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` PRECEDENTIAL
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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
`____________
`
`No. 20-1908
`____________
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`VERIZON PENNSYLVANIA, LLC
`
`v.
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`COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-
`CIO, LOCAL 13000; COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF
`AMERICA, AFL-CIO DISTRICT 2-13,
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` Appellants
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
`(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-00394)
`District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe
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`Argued on January 21, 2021
`
`Before: HARDIMAN, ROTH, Circuit Judges and *PRATTER,
`District Judge
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`(Opinion filed: September 8, 2021)
`
`
`*The Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter, United States District
`Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
`designation.
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`

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`(ARGUED)
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`Counsel for Appellants
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`(ARGUED)
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`Laurence M. Goodman
`Nancy B.G. Lassen
`Alidz Oshagan
`Willig, Williams & Davidson
`1845 Walnut Street
`24th Floor
`Philadelphia, PA 19103
`
`
`
`Meir Feder
`Jones Day
`250 Vesey Street
`New York, NY 10281
`
`E. Michael Rossman
`Samantha C. Woo
`Jones Day
`77 West Wacker Drive
`Chicago, IL 60601
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`James R. Saywell
`Jones Day
`901 Lakeside Avenue East
`Cleveland, OH 44114
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`Counsel for Appellee
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`O P I N I ON
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`2
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`ROTH, Circuit Judge:
`
`This appeal requires us to decide whether the well-
`
`established functus officio doctrine is still viable in labor
`arbitration cases. We hold that it is, and agree with the District
`Court that the arbitration award in this case cannot stand. The
`deference given to arbitration awards is almost unparalleled,
`but not absolute. An arbitrator’s powers are derived from and
`limited by the parties’ agreement, which is made against a
`background of default legal rules. Under these default rules,
`once the arbitrator decides an issue, the functus officio doctrine
`prohibits him from revising that decision without the parties’
`consent. He can decide other issues submitted by the parties,
`correct clerical errors, and even clarify his initial decision—
`but nothing more.
`
`Verizon brought this action to vacate an arbitration
`
`award made pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
`(CBA) between it and Communication Workers of America,
`AFL-CIO, Local 13000 (the Union). In its Merits Award, the
`Arbitration Board held that Verizon violated the CBA by
`contracting with common carriers to deliver FiOS TV set-top
`boxes to “existing customers” for self-installation, work that
`used
`to be performed exclusively by Union Service
`Technicians (Workers). Yet, months later, the Board, under
`the guise of creating a “remedy,” improperly expanded the
`scope of the violation identified in the Merits Award to include
`not only deliveries to both existing and new customers, but also
`the accompanying self-installations. Such revisions are
`precisely what the functus officio doctrine prohibits. Thus, we
`affirm the District Court’s Order, vacating the Remedy Award
`to the extent that it awards damages for work that falls beyond
`
`
`
`3
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`

`

`
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`the outer bounds of the Merits Award. The outer bounds were
`the delivery of boxes to existing customers.
`
`We also hold that the Board improperly awarded
`
`punitive damages, which the Parties agree are not permitted
`under the CBA. For this reason, we will affirm the District
`Court’s Order, remanding the case back to the Board to
`redetermine what compensatory damages,
`if any, are
`appropriate.
`
`
`I
`
`Article 17.01 of the CBA provides that Verizon “will
`
`maintain its established policies as to the assignment of work
`in connection with the installation and maintenance of
`communications facilities owned, maintained and operated by
`the Company.”1 Article 13 provides that certain grievances,
`alleging violations of the CBA, must be submitted to the Board
`of Arbitration.
`
`Verizon FiOS is a television, internet, and phone
`
`service. FiOS TV was first available in Pennsylvania in 2006.
`TV content enters the home through fiberoptic cables that lead
`into a “set-top box.” When FiOS launched, a customer could
`obtain, upgrade, or replace a set-top box in either of two ways:
`(1) a Union Service Technician delivered the box to the
`customer’s home and installed it (Option One), or (2) the
`customer picked up the box from a Verizon store and installed
`it herself (Option Two). In November 2007, Verizon added
`two more options (the mail options) for “adds, upgrades,
`
`1 Appx. 95.
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`
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`
`4
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`

`

`
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`downgrades, or swaps” for “existing customers”: Verizon
`mails the box to the customer’s home (at Verizon’s expense)
`using a common carrier and either (3) the customer installs it
`himself (Option Three), or (4) a Service Technician comes to
`install it for a fee (Option Four).2
`
`On February 25, 2008, shortly after learning about the
`
`mail options, the Workers filed Grievance “EXBD-005-08
`Self-Installation of Set Top Boxes,” demanding that “all work
`associated with the set top boxes must be performed by” the
`Workers.3 They alleged that Verizon violated the CBA by
`contracting out Union work to common carriers through the
`mail options. They did not challenge instore pickup or self-
`installation under Option Two.
`
`On July 7, 2016, the Board issued the Merits Award,
`
`ruling that the mail options violated Article 17.01. The Board
`defined the issue submitted as whether Verizon violated the
`CBA by “implementing a process to deliver set top boxes to
`existing customers by common carrier for customer self-
`installation. And if so, what shall be the remedy?”4 It stated
`that “beginning when [FiOS] was implemented,” Service
`Technicians “were assigned to deliver set top boxes that they
`installed,”5 and that common carriers “who do the delivery
`work . . . are getting the advantage of work that is protected by
`Section 17.01.”6 The Board concluded that Workers “who
`have been denied the opportunity to perform the delivery work
`in question are entitled to compensation” and ordered Verizon
`
`
`2 Id. at 232, 305.
`3 Id. at 405.
`4 Id. at 229.
`5 Id. at 247.
`6 Id. at 252.
`
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`5
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`“to cease and desist from delivery of set top boxes by anyone
`other than” Union employees.7 However, “[t]here [was] no
`record evidence by which to assess how often [Verizon] sent
`out set top boxes to existing customers who wanted a different
`box that they did not want to install themselves.”8 For that
`reason, the Board “referred [the issue of money damages] back
`to the parties for resolution” and retained jurisdiction in case
`the Parties could not agree on a “monetary remedy.”9
`
`The Parties failed to reach an agreement and submitted
`
`the remedy issue back to the Board. The Parties disagreed
`(then and now) about the scope of the “delivery work in
`question” protected by the Merits Award. Specifically,
`Verizon argued that, under the Merits Award, the protected
`work assignment included only the delivery aspect of the mail
`options, not the self-installation aspect, and that the Merits
`Award allowed any Union employee to deliver the boxes.
`Verizon had tried to comply with the Merits Award by creating
`a new Union position, Assistant Technician, solely to deliver
`set top boxes for self-installation by customers. The Workers
`argued that, under the Merits Award, any time a box is
`delivered to (rather than picked up by) a customer, the delivery
`and installation are a single work “assignment” protected by
`Article 17.01. Thus, “unless the customer obtains the box from
`the Company and brings it [home], the Company’s delivery of
`set top boxes, and the installation or maintenance (including
`swaps and upgrades) of those boxes must be performed by” the
`Workers.10 Because the mail options did not cause the
`Workers to fall below full-time employment, they sought
`
`
`7 Id. at 253.
`8 Id. at 252.
`9 Id. at 252–53.
`10 Id. at 261.
`
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`6
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`backpay at overtime rates.
`
`On January 10, 2018, the Board issued the Remedy
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`Award, agreeing with the Workers that, in the Merits Award,
`it had ruled that both the delivery and self-installation aspects
`of the mail options violate the CBA. It further held that
`delivery by Assistant Technicians violated the CBA because
`the protected work assignment belonged to the Service
`Technicians. “[T]o compensate the[] [Service Technicians]
`and to deter future violations of Article 17.01,”11 the Board
`ordered Verizon to pay two hours (the average time to deliver
`and install a box) of backpay for each box shipment delivered
`by mail or an Assistant Technician, equitably distributed
`among the Service Technicians. Although the Workers sought
`overtime rates, the Board awarded only straight-time rates,
`stating “that there is no firm basis for awarding pay at overtime
`rates” because the Workers “did not lose income as they were
`fully employed at the time.”12
`
`On January 31, 2018, Verizon filed this action,
`
`challenging both Awards. The District Court granted summary
`judgment in part13 for Verizon, vacating the Remedy Award
`because it (1) amended the Merits Award in violation of the
`functus officio doctrine and (2) awarded punitive damages.
`The District Court remanded the case to the Board “for
`calculation of a remedy consistent with [its] opinion.”14 The
`
`
`
`11 Id. at 269.
`12 Id. at 268.
`13 The District Court granted summary judgment for the Workers to
`the extent that the Board held that delivery by common carrier
`violates the CBA. Appx. 26. Verizon does not challenge that ruling
`on appeal.
`14 Id.
`
`
`
`7
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`Workers appeal.
`
`
`II
`
`We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s
`
`decision to vacate the Remedy Award.15 Because parties
`litigating the validity of an arbitration award have bargained
`for the arbitrator’s judgment, courts may not review the merits
`of the award.16 A court may vacate an arbitration award if “the
`arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
`them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
`matter submitted was not made.”17 Three limits on arbitrators’
`powers are relevant here. First, because “arbitration is a
`creature of contract . . . an arbitration panel has the authority to
`decide only the issues that have been submitted for arbitration
`by the parties.”18 Second, courts must vacate an arbitrator’s
`award if it is “irrational.”19 An award is irrational if it fails to
`“‘draw[]
`its essence
`from
`the collective bargaining
`agreement’”20 in such a way that it “can[not] be rationally
`derived either from
`the agreement [or]
`the parties[’]
`
`
`15 Kaplan v. First Options of Chic., Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1509 (3d Cir.
`1994).
`16 Major League Umpires Ass’n v. Am. League of Pro. Baseball
`Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2004).
`17 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
`18 Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d
`574, 578 (3d Cir. 2005).
`19 Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998
`Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 295 (3d Cir. 2010).
`20 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union, 73 F.3d 1287,
`1295 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Loc. Union 759,
`461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).
`
`
`
`8
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`submissions to the arbitrators,”21 or “the record before the
`arbitrator reveals no support whatsoever for the arbitrator’s
`determination.”22 Finally, although courts must defer to an
`arbitrator’s initial decision, the functus officio doctrine “bar[s]
`an arbitrator from revisiting the merits of an award once it has
`issued.”23
`
`
`III
`
`A.
`
`Functus Officio
`
`The District Court found that the Remedy Award
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`violates the functus officio doctrine because it expanded the
`protected work identified in the Merits Award by including (1)
`deliveries and self-installations, rather than just deliveries; and
`(2) deliveries to new customers, rather than just “existing
`customers.” We agree.
`
`As an initial matter, we reject the Workers’ argument
`
`that we should abrogate the functus officio doctrine in labor
`arbitration cases. “Although the doctrine was applied strictly
`at common law . . . ‘the federal courts have been less strict in
`applying the common law functus officio rule in reviewing
`
`
`21 Ario, 618 F.3d at 295 (last alteration in original).
`22 United Indus. Workers, Serv., Transp., Pro. Gov’t of N. Am. of
`Seafarers’ Int’l Union of N. Am. v. Virgin Islands, 987 F.2d 162, 170
`(3d Cir. 1993); accord Citgo Asphalt Refining Co. v. Paper, Allied-
`Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union Loc. No. 2-991, 385
`F.3d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 2004); News Am. Publ’ns, Inc. Daily Racing
`Form Div. v. Newark Typographical Union, Loc. 103, 918 F.2d 21,
`24 (3d Cir. 1990).
`23 Office & Pro. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. No. 471 v. Brownsville Gen.
`Hosp., 186 F.3d 326, 331 (3d Cir. 1999).
`
`
`
`9
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`labor disputes’”24 after the Supreme Court interpreted the
`Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 as directing lower
`federal courts to create common law for labor arbitration
`enforcement proceedings.25 Nonetheless, “it has never been
`abrogated by any court of which we have been made aware,”26
`and we hold that it is alive and well in this Court. The doctrine
`prohibits arbitrators from revising their prior decisions because
`arbitrators “lack[] the institutional protection of judges.”27
`Moreover, the doctrine’s three exceptions give arbitrators
`flexibility to effectuate their contractually-derived powers:
`
`
`(1) an arbitrator “can correct a mistake which is
`apparent on the face of his award”; (2) “where
`the award does not adjudicate an issue which has
`been submitted, then as to such issue the
`arbitrator has not exhausted his function and it
`remains
`open
`to
`him
`for
`subsequent
`determination”; and (3) “[w]here the award,
`although seemingly complete, leaves doubt
`whether the submission has been fully executed,
`
`
`24 Id. (quoting Teamsters Loc. 312, 118 F.3d at 991).
`25 See generally Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353
`U.S. 448 (1957).
`26 Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, Loc. Union 824 v. Verizon Fla.,
`LLC, 803 F.3d 1241, 1248 (11th Cir. 2015).
`27 Brownsville Gen. Hosp., 186 F.3d at 331; accord Teamster Loc.
`312 v. Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d 985, 991 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[F]unctus
`officio conceives of arbitrators as ‘ad hoc judges—judges for a case;
`and when the case is over, they cease to be judges and go back to
`being law professors or businessmen or whatever else they are in
`private life.’” (quoting Glass, Molders, Plastics & Allied Workers
`Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, Loc. 182B v. Excelsior Foundry Co.,
`56 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 1995))).
`
`
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`10
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`
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`an ambiguity arises which the arbitrator is
`entitled to clarify.”28
`
`Moreover, if parties want greater flexibility, they can negotiate
`around the doctrine entirely.
`
`The Workers do not explain why the doctrine should not
`
`continue to be the default rule. In fact, they specifically
`bargained for the doctrine to apply here. The CBA provides
`that any “arbitration shall be conducted under the Voluntary
`Labor Arbitration Rules.”29 Rule 40 allows “any party” to
`“request the arbitrator . . . to correct any clerical, typographical,
`technical, or computational errors in the award,” but prohibits
`the arbitrator from “redetermin[ing] the merits of any claim
`already decided.”30 Accordingly, the Board’s powers were
`limited by the functus officio doctrine. As explained below, the
`Remedy Award ran afoul of those limitations.
`
`
`i
`
`Self-Installation
`
`Verizon argues that the Board held in the Merits Award
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`that self-installation did not violate the CBA and that the Board
`thus could not revisit that issue in the Remedy Award. The
`record is not clear as to whether the Board decided the self-
`installation issue in the Merits Award. In many instances, it
`
`
`28 Brownsville Gen. Hosp., 186 F.3d at 331 (alteration in original)
`(quoting Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Omaha Indem. Co., 943 F.2d
`327, 332 (3d Cir. 1991)).
`29 Appx. 222.
`30 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, LABOR ARBITRATION
`available
`at
`RULES
`¶
`40
`(2013),
`https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Labor_Arbitration_Rules_3.
`pdf.
`
`
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`11
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`suggested that the self-installation issue was not included in the
`Parties’ submission. For example, the Board stated that
`“[w]hile the Union views any work, even that done by a
`customer, on a set top box as bargaining unit work, the issue
`before us is whether contracting out the delivery of set top
`boxes to common carriers violates Section 17.01.”31 The
`Board also stated that Verizon’s “focus on customer self-
`installation” was “misplaced” because “[t]he Union’s focus is
`on the delivery of set top boxes . . . by common carrier.”32
`Indeed, in their merits brief, the Workers stated that “this
`dispute is not about [Option Two] or who installs the set top
`boxes after they are delivered to existing customers.”33
`
`In the Remedy Award opinion, however, the Board
`
`concluded (and the Parties agree) that it had already decided
`the scope of the work assignment, including the self-
`installation issue, “in [its] initial decision on the merits of the
`dispute.”34 Indeed, it stated in the opinion accompanying the
`Merits Award that “[t]he question is whether there was an
`established policy in effect at the time of the change as to
`assignment of the installation or maintenance work and the
`delivery of the equipment.”35 Accordingly, we hold that the
`Board did decide this issue in the Merits Award. Indeed, if the
`Board had concluded that the self-installation issue was not
`within the scope of the Parties’ submission, the Board would
`
`
`
`31 Appx. 248.
`32 Id. at 249 (brackets and emphases in original omitted).
`33 Id. at 551 n.7 (second emphasis added).
`34 Id. at 267; see also United Mine Workers of Am. Dist. No. 5 v.
`Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 1981)(“[I]t is
`an arbitrator, and not the court, who is to decide whether the same
`issue has already been resolved in an earlier proceeding.”).
`35 Appx. 247 (emphasis added).
`
`
`
`12
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`

`
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`have exceeded the scope of its authority by deciding that issue
`in the Remedy Award.
`
`The Workers nonetheless argue that the Board could
`
`revisit the scope of the work assignment in the remedy
`proceedings for two reasons. First, the Workers argue that the
`Board reserved the remedy issue and could thus redecide the
`issues addressed in the Merits Award, including the scope of
`the work assignment, either because the Merits Award was not
`a “final award” and the functus officio doctrine did not apply
`to it or because the doctrine’s second exception applied. We
`disagree.
`
`By its terms, the doctrine’s second exception does not
`
`apply. That exception “authorizes an arbitrator to decide a
`remaining issue which has been submitted by the parties but
`not resolved.”36 Moreover, although we have stated in dictum
`that the functus officio doctrine applies only if the “award [is]
`final, complete, and coextensive with the terms of the
`submission,”37 the existence of the doctrine’s second exception
`implies that the doctrine applies to partial decisions that finally
`resolve some, but not all, of the submitted issues.
`
`
`However, allowing arbitrators to revisit issues that they
`have already decided merely because they retained jurisdiction
`on ancillary issues—here, the monetary remedy—creates
`several potential problems. Partial awards are just as
`susceptible as “final” awards to the types of post hoc influences
`and ex parte communications that the doctrine is meant to
`
`36 Teamsters Loc. 312 v. Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d 985, 992 (3d Cir.
`1997) (emphases added).
`37 La Vale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 572 (3d
`Cir. 1967).
`
`
`
`13
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`

`

`
`
`protect against. Additionally, an arbitrator could issue a partial
`award as a placeholder to apply settlement pressure, rather than
`just adjudicating the dispute as the parties agreed she would.38
`
`
`In any event, even if an arbitrator ordinarily could
`
`revisit the merits of a partial award, the Board could not do so
`in this case because the Parties narrowed the scope of their
`submission during the remedy proceedings.39 In their brief, the
`Workers submitted only the following issue: “What shall be
`the appropriate remedy for the Company’s violation of Article
`17.01 of the CBA?”40 The Workers repeatedly treated the
`scope of the work assignment as settled by the Merits Award,
`stating that “the cornerstone of a remedy is the Panel’s Award
`on the merits.”41 Accordingly, the Board was not free to revisit
`the scope of the work assignment.
`
`Second, the Workers argue that the Remedy Award
`
`merely clarified an ambiguity about the scope of the work
`
`
`38 See id. (“The[] exceptions from the functus officio doctrine were
`narrowly drawn to prevent arbitrators from engaging in practices
`that might . . . change a party’s expectations about its rights and
`liabilities contained in an award.”).
`39 Cf. Metromedia Energy, Inc., 409 F.3d at 579 (explaining that
`courts will defer to, but not rubber stamp, arbitrator’s interpretation
`of the issues submitted to it); Trade & Transport, Inc. v. Natural
`Petroleum Charterers Inc., 931 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[I]f
`the parties have asked the arbitrators to make a final partial award
`as to a particular issue and the arbitrators have done so, the
`arbitrators have no further authority, absent agreement by the
`parties, to redetermine that issue.”).
`40 Appx. 950.
`41 Appx. 948.
`
`
`
`14
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`

`
`
`assignment protected by the Merits Awards, under the
`doctrine’s third exception. Again, we disagree.
`
`This exception usually arises in determining whether an
`
`award must be remanded: Where an award itself is too
`ambiguous
`to enforce,
`the court must remand
`it for
`clarification.42 The Workers argue that because the Board has
`already purported in the Remedy Award to clarify that the
`Merits Award protected all deliveries and accompanying self-
`installations, we are required to defer to that “clarification.”
`Not so. Unflagging deference to arbitrators’ “clarifications”
`would effectively give them the power to revisit the merits of
`prior decisions, thus completely eliminating the functus officio
`doctrine. Where an arbitrator has actually decided an issue but
`the ruling is ambiguous, we defer to the arbitrator’s post hoc
`interpretation of his award only if it is a rational clarification
`of the ambiguity; otherwise, the arbitrator is revising the
`award, not clarifying it.43
`
`
`42 Brownsville Gen. Hosp., 186 F.3d at 326; Loc. 719, Am. Bakery
`& Confectionary Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 378
`F.2d 918, 926 (3d Cir. 1967); see also Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. Loc.
`8-74, 671 F.2d 752, 754 n.1 (3d Cir. 1982); Bell Aerospace Co. Div.
`of Textron, Inc. v. Loc. 516, Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace &
`Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1974).
`43 See Gen. Re Life Corp. v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 909 F.3d
`544, 549 (2d Cir. 2018) (explaining that a supplemental award
`clarifying an earlier award violates the functus officio doctrine
`unless “the clarification merely clarifies the award rather than
`substantively modifying it”); Sterling China Co. v. Glass, Molders,
`Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Loc. No. 24, 357 F.3d 546, 556
`(6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he arbitrator’s authority allows for clarification
`of an award subject to multiple interpretations.”); see also SBC
`Advanced Solutions, Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., Dist. 6, 794
`F.3d 1020, 1031 (8th Cir. 2015); Eastern Seaboard Const. Co., Inc.
`
`
`
`15
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`

`

`
`
`We agree with the Workers that the Merits Award itself
`
`was ambiguous as to the scope of the protected work
`assignment. In the award, the Board stated that the Workers
`are entitled to compensation for “the delivery work in
`question,” but did not define that phrase. The Board also stated
`that “[t]he grievance is granted”44 The grievance, in turn,
`related to “all work associated with the set top box.”45 Yet,
`even the Workers do not contend that the Merits Award
`referred to “all work associated with the set top boxes”: They
`concede that Option Two does not violate the CBA.
`
`
`But we need not decide whether the Remedy Award is
`
`a rational clarification of these ambiguities in the Merits Award
`itself, i.e., whether “delivery work in question” could be read
`as shorthand for both the delivery and self-installation aspects
`of the mail options, since that “clarification” is foreclosed by
`the Merits Opinion. Because “arbitrators have no obligation to
`explain their reasons for an award or even to write an opinion
`unless the contract so requires,”46 “mere ambiguity in the
`opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference
`that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a
`reason for refusing to enforce the award.”47 Nonetheless, we
`
`
`v. Gray Const., Inc., 553 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008); Brown v. Witco
`Corp., 340 F.3d 209, 221 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he arbitrator went
`beyond the express scope of the remand order by issuing a
`clarification that essentially reversed the determinations that he
`made in the August 27 Clarification Letter.”).
`44 Appx. 253.
`45 Id. at 230.
`46 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union, 73 F.3d 1287,
`1297 (3d Cir. 1996).
`47 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
`
`
`
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`
`
`may vacate an award where “it is obvious from the written
`opinion” that the arbitrator exceeded his authority.48
`
` Here, it is obvious from the Merits Opinion that the
`
`Remedy Award revised the Merits Award and thus exceeded
`the Board’s authority under the functus officio doctrine. In the
`Merits Opinion, the Board explicitly stated that either the
`Workers were not challenging the self-installation aspect of the
`mail options or, if they were, “[p]rior awards have confirmed
`that self-installation by a customer does not amount to
`contracting out bargaining unit work. . . . The question of self-
`installation of certain equipment . . . has long been settled.
`Delivery is another matter.”49 Thus, the Merits Award
`
`
`U.S. 593, 598 (1960); accord Exxon Shipping Co., 73 F.3d 1287,
`1297 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[A]n arbitrator’s decision need [not] be . . .
`internally consistent.”); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Int’l Broth. of
`Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Loc.
`Union No. 430, 55 F.3d 138, 141–42 (3d Cir. 1995).
`48 Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d
`574, 580 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added); accord Raymond James
`Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Bishop, 596 F.3d 183, 191 (4th Cir. 2010);
`Randall v. Lodge No. 1076, Int’l Ass’n of Machinist & Aerospace
`Workers, AFL-CIO, 648 F.2d 462, 468 (7th Cir. 1981) (explaining
`that court will remand case based on ambiguities in an opinion only
`“once the reasons that are given strongly imply that the arbitrator
`may have exceeded his or her authority under the submission and
`contract”); U.S. Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund v. McSkimming,
`759 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1985); cf. M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH
`& Co., 143 F.3d 1033, 1038 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[I]f the arbitrator’s
`opinion and award, read together, are not ambiguous, the award
`should be enforced.”).
`49 Appx. 249. The Workers argue that the Board referred only to
`“prior awards” and thus was not ruling on this issue. We disagree.
`Why would the Board randomly mention prior awards, particularly
`
`
`
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`

`
`
`protects, at most, deliveries under Options Three and Four, but
`not self-installations.
`
`Nonetheless, the Workers argue that because they
`
`always install the boxes that they deliver, installation and
`delivery were a single work “assignment” before the mail
`options. The Workers rely on the Board’s statement that they
`“were assigned to deliver the set top boxes that they
`installed.”50 This statement only further undermines their
`argument for two reasons.
`
`First, the Workers made similar statements in their
`
`arbitration brief, but did so to show that “delivery is work in
`connection with the installation and maintenance of [a]
`communication facility” and thus can be protected by Article
`17.01.51 Indeed, the Workers specified that the “core work”
`was the “transporting and delivering [of] set top boxes to
`customers premises,” and that “the work . . . is now assigned
`to UPS and other common carrier employees.”52
`
`
`
`in the context of rejecting Verizon’s arguments about self-
`installation, if it was not ruling that self-installation, in some
`contexts, is permitted? As explained above, the Board ruled on the
`issue of self-installation, and these statements clearly show how it
`ruled on that issue: “[S]elf-installation by a customer does not
`amount to contracting out bargaining unit work.”
`50 Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
`51 Id. at 555 (emphases added).
`52 Id. at 550–51 (emphasis added); accord id. at 551 (arguing that
`“the ‘basic work’ of delivery continues to be done[] by non-
`bargaining unit members” (emphasis added)).
`
`
`
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`Second, if anything, the Board’s statement that the
`
`Workers “deliver[ed] the set top boxes that they installed”
`suggests that “the delivery work in question” is even narrower
`than Verizon’s proposed interpretation. Specifically, it
`indicates
`that
`the protected work assignment
`includes
`deliveries only of “boxes that the[ Workers] installed,” not
`deliveries of boxes that others installed. Under that reading,
`the Merits Award protects only deliveries (and perhaps
`installations) under Option Four, where Service Technicians
`actually did the installations, and thus does not protect any
`deliveries under Option Three, let alone the accompanying
`self-installations. In fact, Verizon initially argued for that
`interpretation below, and several parts of the Merits Opinion
`support it.
`
`For example, the Board stated that Verizon must stop
`
`“mailing the product to customers when the Company is to
`provide the installation or maintenance on a set top box,” and
`that the Board could not issue a monetary remedy because there
`was no evidence about the number of deliveries to “customers
`who wanted a different box that they did not want to install
`themselves.”53 The Board also distinguished this case from an
`arbitration decision (Strongin) that held that mail delivery of
`telephone cords for self-installation did not violate the CSA
`because “delivery of the cords was merely incidental to the
`[self-]installation” and “the Company is no longer routinely
`engaged in installing these cords.”54 The Board explained that
`here, “technicians continue to install some set of the set top
`
`
`53 Id. at 252 (emphases added).
`54 Id. at 250.
`
`
`
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`

`
`
`boxes . . . . When that occurs, delivery of a box is not
`incidental.”55 Where a box is delivered under Option Three (or
`by an Assistant Technician), Verizon does not “provide the
`installation or maintenance,” and the Workers did not present
`any evidence of customers who chose Option Three despite
`wanting to choose Options One or Four.
`
`Thus, the parts of the Merits Opinion on which the
`
`Workers rely, viewed in the context of the entire Opinion,
`undermine their argument. We need not decide whether the
`Merits Award protects all deliveries under Options Three and
`Four, as Verizon argues, or only deliveries and Union-
`installations under Option Four, as Verizon argued below.
`Regardless of which of those two interpretations is correct,
`both of them foreclose the Board’s purported “clarification”:
`The Merits Award does not protect self-installations under
`Option Three.56 Accordingly, it is obvious from the face of the
`Merits Opinion that the Board revised the Merits Award by
`awarding damages for self-installations, and
`the
`third
`exception to the functus officio doctrine thus does not apply.
`
`In sum, the Merits Opinion forecloses the Remedy
`
`Award’s purported “clarification” of the scope of the protected
`work assignment, and the Board was not permitted to redecide
`that issue merely because it reserved jurisdiction on the
`remedy. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s Judgment
`holding that the Board violated the functus officio doctrine by
`awarding backpay for self-installations under Option Three.
`
`
`55 Id. (emphasis added).
`56 Because Verizon did not cross-appeal the District Court’s ruling