Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet, Docket Nos. 23-320 & 17-108,
`
`FCC 24-52 (released May7, 2024), App. 1-512.
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`Invoking the same debunked rationales from 2015, the Commission
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`revived its previous “net neutrality” rules, which ban ISPs from blocking,
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`throttling, or paid prioritization. Order 1 492. The Commission also readopted
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`a general conduct standard prohibiting practices “that unreasonably interfere
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`with the ability of consumersor [content providers] to select, access, and use”
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`broadband. Jd. 1518. In contrast to 2015, the Order further claims—for the
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`first time—that Title II is necessary for reasons unrelated to “net neutrality,”
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`such as defending national security and combatting cybersecurity threats. Id.
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`11 30, 42. The Order thus sets out a laundry list of new areas in which the
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`Commission intends to regulate using its claimed Title II powers. Id. 11 26-
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`105.
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`For now, the Commission has also forborne from—that is, declared it
`
`will not enforce—manyTitle II powers. Order { 383; see 47 U.S.C. § 160. Of
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`course, this Commission or a future one may attempt to reactivate those
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`powers at any time. And although the Order forbears from the power to
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`directly set ISPs’ rates, it admits that the Commission can indirectly regulate
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`prices underthe general conduct standard. See Order 1 368.
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`4.
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`On May 31, petitioners sought a stay from the Commission. See
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`Fed. R. App. P. 18(a)(1). On June 7, the Commission deniedrelief.
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`ARGUMENT
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`After years of
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`light-touch regulation of
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`the Internet,
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`across
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`Administrations of both parties, the Commission under President Obama
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`claimed a broad new Title II authority over the Internet. Litigation ensued,
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`but before it could be resolved, the Commission under President Trump
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`reverted to its original position. Now, in the Order challenged here, the
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`Commission under President Biden has flipped back to Title II. This
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`destabilizing pattern is untenable for a critical American industry. The Order
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`should be stayed until courts can confirm, once andforall, that Congress never
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`contemplated common-carrier regulation for broadband.
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`Petitioners readily satisfy the stay criteria. They are likely to succeed
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`on the merits, their memberswill be irreparably injured if the Order takes
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`effect, and the public interest favors the status quo over yet another agency
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`changein position. At a minimum, the Court should expedite briefing and
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`argument to ensure promptresolution of this case.
`
`I.
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`PETITIONERS ARE LIKELY TO PREVAIL ON THE MERITS.
`
`Under “any conceivable test for what makes a rule major,” this one
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`qualifies. U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d at 423 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see
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`Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. & Ian Heath Gershengorn, Title IT “Net Neutrality”
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`Broadband Rules Would Breach Major Questions Doctrine, 76 Fed.
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`Comme’nsL.J. 321, 330 (2024) (“no doubt” that the Ordertriggers the major-
`
`questions doctrine). When an agency asserts such a power, it must identify
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`“clear congressional authorization.” West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723 (quoting
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`

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`Utility Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)). The Commission
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`does not haveit.
`
`A.
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`Reclassifying Broadband UnderTitle IT Is A Major Question.
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`The Orderis “major” across several dimensions. It is economically and
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`politically significant,
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`it reverses the agency’s original and longstanding
`
`interpretation, and it invokes policy concerns beyond the Commission’s
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`expertise.
`
`1.
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`Subjecting broadbandto Title II would “bring about an enormous
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`and transformative expansion” in the Commission’s “regulatory authority.”
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`Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 324. Underthe longstanding light-touch regime, ISPs
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`make business decisions in response to market forces. Under Title II, by
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`contrast, the Commission has plenary authority over nearly every aspect of
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`Internet access—including the powerto dictate “just and reasonable”prices,
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`AT U.S.C. §§ 201, 202; to order ISPs to deploy new infrastructure, zd. § 214;
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`and to require preclearance for services,
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`id. §§ 201, 214. Although the
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`Commission emphasizesthat it has thus far forborne from exercising some of
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`these authorities, Order 11 257, the major-questions doctrine asks aboutthefull
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`implications of the powerclaimed, not how the agency hasacted to date. West
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`Virginia, 597 U.S. at 728-729.
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`10
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`The “economic andpolitical significance” of the Commission’s claimed
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`authority “is staggering by any measure.” Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355,
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`2373 (2023) (citation omitted). The broadband industry generates about
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`$150 billion in annual revenue. See U.S. Chamber Comments, App. 1156-1157.
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`One recent study found that even the “prospect of Title II policy reduced
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`investment” in that industry by $8 billion annually from 2011 to 2020, with a
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`$145-billion annual impact on GDP. Ford Paper, App. 800-801; see Israel Decl.
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`11 20-22, App. 939-940. And the significance of Internet access to Americans
`
`and American businesses far exceeds any price tag. As the Commission
`
`declared, broadbandis “indispensable to every aspect of our daily lives, from
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`work, education, and healthcare, to commerce, community, communication,
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`and free expression.” Order {.1. There can be no “serious dispute that [the
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`Commission] claims the authority to exercise control over a significant
`
`portion”—indeed, one of the most significant portions—“of the American
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`economy.” Biden, 143 S. Ct. at 2373 (citation omitted); see Verrilli &
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`Gershengorn, supra, at 330-331.
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`Politically, the Commission’s authority has “been the subject of an
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`earnest and profound debate across the country.” West Virginia, 597 U.S. at
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`732. The Commission’s position now flips—each time to great fanfare—
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`11
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`whenever it changes political control. Meanwhile, “Congress has been
`
`studying and debating net neutrality regulation for years,” and “considered
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`(but never passed) a variety of bills relating to net neutrality and the
`
`imposition of common-carrier regulations on Internet service providers.”
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`U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d at 423 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see USTelecom
`
`Comments, App. 1136-1137 (cataloging rejectedbills).
`
`2.
`
`Other “telltale sign[s]” confirm that the decision to regulate
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`broadband providers as commoncarriers implicates a major question. Biden,
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`143 8. Ct. at 2382 (Barrett, J., concurring). First, the Commission’s own
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`“post-enactment conduct” is “particularly probative.” Jd. at 2388; see West
`
`Virginia, 597 U.S. at 724-725.
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`Just two years after the 1996 Act, the
`
`Commission concluded that “Internet access services are appropriately
`
`classed as information, rather than telecommunications, services.” Federal-
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`State Joint Board on Universal Service 1 73. That conclusion tracked
`
`regulatory distinctions that predated the 1996 Act, and it held for nearly two
`
`decades.
`
`3.
`
`The Order also strays into areas outside the Commission’s
`
`“comparative expertise.” West Virginia, 597 U.S. 729-730. For example, the
`
`Commission contendsthatit needs Title II to address “national security risks”
`
`12
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`from the Chinese government. Order 11 4, 33. “Thereis little reason to think
`
`Congress assigned such decisions” to the Commission, West Virginia, 597 U.S.
`
`at 729, which has no “historical familiarity [or] policymaking expertise” in
`
`addressing threats from geopolitical rivals. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,
`
`266 (2006); see CTIA Comments, App. 674-679.
`
`Indeed, bipartisan experts
`
`have confirmed that the Commission’s concerns are better left to national-
`
`security experts. Grotto Paper, App. 1544-1547, 1551-1553; Scott Comments,
`
`App. 1423-1424.
`
`B.
`
`The Commission Lacks Clear Congressional Authorization.
`
`The 1996 Act does not provide clear congressional authorization for the
`
`Order. The Supreme Court in Brand X held that it is at least permissible to
`
`classify Internet access as an “information service.” 545 U.S. at 1000. The
`
`D.C. Circuit reached the same conclusion in Mozilla. 940 F.3d at 23. Such
`
`“finding[s] of ambiguity” “by definition mean[] that Congress has not clearly
`
`authorized the FCC”to treat broadband providers as commoncarriers. U.S.
`
`Telecom, 855 F.3d at 426 (Kavanaugh,J., dissenting). And even putting aside
`
`the major-questions doctrine, the better reading of the text, structure, and
`
`nearby statutory provisions is that broadband is an “information service.”
`
`13
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`1.
`
`The plain text makes broadband an “information
`service.”
`
`Thestatutory “definition of ‘information service’ fits broadband Internet
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`access like a glove.” U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d at 395 (Brown,J., dissenting from
`
`denial of rehearing en banc). That is true both because broadbandoffers the
`
`capability for users to manipulate information online, and because broadband
`
`itself
`
`includes necessary components
`
`that process
`
`and manipulate
`
`information.
`
`a.
`
`First, broadbandprovidesusers with the capability to engage with
`
`information on websites and applications.
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`It is thus an “offering of [the]
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`capability” to do all of the actions set forth in the statutory definition:
`
`“generating” and “making available information” by posting on social media;
`
`“acquiring” or “retrieving” information from websites; “storing” information
`
`online; and “transforming,”
`
`9
`
`66
`
`“processing,” and “utilizing” information in
`
`limitless ways, from editing photos to playing video games. See 47 U.S.C.
`
`§ 158(24).
`
`Brand X confirms that conclusion. There, the Supreme Court upheld
`
`the Commission’s classification of cable broadband as an “information
`
`service,” explaining that “Internet service”
`
`7 66
`
`“provides consumers with a
`
`comprehensivecapability for manipulating information,”
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`9) 66
`
`“enabl[ing] users, for
`
`14
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`example, to browse the World Wide Web,to transfer files,”
`
`97
`
`66
`
`“and to access
`
`e-mail.” 545 U.S. at 987. Even the dissent did not dispute that point. See id.
`
`at 1009. The dissent disagreed only with the majority’s conclusion that cable
`
`providers’ additional provision of
`
`transmission services could not be
`
`disentangled from their information-services offering. Id.
`
`The Commission wrongly contendsthat broadbandis nothing more than
`
`a “telecommunications
`
`service’—that
`
`is, “the offering of’ pure data
`
`transmission. 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(50), (53). To be sure, broadband includes the
`
`transmission of data between computers. But ISPs do not “offer” pure
`
`transmission, as Brand X interpreted that term. In “commonusage,”
`
`39 66
`
`“what a
`
`company‘offers’ to a consumer” turns on “what the consumer perceives” she
`
`is buying. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 990. And consumers who buy broadband
`
`purchasethe capability to post on social media or store photosin the cloud, not
`
`to send IP data packets to and from servers. If that were not commonsense,
`
`multiple surveys confirm that the vast majority of consumers (80-90%)
`
`perceive broadband as providing such information-service capabilities.
`
`USTelecom Letter, App. 1588.
`
`b.
`
`Second, even under the Commission’sstrained reading of the text,
`
`broadband is still an “information service” because broadband