`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
`_____________
`
`Nos. 22-1710 & 22-1885
`_____________
`
`GOLDEN FORTUNE IMPORT & EXPORT CORPORATION,
`
`
`
` v.
`
`MEI-XIN LIMITED; MAXIM CATERERS LIMITED
`
`Appellants
`
`______________
`
`On Appeal from the United States
`District Court for the District of New Jersey
`(Civil No. 2:22-CV-01369)
`District Judge: Honorable Julien Xavier Neals
`_____________
`
`Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
`August 4, 2022
`______________
`
`Before: GREENAWAY, JR., MATEY, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
`
`
`(Opinion Filed: August 5, 2022)
`
`______________
`
`
`OPINION
`
`______________
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
`does not constitute binding precedent.
`
`
`
`
`
`GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
`
`
`When evaluating a motion for a preliminary injunction, the gatekeeping issues to
`
`resolve are whether the movant is likely to be successful on the merits and is more likely
`
`than not to suffer irreparable harm should we deny its request. Here, Golden Fortune
`
`Import & Export Corporation (“Golden Fortune”) argues that it satisfies every
`
`requirement to secure a preliminary injunction against the termination of its Distribution
`
`Agreement (“Agreement”) with Mei-Xin (Hong Kong) Limited (“Mei-Xin”). We
`
`disagree. We will reverse based on Golden Fortune’s failure to show a likelihood of
`
`success on the merits and irreparable harm.
`
`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Plaintiff-Appellee Golden Fortune is a distributor of Asian groceries—and quite a
`
`successful one at that. Boasting over “40 years of experience sourcing high quality
`
`products,” it imports and distributes 1,599 products from over 150 brands, including its
`
`own stand-alone brand, throughout the United States. J.A. 723 ¶¶ 4-5. It also offers
`
`service logistics, marketing, and warehousing services to its customers.
`
`Defendant-Appellant Mei-Xin is a Hong Kong company that manufactures
`
`internationally renowned mooncakes1 and other pre-packaged bakery products. When
`
`
`
` 1
`
` A mooncake “is the quintessential food consumed and/or gifted during one of China’s
`most important holidays—the Mid-Autumn Festival”—which “takes place annually,
`falling sometime between September and October.” J.A. 179 ¶ 17.
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Mei-Xin decided to expand to the United States in 2000, it engaged Golden Fortune
`
`along with another company2 to distribute its products and to develop a market for the
`
`brand there. Through their two-decade-long business relationship, Golden Fortune has
`
`enabled Mei-Xin to become the number one mooncake brand in the eastern United States.
`
`Golden Fortune has benefited as well. In the only fiscal year for which Golden Fortune
`
`provided its financial information (September 1, 2018 to August 31, 2019), Mei-Xin
`
`products accounted for $3,959,887—or 8.6%—of Golden Fortune’s $45,720,201 in gross
`
`sales.
`
`In 2021, the parties entered their most recent Distribution Agreement, which is the
`
`subject of this appeal. As relevant here, the Agreement provides that Golden Fortune will
`
`sell Mei-Xin “Mooncakes and Pre-packaged Bakery Products” in the eastern United
`
`States and Panama. J.A. 225 §§ 4-5. It covers the period from May 1, 2021 to April 30,
`
`2022. There are two means for early termination. First, either party has the “right to
`
`terminate this Agreement during the Term by giving the other thirty-day (30) day [sic]
`
`written notice.” J.A 229 § 7.1. Second, Mei-Xin has the unilateral right to “terminate . . .
`
`immediately without notice” if Golden Fortune fails to comply with “any provision.”
`
`J.A. 229 § 7.2(a). In addition, the Agreement contains an arbitration clause providing for
`
`
`
` 2
`
` Chevalier International (USA) Inc. was responsible for the western United States, while
`Golden Fortune was responsible for the eastern United States.
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`the arbitration of “[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
`
`Agreement, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof.” J.A. 231 § 20.
`
`In 2017, Golden Fortune’s annual sales growth of Mei-Xin’s products began
`
`experiencing a significant decline. In 2020, Mei-Xin warned Golden Fortune that it
`
`would exercise its discretion to replace Golden Fortune with another distributor if there
`
`was not adequate improvement. When that improvement did not occur, Mei-Xin
`
`purported to terminate the Agreement via email on January 21, 2022. Golden Fortune
`
`asserted that the termination was insufficient under Sections 7.1 and 11 of the
`
`Agreement, prompting Mei-Xin to send another notice of termination on March 3, 2022.
`
`This time, Golden Fortune claimed that the termination was invalid under the New
`
`Jersey Franchise Practices Act (“NJFPA”). The NJFPA “define[s] the relationship and
`
`responsibilities of franchisors and franchisees in connection with franchise
`
`arrangements.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-2 [hereinafter § 56:10-2]. It was enacted “to
`
`protect franchisees from unreasonable termination by franchisors that may result from a
`
`disparity of bargaining power[.]” Id. Consistent with its protective purpose, it prohibits
`
`franchisors from terminating a franchise “without good cause.” § 56:10-5. In Golden
`
`Fortune’s view, Mei-Xin failed to satisfy the good cause requirement.
`
`Asserting that the NJFPA is inapplicable, Mei-Xin reiterated its purported
`
`termination and engaged a replacement distributor. In response, Golden Fortune
`
`commenced this action in the District Court for the District of New Jersey on March 14,
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`
`2022 against Mei-Xin and its parent company, Maxim’s Caterers Limited (“Maxim’s”).
`
`Golden Fortune alleged three causes of action: (1) violation of the NJFPA, (2) breach of
`
`the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) tortious interference. In
`
`addition, Golden Fortune sought a declaratory judgment that it continues to be Mei-Xin’s
`
`exclusive distributor and that all previous termination efforts were invalid. Lastly,
`
`Golden Fortune filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to prohibit Mei-Xin
`
`and Maxim’s from terminating the Distribution Agreement and from engaging any other
`
`distributor in the eastern United States.
`
`Although it found that the dispute was arbitrable, the District Court granted
`
`Golden Fortune’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The District Court ordered that
`
`the parties enter an “alternative security arrangement” under which Golden Fortune
`
`would purchase 17% more product annually from Mei-Xin. J.A. 44-45. The preliminary
`
`injunction and security agreement are to remain effective until the parties complete
`
`arbitration. On April 18, 2022, Mei-Xin and Maxim’s filed a timely notice of appeal.
`
`II.
`
`JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
`
`
`
`The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
`
`§ 1332(a)(2). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).
`
`“In reviewing the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, we employ a
`
`tripartite standard of review: findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, legal
`
`conclusions are reviewed de novo, and the decision to grant or deny an injunction is
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Osorio-Martinez v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 893 F.3d 153, 161
`
`(3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Del. Strong Families v. Att’y Gen. of Del., 793 F.3d 304, 308 (3d
`
`Cir. 2015)).
`
`III. DISCUSSION
`
`We disagree with the District Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of
`
`Golden Fortune. Golden Fortune has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits or
`
`that it will more likely than not suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the grant of a
`
`preliminary injunction.
`
`A.
`
`Preliminary Injunction
`
`
`
`Preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy” that “should be granted
`
`only in limited circumstances.” Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d
`
`Cir. 2004) (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d
`
`1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994)). In determining whether to grant a request for injunctive
`
`relief, courts consider four factors. These factors are: (1) whether the movant has shown
`
`“a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation”; (2) whether the movant
`
`“will be irreparably injured . . . if relief is not granted”; (3) “the possibility of harm to
`
`other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction”; and (4) whether
`
`granting the preliminary relief will be in “the public interest.” Reilly v. City of
`
`Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Del. River Port Auth. v.
`
`Transamerican Trailer Transp., Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1974)).
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`
`
`The first two factors are the “most critical.” Id. at 179. They are “gateway
`
`factors,” meaning that failure to satisfy them ends the inquiry. Id. Once the gateway
`
`factors are met, the court, “in its sound discretion,” should balance all four factors. Id. at
`
`176.
`
`i. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
`
`A likelihood of success “requires a showing significantly better than negligible but
`
`not necessarily more likely than not.” Id. at 179 (citing Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v.
`
`Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
`
`Here, Golden Fortune has alleged that Mei-Xin’s termination of the Distribution
`
`Agreement violates the good cause standard under the NJFPA. See § 56:10-5. This
`
`claim turns on whether the NJFPA applies to Golden Fortune. The District Court
`
`concluded it does. We disagree for two primary reasons. First, Golden Fortune and Mei-
`
`Xin do not share the requisite community of interest. See § 56:10-3(a). Second, 20% of
`
`Golden Fortune’s annual gross sales are not derived from Mei-Xin. See § 56:10-4(a).
`
`1. Community of Interest
`
`The NJFPA defines franchise as “a written arrangement for a definite or indefinite
`
`period, in which a person grants to another person a license to use a trade name, trade
`
`mark, service mark, or related characteristics, and in which there is a community of
`
`interest in the marketing of goods or services at wholesale, retail, by lease, agreement, or
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`otherwise.” § 56:10-3(a) (emphasis added). Golden Fortune cannot satisfy the
`
`“community of interest” element.
`
`The lynchpin of the community of interest element—and the NJFPA more
`
`generally—is the vulnerability of the purported franchisee. See, e.g., N.J. Am., Inc. v.
`
`Allied Corp., 875 F.2d 58, 65 (3d Cir. 1989) (observing that the New Jersey legislature
`
`enacted the NJFPA to protect the “vulnerable position” of franchisees); Westfield Ctr.
`
`Serv., Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 86 N.J. 453, 466 (N.J. 1981) (explaining that
`
`“[r]estoration of the loss accords with the legislative desire to protect the innocent
`
`franchisee when the termination occurs at the franchisor's convenience”). We consider
`
`several factors bearing on the purported franchisee’s vulnerability in determining whether
`
`this element is satisfied. They include: the “(1) [the] licensor’s control over the licensee,
`
`(2) the licensee’s economic dependence on the licensor; (3) disparity in bargaining
`
`power, and (4) the presence of a franchise-specific investment by the licensee.” Cassidy
`
`Podell Lynch, Inc. v. SnyderGeneral Corp., 944 F.2d 1131, 1140 (3d Cir. 1991).
`
`The first factor—control—requires that the purported franchisee act at the “whim,
`
`direction and control of a more powerful entity whose withdrawal from the relationship
`
`would shock a court’s sense of equity.” Colt Indus. Inc. v. Fidelco Pump & Compressor
`
`Corp., 844 F.2d 117, 120–21 (3d Cir. 1988). Indicators of control include sales quotas
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`
`
`and whether advertising and promotional materials provided to the purported franchisee
`
`are merely suggested as opposed to required. Id.
`
`The second factor—economic dependence—refers to “the complex of mutual and
`
`continuing advantages which induced the [purported] franchisor to reach his ultimate
`
`consumer through entities other than his own which, although legally separate, are
`
`nevertheless economically dependent upon him.” Cassidy Podell Lynch, Inc., 944 F.2d at
`
`1141 (quoting Neptune T.V. & Appliance Serv., Inc. v. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods.
`
`Div., 462 A.2d 595, 600-01 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983)). Relying on a “single
`
`supplier” does not “automatically” render a distributor economically dependent on that
`
`supplier for purposes of the NJFPA. Id. at 1141-42. The parties must intend to create a
`
`franchisor-franchisee relationship when entering the business agreement. Id.
`
`The third factor—disparity in bargaining power—means that the purported
`
`franchisor has “become[] dependent as a result of the relation itself.” Id. at 1142. It does
`
`not exist ex ante. Instead, it occurs when the purported franchisee has been “induce[d] or
`
`require[d] . . . to invest in skills or assets that have no continuing value to” the franchisee
`
`if the business relationship is terminated. Id. The fourth and final factor refers to “any
`
`significant specific investment in capital equipment [by the purported franchisee] that
`
`could only be used” for the benefit of the purported franchisor. Id.
`
`The District Court concluded that a community of interest existed between Golden
`
`Fortune and Mei-Xin. In doing so, it relied primarily on perceived mutual advantages:
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`Golden Fortune developed a client base for Mei-Xin in the eastern United States, and
`
`Mei-Xin gained access to Golden Fortune’s supermarkets and wholesale customers. In
`
`our view, these allegations do not suffice and the above factors weigh against finding a
`
`community of interest.
`
`We begin with control. The Distribution Agreement is an ordinary commercial
`
`contract, and not “so burdensome as to create the unfettered control typically present in a
`
`franchise relationship.” Id. at 1141. While Mei-Xin did provide some guidance to
`
`Golden Fortune as to marketing, these were not requirements. Instead, Golden Fortune
`
`kept its promise to “work together with [a] brand’s in-house marketing team.” J.A. 724 ¶
`
`13.
`
`As for economic dependence, the District Court correctly identified some mutual
`
`advantages stemming from the Distribution Agreement. However, that Golden Fortune
`
`came to rely exclusively on Mei-Xin for its mooncakes does not transform the Distributor
`
`Agreement into a franchisor-franchisee relationship where that intent did not appear to
`
`exist for either party in the first place. Cassidy Podell Lynch, Inc., 944 F.2d at 1141-42.
`
`The facts here indicate a lack of economic dependence: Golden Fortune distributes
`
`approximately 1,598 products aside from Mei-Xin’s mooncakes, and Mei-Xin products
`
`account for only 8.6% of Golden Fortune’s annual revenue.
`
`Nor has Golden Fortune become so dependent on Mei-Xin as to create a disparity
`
`in bargaining power. Golden Fortune did not invest in skills that have no continuing
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`
`
`value beyond the Distribution Agreement. Indeed, the Agreement offered Golden
`
`Fortune one of many opportunities to “sourc[e] high quality products”—a practice that
`
`Golden Fortune has been engaged in for 40 years. J.A. 723 ¶ 4. Nor did Mei-Xin require
`
`Golden Fortune to invest in assets. Lastly, although Golden Fortune has invested in
`
`marketing programs specific to Mei-Xin, those alone do not warrant a different result.
`
`Taken together, these factors indicate that Golden Fortune and Mei-Xin do not share the
`
`community of interest required under the NJFPA. See § 56:10-3(a).
`
`2. 20% Gross Sales Requirement
`
`Further, Golden Fortune does not meet the 20% gross sales requirement. The
`
`NJFPA applies only “(2) where gross sales of products . . . between the franchisor and
`
`franchisee . . . have exceeded $35,000.00 for the 12 months next preceding the institution
`
`of suit pursuant to this act, and (3) where more than 20% of the franchisee’s gross sales
`
`are intended to be or are derived from [the] franchise.” § 56:10-4(a)(2)-(3).
`
`We must decide whether the “12 months next preceding the institution of suit”
`
`clause applies to both subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3). We interpret the provision
`
`“consistent with its plain meaning.” Oberhand v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 193 N.J. 558,
`
`568 (N.J. 2008) (citation omitted). We must also construe remedial statutes like the
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`
`
`NJFPA “broadly to give effect to their legislative purpose.” Liberty Lincoln–Mercury v.
`
`Ford Motor Co., 134 F.3d 557, 566 (3d Cir. 1998).
`
`While the District Court concluded no temporal limitation applies, we think the
`
`better reading is that “20% of a franchisee’s gross sales over a 12-month period are
`
`intended to be or are derived from the franchise.” Unlike § 56:10-4(a)(2), which places a
`
`12-month limitation on the $35,000 gross sales requirement, § 56:10-4(a)(3) contains no
`
`temporal limitation. Nonetheless, the canon of consistent usage indicates that we should
`
`also apply the 12-month limit to subsection (a)(3). Pursuant to that canon, “[a] term
`
`appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it
`
`appears.” United States v. Scott, 14 F.4th 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Ratzlaf v.
`
`United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994)). Both subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) reference
`
`“gross sales” requirements. Because “gross sales” in subsection (a)(2) refers to gross
`
`sales over a 12-month period, we should read “gross sales” in subsection (a)(3) as
`
`referring to a 12-month period as well.
`
`If there were any ambiguity, the context confirms our interpretation. See King v.
`
`Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (explaining that we “read the words [of a statute] ‘in
`
`their context’” and do not construe “isolated provisions”) (citations omitted). Section
`
`56:10-3(a) defines a “franchise” as “a written arrangement for a definite or indefinite
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`
`
`period.” Here, the Distribution Agreement is for a term of 12 months. It follows that we
`
`should consider “gross sales” over that period for purposes of the 20% requirement.
`
`Lastly, our interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the NJFPA, which is to
`
`“protect franchisees from unreasonable termination by franchisors that may result from a
`
`disparity of bargaining power[.]” § 56:10-2. Reading a 12-month limitation into the 20%
`
`gross sales requirement does just that: it offers security to franchisees that depend on a
`
`franchisor for the success of their business. By contrast, distributors who rely on several
`
`different supply streams are less likely to need protection if one supplier terminates the
`
`business relationship.
`
`Applying the 12-month limitation, Golden Fortune has not satisfied the 20% gross
`
`sales requirement. Between September 1, 2018 and August 31, 2019, Golden Fortune
`
`derived $3,959,887—or 8.6%—of its $45,720,201 in gross sales from Mei-Xin. Golden
`
`Fortune urges us to focus only on the “peak sales season for MX Mooncakes”—namely,
`
`the three-month period surrounding the Mid-Autumn Festival during which 24% of
`
`Golden Fortune’s gross sales were derived from Mei-Xin. J.A. 192 ¶ 91. We decline to
`
`do so. That approach poses an inconsistent usage problem. It disregards that the
`
`Distribution Agreement covers a 12-month period and contemplates distribution of a
`
`myriad of non-seasonal Mei-Xin products apart from the mooncake. Lastly, it does not
`
`
`
`13
`
`
`
`
`
`further the protective purpose of the NJFPA: without the Mei-Xin mooncake, Golden
`
`Fortune can still make 91.4% of its gross sales and distribute 1,598 other products.
`
`ii. Irreparable Harm
`
`The District Court held that Golden Fortune’s allegations of irreparable harm were
`
`sufficient. J.A. 36. Specifically, Golden Fortune alleged that it was set to lose (1) its
`
`investment in the promotion of Defendants’ products, entire good will and market share
`
`for MX Mooncakes; and (2) all the sales of its other products that routinely are purchased
`
`by Asian supermarkets alongside their mooncake orders. We disagree.
`
`To establish irreparable harm, there must be “a ‘clear showing of immediate
`
`irreparable injury,’ or a ‘presently existing actual threat.’” Acierno v. New Castle Cnty.,
`
`40 F.3d 645, 655 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The mere “risk of irreparable harm is
`
`not enough.” ECRI v. McGraw–Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987). Further, the
`
`alleged harm “must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone
`
`for it.” Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
`
`It follows that economic loss, including a “temporary loss of income, ultimately to
`
`be recovered, does not usually constitute irreparable injury.” Sampson v. Murray, 415
`
`U.S. 61, 90 (1974); see also Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653. For instance, in Frank’s GMC
`
`Truck Center, Inc., we reversed the grant of a preliminary injunction where a franchisor
`
`ceased supplying some of its products, and a franchisee argued that its inability to sell
`
`those products would make potential customers “more reluctant” to purchase the
`
`
`
`14
`
`
`
`
`
`remaining products. Frank’s GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100,
`
`102 (3d Cir. 1988). We concluded that the loss of “sales and service customers, and
`
`therefore profits,” was not irreparable harm. Id.
`
` Such losses can rise to the level of irreparable harm only where they would
`
`“force[] [the business] to shut down.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc.,
`
`882 F.2d 797, 802 (3d Cir. 1989). As our precedent makes clear, this threshold is a
`
`significant one. In Instant Air Freight Co., we concluded that there was no irreparable
`
`harm where a company stood to lose 80% of its business from the termination of a
`
`business agreement. Id. That 20% of the business survived meant that the company
`
`would not be “forced into bankruptcy.” Id. We also noted that the company was “free to
`
`secure other business,” and the contract at issue would terminate in under two years
`
`regardless of our decision. Id.
`
`Even where allegations of economic injury are coupled with allegations of non-
`
`economic injury, a preliminary injunction is nonetheless inappropriate where money
`
`damages are adequate. Id. Apart from losing a substantial portion of its business, the
`
`plaintiff in Instant Air Freight Co. also alleged the loss of “many if not all of its
`
`employees, and its goodwill and reputation in the industry.” Id. at 798-99, 801. In
`
`holding that money damages were sufficient in Instant Air Freight Co., we relied on three
`
`factors. First, that “[m]oney damages . . . should be provable with reasonable certainty
`
`given the” two-decades-long business relationship. Id. at 802. Second, we considered
`
`
`
`15
`
`
`
`
`
`that the company could “procur[e] suitable substitute performance by means of money
`
`awarded as damages,” which would “compensate [the business] fully for its lost profits
`
`and other injuries it may prove.” Id. (quoting Rest. (Second) of Contracts § 360 (Am. L.
`
`Inst. 1981)). Third, we concluded that the money damages were collectable given the
`
`supplier’s high annual revenue. Id.
`
`At bottom, Golden Fortune argues that it “stand[s] to lose sales and . . . customers,
`
`and therefore profits,” which does not qualify as irreparable harm. Frank’s GMC Truck
`
`Ctr., Inc., 847 F.2d at 102. Further, this is not a scenario where termination of the
`
`Distribution Agreement would “force[] [Golden Fortune] to shut down.” Instant Air
`
`Freight Co., 882 F.2d at 802. Golden Fortune imports and distributes at least 1,599
`
`products and sells over 150 brands as well as its own brand. In all, Mei-Xin products
`
`constitute only 8.6% of its $45 million in annual revenue. In light of our prior holding
`
`that losing 80% of one’s business does not constitute irreparable harm, we are hard
`
`pressed to hold that Golden Fortune has made the requisite showing here. See id.
`
`To be sure, the “loss of control of reputation, loss of trade, and loss of goodwill”
`
`may constitute irreparable harm in some contexts. See, e.g., Pappan Enters., Inc. v.
`
`Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 805 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Opticians Ass’n of
`
`Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 1990)). To the extent that a
`
`plaintiff alleges these harms, we require it to demonstrate that its business “is different
`
`from other types of commerce in such a way that normal breach of contract remedies
`
`
`
`16
`
`
`
`
`
`could not provide a remedy.” Bennington Foods LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance, Grp.,
`
`LLP, 528 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Pappan Enters., Inc., 143 F.3d at 807
`
`(holding that the “right of the public not to be deceived or confused” warrants a
`
`preliminary injunction where two parties were using the same trademark) (quoting
`
`Opticians Ass’n of Am., 920 F.2d at 197); Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson &
`
`Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 589-90, 596 (3d Cir. 2002)
`
`(holding that a preliminary injunction is warranted where a false or misleading ad would
`
`produce consumer confusion, resulting in a “loss of market share” “[i]n a competitive
`
`industry where consumers are brand-loyal”).
`
`Where the alleged harms stem from the termination of a business agreement, we
`
`require evidence that the moving party has not been able to perform on contracts with
`
`third parties because of the loss, or for it to point to a loss of goodwill or reputation with
`
`specific customers. See Bennington Foods LLC, 528 F.3d at 179. Indeed, the harm
`
`caused must be direct. It is not enough for the claim to be “two-step,” meaning (1)
`
`because the supplier is not distributing, the distributor cannot distribute, and (2) the lack
`
`of the delivery harms the reputation with third parties who do not receive the distribution.
`
`Id. at 180. That is a standard breach of contract case, and “there is no reason to make the
`
`extended causal inferences necessary to find irreparable harm to reputation.” Id.
`
`Although Golden Fortune has also alleged non-economic harms, such as the loss
`
`of good will and market share, the adequacy of monetary damages weighs against a
`
`
`
`17
`
`
`
`
`
`finding of irreparable harm. Money damages are readily ascertainable given the two-
`
`decades-long history between Golden Fortune and Mei-Xin. Id. Money damages would
`
`allow Golden Fortune to seek substitute performance, which will fully compensate it—
`
`especially because other companies have mirrored the quality of Mei-Xin mooncakes,
`
`“narrowing [] the gap between MX Mooncakes and competitor brands” over the years.
`
`J.A. 873 ¶ 13. Lastly, there is a high likelihood that money damages will be collectable
`
`given the international success of Mei-Xin and Maxim’s. See Instant Air Freight Co.,
`
`882 F.2d at 802.
`
`Because Golden Fortune has failed to demonstrate that its business “is different
`
`from other types of commerce” or cite specific instances of the loss of good will from its
`
`inability to distribute Mei-Xin products, we have no reason to depart from our general
`
`rule. Bennington Foods LLC, 528 F.3d at 179. Any allegations of a loss of good will are
`
`exactly the kind of “two-step” claims we have previously rejected. See id. at 180.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`
`
`For these reasons, we will reverse the order of the District Court based on Golden
`
`Fortune’s failure to satisfy the requirements for a preliminary injunction.
`
`
`
`18
`
`