`
`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
`NORTHERN DIVISION
`
`HARRIS RESEARCH, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`
`MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
`ORDER GRANTING
`DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO SET
`ASIDE DEFAULT AND DENYING
`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
`ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`JEFF LYDON; LISA SMITH; et al.,
`Defendants.
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`Case No. 1:06-CV-136 TS
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`Defendants Jeff Lydon (Lydon) and Lisa Smith (Smith) move to set aside the default
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`because they allege that they had confused the present case with the very similarly
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`numbered case No. 1:05-CV-136 DAK (2005 case), brought by the same plaintiff against
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`them. Plaintiff Harris Research, Inc., (Harris Research) opposes setting aside the default
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`and also moves for a default judgment.
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) provides that “[f]or good cause shown the court may set
`aside an entry of default.” . . . “[T]he good cause required by Fed. R. Civ.
`P. 55(c) for setting aside entry of default poses a lesser standard for the
`defaulting party than the excusable neglect which must be shown for relief
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`1
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`Case 1:06-cv-00136-DAK Document 20 Filed 02/19/08 Page 2 of 5
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`from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).” Default judgments are
`disfavored by courts. 1
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`The following procedural history is necessary to understand the present motions:
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`Harris Research filed this case against Lydon and Smith on October 26, 2006. At that
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`time, Plaintiff had another case (the 2005 Case) pending against Lydon, Smith, and others,
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`alleging infringement of a patent for a carpet cleaning device for enhancing removal of
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`liquid from fabric. According to the Complaint in the 2005 Case, Harris Research
`2
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`manufactures and distributes its patented carpet cleaning equipment and Lydon and Smith
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`are competitors who are infringing its patent. Harris Research sought summary judgment
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`in the 2005 Case on October 11, 2006. Lydon and Smith initially had counsel in the 2005
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`case, but appeared pro se after their counsel withdrew on October 16, 2006. Lydon and
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`Smith then moved to have counsel appointed or to have the time to respond continued
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`based upon their pro se status. Those motions were denied. Lydon and Smith failed to
`3
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`respond to the summary judgment motion, and a judgment of infringement was entered
`4
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`against them in the 2005 case. 5
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`Polaski v. Colorado Dept. of Transp., 198 Fed.Appx. 684, 685 (10th Cir. 2006)
`1
`(quoting Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 775 n.
`6 (10th Cir.1997)).
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`2
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`2005 Case, Docket No. 1, Complaint, at ¶ ¶15-16 and 20.
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`Id. at Docket No. 47, at 1-2 (finding no constitutional right to appointment of
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`counsel in civil case and finding Lydon and Smith failed to establish they are indigent,
`incapacitated, or otherwise unable to adequately defend the claims against them).
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`4
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`Id. at Docket No. 48 (Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment).
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`5
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`Id. at Docket No. 50 (Clerk’s Judgment).
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`2
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`Case 1:06-cv-00136-DAK Document 20 Filed 02/19/08 Page 3 of 5
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`In the Complaint in the present case, Harris Research also alleges that it
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`manufactures and distributes carpet cleaning equipment and that Lydon and Smith are
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`direct competitors. Additionally, Harris Research alleges that it owns the trademark
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`“Chem-Dry” and that Lydon and Smith have infringed, diluted, or tarnished its trademark
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`rights. The Complaint herein was filed less than ten days after Lydon’s and Smith’s
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`counsel had withdrawn in the 2005 Case and bears a case number remarkably similar to
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`that of the 2005 Case. On December 22, 2006, Harris Research filed a Motion for a
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`Preliminary Injunction against Lydon and Smith in the present case. Lydon and Smith
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`failed to file a response and, on April 5, 2007, a Preliminary Injunction was granted in the
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`present case. On August 1, 2007, Harris Research moved for entry of a default in the
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`present case. Default was entered against them on August 3, 2007.
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`On February 22, 2007, in the 2005 Case, Harris Research filed a Motion for a
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`Permanent Injunction against Lydon and Smith. At that time, the Motion for a Preliminary
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`Injunction was still pending in the present case. On March 20, 2007, in the 2005 Case, the
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`Court granted Harris Research’s Motion for a Permanent Injunction. Subsequently, Lydon
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`and Smith sought relief from the 2005 Case’s Permanent Injunction and Harris Research
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`moved for an order to show cause for their alleged willful violation of that Permanent
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`Injunction. In denying Lydon’s and Smith’s Motion for Relief, the Court in the 2005 Case
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`did suggest several available options for Lydon and Smith to pursue if they do not believe
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`that they are infringing Harris Research’s patent. 6
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`6
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`Id. Docket No. 82, at 3-5.
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`3
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`Case 1:06-cv-00136-DAK Document 20 Filed 02/19/08 Page 4 of 5
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`In the present case, Lydon and Smith contend the Default should be set aside
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`because they allege that when they received the Complaint and Summons and other
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`documents in this case, they mistakenly thought it was part of the almost identically
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`numbered 2005 Case. They note they are appearing pro se in both cases and argue their
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`failure to understand the present case was a separate proceeding was merely excusable
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`neglect. Lydon and Smith also contend they have a meritorious defense to the trademark
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`infringement claims because they contend that their use of Harris Research’s trademark
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`constitutes a parody.7
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`Harris Research contends that it will be prejudiced by the delay and expense that
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`would result from setting aside the default and requiring it to litigate a Permanent Injunction
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`on the merits.
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`The Court has considered the standard for setting aside a default, the parties’
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`arguments, and the unique facts of this case. Those unique facts include the following:
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`an almost unbelievable coincidence in the case numbers of two cases involving the same
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`parties; the present case was filed during the time when Lydon and Smith had just lost their
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`lawyer in the 2005 Case; and there were two separate injunction motions pending in the
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`separate cases during the same time frame. Based upon the unique circumstances, the
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`Court finds that there is good cause to set aside the default in the present case. Where
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`See Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th
`7
`Cir. 1987) (holding that “where a party chooses a mark as a parody of an existing mark,
`the intent is not necessarily to confuse the public but rather to amuse”).
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`4
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`Case 1:06-cv-00136-DAK Document 20 Filed 02/19/08 Page 5 of 5
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`Lydon and Smith have asserted they have a meritorious defense, there is little prejudice
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`to Harris Research because the Preliminary Injunction is still in place to protect its interests
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`pending a determination on the merits of its claim for a Permanent Injunction. It is
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`therefore
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`ORDERED that Lydon’s and Smith’s Motions to Set Aside Default Certificate
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`(Docket Nos. 14 and 15) are GRANTED. It is further
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`ORDERED that the August 3, 2007 Default Certificate is VACATED. It is further
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`ORDERED that Lydon and Smith have 30 days in which to file an Answer to the
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`Complaint. Lydon and Smith are reminded that the Preliminary Injunction remains in place
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`at this time. It is further
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`ORDERED that Harris Research’s Motion for Entry of Judgment by Default and for
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`Entry of Permanent Injunction (Docket No. 16) is DENIED AS MOOT.
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`DATED February 19, 2008.
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`BY THE COURT:
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`_____________________________________
`TED STEWART
`United States District Judge
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`5