Case 2:19-cv-00463-RAJ-LRL Document 241 Filed 09/10/20 Page 1 of 37 PageID# 4551
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`Norfolk Division
`
`
`
`
`IN RE PEANUT FARMERS ANTITRUST
`LITIGATION
`
`
`
`
`
`Court File No. 2:19-cv-00463-RAJ-LRL
`
`Honorable Raymond A. Jackson
`Honorable Lawrence R. Leonard
`
`
`
`
`MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
`
`[REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION]
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`
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`Case 2:19-cv-00463-RAJ-LRL Document 241 Filed 09/10/20 Page 2 of 37 PageID# 4552
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1
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`II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 2
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`III. LEGAL STANDARDS ........................................................................................................... 4
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`IV. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 6
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`A. Rule 23(a) is Satisfied and the Class is Ascertainable. ....................................................... 6
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`B. Plaintiffs Satisfy the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). ........................................................ 8
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`1. Common Questions of Law or Fact Predominate. .......................................................... 9
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`2. Class Treatment is a Superior Means of Adjudication. ................................................ 27
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`V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 28
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`CASES
`
`In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 06-MD-1175(JG)(VVP), 2014 WL 7882100 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2014) ....................10, 25
`
`Am. Sales Co., LLC v. Pfizer, Inc.,
`No. 2:14CV361, 2017 WL 3669604 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2017) ....................................... passim
`
`Amaya v. DGS Constr., LLC,
`326 F.R.D. 439 (D. Md. 2018) ...................................................................................................5
`
`Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor,
`521 U.S. 591 (1997) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds,
`568 U.S. 455 (2013) ......................................................................................................... passim
`
`Bell v. WestRock CP, LLC,
`No. 3:17-CV-829, 2019 WL 1874694 (E.D. Va. Apr. 26, 2019) ........................................5, 27
`
`In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig.,
`MDL No. 09–2081, 2015 WL 6123211 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2015) .....................................10, 24
`
`Brown v. Nucor Corp.,
`576 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2009) .....................................................................................................4
`
`In re Capacitors Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 17-md-02801-JD, 2018 WL 5980139 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2018) ......................................9
`
`In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig.,
`289 F.R.D. 200 (M.D. Pa. 2012) ..............................................................................................24
`
`Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
`569 U.S. 27 (2013) ...................................................................................................................26
`
`DeLoach v. Philip Morris Co.,
`206 F.R.D. 551 (M.D.N.C. 2002) ..........................................................................................6, 9
`
`In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig.,
`329 F.R.D. 336 (M.D. Fla. 2018).............................................................................................26
`
`In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig.,
`MDL No. 2437, 2017 WL 3623466 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2017) ................................................10
`
`In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig.,
`No. M 02–1486 PJH, 2006 WL 1530166 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 5, 2006) .........................................10
`
`ii
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`Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc.,
`348 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2003) .....................................................................................5, 6, 27, 28
`
`Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,
`573 U.S. 258 (2014) .................................................................................................................21
`
`Henderson v. Trans Union LLC,
`3:14-CV-00679-JAG, 2016 WL 2344786 (E.D. Va. May 3, 2016) ........................................28
`
`In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig.,
`985 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ...................................................................................21
`
`In re Indep. Gas. Antitrust Litig.,
`79 F.R.D. 552 (D. Md. 1978) .....................................................................................................6
`
`Kleen Prods. LLC v. Int’l Paper Co.,
`831 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2016) .....................................................................................................9
`
`In re Korean Ramen Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 13-cv-04115-WHO, 2017 WL 235052 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017) ....................................25
`
`Krakauer v. Dish Network L.L.C.,
`311 F.R.D. 384 (M.D.N.C. 2015), aff’d, 925 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 2019) ..................................20
`
`Krakauer v. Dish Network, L.L.C.,
`925 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.Ct. 676 (2019) .........................................4, 8
`
`In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig.,
`305 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 2002).......................................................................................................9
`
`In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig.,
`319 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Pa. 2016) ...............................................................................................10
`
`In re Nexium Antitrust Litig.,
`777 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2015) ..........................................................................................................9
`
`Nitsch v. Dreamworks Animation SKG, Inc.,
`315 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Cal. 2016) .............................................................................................21
`
`In re OSB Antitrust Litig.,
`2007 WL 2253418 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2007) ............................................................................10
`
`In re Packaged Seafood Prod. Antitrust Litig.,
`332 F.R.D. 308 (S.D. Cal. 2019) .......................................................................................25, 26
`
`Peoples v. Wendover Funding, Inc.,
`179 F.R.D. 492 (D. Md. 1998) ...................................................................................................6
`
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`
`Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp.,
`602 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1979) ...................................................................................................26
`
`In re Polyester Staple Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 3:03-CV-1516, 2007 WL 2111380 (W.D.N.C. July 19, 2007)................................. passim
`
`In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
`81 F. Supp. 3d 412 (E.D. Pa. 2015) .........................................................................................22
`
`In re Restasis (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion) Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 18-MD-2819 (NG) (LB), 2020 WL 2555556 (E.D.N.Y. May 5, 2020) ...........................21
`
`In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litig.,
`232 F.R.D. 346 (N.D. Cal. 2005) .............................................................................................10
`
`In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig.,
`527 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2008) .....................................................................................................9
`
`Sharp Farms v. Speaks,
`917 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................................7, 8
`
`Soutter v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC,
`307 F.R.D. 183 (E.D. Va. 2015) (Payne, J.) ..............................................................................8
`
`Technical Learning Collective, Inc. v. Daimler Benz Aktiengesellschaft,
`No. N-77-1443, 1979 WL 1718 (D. Md. July 2, 1979) .............................................................6
`
`In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.,
`2012 WL 555090 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012) ...........................................................................22
`
`In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig.,
`284 F.R.D. 328 (D. Md. 2012), amended by 962 F. Supp. 2d 840 (D. Md.
`2013) ................................................................................................................................ passim
`
`Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,
`136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) .........................................................................................................9, 21
`
`In re Urethane Antitrust Litig.,
`768 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2014) ...........................................................................................9, 22
`
`In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig.,
`279 F.R.D. 90 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ...............................................................................................10
`
`In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.,
`209 F.R.D. 251 (D.D.C. 2002) .................................................................................................10
`
`Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
`564 U.S. 338 (2011) ...................................................................................................................6
`
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`Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc.,
`565 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1977) .......................................................................................................9
`
`Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
`395 U.S. 100 (1969) .................................................................................................................26
`
`In re: Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 2:18-md-2836, 2020 WL 3446895 (E.D. Va. June 18, 2020).............................................4
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ................................................................................................................... passim
`
`6 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 20:52 (5th ed. 2011) .................................5
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`v
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`This is a case about how three large corporations conspired with one another for the past
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`six years to drive down the prices they paid America’s peanut farmers for their hard work. The
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`result: numerous farmer bankruptcies and a historic flattening of the prices farmers receive for
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`Runner peanuts. This motion asks the Court to allow these peanut farmers to proceed in this matter
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`as a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which will allow this case to move forward
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`efficiently and swiftly in an effort to recoup their losses resulting from Defendants’ conspiracy.
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`Plaintiffs D&M Farms, Mark Hasty, Dustin Land, Lonnie Gilbert, Daniel Howell and
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`Rocky Creek Farms (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this price-fixing class action on behalf of
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`themselves and a proposed class (“Class”) consisting of all persons and entities in the United States
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`who sold raw, harvested Runner peanuts (“Runners”) to Defendants1 from at least January 1, 2014
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`through December 31, 2019 (the “Class Period”). Plaintiffs’ claims raise issues (1) for which proof
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`will be common to the Class, and (2) that predominate over any individual issues: a) the existence
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`of, and each Defendant’s participation in, a conspiracy to stabilize and depress the prices of
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`Runners (the “Conspiracy”); b) the Conspiracy’s common impact on the Class; and c) the Class’s
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`aggregate damages resulting from the Conspiracy.
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`The existence and scope of the Conspiracy will be resolved with common evidence focused
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`on Defendants’ agreement to stabilize and depress the prices paid to peanut farmers for their crop.
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`The existence of the Conspiracy and its impact will be shown by emails and contemporaneous
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`
`1 “Defendants” are peanut shelling companies Birdsong Corporation (“Birdsong”), Golden Peanut
`Company, LLC (“Golden Peanut”), and Olam Peanut Shelling Company, Inc. (“Olam”). Golden
`Peanut is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”). Olam is
`a wholly owned subsidiary of Olam International Limited, a leading food and agri-business
`operating in 60 countries and headquartered in Singapore. See https://www.olamgroup.com/about-
`olam.html.
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`telephone calls and text messages among Defendants’ senior executives, wherein they discussed
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`market prices, including future market prices. Further, Plaintiffs’ expert economist, Dr. Michael
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`A. Williams, demonstrates that: (1) all or nearly all Class members were paid artificially depressed
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`prices for their Runners due to the Conspiracy (i.e., common impact), and (2) the damages
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`stemming from those artificially depressed prices can be established on a class-wide basis. See
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`Expert Report of Michael A. Williams, PH.D. (“Williams Rep.”), attached as Ex.2 1, ¶¶ 144-145.
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`Dr. Williams’ findings regarding common impact and aggregate Class damages are based on
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`analyses and evidence entirely common to the Class. Therefore, the Court should grant Plaintiffs’
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`motion and certify the Class.
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`II.
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiffs will prove the Conspiracy with class-wide evidence of 1) conspiratorial contacts
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`among Defendants’ senior executives, and 2) the resulting artificially deflated pricing, which
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`harmed all or virtually all Class members. Class-wide evidence will also make clear that
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`Defendants’ conspiratorial conduct took place in a market well-suited for collusion. First, the
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`selling options open to farmers are limited; the peanut shelling industry is highly concentrated and
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`Defendants control around 80% of the market. Second, Runners are a commodity, as are
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`Defendants’ shelling services, so competition among Defendants to acquire Runners from
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`Plaintiffs and Class members is based primarily on price. Third, because there are no viable
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`substitute crops for Class members to plant instead of peanuts, the Runner market is characterized
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`by inelastic supply, meaning the supply of peanuts does not decrease substantially in response to
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`price drops. Finally, Defendants’ involvement in industry trade associations, which they dominate,
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`enabled them to discuss and share exclusive market information, though as discussed herein,
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`2 “Ex.” refers to Exhibits to the Declaration of Brian D. Clark, attached to this Motion.
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`2
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`Defendants’ numerous direct contacts went way beyond mere “opportunity” contacts. For all the
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`foregoing reasons, Defendants were able to successfully implement, monitor, and enforce their
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`Conspiracy.
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`The participation of each Defendant in the Conspiracy will also be shown primarily by
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`their extensive inter-Defendant contacts, in flagrant violation of their own company antitrust
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`policies.3 Throughout the Class Period, these competitor contacts followed a familiar pattern: the
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`price-setting executive (VP of Procurement) of a Defendant corporation asks a subordinate (area
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`procurement manager) for a competitor’s pricing information. The subordinate contacts the
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`competitor to obtain the desired information. The competitor’s pricing (current and future) is then
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`reported back to the senior executive as coming from a “reliable source.” The competitor’s pricing
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`is presented to the senior executive shortly after – or even contemporaneously with – the
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`subordinate having a phone call and/or exchanging a text message with the “competitor.” And the
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`senior executive uses this information in setting artificially low Runner prices.
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`3 Golden Peanut (and its parent company, ADM) have a set of “Antitrust 101” Guidelines which
`note that “[a]ll communications with competitors pose a heightened antitrust risk” and that Golden
`Peanut employees must not enter into any agreement or understanding involving “the exchange of
`competitive price or cost information.” Ex. 31 (Golden-0003795936) at -937. The guidelines go
`on to instruct “[d]o not obtain information about a competitor’s prices directly from the
`competitor.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, Golden Peanut’s (and ADM’s) “Antitrust and
`Competition Guidelines” instruct that employees must “keep your contact with competitors to
`only the minimum and absolutely necessary level and then pursue only legitimate contact that
`is compliant with antitrust law . . . .” Ex. 30 (Golden-0004025576) at -577 (emphasis added). It
`further instructs that “[a]ny exchange of competitively-sensitive information between [Golden
`Peanut] and its competitors may be considered a violation of competition or antitrust law. It is
`important to avoid exchanging confidential business information with competitors, particularly on
`the following topics: prices (e.g., rebate policy, current prices, planned price increases or
`reductions) . . . .” Id. at -579 (emphasis added). Notably, Birdsong has refused to produce
`information regarding the antitrust guidelines on which its own employees received training, which
`is the subject of a motion to compel. See Pltfs. Mot. to Compel (ECF 224).
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`3
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`Of course, at the class certification stage, Plaintiffs need not establish the existence of the
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`Conspiracy on the merits; Plaintiffs need only show that their claims can be resolved with evidence
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`predominantly common to the Class. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 568 U.S.
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`455, 465-66 (2013); see also Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 2009). This case
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`is no different than the numerous antitrust price-fixing cases that federal courts across the country
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`have certified as class actions. In one similar nation-wide price-fixing case, In re Titanium Dioxide
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`Antitrust Litig., 284 F.R.D. 328, 340-50 (D. Md. 2012), amended by 962 F. Supp. 2d 840 (D. Md.
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`2013), the court relied on Fourth Circuit precedent in certifying a class of titanium dioxide buyers.4
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`As in that case, this trial will focus almost entirely on common, class-wide proof regarding whether
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`Defendants conspired to artificially depress Runner prices paid to Class members, and the resulting
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`harm to the Class. See id. at 348 (“It does not take a crystal ball to predict the way this case will
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`play out at trial—Plaintiffs will overwhelmingly rely on common evidence to prove the existence
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`of a price-fixing conspiracy.”); In re Polyester Staple Antitrust Litig., No. 3:03-CV-1516, 2007
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`WL 2111380, at *14 (W.D.N.C. July 19, 2007) (Proving the conspiracy with common evidence,
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`including witness testimony, documents and expert testimony relating to Defendants’ pricing and
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`conduct, is almost certainly “the predominant common issue for trial.”).
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`III. LEGAL STANDARDS
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`To certify this class, the Court must find that each FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) and (b)(3)
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`requirement has been met by a preponderance of the evidence. See Krakauer v. Dish Network,
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`4 Very recently, a class of direct purchasers of the brand name drug Zetia was certified in an
`antitrust case alleging an unlawful reverse payment agreement intended to delay the entry of
`generic competition to the brand name drug. In re: Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litig., No. 2:18-md-
`2836, 2020 WL 3446895, at *1, *34 (E.D. Va. June 18, 2020) (Miller, M.J.), report and
`recommendation adopted, No. 2:18-md-2836, 2020 WL 4917625, at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 21, 2020)
`(Beach Smith, J.).
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`4
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`L.L.C., 925 F.3d 643, 654-55 (4th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.Ct. 676 (2019) (citation omitted);
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`Titanium Dioxide, 284 F.R.D. at 336. Plaintiffs have done just that, and also satisfy the implicit
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`requirement that a class be “‘ascertainable’ by the court through ‘objective criteria.’” Amaya v.
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`DGS Constr., LLC, 326 F.R.D. 439, 446 (D. Md. 2018) (citing EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d
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`347, 359-60 (4th Cir. 2014)).
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`The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “federal courts should ‘give Rule 23 a liberal rather
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`than a restrictive construction, adopting a standard of flexibility in application which will in the
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`particular case best serve the ends of justice for the affected parties and promote judicial
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`efficiency.’” Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re
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`A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir. 1980)); accord Bell v. WestRock CP, LLC, No. 3:17-CV-
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`829, 2019 WL 1874694, at *2 n.3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 26, 2019). Further, “Merits questions may be
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`considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether the
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`Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Amgen, 568 U.S. at 466 (citations
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`omitted).
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`Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that Rule 23’s predominance requirement is
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`“readily met in certain cases alleging … violations of the antitrust laws.” Amchem Prod., Inc. v.
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`Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997); see also 6 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions
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`§ 20:52 (5th ed. 2011) (“Classes alleging horizontal price-fixing conspiracies will typically satisfy
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`the predominance requirement because all of the customers that purchased the product from the
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`defendants paid higher prices than they would have paid absent the anticompetitive acts and were
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`therefore impacted in the same way.”) (citations omitted). Consistent with that observation, courts
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`5
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`in this Circuit have routinely certified classes in horizontal price-fixing actions.5 This Sherman
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`Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, price fixing case, like Titanium Dioxide, focuses on two issues, both of which
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`will be proven with class-wide evidence — proof of the Conspiracy and its impact on prices.
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`IV. ARGUMENT
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`A.
`
`Rule 23(a) is Satisfied and the Class is Ascertainable.
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`Under Rule 23(a), the Class must satisfy four prerequisites: “(1) numerosity of parties; (2)
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`commonality of factual or legal issues; (3) typicality of claims and defenses of class
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`representatives; and (4) adequacy of representation.” Gunnells, 348 F.3d at 423.
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`Numerosity. Rule 23(a)(1), which requires a sufficient number of Class members, is
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`satisfied here given that the Class is comprised of almost 12,000 farmers that are geographically
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`dispersed across the Southern and Southeastern U.S. Williams Rep. ¶ 135. “[C]ourts find classes
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`of at least 40 members sufficiently large to satisfy the impracticability requirement [of Rule
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`23(a)(1)].” Peoples v. Wendover Funding, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 492, 497 (D. Md. 1998) (citations
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`omitted).
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`Commonality. Rule 23(a)(2) requires questions of law or fact common to the Class. At
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`least one common issue must be central to the action. As the Supreme Court recently noted, “a
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`common contention … must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which
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`means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
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`each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
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`The existence of a conspiracy is the central issue in the case and “in the antitrust context, ‘courts
`
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`5 See, e.g., Titanium Dioxide, 284 F.R.D. 328; Polyester Staple, 2007 WL 2111380; DeLoach v.
`Philip Morris Co., 206 F.R.D. 551 (M.D.N.C. 2002); Technical Learning Collective, Inc. v.
`Daimler Benz Aktiengesellschaft, No. N-77-1443, 1979 WL 1718 (D. Md. July 2, 1979); In re
`Indep. Gas. Antitrust Litig., 79 F.R.D. 552 (D. Md. 1978).
`
`6
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`

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`have held that the existence of an alleged conspiracy or monopoly is a common issue that will
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`satisfy’ the commonalty requirement.” Titanium Dioxide, 284 F.R.D. at 337 (citations omitted).
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`Typicality. Rule 23(a)(3) requires that Plaintiffs’ claims be typical of those of the Class.
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`“[T]he typicality requirement determines ‘whether a sufficient relationship exists between the
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`injury to the named plaintiff and the conduct affecting the class, so that the court may properly
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`attribute a collective nature to the challenged conduct.’” Titanium Dioxide, 284 F.R.D. at 338. In
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`antitrust cases, typicality “‘will be established by plaintiffs and all class members alleging the same
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`antitrust violations by defendants.’” Am. Sales Co., LLC v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2:14CV361, 2017 WL
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`3669604, at *11 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2017) (Miller, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, No.
`
`2:14CV361, 2017 WL 3669097 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2017) (Wright Allen, J.); accord Titanium
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`Dioxide, 284 F.R.D. at 339. Plaintiffs allege they were injured in the same way the Class was
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`injured: by Defendants artificially stabilizing and/or depressing the prices they paid for Runners.
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`The facts necessary to advance Plaintiffs’ claims are the same as those for other Class members.
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`Plaintiffs’ claims therefore satisfy typicality.
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`Adequacy. Rule 23(a)(4) requires that a class action may be maintained if “‘the
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`representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,’” see Sharp
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`Farms v. Speaks, 917 F.3d 276, 290 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted), and are able to do so without
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`a fundamental conflict of interest. See Titanium Dioxide, 284 F.R.D. at 338 (citing Gunnells, 348
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`F.3d at 430-31). Plaintiffs have advanced the interests of the proposed Class vigorously and
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`without any conflicts, let alone fundamental conflicts.6 In this case, as in other price-fixing actions,
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`the incentives of Plaintiffs and other Class members are aligned. See id. at 339.
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`6 See Clark Decl., ¶¶ 39-47.
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`7
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`Rule 23(a)(4) also requires that Interim Co-Lead Counsel protect the interests of the Class
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`and to do so without conflicts of interest.7 Interim Co-Lead Counsel Kimberly A. Justice and Brian
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`D. Clark, and Interim Liaison Counsel Wyatt B. Durrette, Jr. have (1) extensive experience
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`prosecuting antitrust, class action, and complex civil litigation, (2) no conflicts of interest with
`
`Plaintiffs or the Class, and (3) the resources to effectively litigate the action.8 See Am. Sales, 2017
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`WL 3669604, at *13.
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`Ascertainability. In addition, “‘a class cannot be certified unless a court can readily
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`identify the class members in reference to objective criteria.’” Krakauer, 925 F.3d at 654-55
`
`(citation omitted). Here, Class members can readily be identified using objective criteria, i.e.,
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`persons or entities who sold Runners to Defendants or pursuant to contracts with Defendants
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`during the Class Period. Defendants’ transactional purchase and contract data identifies all Class
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`members, see Williams Rep. ¶ 135, and that is legally sufficient. Soutter v. Equifax Info. Servs.,
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`LLC, 307 F.R.D. 183, 197-98 (E.D. Va. 2015) (Payne, J.).
`
`B.
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`Plaintiffs Satisfy the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
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`Rule 23(b)(3) requires that “questions of law or fact common to class members
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`predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,” and that “a class action is
`
`
`7 “Congress in 2003 ‘adopted Rule 23(g) that creates an explicit textual mooring for the class
`counsel analysis[,] but most courts continue to employ the substantive standards generated under
`Rule 23(a)(4) prior to Rule 23(g)’s adoption in their analysis of counsel’s adequacy.’” Sharp, 917
`F.3d at 290 n.7 (quoting 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 3:72 (5th ed. 2011)).
`8 See Pls.’ Mem. In Supp. of Mot. to Appoint Interim Co-Lead Counsel, ECF No. 44 (Sept. 27,
`2019) (summarizing Ms. Justice, Mr. Clark, Mr. Durrette and their team’s extensive experience in
`prosecuting antitrust class actions); see also Declaration of Brian D. Clark, ¶ 48 (providing updated
`details regarding interim co-lead and liaison counsel’s efforts to advance this litigation since being
`appointed in December 2019).
`
`8
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`Case 2:19-cv-00463-RAJ-LRL Document 241 Filed 09/10/20 Page 15 of 37 PageID# 4565
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`superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” FED.
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`R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
`
`1.
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`Common Questions of Law or Fact Predominate.
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`Predominance requires that “questions common to the class predominate, not that those
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`questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.” Amgen, 568 U.S. at 459. “Rule
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`23(b)(3) … does not require a plaintiff seeking class certification to prove that each ‘elemen[t] of
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`[her] claim [is] susceptible to classwide proof,’” but rather that “common questions ‘predominate
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`over any questions affecting only individual [class] members.’” Id. at 469 (citation omitted)
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`(emphasis in original); accord Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016).
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`When considering the predominance requirement, “‘a court’s rigorous analysis begins with the
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`elements of the underlying cause of action.’” Titanium Dioxide, 284 F.R.D. at 344 (citation
`
`omitted). “[T]here are three essential elements in every private anti-trust action: … (1) a violation
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`of the anti-trust law, (2) direct injury to the plaintiff from such violations, and (3) damages
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`sustained by the plaintiff.” Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 65 (4th Cir. 1977).
`
`a)
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`Common Evidence Will Prove a Violation of Section 1 of the
`Sherman Act.
`
`
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`Proof of a price-fixing conspiracy is particularly well suited for class treatment. Titanium
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`Dioxide, 284 F.R.D. at 344, 348; Polyester Staple, 2007 WL 2111380, at *14 (citing 6 Newberg
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`on Class Actions, § 18.28 at 102 (4th ed. 2002)); DeLoach, 206 F.R.D. at 560-61. Just like plaintiffs
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`in the many horizontal price-fixing classes certified across the country,9 Plaintiffs here will offer
`
`
`9 In addition to authority in this Circuit, see also, e.g., Kleen Prods. LLC v. Int’l Paper Co., 831
`F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2016); In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2015); In re Urethane
`Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2014); In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517
`(6th Cir. 2008); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2002); In re
`Capacitors Antitrust Litig., No. 17-md-02801-JD, 2018 WL 5980139 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2018);
`
`
`9
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`

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`Case 2:19-cv-00463-RAJ-LRL Document 241 Filed 09/10/20 Page 16 of 37 PageID# 4566
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`evidence common to the class to prove Defendants conspired to stabilize and/or depress the price
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`paid to farmers for Runners.
`
`i.
`
`Throughout the Class Period, Defendants Unlawfully
`Communicated on Purchase Prices, Harming Plaintiffs and
`the Class.
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`Throughout the Class Period, Defendants engaged in a continuous course of conduct to
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`exchange information regarding prices offered to Class members for Runners, including future
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`pricing information, that was then used to coordinate prices among Defendants.10 The evidence
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`will consist of internal emails in which senior Defendant executives passed competitive pricing
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`information to top management shortly after (or even during) texts and/or phone calls with
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`competitors, which will be established with emails, phone records and deposition testimony. This
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`common, class-wide proof of Conspiracy also demonstrates impact across all Class members,
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`because the prices discussed are market-wide and not specific to a particular farmer. While
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`Plaintiffs have only taken five depositions to date, with roughly another 25 scheduled or being
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`scheduled, the record already contains significant class-wide evidence of Conspiracy. Below is the
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`kind of class-wide evidence throughout the Class Period that will establish the Conspiracy.
`
`
`In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2437, 2017 WL 3623466 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23,
`2017); In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 319 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. P