Case 2:24-cv-00321-EWH-DEM Document 25 Filed 08/26/24 Page 1 of 24 PageID# 269
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`THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`NORFOLK DIVISION
`
`Plaintiff,
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`
`SOUNDCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES LLC, §
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`
`§
`
`
`§
`
`§ Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-00321-EWH-DEM
`v.
`§
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`
`§
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`§
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`
`§
`
`
`§
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`
`§
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF GOOGLE LLC’S
`PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT UNDER RULE 12(b)(6)
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`
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-EWH-DEM Document 25 Filed 08/26/24 Page 2 of 24 PageID# 270
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
`Page
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`THE ’374 PATENT CLAIMS ARE INELIGIBLE UNDER 35 U.S.C ............................ 2
`SoundClear’s procedural points should be rejected. .............................................. 2
`SoundClear’s arguments on the merits are wrong. ................................................ 7
`One)............................................................................................................ 7
`technologies merely as a tool. .................................................................... 7
`incorrect. .................................................................................................... 9
`ordered combination (Alice Step Two). ............................................................... 12
`SoundClear misstates the legal standard. ................................................. 12
`SoundClear failed to articulate the alleged inventive concept. ................ 13
`SoundClear’s request for leave to amend should be denied. ............................... 13
`INFRINGEMENT OF THE ’819 PATENT .................................................................... 14
`SUIT AND POST-SUIT WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT ................................................ 16
`
`
`I.
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
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`
`
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`
`
`
`
`A.
`B.
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`The ’374 patent claims are directed to an abstract idea (Alice Step
`
`The claims of the ’374 patent do not recite a specific asserted
`improvement in computer capabilities, but rather invoke known
`
`SoundClear’s analyses under the three tests are cursory and
`
`C.
`
`There is no inventive concept in the claim elements individually or as an
`
`1.
`2.
`
`D.
`SOUNDCLEAR FAILS TO STATE A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR DIRECT
`
`SOUNDCLEAR FAILS TO STATE A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR BOTH PRE-
`
`-i-
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-EWH-DEM Document 25 Filed 08/26/24 Page 3 of 24 PageID# 271
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Page
`
`Cases
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) ......................................................................................................... passim
`
`Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc.,
`841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................9
`
`Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.,
`687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................3
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .............................................................................................................1, 14
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
`881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................12
`
`Beteiro, LLC v. DraftKings Inc.,
`104 F.4th 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2024) ........................................................................................11, 12
`
`Bozeman Fin. LLC v. FRB of Atlanta,
`955 F.3d 971 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..................................................................................................13
`
`CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc.,
`955 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2020)............................................................................................9, 10
`
`Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC,
`859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................4
`
`Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp.,
`951 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..................................................................................................8
`
`Data Scape Ltd. v. W. Dig. Corp.,
`816 F. App’x 461 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ..........................................................................................14
`
`Dialect, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. 1:23-cv-581, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201180 (E.D. Va. Nov. 8, 2023) ...........................10
`
`Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrain Rivera Maynez Enterprises, Inc.,
`946 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................17
`
`In re Elbaum,
`No. 2023-1418, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 33719 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 20, 2023) ................................6
`
`Elec. Commc’ns Techs., LLC v. ShoppersChoice.com, LLC,
`958 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..................................................................................................4
`
`
`
`
`
`-ii-
`
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-EWH-DEM Document 25 Filed 08/26/24 Page 4 of 24 PageID# 272
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
`830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..............................................................................................2, 8
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)............................................................................................8, 10
`
`Esignature Software, LLC v. Adobe Inc.,
`No. 2023-1711, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 16253 (Fed. Cir. July 3, 2024).................................12
`
`Ficep Corp. v. Peddinghaus Corp.,
`No. 2022-1590, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 21842 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 2023) .............................13
`
`Fitbit Inc. v. AliphCom,
`No. 16-cv-00118-BLF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30721 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2,
`2017) ..........................................................................................................................................8
`
`Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C.,
`818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................6
`
`IBM Corp. v. Zillow Grp., Inc.,
`50 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ..............................................................................................7, 8
`
`Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Cap. One Fin. Corp.,
`850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017)............................................................................................8, 12
`
`Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co.,
`711 F. App’x 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ........................................................................................13
`
`Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.,
`838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016)............................................................................................6, 12
`
`Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.,
`790 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................7
`
`In re Killian,
`45 F.4th 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ..................................................................................................8
`
`McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
`837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................10
`
`Mobile Acuity Ltd. v. Blippar Ltd.,
`No. 2022-2216, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19573 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 6, 2024) .................................2
`
`Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. MModal LLC,
`2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210715 (D. Del. Dec. 14, 2018) ...................................................10, 11
`
`
`
`
`
`-iii-
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-EWH-DEM Document 25 Filed 08/26/24 Page 5 of 24 PageID# 273
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Google LLC,
`8 F.4th 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ....................................................................................................3
`
`Riggs Tech. Holdings, LLC v. Cengage Learning, Inc.,
`No. 2022-1468, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 942 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 17, 2023) ...................................13
`
`Sanderling Mgmt. v. Snap Inc.,
`65 F.4th 698 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ..............................................................................................4, 13
`
`Security First Innovations, LLC v. Google LLC,
`No. 2:23-cv-00097, ECF No. 125 (E.D. Va. Nov. 15, 2023) ..................................................17
`
`Simio, LLC v. Flexsim Software Prods.,
`983 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2020)............................................................................................4, 14
`
`Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................6
`
`TLI Commc’ns LLC v. AV Auto., L.L.C.,
`823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016)....................................................................................................5
`
`Trinity Info Media, LLC v. Covalent, Inc.,
`72 F.4th 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ..............................................................................................3, 4
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017)............................................................................................4, 11
`
`Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
`772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014)....................................................................................................5
`
`Yu v. Apple Inc.,
`1 F.4th 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ............................................................................................5, 6, 7
`
`ZapFraud, Inc. v. Barracuda Networks, Inc.,
`528 F. Supp. 3d 247 (D. Del. 2021) .........................................................................................17
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ...................................................................................................................... passim
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Rule 12(b)(6) ..............................................................................................................................3, 16
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-iv-
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`

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`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`SoundClear wrongly seeks to delay the inevitable. The ’374 patent claims are directed to
`
`an abstract idea and involve nothing more than admittedly conventional, well-known technology.
`
`Nothing in the Opposition changes this basic conclusion. Under controlling law, there is no need
`
`to engage in expensive discovery, time consuming claim construction, or a futile search for
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`inventiveness in dependent claims to avoid resolving this issue. The issue is ripe, and the Court
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`should address it now to streamline this litigation. Similarly, given the clear implausibility of the
`
`allegations for the ’819 patent, as gatekeeper, this Court should dismiss the defective claim at this
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`stage to avoid unnecessary expense and effort in this complex litigation.
`
`SoundClear’s Opposition repeatedly misstates the law and its application. For example,
`
`SoundClear cites the old “no set of facts” standard explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in
`
`Twombly and Iqbal and relies on that wrong law in its arguments. Dkt. 23 (“Opp.”) 3, 18-19.
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`As to the ’374 patent, SoundClear leads with procedure, urging this Court to postpone its
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`decision on patent eligibility because other, non-asserted claims exist (Opp. § IV.A), claim
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`construction has not happened yet (Opp. § IV.B), the asserted claims include structure (Opp. §
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`IV.C), and the Patent Office found the claims novel over the prior art (Opp. § IV.D). Each of
`
`SoundClear’s arguments contradict Federal Circuit precedent. None of those procedural points
`
`preclude dismissal, as evidenced by the scores of cases in the past decade that granted motions to
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`dismiss on patent ineligibility grounds, unless SoundClear articulates how they impact the § 101
`
`analysis. As discussed below, SoundClear has not done so. SoundClear then turns to substance but
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`has very little to say other than the asserted claims have a lot of words and appear complex.
`
`Similarly, with regard to its implausible infringement claim for the ’819 patent, SoundClear
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`again relies on procedure, wrongly arguing that discovery and claim construction are necessary.
`
`1
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`

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`
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`But neither is necessary here because the plausibility question is simple: has SoundClear plausibly
`
`alleged that the Accused Products can be put into a “locked” state as required by the asserted
`
`claim? SoundClear’s own Complaint shows the answer is “no.” In its opposition brief, SoundClear
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`appears to take the position that the volume is locked any time the user is not actively in the process
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`of adjusting the volume, even though nothing prevents a user from adjusting the volume at any
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`time. As explained in Google’s opening brief, and more below, no plausible reading of the ’819
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`patent claims support that theory.
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`Google moved to dismiss because wasteful litigation is unnecessary where, as here, the
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`questions of patent eligibility and non-infringement are ripe for resolution in Google’s favor.
`
`Dismissing the ’374 and ’819 patents now will meaningfully streamline this case, and dismissal
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`now is the correct result on the merits.
`
`II.
`
`THE ’374 PATENT CLAIMS ARE INELIGIBLE UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
`
`A.
`
`SoundClear’s procedural points should be rejected.
`
`Representative claim. SoundClear faults Google’s focus on Claim 9 of the ’374 patent,
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`Opp. 5, but overlooks a key fact: this is the only claim of the ’374 patent that SoundClear asserted
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`in the Complaint. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 59, 77. Even setting that aside, SoundClear fundamentally
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`misapprehends its burden in this context. Once Google makes “a prima facie showing that the
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`group of claims are ‘substantially similar and linked to the same’ ineligible concept,” the burden
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`shifts to SoundClear “to present non-frivolous arguments as to why the eligibility of the identified
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`representative claim cannot fairly be treated as decisive of the eligibility of all claims in the group.”
`
`Mobile Acuity Ltd. v. Blippar Ltd., No. 2022-2216, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19573, at *17 (Fed.
`
`Cir. Aug. 6, 2024). See also Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2
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`

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`
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`2016) (plaintiff failed to present “any meaningful argument for the distinctive significance of any
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`claim limitations other than those included in claim 12”). SoundClear has failed to meet its burden.
`
`Here, Google demonstrated that all claims of the ’374 patent are substantially similar to
`
`and linked to the same abstract idea as Claim 9. Dkt. 14 (“Mot.”) 5-8, 15-16; Mot., Ex. 1. In
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`response, SoundClear did not offer any arguments as to why Claim 9 cannot fairly be treated as
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`representative. Instead, SoundClear simply lists dependent claims and asserts that it “is clear” that
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`the additional limitations are material to the Alice analysis. Opp. 5. It is not. SoundClear did not
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`articulate what about those dependent claims changes the character of the claims as a whole or
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`constitutes a saving inventive concept. Therefore, this Court can–and should–treat Claim 9 as
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`representative.
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`Claim construction. SoundClear argues that dismissal is premature before claim
`
`construction. Opp. 6-7. SoundClear’s arguments err on every level. SoundClear starts by
`
`suggesting that claim construction is almost always necessary. Opp. 2 (citing Bancorp Servs., LLC
`
`v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1273-74 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). But the immediately
`
`preceding sentence makes clear that the actual rule is the exact opposite. Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d
`
`at 1273 (“claim construction is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity determination under §
`
`101.”).
`
`More recent authority re-emphasizes that the § 101 inquiry “may be, and frequently has
`
`been, resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) or (c) motion where the undisputed facts, considered under the
`
`standards required by that Rule, require a holding of ineligibility under the substantive standards
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`of law.” PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 8 F.4th 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (emphasis
`
`added). Indeed, the Federal Circuit has “repeatedly affirmed § 101 rejections at the motion to
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`dismiss stage, before claim construction or significant discovery has commenced.” Trinity Info
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`3
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`

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`
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`Media, LLC v. Covalent, Inc., 72 F.4th 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Cleveland Clinic
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`Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (collecting cases))
`
`(emphasis added).
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`Then, SoundClear identifies its burden–to explain how a claim construction dispute will
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`impact the § 101 analysis–and chooses to shirk it, asserting only that the issues are “self-evident.”
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`Opp. 7, n.3. They are not. SoundClear’s arguments are contrary to Federal Circuit precedent:
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`A patentee must do more than invoke a generic need for claim construction or discovery to
`avoid grant of a motion to dismiss under § 101. Instead, the patentee must propose a
`specific claim construction or identify specific facts that need development and explain
`why those circumstances must be resolved before the scope of the claims can be
`understood for § 101 purposes.
`Trinity, 72 F.4th at 1360-61 (emphasis added) (citing Cleveland Clinic, 859 F.3d at 1360). See
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`Simio, LLC v. Flexsim Software Prods., 983 F.3d 1353, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (plaintiff failed to
`
`explain “how it might benefit from any particular term’s construction under an Alice § 101
`
`analysis”); Elec. Commc’ns Techs., LLC v. ShoppersChoice.com, LLC, 958 F.3d 1178, 1183-84
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`(Fed. Cir. 2020) (plaintiff failed to explain “how this construction could affect the analysis.”);
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`Sanderling Mgmt. v. Snap Inc., 65 F.4th 698, 704 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (plaintiff “failed to explain why
`
`any proposed constructions were not frivolous or how its constructions would make any difference
`
`to the Alice analysis.”).
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`Even for the two claim construction “non-limiting examples” that SoundClear provides
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`(“pick-up state” and “speech quality valuation [sic] [step/unit]”), SoundClear never even attempts
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`to explain why its proposed constructions change the § 101 analysis or conclusion. The Federal
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`Circuit says this failure warrants rejecting SoundClear’s argument.1
`
`
`1 Even adopting SoundClear’s proposed constructions for “pick-up state” and “speech quality
`valuation [step/unit]” (for the purposes of this Motion only), neither alter the § 101 analysis. See
`Two-Way Media Ltd v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
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`4
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`

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`Structural limitations. SoundClear argues that the Court cannot dismiss the ’374 patent
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`yet because Google has somehow oversimplified the claims and glossed over “material” details in
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`the claims. Opp. 1, 7-9. In particular, SoundClear points to “structural portions” of Claim 9, e.g.,
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`“first pick-up unit,” “transmitter,” “light emission device,” etc. Opp. 7-8.
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`Setting aside that each of these “structural portions” were in fact addressed in Exhibit 1 to
`
`Google’s opening brief, SoundClear’s arguments are again premised on an erroneous
`
`understanding of § 101 law, which is clear that simply including tangible components does not
`
`save the claims from patent ineligibility.
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`In Alice itself, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that the claimed
`
`invention’s tangible structure somehow automatically rendered it patent eligible:
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`The fact that a computer “necessarily exist[s] in the physical, rather than purely conceptual,
`realm,” Brief for Petitioner 39, is beside the point. There is no dispute that a computer is a
`tangible system (in § 101 terms, a “machine”), or that many computer-implemented claims
`are formally addressed to patent-eligible subject matter. But if that were the end of the §
`101 inquiry, an applicant could claim any principle of the physical or social sciences by
`reciting a computer system configured to implement the relevant concept.
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 224 (2014). Reciting concrete, tangible
`
`components does not insulate the claims from patent ineligibility. See, e.g., TLI Commc’ns LLC v.
`
`AV Auto., L.L.C., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims reciting “concrete, tangible
`
`components such as ‘a telephone unit’ and a ‘server’” held patent ineligible); Yu v. Apple Inc., 1
`
`F.4th 1040, 1043-44, 1044 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (claims reciting image sensors, lenses, analog-to-
`
`digital converting circuitry, memory, and a processor held patent ineligible).
`
`
`(claims ineligible even under plaintiff’s proposed constructions). It is unclear how SoundClear’s
`“pick-up state” construction is different from limitation 9[h] (addressed in Google’s analysis). And
`SoundClear’s “speech quality valuation [step/unit]” construction simply says compare the volume
`or, vaguely, “other feature” to a reference level. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d
`709, 714-15 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (step of comparing to a value in an activity log did not change § 101
`analysis).
`
`5
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`

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`
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`Inventiveness. SoundClear argues that because the ’374 patent purports to solve a problem
`
`in the art and “distinguishes between conventional technology and the claimed improvements,”
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`that alone creates a fact issue precluding dismissal. Opp. 3-4, 8, 18-19.
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`Once again, SoundClear’s arguments are premised on an erroneous understanding of § 101
`
`law. First, patent ineligibility does not depend on utility, i.e., solving a problem. In re Elbaum, No.
`
`2023-1418, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 33719, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 20, 2023) (“[E]ven if Mr. Elbaum
`
`is correct that the claimed method provides a practical solution to a problem faced by online sellers,
`
`the utility of an abstract idea is insufficient to confer patent eligibility.”); Genetic Techs. Ltd. v.
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`Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the claims
`
`were useful and thus patent eligible as having “no basis in case law or in logic”).
`
`Second, patent ineligibility does not depend on novelty–i.e., whether that purported
`
`solution improved on the prior art. SoundClear’s argument that the claims are patent eligible
`
`because they are inventive over the prior art conflates abstractness with novelty and has been
`
`directly rejected by the Federal Circuit. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138,
`
`1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”); Intell. Ventures
`
`I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or
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`steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the
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`subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”).
`
`Third, a statement that a patent improves on the prior art is not a magical talisman that can
`
`be added to every patent to ward it against § 101. The Federal Circuit has frequently affirmed
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`claims as patent ineligible under § 101 despite patent language claiming to improve on the art. In
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`Yu, 1 F.4th at 1042-44, for example, the representative claim recited “[a]n improved digital
`
`camera” and the specification “support[ed] the contention that the asserted advance in the claims
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`6
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`
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`is the particular configuration of lenses and image sensors.” The Federal Circuit explained that the
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`representative claim’s “solution to those problems is the abstract idea itself—to take one image
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`and ‘enhance’ it with another.” Id.; see also Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790
`
`F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (dismissal on § 101 despite specification’s contention that the
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`alleged invention improved on the prior art).
`
`B.
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`SoundClear’s arguments on the merits are wrong.
`
`1.
`
`The ’374 patent claims are directed to an abstract idea (Alice Step One).
`
`Google’s opening brief showed the claims are directed to gathering sound data, analyzing
`
`that data to detect speech and evaluate its quality, and indicating the results of that analysis. Mot.
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`5-8. SoundClear disagrees, arguing the claims are directed to an improvement in computer
`
`capabilities. Opp. 8-9. But the claims do not recite any such improvement, and the law is clear that
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`claims are ineligible where, as here, the claims merely use known technology as a tool. And
`
`SoundClear’s claims still fail the three tests Google analyzed in its opening brief.
`
`2.
`
`The claims of the ’374 patent do not recite a specific asserted
`improvement in computer capabilities, but rather invoke known
`technologies merely as a tool.
`It is true that not all cases involving computers and user interfaces are necessarily patent
`
`ineligible. See Opp. 9. But that is not the right question. The correct question in this case is whether
`
`the asserted claims are patent ineligible. To answer that, the Federal Circuit has explained the
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`“inquiry often turns on whether the claims focus on specific asserted improvements in computer
`
`capabilities or instead on a process or system that qualifies [as] an abstract idea for which
`
`computers are invoked merely as a tool.” IBM Corp. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 50 F.4th 1371, 1377 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2022). The claims of the ’374 patent here do not focus on asserted improvements in computer
`
`7
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`

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`
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`capabilities suggested by Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`See Opp. 9. Rather, the claims merely invoke known technology as a tool.
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`IBM v. Zillow is instructive. There, the claims of one of the patents were directed to
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`“responding to a user’s selection of a portion of a displayed map by simultaneously updating the
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`map and a co-displayed list of items on the map.” 50 F.4th at 1377. The Federal Circuit explained
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`that “‘improving a user’s experience while using a computer application is not, without more,
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`sufficient to render the claims’ patent-eligible at step one.” Id. (quoting Customedia Techs., LLC
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`v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020)). The claims failed to “recite any
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`assertedly inventive technology for improving computers as tools” but rather were directed to “an
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`abstract idea for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Id. at 1377-78 (citations omitted).
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`The court explained:
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`Identifying, analyzing, and presenting certain data to a user is not an improvement
`specific to computing. “Merely requiring the selection and manipulation of information—
`to provide a ‘humanly comprehensible’ amount of information useful for users . . . by itself
`does not transform the otherwise-abstract processes of information collection and
`analysis.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`We have repeatedly held claims “directed
`to collection of
`information,
`comprehending the meaning of that collected information, and indication of the
`results, all on a generic computer network operating in its normal, expected manner”
`to be abstract. In re Killian, 45 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2022); see also Intell. Ventures
`I LLC v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (describing cases).
`Id. at 1378 (emphasis added). As in IBM v. Zillow, the claims at best do nothing more than turn on
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`a light if clear speech is being transmitted. SoundClear does not dispute that the claims of the ’374
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`patent do not recite any improvement to computers, microphones, transceivers, lights, or push-to-
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`talk buttons, but rather merely use those known technologies as tools. See also Fitbit Inc. v.
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`AliphCom, No. 16-cv-00118-BLF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30721, at *28-30 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2,
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`2017) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that claims directed to gathering activity data, analyzing that
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`8
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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-EWH-DEM Document 25 Filed 08/26/24 Page 14 of 24 PageID# 282
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`data, and displaying the results to users using an LED constituted a specific improvement in
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`computer capabilities). The claims of the ’374 patent are directed to an abstract idea.
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`3.
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`SoundClear’s analyses under the three tests are cursory and incorrect.
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`Case law comparison test. SoundClear does not dispute that the challenged claims can fail
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`Alice Step 1 by “compar[ing] claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an
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`abstract idea in previous cases.” Mot. 8 (citations omitted). See also Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet
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`Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (court should examine “earlier cases in which
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`a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen—what prior cases were about, and which way
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`they were decided”).
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`But rather than relying on or distinguishing similar cases involving speech recognition,
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`data processing, and indicating the results of that processing, SoundClear instead relies on
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`dissimilar cases about heart arrhythmias, database structures, 3D animation of faces, and transcript
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`cursors. In grasping to avoid the unfavorable results of similar cases, SoundClear fails to explain
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`why this Court should ignore those similar cases in favor of dissimilar ones.
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`For example, SoundClear discusses CardioNet at length, but admits that “[t]he
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`technological field in CardioNet was distinct from the case at bar.” Opp. 11. The patent in
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`CardioNet taught “systems and techniques determine the beat-to-beat variability in heart rate over
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`a series of successive heartbeats.” CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 955 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2020).2 SoundClear’s reliance on CardioNet is misplaced. Opp. 10-13. The ’374 patent here
`
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`2 The device in CardioNet “more accurately detects the occurrence of atrial fibrillation and atrial
`flutter—as distinct from V-TACH and other arrhythmias—and allows for more reliable and
`immediate treatment of these two medical conditions” and “demonstrated both high ‘positive
`predictivity’ of, and high ‘sensitivity’ to, atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter, meaning that it
`effectively avoids false positives and false negatives, respectively, in detecting these two
`conditions.” Id. at 1368-69 (citation omitted). A far cry from a light on a speaker.
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`9
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`does not involve medical devices, detecting heart rate variability, or detecting heart arrhythmias–
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`much less a specific more reliable way to detect arrhythmias. Tellingly, SoundClear fails to
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`advance any persuasive argument why a patent for detecting heart arrhythmias is somehow more
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`instructive than the cases of the same technology cited in Google’s opening brief, including
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`Dialect, a decision from the Eastern District of Virginia last year, which involved detecting speech,
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`parsing and interpreting that speech, and deciding what to do depending on the result of that
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`parsing and interpreting. Dialect, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:23-cv-581, 2023 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 201180, at *4-5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 8, 2023).
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`SoundClear fares no better with its other dissimilar cases. Opp. 9-13. Enfish involved a
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`self-referential database, which was “a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way
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`a computer stores and retrieves data in memory.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. But the ’374 patent
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`does not involve computer databases, data structures, or new ways to store and retrieve data from
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`memory. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2016),
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`involved methods for automatically animating lip synchronization and facial expressions of
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`animated 3D characters. Enfish and McRO are not remotely of “a similar or parallel descriptive
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`nature” to the claims of the ’374 patent, and certainly not more similar than Dialect.
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`SoundClear attempts to analogize to the two patents found valid in Nuance for correcting
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`transcript errors. Opp. 13-14. But those patents