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`1042548.2
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`1042548.2
`1042548.2
`1042548.2
`1042548.2
`1042548.2
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
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`SUMI KIM,
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` Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`OPENAI INC., X CORP., GOOGLE LLC,
`MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
`ANTHROPIC PBC, AMAZON.COM INC.,
`MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
`TECHNOLOGY, STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
`META PLATFORMS, INC.,
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` Defendants.
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`Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-1258 (CMH/IDD)
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`DEFENDANT X CORP.’S OPPOSITION TO
`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
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`Case 1:25-cv-01258-PTG-IDD Document 80 Filed 09/16/25 Page 1 of 14 PageID# 395
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`I. INTRODUCTION
`Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order ( ECF No. 3; “Motion”) should be
`denied because Plaintiff fails to meet the high burden to obtain the extraordinary relief Plaintiff
`seeks. Plaintiff is the alleged inventor of an “AI Operating System” called “ResonanceOS,” who
`has experienced “active and unauthorized intrusions” and misuse of the operating system, as well
`as purported “reverse-engineering attempts targeting” the operating system. Plaintiff seeks a TRO
`to halt alleged “use, access, or reverse-engineering of Resonance OS by named parties,” including
`X Corp., to “[e]nforce copyright protections over the ResonanceOS framework,” and to
`“[r]ecognize the ongoing pattern of intrusion, misappropriation, and institutional silence as legal
`and ethical misconduct.”
`Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied for at least several reasons.
`At the outset, the Motion should be denied because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction
`over X Corp. Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of allegations about personal jurisdiction at all, much
`less allegations sufficient to establish that this Court has general or specific personal jurisdiction
`over X Corp.
`On the merits, Plaintiff’s Motion fails to meet any of the four elements to obtain the
`requested relief. First, Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiff fails to
`even identify any specific claim against X Corp. (or any defendant, for that matter). And even
`construing the inscrutable Complaint as purporting to assert claims for copyright and patent
`infringement, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege any of the required elements of those claims.
`Plaintiff thus fails to show a likelihood of success on the merits, and the Motion should be denied.
`Second, even if Plaintiff had shown a likelihood of success on the merit s (Plaintiff does
`not), Plaintiff fails to establish the remaining elements necessary to obtain the injunctive relief
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`Plaintiff seeks. Plaintiff fails to show any irreparable injury absent the requested relief, as Plaintiff
`fails to provide facts or evidence establishing any harm–much less a “clear showing” of harm that
`is “neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.” See Williams Ohio Valley Midstream,
`LLC v. Kittle, No. 23-2185, 2024 WL 3325532, at *3, 5 (4th Cir. July 8, 2024). Plaintiff also fails
`to show the balance of hardships tips in Plaintiff’s favor (the third factor), nor that the requested
`TRO would be in the public interest (the fourth factor).
`Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied.
`II. BACKGROUND
`A. Plaintiff’s Complaint
` According to the Complaint, Plaintiff is the alleged “sole inventor and architect of
`Resonance OS,” which, according to Plaintiff, is an “original and independently developed
`rhythm-based artificial intelligence cognition system.” Compl. at 1. Plaintiff conte nds this
`“matter” involves “active and unauthorized intrusions, misuse, and reverse-engineering attempts”
`targeting ResonanceOS. Id. at 2.
` Plaintiff’s Complaint names X Corp. as a defendant, as well as six other technology
`companies (OpenAI Inc., Google LLC, Microsoft Corporation, Anthropic PBC, Amazon.com Inc.,
`and Meta Platforms, Inc.) and two universities (Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
`Stanford University). But Plaintiff’s Complaint does not identify any claim against X Corp. or any
`other d efendant. Plaintiff’s “Statement of Jurisdiction,” filed separately, states the Complaint
`asserts claims that “arise under the United States Copyright Act [and] the Patent Act.” ECF No. 1-
`2 at 1. But although Plaintiff purports to have “copyright & patent evidence” of ResonanceOS,
`Plaintiff does not allege a valid copyright or patent. See Compl. at 3-4.
`Plaintiff’s Complaint also does not specify what X Corp.--or any other defendant–did with
`respect to any alleged misconduct. With respect to X Corp., Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff “made
`Case 1:25-cv-01258-PTG-IDD Document 80 Filed 09/16/25 Page 3 of 14 PageID# 397
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`every effort to resolve these matters peacefully and professionally with major AI corporations,”
`but “despite 40 direct communications –including messages to OpenAI (Sam Altman), X (Elon
`Musk), Google, Meta, Microsoft, Anthropic, Amazon, MIT, and Stanford–no meaningful response
`was received.” Compl. at 2.1
`For relief, Plaintiff seeks “emergency relief,” including a temporary restraining order
`“halting further use, access, or reverse -engineering of ResonanceOS” by the defen dants and
`“affiliated institutions,” “enforce[ment of] of copyright protections over the ResonanceOS
`framework," and “[r]ecogn[ition of] the ongoing pattern of intrusion, misappropriation, and
`institutional silence as legal and ethical misconduct.” Id. at 4.
`B. The Instant Motion
`Consistent with the Complaint, Plaintiff’s Motion asks the Court to issue a TRO to halt
`alleged “use, access, or reverse -engineering of Resonance OS by named parties,” including X
`Corp.2 ECF No. 3. 3 In purported support of the Motion, Plaintiff submitted a “Declaration
`Regarding Resonance Session Logs Originated via Meta Platforms[,]” but the declaration is not
`tied to any specific claim (of which there are none), and it largely is unintelligible. See ECF No.
`4-20 at 58-60.
` 1 Plaintiff also alleges that she “[p]ublic[ly] release[d] . . . ResonanceOS structural design and
`licensing statement via X,” Compl. at 2, but it is unclear how that allegation relates to her alleged
`claims, if at all.
`2 X Corp. is a social media company whose products and services do not include artificial
`intelligence, therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations and requested relief are inapplicable as to X Corp.
`3 Plaintiff’s Motion does not set a hearing date, required under Local Rule 7(F)(1) to establish a
`deadline for X Corp.’s response. Plaintiff's Motion also did not comply with Local Rule 7’s
`requirement of a separate motion, memorandum, and notice of hearing. Also, submission of a
`motion without a hearing requires consent from the opposing parties; before filing her motion,
`Plaintiff neither sought nor obtained X Corp.’s permission to submit her motion (nor did she seek
`X Corp.’s position on it). Finally, Plaintiff failed to seek consent for submission of the motion
`without oral argument in violation of Local Civil Rule 7(E).
`Case 1:25-cv-01258-PTG-IDD Document 80 Filed 09/16/25 Page 4 of 14 PageID# 398
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`III. ARGUMENT
`A. Plaintiff’s Motion Should Be Denied Because This Court Lacks Personal
`Jurisdiction over X Corp.
`“[I[njunctive relief may issue only if the court has personal jurisdiction over the enjoined
`party . . . .” Gilchrist v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. , 262 F.3d 295, 30 1 (4th Cir. 2001). To determine
`personal jurisdiction, “the Court undertakes a two-step inquiry. First, the Court determines whether
`the long-arm statute of the forum state authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over the challenging,
`nonresident defendant. Then, the Court evaluates whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
`the defendant comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Andrews v.
`Shandong Linglong Tyre Co., Ltd. , 656 F. Supp. 3d 583, 591 (E.D. Va. 2023) (citation omitted).
`In Virginia, “the two-prong test collapses into a single inquiry”—i.e., whether the defendant “ha[s]
`certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
`‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
`326 U.S. 310, 316(1945)) (second alteration in original).
`Plaintiff fails to establish this Court has personal jurisdiction over X Corp. The Complaint
`is devoid of allegations regarding personal jurisdiction. In any event, Plaintiff does not, and cannot,
`show that this Court has general jurisdiction over X Corp., a corporation incorporated in Nevada
`that has its principal place of business in Texas. Further, Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks allegations
`sufficient to establish this Court has specific jurisdiction over X Corp. Accordingly, this Court
`lacks personal jurisdiction over X Corp., and the Motion should be denied.
`1. This Court lacks general jurisdiction over X Corp.
` A court may assert general jur isdiction over nonresident defendants only when their
`“affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home
`in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)
`Case 1:25-cv-01258-PTG-IDD Document 80 Filed 09/16/25 Page 5 of 14 PageID# 399
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`(quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). Absent exceptional circumstances, a corporate defendant is
`only “at home” in a forum where it is either incorporated or has its principal place of business.
`Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014).
` Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of allegations that would establish that X Corp. is “at home”
`in Virginia. Plaintiff does not, and cannot, allege that X Corp.’s place of incorporation or its
`principal place of business is located in Virginia. (In fact, X Corp. is a Neva da corporation with
`its principal place of business in Texas. See Declaration of Kenneth M. Trujillo -Jamison, Ex. 1.)
`Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations in her Complaint do not show any connection between X Corp.
`and Virginia at all. Thus, the Court lacks general jurisdiction of X Corp. See Daimler AG, 571 U.S.
`at 137; see also, e.g. , Geegieh v. Unknown Parties , No. CV -24-02993-PHX-SMB, 2025 WL
`1769766, at *3-4 (D. Ariz. June 26, 2025) (finding no general jurisdiction over X Corp. where the
`operative complaint that was “bereft of allegations to support general jurisdiction,” including “no
`allegations of X Corp.’s place of incorporation or principal place of business” and “no allegations
`regarding X Corp.’s Arizona affiliations”).
`2. This Court lacks specific jurisdiction over X Corp.
`Specific jurisdiction exists only “where the defendant’s contacts with the forum state ‘form
`the basis for the suit.’” Hassan v. Barzani, 674 F. Supp. 3d 282, 292 (E.D. Va. 2023) (citations
`omitted). In the Fourth Circuit, courts ap ply a three -part test to evaluate whether a defendant’s
`contacts are sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction: “(1) the extent to which the defendant
`purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State; (2) whether the
`plaintiffs’ claims arise out of those activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the exercise of
`personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable.” Consulting Eng'rs Corp. v. Geometric
`Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 278 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omit ted). To make this determination, courts
`must decide whether the defendant’s “conduct and connection with the forum State are such that
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`[it] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
`Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 2 97 (1980). This turns on “whether the defendant’s actions connect [it]
`to the forum . . . .” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 288-89 (2014) (alteration in original) (finding
`no “minimal contacts” where “no part of [defendant]’s course of conduct occurred in” the forum
`state).
`Plaintiff does not allege any conduct by X Corp. in Virginia at all, much less any that
`would give rise to specific jurisdiction over X Corp. in this state. As noted, the Complaint is
`entirely devoid of allegations as to jurisdiction. In a separately filed “Statement of Jurisdiction,”
`Plaintiff contends venue is proper in this Court because “Plaintiff resides in this district and a
`substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred within this district.” ECF No. 1 -2
`at 1. That Plaintiff allegedly resides in Virginia, by itself, insufficient to establish specific
`jurisdiction over X Corp. See Long v. Chevron Corp. , No. 4:11cv47, 2011 WL 3903066, at *13
`(E.D. Va. Sept. 2, 2011) (plaintiff failed to establish personal jurisdi ction where, “[a]t most,
`Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have business interests in Virginia that do not relate to this lawsuit
`and Plaintiff has suffered injury in Virginia . . . .”) (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s latter, conclusory
`allegation that “a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims” purportedly occurred in
`the Eastern District of Virginia–an allegation wholly unsupported by allegations in the Complaint–
`is also insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over X Corp. See, e.g. , Baker v. Patterson
`Medical Supply, Inc., No. 4:11cv37, 2011 WL 7153948, at *4 n.5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 17, 2011) (“bare
`legal conclusions are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction”); Orion Capital,
`LLC v. Promier Prods., Inc., No. 4:21-cv-0015, 2021 WL 4943501, at *5 (W.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2021)
`(finding no personal jurisdiction over defendant in Virginia where plaintiff made only “conclusory
`statements asserting that personal jurisdiction” existed).
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`In sum, because Plaintiff fails to establish e ither general or specific personal jurisdiction
`over X Corp., Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied.
`B. Plaintiff’s Motion Fails on the Merits and Thus Should Be Denied
`“Because a preliminary injunction grants relief, albeit temporarily, before trial on the
`merits, it is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy,’ ‘that may only be awarded upon a clear showing
`that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.’ And it should be ‘granted only sparingly and in limited
`circumstances.’” 2311 Racing LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, LLC, 139 F.4th 404,
`408 (4th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted). To obtain such relief, a plaintiff must show that she is “(1)
`. . . likely to succeed on the merits, (2) . . . likely to suffer irreparable harm, (3) the balance of
`hardships tips in [the plaintiff’s] favor, and (4) the injunction is in the public interest.” Metro. Reg’l
`Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 722 F.3d 591, 595 (4th Cir. 2013). Each of these
`four factors must be satisfied. Di Biase v. SPX Corp. , 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017). The
`standards for a TRO and a preliminary injunction are functionally identical. Moore v. Kempthorne,
`464 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“The standard for granting either a TRO or a
`preliminary injunction is the same.”).
`As explained below, Plaintiff fails to establish any, much less all, of the four factors
`required to show entitlement to the sought TRO. Therefore, the Motion should be denied.
`1. Plaintiff Fails to Show a Likelihood of Success on the Merits
`Plaintiff fails to state any claim against X Corp., and thus fails to show likelihood of success
`on the merits.
`At the outset, the Complaint does not identify any specific claim against X Corp., nor even
`any specific allegation of misconduct by X Corp. (or any of the other named defendants) that could
`give rise to a claim. Having failed to put X Corp. on notice of any claims asserted against it,
`Plaintiff fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and therefore cannot show
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`likelihood of success on any claim. See Bing v. Birvo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 616 (4th Cir. 2020)
`(although pro se complaints must be broadly construed, they still “must contain ‘factual allegations
`sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level’”) (alterations omitted) (quoting Bell
`Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); Sewraz v. Guice , No. 3:08 -cv-35, 2008 WL
`3926443, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2008) (noting that “pro se plaintiffs must recognize Rule 8’s
`vision for ‘a system of simplified pleadin gs that give notice of the general claim asserted, allow
`for the preparation of a basic defense, narrow the issues to be litigated, and provide a means for
`quick dispositions of sham claims”) (citation omitted; emphasis omitted); Stosdill v. Clear , No.
`7:23cv00133, 2025 WL 952261, at *3 (W.D. Va. Mar. 28, 2025) (the plaintiff’s “collective
`references” to the defendants did not “substitute for the requirement that he identify actions or
`inactions of each individual defendant” under Rule 8).
`To the extent Pla intiff’s request for an order to “[e]nforce copyright protections over the
`ResonanceOS framework” and the contention that “[s]he has presented multiple forms of verified
`evidence . . . showing direct and ongoing infringement” could be construed as a claim for copyright
`infringement, Motion at 1-2, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege such a claim. To state a violation of
`the Copyright Act, Plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2)
`copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
`Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plausibly allege either element.
`First, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege ownership of a valid copyright. Although Plaintiff
`allegedly has presented a “copyright registration,” Motion at 2, documents attached to the
`Complaint indicate Plaintiff submitted only a copyright application and Plaintiff has not attached
`a certificate from the Copyright Office demonstrating the application wa s granted. See ECF No.
`4-14 at 44 (“[t]he following document summarizes the strategic copyright submission”). Further,
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`as shown in Defendants Amazon.com, Inc., Google LLC, and Microsoft Corporation’s Opposition
`to Plaintiff’s TRO (ECF No. 25), there is no record of any registered copyright registration for any
`of the work allegedly at issue. See ECF No. 25 at 4: 25 -1 - 25-10. That Plaintiff has not
`demonstrated ownership of a valid copyright is fatal; therefore, Plaintiff cannot show likelihood
`of success o n a copyright infringement claim. See Fourth Estate Pub. Ben. Corp. v. Wall -
`Street.com, 586 U.S. 296, 302 (2019) (affirming dismissal of copyright claim where plaintiff
`alleged is had filed applications to register documents with the Copyright Office but did not allege
`the applications had been granted before suing); 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (“no civil action for
`infringement . . . shall be instituted until . . registration of the copyright claim has been made in
`accordance with this title”); Harris v. Lexjet Co rp., No. 3:09-CV-616, 2009 WL 4683699, at *3
`(E.D. Va. Dec. 3, 2009) (dismissing copyright infringement claim where the plaintiff made
`“several references to the copyright registration in his [c]omplaint” but did not provide a copy of
`it or otherwise plead facts sufficient to establish he owned a valid registered copyright).
`Second, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plausibly allege that X Corp. copied anything from
`Plaintiff, much less “constituent elements of [Plaintiff’s] work that are original.” Feist Publ’ns,
`499 U.S. at 31. X Corp. is a social media company ; it does not develop or engineer artificial
`intelligence technologies, and has no products that resemble or would utilize Plaintiff’s allegedly
`infringed work. Plaintiff’s sole reference to X Corp. in the Complaint is the purported “direct . . .
`messages to . . . X (Elon Musk) . . . .,” to which “no meaningful response was [allegedly] received.”
`Compl. at 2. This fails to plausibly allege any copying took place. And Plaintiff’s declaration filed
`in support of the TRO Motion also fails to allege that X Corp. copied any allegedly copyrighted
`materials. See ECF No. 4 -20 at 58. Thus, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege this second required
`element of a copyright infringement claim. See, e.g., Metro. Eng'g, I nc. v. WDG Architecture,
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`PLLC, No. 1:22-cv-1413, 2023 WL 5673117, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sep. 1, 2023) (dismissing copyright
`claim for failure to plausibly allege the defendant copied any copyrighted work where plaintiff did
`not allege the content of defendant’s alleged copied drawings or attach them to the complaint);
`Macher v. Netflix, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 3d 509, 515–16 (W.D. Va. 2023) (dismissing copyright claim
`for failing to allege any facts supporting the conclusory allegation the defendant “copied protected
`aspects of his book”).
`To the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint could be construed to state a claim under the Patent
`Act, Plaintiff also fails to plausibly allege such a claim and, thus, fails to show a likelihood of
`success on the merits.4 “To plead patent infringement, a plaintiff must first identify which patent
`claims the defendant infringed.” Chan Soo Kim v. Green Tea Ideas, Inc. , No. 3:17 -CV-00449,
`2018 WL 1172998, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2018). Next, the plaintiff must “specify which features
`of an accused product correspond to the limitations in the allegedly infringed patent,” and “identify
`with particularity how each allegedly infringing feature of the accused product infringes the patent,
`literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.” Id. (citation modified).
`Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plead facts sufficient to establish any of these requirements.
`For starters, the Complaint identifies only a provisional patent application, not an enforceable
`patent, and therefore the purported patent infringement claim fails as a matter of law. See Compl.
`At 3 (identifying USPTO Provisional Patent Application) (emphasis added); Chinsamny v. United
`States, 94 Fed. Cl. 21, 25 (2010) (dismissing patent infringement claims relying on a provision
`patent because “[p]ro visional patent rights do not exist independently of the requisite approved
`and issued patent”). The Complaint also is devoid of allegations identifying the features of
` 4 Plaintiff’s Complaint purports to provide “Patent Evidence[,]” including a citation to a
`“USPTO Provisional Patent Application No. 63/811,886). Compl. at 3. Plaintiffs’ separately
`filed “Statement of Jurisdiction” also asserts that Plaintiff’s “claims arise under . . . the Patent
`Act.” ECF No. 1-2.
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`Plaintiff’s allegedly infringed work, much less which features of any product by X Corp . that
`correspond to that work, nor does Plaintiff “identify with particularity” how each “allegedly
`infringing feature” of any product by X Corp. “infringes” his work. See generally Compl. See Kim,
`2018 WL 1172998, at *2.
`In sum, Plaintiff fails to ident ify any specific claim against X Corp., much less state one.
`Furthermore, even construing Plaintiff’s Complaint broadly as containing allegations purporting
`to state claims for copyright and patent infringement, Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks allegations
`sufficient to plausibly allege any of the elements of those claims. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to show
`a likelihood of success on the merits of that claim, and the Motion should be denied. See, e.g.,
`Johnson v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , No. 2:15cv513, 2016 WL 7042944, at *5 (E.D. Va.
`Jan. 26, 2016) (denying request for a TRO and preliminary injunction where plaintiff “failed to
`adequately plead any of his . . . claims”); Morley-Mower v. Prof’l Foreclosure Corp. of Va., No.
`5:16-mc-1, 2016 WL 3811553, at *3-4 (W.D. Va. June 21, 2016) (in denying the plaintiff’s request
`for a TRO and preliminary injunction, determining that the plaintiff was “not likely to succeed on
`the merits, as she failed to allege any facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss”); Softech
`Worldwide, LLC v. Internet Tech. Broad. Corp. , 761 F. Supp. 2d 367, 371 –72 (E.D. Va. 2011)
`(denying TRO holding the court could not “find copyright violations as to these pieces of software”
`where plaintiff was “not specific regarding which pieces of software [had] been copied”).
`2. Plaintiff Fails to Establish the Remaining Factors to Obtain Injunctive
`Relief
`Even if Plaintiff had shown a likelihood of success on the merits (as explained above,
`Plaintiff did not), the Motion still should be denied because Plaintiff fails to establish the
`remaining factors for obtaining injunctive relief.
`Plaintiff fails to establish irreparable harm, the second factor of the Court’s injunction
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`analysis. See Metro. Reg’l Info. Sys., Inc., 722 F.3d at 595. Plaintiff asserts without factual support
`that “[t]he structural replication of the Plaintiff's AI operating system cannot be undone” and “[i]ts
`originality and functional distinctiveness will be permanently diluted.” Motion a t 2. Plaintiff’s
`Complaint also asserts that, absent relief, Plaintiff will suffer “loss of competitive advantage,”
`which purportedly would be “immediate and irreparable. ” Compl. at 4. Plaintiff fails to support
`these inscrutable allegations with any facts or evidence, and therefore comes nowhere close to
`making the required “clear showing” of harm” that is “neither remote nor speculative, but actual
`and imminent.” See Williams Ohio Valley Midstream, LLC , 2024 WL 3325532, at *3, 5 (finding
`that the district court abused its discretion by granting preliminary injunction where the plaintiff’s
`assertions of irreparable harm were “speculative and unsupported by evidence”).5
`Plaintiff also fails to show the “balance of hardships tips in [her] favor,” the third fa ctor.
`See Metro. Reg’l Info. Sys., Inc. , 722 F.3d at 595. Plaintiff contends the balance tips in her favor
`because Plaintiff “stands alone as a Pro Se inventor without institutional support, while
`Defendants are resource -dominant AI entities.” That X Corp . (which is not an “AI entity”) has
`more “resource[s]” than Plaintiff does not tip the balance of hardships in Plaintiff’s favor. Indeed,
`if Plaintiff’s requested relief were granted, X Corp. (and the other defendants) would be subject to
`inchoate and uncl ear restrictions to “halt[] further use, access, or reverse -engineering of
`ResonanceOS,” which would be impossible to comply with given Plaintiff’s failure to even
`identify how X Corp. is allegedly engaging in any conduct with respect to Plaintiff’s allege d
`system.
` 5 Generally, a “prima facie showing of copyright infringement establishes a presumption that the
`copyright owner has suffered irreparable harm.” Hennon v. Kirklands, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 118,
`120 (W.D. Va. 1994). As discussed above, Section III.B.1., supra, Plaintiff fails to plausibly
`allege either of the elements of a copyright infringement claim. Accordingly, this presumption
`does not apply here.
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`Finally, Plaintiff fails to show how the requested relief would be in the public interest, the
`fourth factor. See Metro. Reg’l Info. Sys., Inc. , 722 F.3d at 595. Plaintiff asserts in conclusory
`fashion that the requested TRO would be in the public interest because this case purportedly “raises
`urgent issues regarding consent, attribution, and structural authorship in artificial intelligence" and
`“[g]ranting relief would affirm legal protections for innovation, fairness, and trust in future AI
`systems.” Motion at 2. As noted above, however, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to even assert an
`identifiable claim against X Corp. (or any other defendant), much less show a likelihood of success
`on any such claim. As such, granting sweeping injunctive relief where Plaintiff fails to even show
`likelihood of success on the merits –much less the other required factors for obtaining injunctive
`relief–would not be in the public interest.
`IV. CONCLUSION
` For all these reasons, X Corp. respectfully requests that the Court deny the Motion.
`
`Dated: September 16, 2025
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ Frederick S. Rudesheim
`Frederick S. Rudesheim (VA Bar No. 99649)
`Shook, Hardy & Bacon
`1800 K St. NW, Suite 1000
`Washington, DC 20006
`Telephone: (202) 639-5653
`Email: frudesheim@shb.com
`
`Kenneth M. Trujillo-Jamison
`(application for admission pro hac vice
`forthcoming)
`WILLENKEN LLP
`707 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 4100
`Los Angeles, CA 90017
`Telephone: (213) 955-9240
`Facsimile: (213) 955-9250
`ktrujillo-jamison@willlenken.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant X Corp.
`
`Case 1:25-cv-01258-PTG-IDD Document 80 Filed 09/16/25 Page 14 of 14 PageID#
`408
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