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`NOT PRECEDENTIAL
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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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`No. 24-1303
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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`v.
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`JOSHUA HALL,
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`Appellant
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`On Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
`(District Court No.1:23-cr-00114-001)
`District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
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`Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
`December 9, 2024
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`Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
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`(Filed: January 17, 2025)
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`OPINION1
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`CHUNG, Circuit Judge.
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`Joshua Hall appeals the District Court’s imposition of a special condition,
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`This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does
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`not constitute binding precedent.
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`computer monitoring, on Hall’s two-year term of supervised release. Hall argues that the
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`computer monitoring condition infringes upon his First and Fourth Amendment rights
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`because it chills his speech and invades his privacy interests. Hall therefore requests that
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`we vacate the computer monitoring condition. We conclude that the District Court’s
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`imposition of the condition was not plain error and will affirm.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND2
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`Between September 2019 and December 2020, Hall used a crowdfunding website
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`and several fake social media accounts to raise funds that he claimed would go towards
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`supporting President Trump’s reelection campaign. In reality, Hall appropriated the
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`money for his own use. Hall was indicted due to this conduct. While on pretrial release,
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`Hall abused alcohol repeatedly and, on one occasion, called the office of a sitting United
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`States Congressman and threatened to kill him. As a result, Hall was charged in a
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`superseding indictment with transmitting an interstate communication containing a threat
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`to injure another person. On December 21, 2022, after having previously pleaded guilty
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`to both counts, Hall was sentenced for both offenses to twenty months’ imprisonment and
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`three years’ supervised release.
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`Hall’s term of supervised release began on October 6, 2023, and throughout the
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`fall of 2023, Hall cycled in and out of alcohol rehabilitation facilities, often leaving each
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`facility after only a few days. These untimely departures were contrary to a condition of
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`his supervised release that he participate in an inpatient substance abuse treatment
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`Because we write for the parties, we recite only facts pertinent to our decision.
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`program.
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`Hall was also subject to another condition that he disclose all of his online
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`accounts to his probation officer. On January 9, 2024, Hall announced that he was
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`running for Congress via an undisclosed X (formerly Twitter) account. Hall also used
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`this account to issue another threat to the same United States Congressman. Hall’s
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`probation officer petitioned the District Court to issue an arrest warrant for Hall’s
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`violation of the conditions of his supervised release. Hall was arrested, highly
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`intoxicated, shortly thereafter.
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`The District Court held a supervised release revocation hearing on February 5,
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`2024. At that hearing, the District Court noted that Hall had violated the condition
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`requiring that he report all online accounts to his probation officer when he failed to
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`disclose his X account. App. 51. Because of this violation, and Hall’s refusal to accept
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`treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, the District Court revoked Hall’s supervised
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`release. The District Court said its “main concern” in sentencing was “community
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`protection and deterrence,” App. 54, and Hall was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment
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`followed by a two-year term of supervised release. The District Court imposed several
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`conditions on Hall’s term of supervised release, including a special condition that
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`required the installation of computer monitoring software and unannounced searches of
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`his computers. App. 55. Hall did not object to this condition at his revocation hearing.
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`Hall timely brought this appeal, arguing that the computer monitoring condition
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`violates the First and Fourth Amendments. For the reasons discussed below, we find that
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`the computer monitoring condition is constitutional, and we therefore affirm the District
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`Court’s order in full.
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`II.
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`DISCUSSION3
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` A
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` district judge may impose a special condition on a term of supervised release
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`after considering factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Special conditions that restrict
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`the defendant’s First or Fourth Amendment rights “will be upheld if (1) they are directly
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`related to deterring [the] defendant and protecting the public and (2) are narrowly
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`tailored.” United States v. Santos Diaz, 66 F.4th 435, 448 (3d Cir. 2023). A condition is
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`not “narrowly tailored” if it restricts a constitutional freedom “without any resulting
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`benefit to public safety.” United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2018).
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`Regardless of the type of condition imposed, “[w]e insist on some evidence that
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`the special conditions imposed are tangibly related to the goals of supervised release. To
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`justify special conditions, district courts must find supporting facts. We may affirm if we
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`can ascertain any viable basis in the record for the restriction.” Holena, 906 F.3d at 290–
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`91 (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 144 (3d
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`Cir. 2007) (“Conditions of supervised release must be supported by some evidence that
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`the condition imposed is tangibly related to the circumstances of the offense, the history
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`The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). We
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`have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Hall did not object to
`the conditions of his supervised release, so we review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim.
`P. 52(b); United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2009). To satisfy the
`plain-error standard, Hall must establish that (1) the District Court erred; (2) the error was
`clear or obvious under the law at the time of review; and (3) the error affected substantial
`rights, that is, the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. Johnson v. United
`States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997). If all three elements are established, we may, but need
`not, exercise our discretion to award relief. Id.
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`of the defendant, the need for general deterrence, or similar concerns.”).
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`Hall argues that the District Court plainly erred in imposing the computer
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`monitoring condition because the condition unconstitutionally infringes upon his First
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`and Fourth Amendment rights. We disagree.
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`Hall’s First Amendment Argument
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`A.
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`The computer monitoring condition was imposed for the purposes of deterring
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`Hall from making more threats to injure others, protecting the public from those threats,
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`and rehabilitating Hall. App. 54; see Holena, 906 F.3d at 295. (“[R]estrictions must be
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`tailored to deterring crime, protecting the public, or rehabilitating the defendant.”).
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`Hall’s personal computer has been integral to the majority of Hall’s charged conduct—
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`from making a fraudulent online fundraising account, to impersonating others via fake
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`social media accounts, to making threats against a Congressman on X. Moreover, the
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`computer monitoring condition was not imposed reflexively upon Hall’s release. Rather,
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`it was imposed only after Hall misled his probation officer about the existence of his X
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`account, demonstrating a need to obtain more reliable information about Hall’s social
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`media use. Finally, the computer monitoring condition lasts only as long as the term of
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`Hall’s supervised release and therefore extends no longer than necessary to address the
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`purposes of imposing supervised release on Hall in the first place. See 18 U.S.C.
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`§ 3583(d)(1); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2, comment. (n.4). On plain error review, we will affirm.
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`There is a “viable basis in the record” to support the District Court’s imposition of the
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`condition, Holena, 906 F.3d at 290–91 (3d Cir. 2018), and condition is “tangibly related
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`to the goals of supervised release.” See Holena, 906 F.3d at 290.4 We perceive no “clear
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`or obvious error under the law,” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, in the District Court’s tailoring
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`of the condition to address Hall’s failure to comply with a previous condition of release
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`and the District Court’s concern for community protection and deterrence. Santos Diaz,
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`66 F.4th at 448.
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`B.
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`Hall’s Fourth Amendment Argument
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`Next, Hall argues that the District Court plainly erred in imposing the search
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`portion of the computer monitoring condition because it infringes his privacy interests
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`under the Fourth Amendment. Again, we disagree.
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`“Defendants on supervised release enjoy less freedom than those who have
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`finished serving their sentences,” Holena, 906 F.3d at 295, so Hall has a reduced privacy
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`Hall relies on various cases to support his argument that the computer monitoring
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`condition “has a chilling effect on his ability to express political views,” and thus violates
`his First Amendment rights. The District Court did not plainly err by failing to sua
`sponte consider these cases, especially when considering that those cases are readily
`distinguishable from Hall’s. Compare App. 55 (special condition imposing no restriction
`on Hall’s access to the internet, social media posting, or run for Congress); with Cooksey
`v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 236 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (agency
`threatened to remove Appellant’s website unless he complied with certain guidelines,
`provided a “red-pen mark-up of his website,” and threatened to continuously monitor his
`website to ensure compliance); Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 57–58 (1st Cir.
`2003) (finding that the Appellant had First Amendment standing where he alleged that he
`“faced ... a real threat of prosecution” because of his investigative reporting and where
`Appellant could not “limit his exposure other than [by] curtail[ing] his investigative and
`journalistic activities”). Hall’s references to Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98
`(2017)—where the Supreme Court found that a law prohibiting registered sex offenders
`from ever accessing certain websites violated the First Amendment—are equally
`unpersuasive. See United States v. Browder, 866 F.3d 504, 511 n.26 (2d Cir. 2017)
`(noting that Packingham was not on point as “[i]t involved an internet ban—not internet
`or computer monitoring—and that ban extended beyond the completion of a sentence.”).
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`interest in his computers while he is on supervised release. See United States v.
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`Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 187 (3d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Balon 384 F.3d
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`38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) Indeed, nearly two decades ago, the Supreme Court held that
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`because individuals on supervised release have a significantly diminished expectation of
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`privacy, the Fourth Amendment does not categorically prohibit the suspicionless search
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`of those individuals. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 849, 857 (2006).5
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`Taking into account Hall’s reduced privacy interest in his computers, we must
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`consider whether the computer monitoring condition imposes a “greater deprivation of
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`liberty than is reasonably necessary.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2); Holena, 906 F.3d at 291
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`(“A defendant’s conduct should inform the tailoring of his condition[].”). While the
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`monitoring condition contains no limitations on when the probation officer may search
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`Hall’s computers, the searches are limited in purpose to “determin[e] whether the
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`computer contains any prohibited data prior to installation of the monitoring software, to
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`determine whether the monitoring software is functioning effectively after installation,
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`and to determine whether there have been attempts to circumvent the monitoring software
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`after installation” and apply only for the length of Hall’s supervised release. This
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`condition is clearly geared towards ensuring the proper functioning of the means (the
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`software) for deterring further violations and addressing Hall’s lack of candor with his
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`Hall argues that probation and supervised release should be treated differently and
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`that therefore Samson does not apply here, but Hall cites to no caselaw to support this
`conclusion, and several Courts of Appeal have applied Samson in the context of federal
`supervised release. See, e.g., United States v. Rusnak, 981 F.3d 697, 712 (9th Cir. 2020);
`United States v. Winding, 817 F.3d 910, 916 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Supervised release is akin
`to parole.”).
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`probation officer. We again perceive no “clear or obvious error under the law,” Johnson,
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`520 U.S. at 467, in the District Court’s tailoring of the condition given that it is “directly
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`related to deterring [the] defendant and protecting the public.” Santos Diaz, 66 F.4th at
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`448. This is especially so in light of the ample “viable bas[e]s in the record for the
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`restriction” such as Hall’s violation of the terms of his initial supervised release by
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`misusing his personal computer and failing to accurately report his activities on that
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`computer. Holena, 906 F.3d at 290–91 (3d Cir. 2018). Considering the above, the
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`District Court did not commit plain error in imposing the computer monitoring condition.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order, imposing the
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`computer monitoring condition on Hall’s term of supervised release.
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