`
`BRIAN M. BOYNTON, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division
`MICHAEL D. GRANSTON, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
`GUSTAV W. EYLER, Director, Consumer Protection Branch
`LISA K. HSIAO, Assistant Director
`ALISHA M. CROVETTO, Trial Attorney
`Consumer Protection Branch
`Civil Division
`U.S. Department of Justice
`450 5th Street, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20530
`Telephone: (202) 305-7196
`alisha.m.crovetto@usdoj.gov
`
`
`THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF UTAH
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
`
`
`
`
`
`VIVINT SMART HOME, INC., a corporation,
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:21-cv-00267-TS
`
`COMPLAINT FOR CIVIL
`PENALTIES, PERMANENT
`INJUNCTION AND OTHER
`RELIEF
`
`Judge Ted Stewart
`
`
`
`Plaintiff, the United States of America, acting upon notification and authorization to the
`
`Attorney General by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”), for its
`
`Complaint, alleges:
`
`1.
`
`Plaintiff brings this action under Sections 5(a), 13(b), and 16(a) of the Federal
`
`Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 53(b), and 56(a), and Section 621(a) of
`
`the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a), to obtain monetary civil
`
`penalties and permanent injunctive or other relief for Defendant’s violations of the FTC Act, 15
`
`U.S.C. § 45(a); the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x; and the Duties Regarding the Detection,
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00267-DAK Document 2 Filed 04/29/21 PageID.4 Page 2 of 15
`
`Prevention, and Mitigation of Identity Theft (“Red Flags Rule”), 16 C.F.R. § 681.1, issued
`
`pursuant to Section 615(e) of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e).
`
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`
`2.
`
`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a),
`
`1345, and 1355, and 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a).
`
`3.
`
`Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(2),
`
`1395(a), and 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
`
`DEFENDANT
`
`4.
`
`Defendant Vivint Smart Home, Inc. (“Vivint” or the “Company”), is a Delaware
`
`corporation with its principal place of business at 4931 North 300 West, Provo, Utah 84604.
`
`Vivint transacts business in this District.
`
`COMMERCE
`
`5.
`
`At all times relevant to this Complaint, the Defendant has maintained a substantial
`
`course of trade in or affecting commerce, as “commerce” is defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act,
`
`15 U.S.C. § 44.
`
`DEFENDANT’S BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
`
`6.
`
`Vivint sells smart home technology platforms, including home security devices
`
`and related monitoring services. The Company currently serves over 1.5 million customers in
`
`the United States and Canada. One of the channels through which Vivint acquires new
`
`customers is its door-to-door sales force, which includes young adults, often students on summer
`
`breaks. Vivint equips its sales representatives with iPads loaded with Vivint’s proprietary sales
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00267-DAK Document 2 Filed 04/29/21 PageID.5 Page 3 of 15
`
`system—Street Genie—which manages the new customer onboarding process, including
`
`customer credit verifications with Consumer Report Agencies (“CRAs”).
`
`New Account Credit Financing
`
`7.
`
`The typical Vivint smart home security and monitoring system costs
`
`approximately one thousand dollars or more, and thus most consumers finance the cost of the
`
`equipment with a loan.
`
`8.
`
`Prior to 2017, Vivint offered its customers a package that included home security
`
`and automation equipment and monitoring services for a combined monthly fee. Under this
`
`product offering, customers were required to pass a credit check and agree to subscribe to
`
`Vivint’s services for a minimum contractual term, which usually ranged from 36 to 60 months.
`
`9.
`
`Since 2017, Vivint has offered its customers the option of financing home
`
`security equipment with Vivint internally through its own loans, called Retail Installment
`
`Contracts (“RICs”). These internally-financed credit arrangements have made up a substantial
`
`portion of Vivint’s sales from 2017 through 2019.
`
`10.
`
`In the second quarter of 2017, Vivint began offering an additional financing
`
`option to its customers, called “Vivint Flex Pay,” which connects the customer with a third-party
`
`bank for financing. If a customer declines or does not qualify for the third-party financing but
`
`meets Vivint’s minimum criteria, Vivint continues to offer its internal financing option through
`
`RICs.
`
`11.
`
`RIC accounts made up approximately 32% of new accounts sold in 2017,
`
`approximately 20% of accounts sold in 2018, approximately 11% of new accounts sold in 2019,
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00267-DAK Document 2 Filed 04/29/21 PageID.6 Page 4 of 15
`
`and approximately 3% of accounts sold through the fall of 2020, in total amounting to hundreds
`
`of thousands of customer accounts over this time period.
`
`12.
`
`For either type of approach to credit financing, Vivint requires that potential
`
`customers satisfy a certain threshold of creditworthiness in order to qualify for the loan. In
`
`connection with a RIC, the determination of creditworthiness is made through an inquiry to a
`
`CRA by the door-to-door Vivint sales representative through Vivint’s custom software.
`
`Misconduct by Sales Representatives
`
`13.
`
`Vivint compensates its seasonal sales representatives entirely through
`
`commissions for the sales of new systems. These sales representatives are attracted to Vivint by
`
`the promise of a lucrative summer job. As with any commission-based occupation, this approach
`
`to payment incentivized the sales representatives to work hard and, occasionally, to cut corners.
`
`In Vivint’s case, the compensation structure combined with the lack of effective oversight also
`
`incentivized the representatives to violate the law.
`
`14.
`
`As part of the customer onboarding process, the Vivint sales representative must
`
`request and obtain from a CRA a consumer report to evaluate the potential customer’s
`
`creditworthiness. The sales representative uses Vivint’s Street Genie app on the Company-
`
`issued iPad to request and obtain the consumer’s credit report from a CRA. Due to the size of
`
`the Vivint business and the size of its seasonal sales force—more than 4,000 in an average
`
`year—Vivint’s sales representatives request thousands of consumer credit reports per day during
`
`its peak sales season from April through October each year, and continue to request numerous
`
`credit reports per day the rest of the year. For example, Vivint’s sales representatives made more
`
`than 130,000 inquiries to a single CRA in a single month in 2016.
`4
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00267-DAK Document 2 Filed 04/29/21 PageID.7 Page 5 of 15
`
`15.
`
`If a customer meets the credit requirement, the sales representative is able to
`
`complete the new customer registration and earn the commission. If a customer does not qualify,
`
`then the sales representative cannot proceed with the new customer registration. As a result,
`
`certain Vivint sales representatives developed two means by which to deceive the software to
`
`permit them to register a new customer who did not satisfy the credit requirement—the first is
`
`informally known as “white paging” and the second is adding impermissible co-signers.
`
`16.
`
`Although the specifics could vary, “white paging” worked generally as follows:
`
`If a potential customer did not satisfy the credit requirement, the sales representative would use
`
`the white pages to identify an unrelated individual with a same or similar name to the customer
`
`who had just failed the credit check. The sales representative would then enter that unrelated
`
`customer’s address as a “previous address” in the Street Genie app, and re-run the credit check,
`
`pulling the credit score of the similarly-named third party. The sales representative would
`
`thereby trick Vivint’s system into approving a new account for the unqualified customer by
`
`unlawfully using the credit history of the unrelated individual. Vivint would then extend credit
`
`to this unqualified customer, based on the third party’s credit score.
`
`17.
`
`Adding impermissible co-signers worked similarly, except the name unlawfully
`
`added to the account was not the same or similar to the primary account holder. For example, a
`
`Vivint sales representative might ask a consumer who had failed credit whether they knew of
`
`anyone else who might qualify (e.g., a relative). The rep would then obtain a credit report for
`
`that individual without permission, add their address into “previous address” and thereby qualify
`
`the primary account holder. In other instances, the representative would add a co-signer on the
`
`account whom the primary account holder does not know, but is a person the representative
`5
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00267-DAK Document 2 Filed 04/29/21 PageID.8 Page 6 of 15
`
`knows can pass credit. Similarly to white paging, Vivint would then extend credit to the
`
`unqualified customer, based on the innocent third party’s credit score.
`
`18.
`
`In the event that a customer registered under such false pretenses eventually
`
`defaulted on its Vivint account, the address of the unrelated individual with the same or similar
`
`name or the impermissible co-signer entered into Street Genie as a “previous address” would be
`
`passed on to Vivint’s debt buyer, thus implicating the innocent individual’s credit standing and
`
`causing them to be pursued by debt collectors. Consumers have complained to the FTC and the
`
`Better Business Bureau accusing Vivint of identity theft, with several consumers describing this
`
`exact scenario—the consumer learns from a collection agency that they have defaulted on a
`
`Vivint account, but they had never even heard of Vivint, much less held an account with the
`
`company.
`
`Vivint Knew About Sales Representatives’
`Misconduct And Allowed It To Continue
`
`19.
`
`Vivint has been aware of “white paging” since at least 2016, but failed to take
`
`meaningful steps to curb the problem.
`
`20.
`
`In early 2017, Vivint terminated hundreds of sales representatives for misconduct
`
`related to white paging and impermissible co-signers. Vivint later rehired some of these same
`
`sales representatives. Because one of the implicated sales teams generated millions of dollars of
`
`revenue for Vivint, the Company allowed many of the terminated sales representatives to work at
`
`Vivint’s sister company for a year, and permitted some of them to return to Vivint the following
`
`sales season. Following the discovery of the scheme in 2016, Vivint instituted easily-
`
`circumvented controls to regulate the frequency with which the consumer reports were
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00267-DAK Document 2 Filed 04/29/21 PageID.9 Page 7 of 15
`
`requested. For example, the Company claims that its system limited running credit inquires to
`
`only two consumers per address. Sales representatives learned they could run multiple credit
`
`inquiries on a single address simply by modifying the sale location address slightly (e.g., adding
`
`“BLDG 1” or “Apartment A” after the street address). This function would allow a sales
`
`representative to continue running credit inquires on an individual until the consumer “passes”
`
`credit and the representative can earn a commission on the sale.
`
`21.
`
`Since at least 2017, several Vivint employees have warned Vivint managers that
`
`sales representatives have continued to evade the meager prevention measures the Company
`
`attempted to implement. At least one company employee engaged in a back-end analysis that
`
`revealed issues with white-paging and impermissible co-signers. Evidence shows that the
`
`Company was aware of this scheme, and sometimes mildly penalized the worst offending sales
`
`representatives who had been involved. However, the Company allowed the practices to
`
`continue.
`
`22.
`
`Notwithstanding the risk to which these practices expose the thousands of
`
`consumers whose consumer reports have been obtained from CRAs on a daily basis for years,
`
`Vivint did not have a written Identity Theft Prevention Program (“Program”) designed to detect,
`
`prevent, and mitigate identity theft until January 2020, several months after the FTC began
`
`investigating Vivint and learning of the FTC staff’s concerns.
`
`23.
`
`Based on the facts and violations of law alleged in this Complaint, the FTC has
`
`reason to believe that Defendant is violating or are about to violate laws enforced by the
`
`Commission.
`
`7
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00267-DAK Document 2 Filed 04/29/21 PageID.10 Page 8 of 15
`
`RED FLAGS RULE VIOLATIONS
`
`24.
`
`Section 615 of the FCRA (15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e)) requires the FTC to promulgate
`
`rules requiring creditors to address identity theft. The Commission subsequently promulgated
`
`the Red Flags Rule (16 C.F.R. § 681.1), requiring that creditors offering covered accounts must
`
`address identity theft through, among other things, the:
`
`(d) Establishment of an Identity Theft Prevention Program –
`
`(1) Program requirement. Each financial institution or creditor that
`offers or maintains one or more covered accounts must develop and
`implement a written Identity Theft Prevention Program (Program) that is
`designed to detect, prevent, and mitigate identity theft in connection with
`the opening of a covered account or any existing covered account. The
`Program must be appropriate to the size and complexity of the financial
`institution or creditor and the nature and scope of its activities.
`
`(2) Elements of the Program. The Program must include reasonable
`policies and procedures to:
`
`(i) Identify relevant Red Flags for the covered accounts that the
`financial institution or creditor offers or maintains, and
`incorporate those Red Flags into its Program;
`
`(ii) Detect Red Flags that have been incorporated into the
`Program of the financial institution or creditor;
`
`(iii) Respond appropriately to any Red Flags that are detected
`pursuant to paragraph (d)(2)(ii) of this section to prevent and
`mitigate identity theft; and
`
`(iv) Ensure the Program (including the Red Flags determined to
`be relevant) is updated periodically, to reflect changes in risks to
`customers and to the safety and soundness of the financial
`institution or creditor from identity theft.
`
`16 C.F.R. § 681.1(d). In addition to these requirements, the Red Flags Rule imposes other
`
`requirements regarding the administration (16 C.F.R. § 681.1(e)) and content (16 C.F.R.
`
`§ 681.1(f)) of the Identity Theft Prevention Program.
`8
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00267-DAK Document 2 Filed 04/29/21 PageID.11 Page 9 of 15
`
`25.
`
`“Creditor” is defined in the Red Flags Rule initially by reference to Section 702 of
`
`the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) (15 U.S.C. § 1691a(d)). The ECOA defines
`
`“creditor” in pertinent part as “any person who regularly extends, renews, or continues credit;
`
`[or] any person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or continuation of credit[.]”
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e). Vivint is a “creditor” under the ECOA because it regularly extends,
`
`renews, continues, or arranges for the extension of credit through both the RIC accounts and the
`
`Vivint Flex Pay accounts.
`
`26.
`
`The Red Flags Rule then narrows the ECOA definition of “creditor” by specifying
`
`in pertinent part that it only applies to creditors that, regularly and in the ordinary course of
`
`business “obtain[] or use[] consumer reports, directly or indirectly, in connection with a credit
`
`transaction[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e)(4). Vivint is a “creditor” under the Red Flags Rule
`
`because it regularly extends, obtains or uses consumer reports in connection with its RIC and
`
`Vivint Flex Pay credit transactions.
`
`27.
`
`The Red Flags Rule applies to “covered accounts,” which it defines as an account
`
`that (1) “a creditor offers or maintains, primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,
`
`that involves or is designed to permit multiple payments or transactions, such as a credit card
`
`account, mortgage loan, automobile loan . . .cell phone account,” and (2) “any other account that
`
`[a creditor] offers or maintains for which there is a reasonably foreseeable risk to customers or to
`
`the safety and soundness of the [creditor] from identity theft, including financial, operational,
`
`compliance, reputational, or litigation risks.” 16 C.F.R. § 681.1(b)(3). Vivint’s RIC accounts
`
`are “covered accounts” under the Red Flags Rule because they are accounts that Vivint, as a
`
`direct creditor, offers or maintains primarily for personal, family or household purposes (i.e.,
`9
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00267-DAK Document 2 Filed 04/29/21 PageID.12 Page 10 of 15
`
`smart home monitoring system operations), and that involve multiple payments. The RIC
`
`accounts involve a reasonably foreseeable risk to customers or Vivint from identity theft.
`
`28.
`
`Vivint failed to develop and implement a written Identity Theft Prevention
`
`Program designed to detect, prevent, and mitigate identity theft in connection with the opening of
`
`a covered account or any existing covered account. Vivint’s limited efforts to address identity
`
`theft were inadequate and, in any case, failed to satisfy the Red Flags Rule. Vivint did not
`
`provide for adequate training or monitoring of employees who obtain consumer reports and
`
`participate in extending financing agreements to customers, and did not take into account
`
`previous allegations of identity theft at the Company. In addition to being a clear violation of the
`
`language of the Red Flags Rule, Vivint’s lack of an Identity Theft Prevention Program enabled
`
`systemic violations of the FCRA to the detriment of consumers, which would have been
`
`remediated had Vivint executed on the basic requirements of a Red Flags program, such as by
`
`examining the “methods it provides to open its covered accounts,” 16 C.F.R. Appendix
`
`A(II)(A)(2) to Part 681, as discussed in the next Section.
`
`29.
`
`Section 621(a)(2)(A) of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(2)(A), as adjusted by 16
`
`C.F.R. § 1.98(m), authorizes the Court to award monetary civil penalties of not more than $4,111
`
`for each knowing violation of the FCRA that constitutes a pattern or practice of violations of the
`
`statute.
`
`30.
`
`Each instance in which Vivint has failed to comply with the Red Flags Rule’s
`
`establishment of an identity theft prevention program provision, 16 C.F.R. § 681.1(d), constitutes
`
`a separate violation of the FCRA for the purpose of assessing monetary civil penalties.
`
`10
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00267-DAK Document 2 Filed 04/29/21 PageID.13 Page 11 of 15
`
`VIOLATIONS OF THE FCRA’S PERMISSIBLE PURPOSE REQUIREMENT
`
`31.
`
`Section 621 of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s, authorizes the Commission to use
`
`all of its functions and powers under the FTC Act to enforce compliance with the FCRA by all
`
`persons subject thereto except to the extent that enforcement specifically is committed to some
`
`other governmental agency, irrespective of whether the person is engaged in commerce or meets
`
`any other jurisdictional tests set forth by the FTC Act.
`
`32.
`
`The FCRA prohibits CRAs from furnishing consumer reports except for certain
`
`permissible purposes, Section 604(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a), and prohibits persons from
`
`obtaining consumer reports for any reason other than those permissible purposes, Section 604(f),
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f). Additionally, a user must certify truthfully that it is obtaining the
`
`consumer report for a permissible purpose. Section 604(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f)(2).
`
`33.
`
`The FCRA restricts requests for consumer reports to the permissible purposes
`
`enumerated in Section 604(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a). Pursuant to the limitation in Section 604(f)
`
`of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f): “A person shall not use or obtain a consumer report for any
`
`purpose unless . . . the consumer report is obtained for a purpose for which the consumer report
`
`is authorized to be furnished under this section.”
`
`34.
`
`Vivint violated this restriction on the use or obtainment of consumer reports each
`
`time Vivint’s sales representatives successfully sought and obtained the consumer report of a
`
`third party in order to circumvent the credit score limitations of its customer acquisition
`
`software. Circumventing credit score limitations on software is not a permissible purpose under
`
`the FCRA.
`
`11
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00267-DAK Document 2 Filed 04/29/21 PageID.14 Page 12 of 15
`
`35.
`
`Each instance in which Vivint failed to comply with the FCRA’s Permissible
`
`Purpose Requirement, Section 604(f) of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f), also constitutes a
`
`separate violation of the FCRA for the purpose of assessing monetary civil penalties under
`
`Section 621(a)(2)(A) of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(2)(A).
`
`Count I
`No Established Identity Theft Prevention Program
`
`Paragraphs 1-35 are incorporated as if set forth herein.
`
`Through the acts and practices described in paragraphs 28-30, Vivint has failed to
`
`36.
`
`37.
`
`develop and implement a written Identity Theft Prevention Program that is designed to detect,
`
`prevent, and mitigate identity theft in connection with the opening of a covered account or any
`
`existing covered account.
`
`38.
`
`Vivint thereby has violated the Red Flags Rule establishment of an Identity Theft
`
`Prevention Program provisions, 16 C.F.R. § 681.1(d).
`
`39.
`
`Pursuant to Section 621(a)(1) of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(1), Vivint’s
`
`violations of the Red Flags Rule constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of
`
`Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
`
`40.
`
`The acts and practices described in paragraphs 28-30 constitute a pattern or
`
`practice of knowing violations, as set forth in Section 621(a)(2)(A) of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §
`
`1681s(a)(2)(A).
`
`Count II
`Obtaining Credit Reports Without a Permissible Purpose
`
`41.
`
`Paragraphs 1-40 are incorporated as if set forth herein.
`
`12
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00267-DAK Document 2 Filed 04/29/21 PageID.15 Page 13 of 15
`
`42.
`
`Through the acts and practices described in paragraphs 13-23 and 34-35, the
`
`Defendant permitted Vivint’s sales representatives to obtain consumer reports for individuals
`
`without permission in order to qualify a potential customer for a Vivint account.
`
`43.
`
`Defendant thereby violated the permissible purpose requirement of the FCRA, 15
`
`U.S.C. § 1681b(f).
`
`44.
`
`Pursuant to Section 621(a)(1) of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(1), the
`
`Defendant’s violations of the FCRA constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation
`
`of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
`
`45.
`
`The acts and practices described in paragraphs 13-23 and 34-35 constitute a
`
`pattern or practice of knowing violations, as set forth in Section 621(a)(2)(A) of the FCRA, 15
`
`U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(2)(A).
`
`Count III
`Unfair Sale of False Debt to Debt Buyers or Collectors
`
`Paragraphs 1-45 are incorporated as if set forth herein.
`
`In numerous instances, Defendant transmitted to third-party debt buyers the
`
`46.
`
`47.
`
`names and addresses of individuals that were produced through the “white paging” and
`
`impermissible co-signer schemes identified above, at paragraphs 13-18, causing them to be
`
`pursued by debt buyers or collectors.
`
`48.
`
`Defendant’s actions cause or are likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
`
`that consumers cannot reasonably avoid themselves and that is not outweighed by countervailing
`
`benefits to consumers or competition.
`
`13
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00267-DAK Document 2 Filed 04/29/21 PageID.16 Page 14 of 15
`
`49.
`
`Therefore, Defendant’s acts or practices as set forth in paragraphs 13-18
`
`constitute unfair acts or practices in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), (n).
`
`CONSUMER INJURY
`
`50.
`
`Consumers are suffering, have suffered, and will continue to suffer substantial
`
`injury as a result of Defendant’s violations of the FTC Act, the FCRA, and the Red Flags Rule.
`
`PRAYER FOR RELIEF
`
`
`
`WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § § 45(a), 53(b), and 1681s, and the
`
`Court’s own equitable powers, requests that the Court:
`
`A.
`
`Enter judgment against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff for each violation
`
`alleged in this Complaint;
`
`B.
`
`Enter a permanent injunction to prevent future violations of the FTC Act, the
`
`FCRA, and the Red Flags Rule by the Defendant;
`
`C.
`
`Award such relief as the Court finds necessary to address Defendant’s violations
`
`of the FTC Act, the FCRA, and the Red Flags Rule, including rescission or reformation of
`
`contracts, restitution, the refund of monies paid, the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, or other
`
`relief necessary to redress injury to consumers resulting from Defendant’s violations;
`
`D.
`
`Award Plaintiff monetary civil penalties from Defendant for each violation of the
`
`FCRA and the Red Flags Rule alleged in this Complaint; and
`
`E.
`
`Award Plaintiff the costs of bringing this action, as well as such other additional
`
`relief as the Court may determine to be just and proper.
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00267-DAK Document 2 Filed 04/29/21 PageID.17 Page 15 of 15
`
`DATED: April 29, 2021
`
`
`
`Of Counsel
`GORANA NESKOVIC (D.C. Bar
`997322)
`KEVIN MORIARTY (D.C. Bar 975904)
`Attorneys
`Federal Trade Commission
`Division of Privacy and Identity
`Protection
`Federal Trade Commission
`600 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
`Washington, DC 20580
`Mail Stop CC-8232
`
`(202) 326-2322(Neskovic)
`(202) 326-2949 (Moriarty)
`(202) 326-3392 (Fax)
`
`
`
`
`
`FOR THE UNITED STATES OF
`AMERICA:
`
`BRIAN M. BOYNTON
`Acting Assistant Attorney General
`Civil Division
`
`MICHAEL D. GRANSTON
`Deputy Assistant Attorney General
`
`GUSTAV W. EYLER
`Director
`Consumer Protection Branch
`
`LISA K. HSIAO
`Assistant Director
`/s/Alisha M. Crovetto
`ALISHA M. CROVETTO
`Trial Attorney
`Consumer Protection Branch
`Civil Division
`U.S. Department of Justice
`450 5th Street, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20530
`(202) 305-7196
`alisha.m.crovetto@usdoj.gov
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`