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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`Alexandria Division
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`Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-96 (PTG/LRV)
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`JOHN FRANKLIN DARNELL,
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`Appellant,
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`V.
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`CAROLINA WASINGER, et al.
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`Appellees.
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`This matter comes before the Court on pro se Appellant-Debtor John Franklin Darnell’s
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`appeal of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia’s January 5,2024
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`Order. At the time he filed for bankruptcy, Mr. Darnell sought to discharge two judgments that
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`Appellees Carolina Wasinger and Maddalena Wasinger (collectively, “the Wasingers”) obtained
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`against him for defamation in Fairfax County Circuit Court. The Wasingers sought an exception
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`from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). In its January 5^'’ 2024 Order, the bankruptcy coirt
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`declared the judgments were non-dischargeable.
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`The parties have fully briefed this appeal.
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`Because the record and legal arguments are fully set forth in the existing record, a hearing would
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`not aid the decisional process. Therefore, the Court will decide this matter on the papers. For the
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`reasons that follow, the Court affirms the bankruptcy court’s judgment.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`A.
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`Factual Background and Proceedings in Fairfax Circuit Court (CL 202')-
`15460; CL 2020-15461)
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`The following relevant facts were derived from the record in this case:
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`Meghan Wasinger, the mother of Carolina and Maddelena, offered Mr. Darnell a job as a
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`1
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`Case 1:24-cv-00096-PTG-LRV Document 13 Filed 03/27/25 Page 2 of 10 PageID# 554
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`real estate agent on her team at a real estate company. At some point, Mr. Darnell moved to work
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`for Meghan Wasinger at an independent brokerage she started.
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`Subsequently, Mr. Darnell
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`believed that he was cut out of two transactions which resulted in a loss of about $13,000 in
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`compensation.
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`On September 25,
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`2020,
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`Mr. Darnell began posting
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`on
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`the
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`website,
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`FairfaxUnderground.com, under several different screennames to obscure his identity. The parties
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`stipulated that on that same date and later the following date, Mr. Darnell made several postings
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`about Meghan Wasinger’s children: Carolina Wasinger,* Maddalena Wasinger,^ and Stephen
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`Wasinger.^ Mr. Darnell stipulated that each of these posts were defamatory per se.
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`On September 25, 2020, Mr. Darnell posted:
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`Carolina Wasinger, of William & Mary class of’21 [,] was arrested on Sunday after
`a verbal altercation with a police officer that spun after a house party was shut
`down. Intoxicated Carolina didn’t comply with the officers[’] demands and instead
`became increasingly confrontational,] threatening to sue and leave William &
`Mary. The officer asked the young lady to calm down[,] and she didn’t comply.
`She became violent and Carolina Wasinger was booked on assault and batteiy at
`Virginia peninsula jail[.j
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`^ On September 25, 2020, Mr. Darnell posted:
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`Maddalena Wasinger of Fairfax Station[,] a recent Foxcroft ’20[,j grad was booked
`Tuesday on armed robbery and second degree manslaughter. Armed robbery
`happened in the Timberidge neighborhood in Fairfax Station. A white male about
`6’3 and a younger woman with masks approached an owner demanding $500. The
`white male brandished a hand gun [sic]. The owner by God[’]s miracle jumped on
`The white male got away in a newer white
`the gun and no one was injured.
`mustang[;] Maddalena Wasinger wasn’t able to get away and was booked in Lorton
`county jail. The white male is still on the run, if you know who the male [is,] we
`ask that you come forward.
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`Mr. Darnell additionally posted: ‘T live in the Timberidge neighborhood[;] my neighbor
`Maddie Wasinger was one of the individuals involved.
`The
`next door was robbed.
`description above is the same I gave to police.”
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`^ On September 26, 2020, Mr. Darnell posted: "Update on this situation, the person driving the
`white mustang was actually her brother[,] Stephen Wasinger. Both Maddalena and Stephen
`Wasinger are in custody at this point.”
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`2
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`Case 1:24-cv-00096-PTG-LRV Document 13 Filed 03/27/25 Page 3 of 10 PageID# 555
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`On October 6, 2020, Carolina Wasinger and Maddalena Wasinger filed civil actions, CL
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`2020-15460 and CL 2020-15461, in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia. The two cases
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`were consolidated for trial, which was conducted on August 8, 2022.
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`After the jury returned a
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`verdict in favor of the Wasingers, the Fairfax Circuit Court entered a final order: (1) awarding
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`Carolina Wasinger compensatory damages in the amount of $120,000 plus interest, and punitive
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`damages in the amount of $180,000; and (2) awarding Maddalena Wasinger compensatory
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`damages in the amount of $175,000 plus interest, and punitive damages in the amount of $210,000.
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`Dkt. 2-2 at 87; Dkt. 2-4 at 65; see also Dkt. 2-1 at 10-12.
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`B.
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`Bankruptcy Litigation
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`On January 11, 2023, Mr. Darnell filed a Voluntary Petition under Chapter 7 in the
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`bankruptcy court.'' Dkt. 3-1 at 1; see also In re John Franklin Darnell, Case No. 23-10054 (Bankr.
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`E.D. Va. Jan. 11, 2023). On March 29, 2023, the Wasingers timely filed their Complaint in the
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`adversary proceeding, seeking a declaration that their judgments against Darnell be declared non-
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`dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6). Dkt. 13, In re John Franklin Darnell, No. 23-10054
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`(Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 29, 2023); Dkt. 1, Wasinger v. Darnell, Adv. No. 23-1012 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
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`Mar. 29, 2023); see also Dkt. 2-2 at 90-97, Darnell v. Wasinger et ai. No. l:24-cv-96 (E.D. Va.
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`Feb. 16, 2024).
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`On May 31, 2023, the Wasingers moved for summary judgment. On June 27, 2023, the
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`Court held a hearing on the motion. On July 12, 2023, the bankruptcy court granted in part and
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`denied in part the motion for summary judgment.
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`Dkt. 27, Wasinger v. Darnell, No. 23-1012
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`(Bankr. E.D. Va. Jul. 27, 2023).
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`Specifically, the bankruptcy court held that Mr. Darnell made
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`these statements and that they were defamatory, and recognized that the Fairfax County Circuit
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`^ The Honorable Brian F. Kenney presided.
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`3
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`Case 1:24-cv-00096-PTG-LRV Document 13 Filed 03/27/25 Page 4 of 10 PageID# 556
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`Court entered judgments against Mr. Darnell. Id. at 5. Thus, the only remaining issue for trial
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`was
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`whether Mr. Darnell made the statements willfully and maliciously for purposes of
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`§ 523(a)(6). Id. at 7.
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`On December 8, 2023, the bankruptcy court held a trial on the matter. Dkt. 59, Wasinger
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`V. Darnell,'Ho. 23-1012 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2023). The Wasingers and Mr. Darnell were represented
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`by counsel at trial.
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`Mr. Darnell, however, chose not to appear at the trial or testify.
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`At the
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`conclusion of the trial, the bankruptcy court concluded that Mr. Darnell’s acts were willful and
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`malicious.
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`On January 5, 2024, the bankruptcy court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
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`Law to supplement its ruling from the bench and entered a final order of judgment for Carolina
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`and Maddalena Wasinger, declaring that their judgments were non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C.
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`§523(a)(6) because they arose from ''willful and malicious injury ... to another entity or to the
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`property of another entity.
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`Dkt. 2-3 at 39-46. First, the bankruptcy court concluded that Mr.
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`Darnell ''intended to cause harm to [the Wasingers’] mother by harming her daughters.Id. at 43.
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`Second, the banki'uptcy court reasoned that Mr. Darnell’s actions were willful since he admitted
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`in his deposition in the Fairfax action that “he felt ‘ill will’ toward [the Wasingers’] mother” and
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`“knew that the defamatory statements were not true” and that he “accus[ed the Wasingers] of
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`committing crimes.” Id. at 44 (citing Parsons v. Parks (In re Parks), 91 F. App’x 817, 819 (4th
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`Cir. 2003)). Third, the bankruptcy court found that Mr. Darnell acted with malice given that “he
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`was angry with [the Wasingers’] mother[,] .
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`.
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`. knew to a certainty” that his statements were false,
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`and “intended to hurt the mother by hurling the daughters.” Id. at 45 (citing E.L. Hamm & Assocs.,
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`Inc. V. Sparrow (In re Sparrow), 306 B.R. 812, 838 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003)).
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`On January 19, 2024, Mr. Darnell timely appealed the bankruptcy court’s January 5, 2024
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`4
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`Case 1:24-cv-00096-PTG-LRV Document 13 Filed 03/27/25 Page 5 of 10 PageID# 557
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`Order. Dkt. 1.
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`A. Legal Standard
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`II.
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`ANALYSIS
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`Federal district courts are empowered to hear appeals from final judgments, orders, and
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`decrees issued by the bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). When considering an appeal from
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`the bankruptcy court, the district court reviews the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear
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`error and its legal conclusions de novo. Shin v. Lee, 550 F. Supp. 3d 313, 318 (E.D. Va. 2021)
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`(citing Gold v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’I Ass’n (In re Taneja), 743 F.3d 423, 429 (4th Cir. 2014)).
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`Mixed questions of law and fact are also reviewed de novo.
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`Id. (citing Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v.
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`Tessler (In re .JA. Jones), Inc., 492 F.3d 242, 249 (4th Cir. 2007)). According to the Supreme
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`Court, “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the
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`reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
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`has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (alteration in
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`original) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
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`At issue in this appeal is whether the bankruptcy court emed in finding that Appellant’s
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`actions were willful and malicious such that the defamation judgments against him from Fairfax
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`County Circuit Court are non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6).^ For the reasons stated
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`^ Mr. Darnell also appears to challenge the bankruptcy court’s judgment based on the fact that “[a]t
`no point in time during the bankruptcy litigation was any discovery conducted by [the Wasingers]
`Dkt. 4 at 13. However, a review of the appellate record shows that discovery was conducted. See
`Dkt. 2-1 at 1-8. In addition, Mr. Darnell challenges the bankruptcy court’s judgment based on the
`Wasingers’ failure to call Mr. Darnell to testify at the bankruptcy proceedings. Dkt. 4 at 13. The
`Wasingers were the plaintiffs in the adversarial proceeding below, and it was their burden to
`establish that the debts are non-dischargeable. See Dkt. 2-1 at 1.; In re Sparrow, 306 B.R. 812,
`823 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003) (“Under Bankruptcy Rule 4005, the plaintiff has the burden of proof
`to make a debt non-dischargeable.”). The Wasingers, however, were not required to call Mr.
`Darnell to testify because it is in their discretion to decide what evidence to present.
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`5
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`Case 1:24-cv-00096-PTG-LRV Document 13 Filed 03/27/25 Page 6 of 10 PageID# 558
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`below, the Court finds that the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that the judgments were
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`nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
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`B.
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`Whether Debt was Dischargeable Under 11 U,S,C. § 523(a)(6)^
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`Chapter 7 bankruptcy allows for the discharge of debts in exchange for liquidating
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`damages. Section 523(a)(6) provides that a debtor will not receive discharge from any debt “for
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`w'illful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.”
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`11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
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`For a court to determine whether a debt is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6),
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`the court must find that “(1) the debtor caused an injury; (2) the debtor’s actions were willful; and
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`(3) that the debtor’s actions were malicious.
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`Ocean Equity Grp. v. Wooten (In re Wooten), 423
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`B.R. 108. 128 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010) (quoting/nre5/wroM', 306 B.R. at 834). Under Bankruptcy
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`Rule 4005, the plaintiff has the burden of proof to demonstrate a debt is non-dischargeable. In re
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`Sparrow, 306 B.R. at 823. “Under
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`523(a), the plaintiff must prove non-dischargeability by a
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`preponderance of the evidence.” Id. Here, Mr. Darnell does not dispute that he caused an injury
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`but only argues that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that his actions were (1) willful and (2)
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`malicious. The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
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`(1) Whether Mr. Darnell’s Actions Were Willful
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`For a debt to be nondischargeable, there must be “a deliberate or intentional injury, not
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`^ Mr. Darnell cites Gonzalez v. Anthony (In re Anthony), 538 B.R. 145 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2015),
`Dkt. 4 at 12. The issue here is
`for the proposition that defamation judgments are dischargeable.
`not whether defamation judgments can be discharged but rather whether there was error in
`determining that the judgments were non-dischargeable here. Additionally, in In re Anthony, the
`court found that the defamation claim was dischargeable for several reasons, including that the
`statement was not a false statement about the plaintiff and not uttered with malice. 538 B.R. at
`156. In contrast, as discussed below, here, Mr. Darnell made the defamatory statements with
`knowledge of their falsity and admitted he made the statements because he was angry at the
`Wasingers’ mother and took it out on them. Dkt. 2-1 at 36, 52-53, 55.
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`6
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`Case 1:24-cv-00096-PTG-LRV Document 13 Filed 03/27/25 Page 7 of 10 PageID# 559
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`merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.
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`Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61
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`(1998). In other words, a debtor must “intend the consequences of [his action], not simply, the act
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`itself.
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`Id. at 61-62 (internal quotations omitted). In the Fourth Circuit, an injury may be willful
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`if “the debtor acted with 'substantial certainty [that] harm [would result] or a subjective motive to
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`cause harm. ^99
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`In re Parks, 91 F. App’x. 817, 819 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting
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`In re Miller, 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1998)).
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`“In defamation cases, the true injury is not the damage to the creditor’s reputation; it is the
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`publication of falsehoods about the creditor that led to the damaged reputation.
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`In re Wooten,
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`423 B.R. at 133 (quoting
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`Inc. v. Russell (In re Russell), 262 B.R. 449, 454-55 (Bankr. N.D.
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`Ind. 2001)). Here, it is clear that Mr. Darnell willfully published falsehoods about the Wasingers.
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`Mr. Darnell intentionally posted the defamatory statements on the internet, thus publishing them.
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`See Leask v. Robertson, 589 F. Supp. 3d 506, 528 (D.S.C. 2022) (finding that a blog post
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`“published on the internet and available” satisfied the publication element for defamation under
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`South Carolina law); Dkt. 2-1 at 14-17 (Mr. Darnell’s stipulation in Fairfax County Circuit Court).
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`Indeed, Mr. Darnell does not contend that he accidentally posted the defamatory statements online.
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`In addition, at his deposition for the trial in Fairfax County Circuit Court, Mr. Darnell admitted
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`that he knew that the statements he posted were not true.
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`Dkt. 2-1 at 52-53. Mr. Darnell also
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`admitted that he felt “ill will” toward the Wasingers’ mother, and was frustrated with her and took
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`it out on her daughters. Dkt. 2-1 at 36, 52, 55. The Court finds that these facts establish that Mr.
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`Darnell intended to publish falsehoods about the Wasingers, thus willfully causing injury to the
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`Wasingers.
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`Accordingly, the Court finds that the bankruptcy court, in considering the same
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`evidence, did not err in making the same finding.
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`7
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`Case 1:24-cv-00096-PTG-LRV Document 13 Filed 03/27/25 Page 8 of 10 PageID# 560
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`(2) Whether Mr. Darnell’s Actions Were Malicious
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`Malice[]’ .
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`.
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`. docs not mean the same thing in Section 523(a) that it often does in other
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`contexts.
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`Firs! Nat 7 Bank ofMd. v. Stanley (In re Stanley), 66 F.3d 664, 667 (4th Cir. 1995). “A
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`debtor may act with malice even though he bears no subjective ill will toward, and does not
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`specifically intend to injure, his creditor.” Id. '"The Fourth Circuit defines malice as an act causing
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`injury without just cause or excuse.
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`In re Wooten, 423 B.R. at 130 (citing Branch Banking & Tr.
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`Co. ofVa. V. Powers (In re Powers), 227 B.R. 73, 73 (Bankr E.D. Va. 1998)).
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`Implied malice
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`“shown by the acts and conduct of the debtor in the context of their suirounding circumstances is
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`sufficient under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).” St. Paid Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vaughn (In re Vaughn),
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`779 F.2d 1003, 1010 (4th Cir. 1985).
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`Here, the Court finds that the record establishes that Mr. Darnell acted maliciously in
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`making the defamatory statements.
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`“To recover punitive damages in a defamation case, the
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`plaintiff must prove actual malice by ‘clear and convincing evidence that [the defendant] either
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`knew the statements he made were false at the time he made them, or that he made them with a
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`reckless disregard for their truth.
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`Gov’t Micro Res., Inc. v. Jackson, 624 S.E.2d 63, 70 (Va.
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`2006) (alteration in original) (first emphasis added) (quoting Ingles v. Dively, 435 S.E.2d 641, 646
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`(Va. 1993)). At the trial in Fairfax County Circuit Court, the jury awarded punitive damages to
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`the Wasingers. See Dkt. 2-2 at 87; Dkt. 2-4 at 65. Thus, thejury necessarily found that Mr. Darnell
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`acted with malice.
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`See Muse v. Day (In re Day), 409 B.R. 337, 344 (Bankr. D. Md. 2009)
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`(concluding that jury’s finding of “constitutional malice” in state-court defamation action
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`“collaterally estopped [debtor] from contesting that he acted maliciously, as required by Section
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`523(a)(6)”).
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`The malice standard under § 523(a)(6) is generally less stringent than malice
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`standards in other contexts. See Hagan v. McNallen (In re McNallen), 62 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir.
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`Case 1:24-cv-00096-PTG-LRV Document 13 Filed 03/27/25 Page 9 of 10 PageID# 561
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`1995) (‘The malice standard under § 523(a)(6) eschews ‘specific malice or some other strict
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`standard of malice,’ and concludes that ‘[ijmplied malice, which may be shown by the acts and
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`conduct of the debtor in the context of their surrounding circumstances, is sufficient under 11
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`U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).’” (quoting In St. Paul Fire, 779 F.2d at 1010)). Thus, the jury’s finding of
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`malice under a higher malice standard is sufficient to establish malice under the lower § 523(a)(6)
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`standard.
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`Even if the Fairfax County Circuit Court jury’s finding of malice cannot be imputed here,
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`the Court still finds that Mr. Darnell acted with malice under the § 523(a)(6) standard.
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`It is
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`uncontested that Mr. Darnell’s actions caused injury, and he offers no just cause or excuse for his
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`actions.
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`In fact, Mr. Darnell stated in his deposition that he posted the defamatory statements
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`because the Wasingers’ mother “couldn’t afford to pay [him].” Dkt. 2-1 at 52-53. Thus, the Court
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`finds that Mr. Darnell’s actions were malicious, and the bankruptcy court did not err in so finding.
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`9
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`Case 1:24-cv-00096-PTG-LRV Document 13 Filed 03/27/25 Page 10 of 10 PageID#
`562
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`111.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Mr. Darnell’s posting of the defamatory
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`statements regarding the Wasingers was both willful and malicious. Thus, the Court finds that the
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`bankruptcy court correctly ruled that the Final Orders in CL 202-15460 and CL 2020-15461—the
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`defamationjudgments against Mr. Darnell—were non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
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`Accordingly, the bankruptcy court’s January 5, 2024 Judgement Order is AFFIRMED.
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`It is SO ORDERED.
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`Entered this 27^‘^ day of March, 2025
`Alexandria, Virginia
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`Lm
`Patricia Tolliver Giles
`United States District Judge
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`'' The Wasingers sought for the Court to apply the test from the Sixth Circuit, that “all a creditor
`judgment from discharge is that the debtor knew the
`needs to prove to except a defamation per
`facts which made his statements actionable: that they were false and published without privilege
`to a third party.” Roe v. Boland (In re Boland), 946 F.3d 335, 338 (6th Cir. 2020). Virginia la\y
`presumes that injury results from statements that are per se defamatory. Swengler v. ITT Corp. j
`Electro-Optical Prods. Div., 993 F.2d 1063, 1071 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[I]f a plaintiff establishes a'
`claim for defamation per se, Virginia law presumes that the plaintiff suffered actual damage to
`its reputation.”). As stated, Mr. Darnell stipulated that the statements he posted were defamatory
`per se, and, as discussed above, admitted that he knew such statements were false. Dkt. 2-1 at
`14, 16-17. The Court notes that if Boland were applied, these facts establish that the debts are
`non-dischargeable.
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`10
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`