Case: 20-2725 Document: 84 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/28/2021
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`Nos. 20-2725, 2885
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
`
`KAREN HEPP,
`
`Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
`
`v.
`FACEBOOK, INC. and WGCZ S.R.O,
`Appellees,
`IMGUR, INC. and REDDIT, INC.,
`Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
`
`
`On Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
`No. 2-19-cv-04034-JMY (Hon. John Milton Younge)
`
`BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE INTERNET ASSOCIATION
`IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE FACEBOOK’S PETITION FOR
`REHEARING EN BANC AND AFFIRMANCE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`THOMAS G. SPRANKLING
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`2600 EL Camino Real, Suite 400
`Palo Alto, CA 94306
`650-858-6000
`
`SAMUEL LEIFER
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`60 State Street
`Boston, MA 02109
`617-526-6000
`October 28, 2021
`
`
`
`PATRICK J. CAROME
`ARI HOLTZBLATT
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`202-663-6000
`
`
`
`
`Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
` The Internet Association
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`

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`Case: 20-2725 Document: 84 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/28/2021
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`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
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`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a) and Third Circuit
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`Local Appellate Rule 26.1, the Internet Association is not a publicly held corporation
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`and does not have a parent corporation. No publicly traded corporation owns ten
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`percent or more of its stock.
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`i
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page(s)
`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT...................................................i
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .........................................................................iii
`INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE ................................................................ 1
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................................... 2
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................... 3
`THIS CASE POSES AN ISSUE OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE
`REGARDING SECTION 230’S SCOPE .......................................................... 3
`A.
`The Divided Panel’s Ruling Creates An Unjustified
`Circuit Split ............................................................................... 3
`The Breadth Of Subsection 230(e)(2) Is An Issue Of
`National Importance .................................................................... 4
`The Divided Panel’s Decision Contravenes
`Congressional Intent And Incentivizes Forum Shopping
`And Artful Pleading .................................................................... 9
`CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 12
`CERTIFICATE OF BAR MEMBERSHIP ..................................................... 13
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................. 14
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................... 15
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`B.
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`C.
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`ii
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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` Page(s)
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`Cases
`Asmi v. Nasir,
`2014 WL 5690503 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2014) ........................................ 8
`Bennett v. Google, LLC,
`882 F.3d 1163 (D.C. Cir.2018)................................................................... 5
`Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc.,
`109 N.E.3d 390 (Ind.2018) ........................................................................ 8
`Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,
`528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir.2008)..................................................................... 11
`ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.,
`332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir.2003)....................................................................... 7
`Gignilliat v. Gignilliat, Savitz & Bettis, L.L.P.,
`684 S.E.2d 756 (S.C.2009) ........................................................................ 7
`Green v. America Online (AOL),
`318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir.2003) ....................................................................... 2
`In re Facebook, Inc.,
`625 S.W.3d 80 (Tex.2021) ........................................................................ 5
`In re Jackson,
`972 F.3d 25 (2d Cir.2020) ......................................................................... 8
`Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC,
`817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.2016)......................................................................... 4
`Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
`416 U.S. 470 (1974) ................................................................................. 8
`Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc.,
`836 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir.2016) ................................................................... 10
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`iii
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`McFarland v. Miller,
`14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir.1994) ......................................................................... 6
`Nemet Chevrolet Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc.,
`591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir.2009)..................................................................... 11
`Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc.,
`529 S.E.2d 80 (Va.2000) ........................................................................... 8
`Obado v. Magedson,
`612 F. App’x 90 (3d Cir.2015) ............................................................. 2, 10
`Ohio State University v. Redbubble, Inc.,
`989 F.3d 435 (6th Cir.2021)....................................................................... 8
`Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC,
`488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir.2007) .............................................................passim
`Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,
`926 P.2d 1130 (Alaska 1996) ..................................................................... 8
`Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,
`1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995)........................................... 4
`Universal Communication Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc.,
`478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir.2007) ....................................................................... 4
`Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,
`129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir.1997)..................................................................... 10
`Statutes
`18 U.S.C. §1833 Statutory Note ...................................................................... 9
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`47 U.S.C.
`§230 ...............................................................................................passim
`§230(a) ............................................................................................... 3, 5
`§230(b) ................................................................................................... 3
`§230(b)(1) ........................................................................................... 2, 5
`§230(b)(2) ............................................................................................... 5
`§230(e)(1) ............................................................................................... 9
`§230(e)(2) .......................................................................................passim
`§230(e)(3) ......................................................................................... 2, 11
`§230(e)(4) ............................................................................................... 9
`§230(e)(5) ............................................................................................... 9
`Other Authorities
`1 McCarthy & Schecter, Rights of Publicity and Privacy
`(2d ed. 2021 update) ................................................................................. 7
`Goldman, Eric, Why Section 230 Is Better Than The First Amendment,
`95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 33 (2019)............................................................... 9
`H.R. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) ..................................................... 4
`Prosser, William L., Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960) ................................... 7
`Restatement (Second) of Torts §652C.............................................................. 7
`Senator Ron Wyden & Representative Chris Cox, Reply Comments of
`Co-Authors of Section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934, In
`the Matter of National Telecommunications and Information
`Administration Petition for Rulemaking to Clarify Provisions of
`Section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (Sept. 17, 2020) .................... 5
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`v
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`INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE1
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`Amicus Curiae Internet Association (Amicus or IA) represents the interests of
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`leading internet companies and their users, and seeks to protect internet freedom,
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`promote innovation and economic growth, and empower individuals.
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` Because IA’s members are platforms for communications and services, they
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`are frequently parties to lawsuits for alleged harms resulting from online exchanges
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`of information. The immunity that 47 U.S.C. §230 affords to online platforms from
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`claims arising from third-party content is critically important, protecting them from
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`the risks, burdens, and uncertainties of litigation, and thereby preserving the vitality
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`of online free speech generally.
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`A key aspect of Section 230 is that it protects platforms against a wide range
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`of claims with only a few, carefully delimited exceptions. Among those is
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`subsection 230(e)(2), which states: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to
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`limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.” Ensuring that the scope
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`of subsection 230(e)(2) remains narrow, well-defined, and uniform throughout the
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`Amicus certifies that (1) no party or party’s counsel authored this brief in
`1
`whole or in part and (2) no party, no party’s counsel, and no person other than
`Amicus, Amicus’s members (other than Facebook), or Amicus’s counsel made a
`monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
`Amicus’s members are listed at http://internetassociation.org/our-members/. As
`noted, while Facebook is an IA member, it played no role in authoring or funding
`this brief.
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`1
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`United States is important to IA’s members, lest the exception largely swallow
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`Section 230’s core promise of immunity.
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`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
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`Section 230 provides broad immunity to online platforms to encourage “the
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`continued development of the Internet.” 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(1). The heartland of
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`this protection includes immunity from suits that seek to hold “providers of
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`interactive computer services … liable for publishing or distributing defamatory
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`material written by others.” Obado v. Magedson, 612 F. App’x 90, 93 (3d Cir.2015);
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`accord Green v. America Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir.2003). To avoid
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`clever pleading designed to circumvent the statute’s broad reach, Section 230
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`expressly preempts all “inconsistent” state laws. 47 U.S.C. §230(e)(3).
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`The divided panel’s erroneous interpretation of subsection 230(e)(2)
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`significantly departs from existing law and merits rehearing for at least three reasons.
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`First, the majority’s holding that subsection 230(e)(2) applies to state intellectual
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`property law creates a split with the Ninth Circuit, which has long held that the
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`exception applies only to claims brought under “federal intellectual property” law.
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`Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-1119 (9th Cir.2007). Second,
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`the holding creates uncertainty in every state with a right-of-publicity law (or any
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`other specialized law that might be deemed intellectual property) until a court
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`decides whether each such law “pertain[s] to intellectual property” within the
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`2
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`meaning of subsection 230(e)(2). Third, the panel majority’s test threatens to
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`substantially shrink Section 230’s scope, potentially carving out exceptions for every
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`claim that can arguably be categorized under state intellectual property law, and
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`incentivizing forum shopping and artful pleading. The panel’s ruling would make
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`subsection 230(e)(2) the only provision of Section 230 that operates differently in
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`different states, undermining the uniformity and certainty that Section 230 was
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`enacted to create for a medium that necessarily operates nationally.
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`ARGUMENT
`THIS CASE POSES AN ISSUE OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE REGARDING SECTION
`230’S SCOPE
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`A. The Divided Panel’s Ruling Creates An Unjustified Circuit Split
`The Ninth Circuit has long interpreted subsection 230(e)(2) to apply to only
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`federal intellectual property law, not state intellectual property law. See Perfect 10,
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`488 F.3d at 1119. The Perfect 10 court explained that “permitting the reach of any
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`particular state’s definition of intellectual property to dictate the contours of this
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`federal immunity would be contrary to Congress’s expressed goal of insulating the
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`development of the Internet from the various state-law regimes.” Id. at 1118 (citing
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`47 U.S.C. §§230(a)-(b)).
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`Until the divided panel’s decision, no appellate court had reached a contrary
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`conclusion in the quarter-century since Section 230’s enactment. And in the nearly
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`15 years since Perfect 10, that ruling has taken on outsized importance—and
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`engendered significant reliance interests among online platforms—because many
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`platforms are based within the Ninth Circuit.
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`The panel majority incorrectly cites Universal Communication Systems, Inc.
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`v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir.2007), as already establishing a “clear split”
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`with the Ninth Circuit regarding subsection 230(e)(2). See Op. 11-12, 16. In fact,
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`Perfect 10 itself addressed and refuted the notion that it split from Lycos. See 488
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`F.3d at 1119 n.5 (noting that “neither party [in Lycos] raised the question of whether
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`state law counts as ‘intellectual property’ for purposes of § 230”). And the First
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`Circuit later confirmed that Lycos had not “decid[ed]” whether state-law intellectual
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`property claims fall within subsection 230(e)(2). Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com,
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`LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 26 & n.9 (1st Cir.2016).
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`B. The Breadth Of Subsection 230(e)(2) Is An Issue Of National Importance
`The panel majority’s construction of subsection 230(e)(2) raises a crucial
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`question regarding Section 230 that merits consideration by the en banc court.
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`Congress enacted Section 230 to overrule a state court’s decision that online
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`providers could be liable for defamatory third-party content on their platforms. See
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`Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
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`24, 1995); see also, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
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`Congress expressly sought to “promote the continued development of the Internet,”
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`4
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`protect a “forum for a true diversity” of speech, and “preserve the vibrant and
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`competitive free market” online. 47 U.S.C. §§230(a), (b)(1)-(2).
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`As Congress intended, Section 230 “paved the way for a robust new forum
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`for public speech.’” Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1166 (D.C. Cir.2018).
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`Today, “[v]irtually every significant brick-and-mortar business of any kind, from
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`newspapers to retailers to manufacturers to service providers, has an internet
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`presence.” Wyden & Cox, Reply Comments, NTIA Petition for Rulemaking to
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`Clarify Provisions of Section 230, at 12 (Sept. 17, 2020). Section 230 has
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`accomplished Congress’s goals by providing online platforms with stability and
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`certainty. Outside of a few carefully tailored exceptions, platforms have been able
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`to rely on the principle that they cannot be held liable for third-party speech and have
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`“negotiat[ed] their contracts and structure[ed] their … transactions against a
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`backdrop of that immunity.” In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d 80, 92 (Tex.2021)
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`(quotations omitted)). The panel majority’s holding risks dramatically altering
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`Section 230’s careful balance by potentially carving out a significant exception to
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`that broad immunity for any kind of state-law claim that arguably sounds in
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`intellectual property.
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`While the panel majority stated that its decision would “not open the
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`floodgates” to claims against online providers under myriad state laws, Op. 22, it
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`offered scant basis for that prediction. The majority pointed to the fact that its ruling
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`addresses only Pennsylvania’s formulation of a right of publicity and expresses “no
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`opinion” about other states’ laws. Op. 22. But its decision did not turn on anything
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`specific to Pennsylvania’s law, see Op. 17-21—it relied instead on a “survey of legal
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`dictionaries,” Op. 18, to propose a broad legal interpretation of the “intellectual
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`property” text of subsection 230(e)(2). (Indeed, the panel’s decision hints—without
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`squarely holding—that the Bouvier Law Dictionary’s definition of “intellectual
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`property” effectively establishes the scope of subsection 230(e)(2). Op. 18.)
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`The panel majority’s logic could mean, for example, that New Jersey’s right-
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`of-publicity law falls within subsection 230(e)(2), because “[i]n New Jersey, the
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`right of publicity is a property right” that can be “infringed.” McFarland v. Miller,
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`14 F.3d 912, 917 (3d Cir.1994). Moreover, plaintiffs who can find some basis for
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`bringing suit in the Third Circuit would be free to look to the laws of any other state
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`as a basis for similar arguments. See infra pp. 10-11 (discussing the forum shopping
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`problem). This is important because state intellectual property laws “vary widely
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`from state to state” and “are by no means uniform.” Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118-
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`1119 & n.5; see, e.g., infra pp. 7-8. If the scope of Section 230 were linked to this
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`patchwork, the immunity of a defendant that operates throughout the country—as
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`online providers invariably do—would turn on and off depending on the state in
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`which a claim is brought. Any state, moreover, could try to whittle away at the scope
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`6
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`of Section 230 immunity simply by purporting to re-categorize one or more torts as
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`sounding in “intellectual property.”
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`These concerns are especially acute for right-of-publicity claims, which are
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`available under the law of more than two-thirds of states. 1 McCarthy & Schecter,
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`Rights of Publicity and Privacy §6:1 (2d ed. 2021 update). But there is no uniform
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`rule whether such a right is intellectual property or merely a tort that protects privacy.
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`Compare, e.g., Gignilliat v. Gignilliat, Savitz & Bettis, L.L.P., 684 S.E.2d 756, 759
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`(S.C.2009) (privacy tort), with ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928
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`(6th Cir.2003) (intellectual property right); see also, e.g., Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal.
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`L. Rev. 383, 401 (1960) (“appropriation, for the defendant’s benefit or advantage,
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`of the plaintiff’s name or likeness” has “bulked rather large in the law of privacy”);
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`Restatement (Second) of Torts §652C cmt. B (“The common form of invasion of
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`privacy under the rule here stated is the appropriation and use of the plaintiff’s name
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`or likeness.”). Given that Pennsylvania courts have traced the Commonwealth’s
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`common law right of publicity to privacy, rather than intellectual property,
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`see Pet. 14, it is even possible that subsection 230(e)(2) would operate differently in
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`Pennsylvania state court than it does in federal courts located in Pennsylvania.
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`To make matters even more confusing, different states establish differing
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`elements for what qualifies as an actionable right-of-publicity claim. These
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`differences—such as a split over whether the defendant must have used the
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`7
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`plaintiff’s identity for a “commercial purpose”—might well impact whether the
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`claim constitutes a property right or instead protects individual privacy. Compare,
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`e.g., In re Jackson, 972 F.3d 25, 52 (2d Cir.2020) (Connecticut right-of-publicity
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`claim does not have a commercial-purpose element), and Asmi v. Nasir, 2014 WL
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`5690503, at *10 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2014) (same for Michigan), with Ohio State
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`Univ. v. Redbubble, Inc., 989 F.3d 435, 443 (6th Cir.2021) (Ohio law does have a
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`commercial-purpose element) and Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 109 N.E.3d 390, 394
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`(Ind.2018) (same for Indiana). Under the panel majority’s state-by-state approach,
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`see supra pp. 5-6, any such minor state-to-state differences would have to be litigated
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`to determine subsection 230(e)(2)’s ambit.
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`The divided panel’s ruling also risks opening the door to suits invoking other
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`kinds of state-specific (and often esoteric) claims that arguably constitute intellectual
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`property. E.g., Network Sols., Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 85 (Va.2000)
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`(leaving open whether “domain names are a new form of intellectual property”);
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`Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 926 P.2d 1130, 1135 (Alaska 1996) (permitting
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`state-law claims for “the protection of ideas,” even though plaintiff enjoyed no
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`federal patent or copyright protection). Indeed, the panel majority’s test could lead
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`to the bizarre result that claims under state trade secret laws would fall within
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`subsection 230(e)(2), see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478
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`(1974) (describing state trade secret laws as covering a “kind[] of intellectual
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`8
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`property”), while claims brought under federal trade secrets law would not, see 18
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`U.S.C. §1833 Statutory Note (the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 “shall not be
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`construed to be a law pertaining to intellectual property for purposes of any other
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`Act of Congress.”).
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`In short, the panel decision would create uncertainty in every state with a
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`right-of-publicity statute (or any other specialized law conceivably characterized as
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`“intellectual property”) “until a court decides the legal issue” whether each law is “a
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`law pertaining to intellectual property” within the meaning of subsection 230(e)(2).
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`Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118-1119 & n.5. Making Section 230’s protections turn on
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`such a wide array of disparate legal regimes would expose platforms to the very
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`uncertainty and dis-uniformity that Section 230 was enacted to eliminate. See
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`Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better Than The First Amendment, 95 Notre Dame L.
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`Rev. 33, 43 (2019) (“Internet services would incur substantial costs to identify these
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`variations and then deploy state-by-state versions of their services.”).
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`C. The Divided Panel’s Decision Contravenes Congressional Intent And
`Incentivizes Forum Shopping And Artful Pleading
`Every other provision of Section 230—both those conferring immunity and
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`those carving out exceptions—operates uniformly nationwide. Pet. 9-10. 2 As the
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`2 See 47 U.S.C. §230(e)(1) (Section 230 does not impair enforcement of “any …
`Federal criminal statute”); id. §230(e)(4) (no limit to applicability of “the Electronic
`Communications Privacy Act of 1986 … or any similar State law”); id. §230(e)(5)
`9
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`petition ably explains, Pet. 6-13, nothing indicates that Congress intended subsection
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`230(e)(2) alone to create a crazy-quilt patchwork of protection for Internet platforms.
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`The panel majority’s rule would improperly incentivize forum-shopping and
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`artful pleading to reframe claims over allegedly defamatory content as “right-of-
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`publicity” claims. For example, under the majority’s rule, the New Jersey plaintiff
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`in Obado might have eluded this Court’s Section 230 dismissal of his claims for
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`defamation, invasion of privacy, and other torts had he simply characterized them as
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`“right of publicity” claims. 612 F. App’x at 91-92; see supra p. 6 (discussing New
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`Jersey law). Similarly, the allegations in this case suggest Ms. Hepp would have
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`asserted garden-variety defamation claims if such claims were not obviously barred
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`by Section 230. See App.58a, 61a (characterizing the third-party content at issue as
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`“derogatory,” “degrading,” and “irreparabl[y] harm[ing]” Hepp’s “reputation”).
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`Courts across the country have consistently rejected interpreting Section 230
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`in ways that would permit plaintiffs to use artful pleading to evade the statute’s broad
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`immunity. E.g., Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir.1997)
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`(“Although Zeran attempts to artfully plead his claims as ones of negligence, they
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`are indistinguishable from a garden variety defamation action…. [which] is clearly
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`protected by § 230’s immunity.”)); Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1266
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`(no impairment of claims under particular federal sex-trafficking statute or of state
`prosecutions “if the conduct underlying the charge” violated that federal statute).
`10
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`(9th Cir.2016) (rejecting “effort to circumvent [Section 230]’s protections through
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`‘creative’ pleading”); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir.2008)
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`(rejecting “artful pleading”). Indeed, as the cited cases indicate, plaintiffs have
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`attempted to evade Section 230 through artful pleading from the provision’s
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`inception and continuing through to today.
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`Forum-shopping is uniquely problematic for online platforms due to their
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`broad, nationwide reach across multiple jurisdictions. The panel’s rule would
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`incentivize litigants to bring suit against online platforms within the Third Circuit—
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`even if the controversy has little or no connection to the forum—in the hopes of
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`evading Section 230’s normal reach.
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`Finally, the net effect of the panel’s ruling could be to force online platforms
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`to litigate whether dozens of state laws can be shoehorned into subsection 230(e)(2).
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`That cannot have been Congress’s intention when it enacted Section 230 to provide
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`broad immunity from suit. See 47 U.S.C. §230(e)(3) (“No cause of action may be
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`brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is
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`inconsistent with this section.” (emphasis added)). Section 230 and its exceptions
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`should be construed in a way that protects online platforms “not merely from
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`ultimate liability, but also from having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.”
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`Nemet Chevrolet Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254-255 (4th
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`Cir.2009) (quotations omitted).
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`11
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`Case: 20-2725 Document: 84 Page: 18 Date Filed: 10/28/2021
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`CONCLUSION
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`This Court should grant rehearing en banc and affirm the district court.
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Patrick J. Carome
`PATRICK J. CAROME
`(DC Bar No. 385676)
`ARI HOLTZBLATT
`(DC Bar No.1009913)
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`202-663-6000
`
`
`
`
`Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
` The Internet Association
`
`THOMAS G. SPRANKLING
`(CA Bar No. 294831)
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`2600 EL Camino Real, Suite 400
`Palo Alto, CA 94306
`650-858-6000
`
`SAMUEL C. LEIFER
`(MA Bar. No. 696171)
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`60 State Street
`Boston, MA 02109
`617-526-6000
`
`October 28, 2021
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`12
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`Case: 20-2725 Document: 84 Page: 19 Date Filed: 10/28/2021
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`
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`CERTIFICATE OF BAR MEMBERSHIP
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`In accordance with Local Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.3(d), I certify that I
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`am a member of the bar of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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`
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`October 28, 2021
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`/s/ Patrick J. Carome
`PATRICK J. CAROME
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`13
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`Case: 20-2725 Document: 84 Page: 20 Date Filed: 10/28/2021
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`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
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`1.
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`This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
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`29(b)(4) and 32(a)(7)(B). The brief contains 2,586 words, excluding the parts of the
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`brief exempted by the rules, as provided in Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).
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`2.
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`This document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App.
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`P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this
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`document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft
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`Office 365 (Word 2019) in font size 14 Times New Roman.
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`3.
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`Pursuant to Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 31.1(c), the undersigned
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`hereby certifies that the text of the electronic brief filed with the Court is identical
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`to the paper copies, and that a virus detection program has been run on the electronic
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`file and that no virus was detected. The virus detection program used was
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`CylancePROTECT anti-virus software, version 2.1.1574.39.
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`/s/ Patrick J. Carome
`PATRICK J. CAROME
`
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`October 28, 2021
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`14
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`Case: 20-2725 Document: 84 Page: 21 Date Filed: 10/28/2021
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on this 28th day of October, 2021, I electronically filed
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`the foregoing with the Clerk using the appellate CM/ECF system. Counsel for all
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`parties to the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the appellate
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`CM/ECF system.
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`
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`/s/ Patrick J. Carome
`PATRICK J. CAROME
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`15
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