Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`SOUNDCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES LLC, §
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`§
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`§
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`§ Case No. 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM
`§
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`§
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`§
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`§
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`§
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`§
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`GOOGLE LLC,
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`
`Defendant.
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`GOOGLE’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO TRANSFER TO THE
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
`
`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 63 Filed 01/06/25 Page 1 of 27 PageID# 1239
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`THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`NORFOLK DIVISION
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 63 Filed 01/06/25 Page 2 of 27 PageID# 1240
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 1
`A.
`Google’s Declarations are Reliable. ...................................................................... 1
`B.
`The Transfer Factors Weigh Heavily in Favor of Transfer. .................................. 7
`1.
`SoundClear Admits it is an NPE; Thus, its Choice of Forum
`Should Be Given Little to No Weight........................................................ 7
`The Convenience and Access of Witnesses (None of Which Are in
`Virginia) Strongly Favors Transfer. ........................................................... 8
`a.
`Party witnesses ............................................................................... 8
`b.
`Third Party Witnesses .................................................................. 12
`c.
`Summary of witnesses ................................................................. 12
`The Convenience of the Parties Strongly Favors Transfer. ..................... 14
`a.
`Ease of Access of Sources of Proof Favors Transfer. .................. 14
`b.
`Cost of Obtaining Witnesses Favors Transfer. ............................ 15
`c.
`Availability of Compulsory Process Undeniably Favor
`Transfer. ....................................................................................... 15
`The Interests of Justice Strongly Favor Transfer. .................................... 15
`4.
`The Court Should Reject SoundClear’s Plea to Ignore Established
`Authority .............................................................................................................. 17
`SoundClear’s Request for Venue Discovery Should Be Denied. ........................ 18
`D.
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 20
`
`
`I.
`II.
`
`III.
`
`
`
`
`
`C.
`
`-i-
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 63 Filed 01/06/25 Page 3 of 27 PageID# 1241
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`In re Apple Inc.,
`979 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................15
`
`Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Tex.,
`571 U.S. 49 (2013) ...................................................................................................................17
`
`Chertoff Capital, LLC v. Syversen,
`No. 20-cv-0138, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 253453 (E.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2020) .............................19
`
`Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.,
`No. 2:15-cv-21, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50253 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2015) ..............................14
`
`In re Eyewear Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 23-cv-3065, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104228 (D. Minn. June 12, 2024)...........................17
`
`Fintiv, Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,
`No. 6:18-cv-00372, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171102 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 10,
`2019) ........................................................................................................................................13
`
`Gebr. Brasseler GmbH & Co. KG v. Abrasive Tech., Inc.,
`No. 1:08-cv-1246, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25926 (E.D. Va. Mar. 27, 2009) ............................2
`
`Global Touch Solutions, LLC v. Toshiba Corp.,
`109 F. Supp. 3d 882 (E.D. Va. 2015) ..............................................................................6, 7, 16
`
`In re Google LLC,
`No. 2021-170, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 29137 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 27, 2021) ...............................11
`
`Heinz Kettler GmbH & Co. v. Razor USA, LLC,
`750 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Va. 2010) ......................................................................................11
`
`Intercarrier Commc’ns, LLC v. Glympse, Inc.,
`No. 3:12-cv-767-JAG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113572 (E.D. Va. Aug. 12,
`2013) ....................................................................................................................................8, 16
`
`In re Interior Molded Doors Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 3:18-cv-00718-JAG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36167 (E.D. Va. Mar. 6,
`2019) ........................................................................................................................................14
`
`In re Juniper Networks, Inc.,
`No. 2021-156, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 29812 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2021) ..................................13
`
`
`
`
`
`-ii-
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 63 Filed 01/06/25 Page 4 of 27 PageID# 1242
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page
`
`
`MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc.,
`467 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Va. 2006) ......................................................................................19
`
`Monarch Networking Sols. LLC v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
`No. 1:23-cv-670, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237871 (E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 2023)..................... passim
`
`NanoEnTek, Inc. v. Bio-Rad Labs.,
`No. 2:11-cv-427, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138535 (E.D. Va. Dec. 2, 2011) ............................14
`
`Price v. Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C.,
`No. 24-cv-04720 (JMW), 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190069 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18,
`2024) ........................................................................................................................................17
`
`SoundClear Techs. LLC v. Amazon.Com, Inc. et al,
`No. 1:24-cv-001283-AJT-WBP (E.D. Va.) .............................................................................15
`
`SoundClear Techs. LLC v. Amazon.Com, Inc. et al,
`No. 2:24-cv-00320-AWA-LRL (E.D. Va.) ..............................................................................15
`
`SoundClear Techs. LLC v. Google LLC,
`No. 3:24-cv-00540-MHL (E.D. Va.) .......................................................................................15
`
`Sunstone Info. Def., Inc. v. F5 Networks, Inc.,
`No. 2:21-cv-50-RCY, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234539 (E.D. Va. Dec. 7, 2021) ....................17
`
`SZ DJI Tech. Co. v. Bell Textron Inc.,
`No. 1:23-cv-931 (DJN), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181050 (E.D. Va. Oct. 6,
`2023) ........................................................................................................................................16
`
`Tate v. Brinderson Constructors, Inc.,
`No. 16-cv-4314, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178350 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2016) ..........................17
`
`ThroughPuter, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`No. 3:21-cv-216, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52720 (E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2022) ......................10, 14
`
`Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 6-19-cv-00532-ADA, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109037 (W.D. Tex. June
`22, 2020) ..................................................................................................................................13
`
`In re VistaPrint Ltd.,
`628 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................16
`
`Other Authorities
`
`FRE 104(a) .......................................................................................................................................3
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 63 Filed 01/06/25 Page 5 of 27 PageID# 1243
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page
`
`
`FRE 602 ...........................................................................................................................................4
`
`FRE 901 ...........................................................................................................................................5
`
`
`
`
`iv
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`

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`
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`SoundClear presents no facts to rebut that the NDCA is the clearly more convenient forum,
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`and that the EDVA is inconvenient in this case. Despite asserting “SoundClear forms the fabric of
`
`this District’s innovation economy,” Dkt. 61 (“Opp.”) at 2, SoundClear is unable to identify any
`
`witnesses in the EDVA with relevant information. SoundClear is also unable to refute Google’s
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`reliable declarations demonstrating that the overwhelming majority of evidence and material
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`witnesses are located in the NDCA. SoundClear also has no law to rely on. It urges the Court
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`instead to ignore decades of established authority and to create a new standard that says Google
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`should never be able to transfer venue in any case for convenience by the mere fact that it is
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`Google.
`
`SoundClear’s attempts to distract from the merits should be disregarded. And its invitation
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`that the Court ignore established law should be declined. In short, nothing in SoundClear’s
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`opposition refutes that the NDCA is the clearly more convenient forum and that the EDVA is an
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`inconvenient forum. This case should therefore be transferred to the NDCA.
`
`II.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`Google’s Declarations are Reliable.
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`Unable to build up reasons to support its position, SoundClear spends most of its opposition
`
`attempting to tear down the declarations Google filed in support of its motion to transfer (Dkts.
`
`57-2–57-4, collectively “Google Declarations”). Each attempt fails. The declarations provide
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`reliable fact testimony showing why transfer is warranted in this case.
`
`SoundClear mischaracterizes the declarant investigations. SoundClear claims that
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`“Google admitted that ‘Google’s attorneys organized [and] conducted this investigation.’” Opp.
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`11; see also id. 13 (“Google’s lawyers unequivocally stated that outside counsel conducted the
`
`investigation”), 26. The email that SoundClear relies on to make this claim involved Google
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`

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`
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`explaining that discovery into the declarants’ investigation was unwarranted and, to the extent
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`SoundClear sought how Google’s attorneys organized and conducted the investigation
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`(investigation done at direction of counsel for the purposes of litigation and involving attorney-
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`client communications), then that particular information was also privileged. Id., Ex. 2, at 3.1
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`Discovery into any non-privileged information is also not justified here. SoundClear does not
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`provide evidence of “any fraud or intentional misconduct” that would necessitate discovery.
`
`Monarch Networking Sols. LLC v. Juniper Networks, Inc., No. 1:23-cv-670, 2023 U.S. Dist.
`
`LEXIS 237871, at *8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 2023) (“Monarch”). Regardless, counsel had to have been
`
`involved in organizing and conducting the investigation. It would make no sense for a Google
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`engineer to independently seek out SoundClear’s complaint, analyze it without guidance or
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`context, and submit a declaration regarding the locations of employees who work on the
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`functionalities referred to in the complaint. SoundClear’s implication is that because counsel was
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`involved, counsel must have reported the facts in bad faith. SoundClear’s accusation is completely
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`unfounded and false. The declarants noted in their declarations that they were speaking from
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`personal knowledge including their own investigation. See Dkt. 57-2 ⁋⁋ 1, 6; Dkt. 57-3 ⁋⁋ 1, 5;
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`Dkt. 57-4 ⁋ 1.
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`SoundClear claims it is improper for Google to identify who it anticipates will testify.
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`SoundClear also asserts that the declarations are not reliable because Google identified individuals
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`it believes will be relevant, non-cumulative witnesses. Opp. 10 (attacking Google’s statements
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`about who it “anticipates” will be witnesses). Google identifying relevant witnesses for this case
`
`is entirely proper, normal, and how all litigations work. As courts in this District have found, “[a]
`
`
`1 Notably, when SoundClear first misquoted Google over email (Opp., Ex. 2, at 2), Google
`corrected it and noted the mischaracterization was “not productive” (id. at 1). Notwithstanding,
`SoundClear elected to make this same mischaracterization to the Court.
`
`2
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`

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`
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`‘motion to transfer venue must be brought at an early stage in litigation when it is typically difficult
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`to anticipate the identity of trial witnesses, or the matters upon which they will testify’ . . . . A
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`court must therefore rely on preliminary assessments of preliminary lists of witnesses.” Monarch
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`at *18–19 (citations omitted).
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`SoundClear claims that the language in the declarations is “ambiguous.” See Opp. 13–
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`14. Not so. For example, SoundClear claims not to understand what a “majority”2 is or what it
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`means when an employee can “speak to” particular topics. Id. This could not be more clear.
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`SoundClear spending a majority of its brief urging this Court to reject on-point legal authority and
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`then feigning confusion about the Google Declarations speaks to SoundClear’s inability to engage
`
`with the merits of Google’s motion.
`
`SoundClear also asserts that no details are provided as to how relevant teams were
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`identified (Opp. 14), but as Google’s motion makes clear, the declarations identify individuals and
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`teams who work on the accused products and features as defined in SoundClear’s complaint. Dkt.
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`57-1 (“Mot.”) at 2–9. Google went above and beyond in meeting the standard of identifying “the
`
`prospective witness and specifically describ[ing] their proposed testimony.” Gebr. Brasseler
`
`GmbH & Co. KG v. Abrasive Tech., Inc., No. 1:08-cv-1246, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25926, at *11
`
`(E.D. Va. Mar. 27, 2009). The declarations name particular employees, what they work or worked
`
`on, and where they are located. See Google Declarations. Google then explained at length why
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`each individual was expected to be a material and non-cumulative witness in this case based on
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`the allegations in the complaint. Mot. 5–9. None of SoundClear’s purported confusion about the
`
`language in the declarations changes that.
`
`
`2 This is despite SoundClear also using the word “majority” in their opposition multiple times. See
`Opp. 3, 24 (claiming that “the majority of Google’s witnesses testified remotely at trial”).
`
`3
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`

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`SoundClear also incorrectly states that the declarations “offer no details on where
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`development or maintenance” of functionalities is performed. Opp. 14. As outlined (by accused
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`functionality) in Google’s motion and supported by the Google Declarations, Google identified
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`the teams and people involved with development, maintenance, and operation of the accused
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`functionalities and where those teams and people sit. Mot. 5–9; see also Google Declarations.
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`Faced with the reality that the declarants provided this information, SoundClear next asserts that
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`these are merely “empty words” because it cannot distinguish between “design, development, and
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`maintenance.” Opp. 15. But it does not need to. The declarations establish that any relevant design,
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`development, and maintenance took place primarily in the same place, the NDCA. Mot. 5–9; see
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`also Google Declarations. If it took place anywhere else by a minority of team members, the
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`declarations so state. Id.
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`SoundClear argues that the Google Declarations fail to satisfy the Federal Rules of
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`Evidence. Opp. 12 n.29, 13–16. SoundClear then throws everything at the wall, running through
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`eight different rules of evidence, searching for some foothold to challenge the Google
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`Declarations. SoundClear is wrong across the board. For example, SoundClear states without any
`
`explanation that it objects under FRE 104. Opp. 12 n.29. But FRE 104(a) says “the court must
`
`decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or
`
`evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on
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`privilege.” FRE 104(a). This suggests that the Court can decide admissibility without being bound
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`by evidence rules.
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`SoundClear then claims that the declarations are improper under FRE 602. Opp. 13. Rule
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`602 states “[a] witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support
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`a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal
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`4
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`knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony.” FRE 602. Each declarant clearly states
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`that they have “personal knowledge of the following facts” and that certain information was
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`obtained, e.g., “as part of [their] job.” See Dkt. 57-2 ⁋⁋ 1, 5 (“As part of my job, I also obtained
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`historical knowledge about aspects of the people and teams that were involved in designing and
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`developing the Google Products”); Dkt. 57-3 ⁋ 1; Dkt. 57-4 ⁋⁋ 1, 4. The declarations that refer to
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`facts about other, specific individuals additionally state that this information is based on their
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`personal knowledge including knowledge they obtained “based on [their] investigation.” Dkt. 57-
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`2 ⁋ 6; Dkt. 57-3 ⁋ 5.
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`SoundClear then criticizes Mr. Cheung’s declaration, claiming he provides “no basis at all
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`for his personal knowledge.” Opp. 13. Mr. Cheung states, e.g., that he is “based in Google’s
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`Mountain View, California Headquarters.” Dkt. 57-4 ⁋ 2. And “[a]s a Senior Staff Hardware
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`Engineer Manager. . . I am knowledgeable about the development and operation of Google Nest
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`and Google Home hardware, including on-device processors, memory, microphones, LEDs, LED
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`control components, volume control components, transmitter components, and speakers.” Id. ⁋⁋
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`4–5. The basis for Mr. Cheung’s statements—where he lives and what he works on— is self-
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`evident. As for other statements regarding, e.g., team members (id. ⁋ 6), Mr. Cheung was likewise
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`clear that “as part of my job responsibilities, I am familiar with hardware components of the
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`Google Products and the teams that work on these components.” Id. ⁋ 4. Accordingly, Mr. Cheung
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`provided the basis for his knowledge.
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`Thus, in light of the witnesses’ testimony that they have personal knowledge of the facts
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`contained in their declaration (including knowledge obtained through their job responsibilities or
`
`investigation), the declarants affirmed that they are knowledgeable about the facts they testified
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`to, which relate to their work and knowledge of teams and individuals they interact with.
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`5
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`
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`Next, SoundClear throws in a citation, without any explanation whatsoever, suggesting that
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`the Google Declarations violate FRE 901. See Opp. 12 n.29, 13. That rule relates to authenticating
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`“an item of evidence” and producing “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what
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`the proponent claims it is.” FRE 901. SoundClear’s invocation of Rule 901 is unfounded. The
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`declarants provided sworn statements and stated they had personal knowledge of the information
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`contained in those statements. See Google Declarations. They also included the basis for that
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`knowledge. Id.
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`SoundClear then cites two rules governing opinion testimony, arguing that the information
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`contained in the Google Declarations are opinions, including expert opinions, subject to FRE 701
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`and 702. Opp. 12 n.19, 13–16. But the information contained in the declarations are plainly facts,
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`not opinions. For example, they relate to which witnesses work on what functionalities and where
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`those witnesses are located. See Google Declarations. Those cannot rationally be called opinions.
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`SoundClear claims that the declarants each “opine” on what matters are “relevant to this litigation.”
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`Opp. 15. But when the declarants describe employees with “relevant knowledge” to the litigation
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`they identify specifically the facts included in their declaration that are relevant. See Dkt. 57-2 ⁋
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`8; Dkt. 57-3 ⁋ 6; Dkt. 57-4 ⁋ 7. Regardless, what is important is that the declarants confirmed
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`where employees who worked on the particularly identified functionalities are located and where
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`documents were created and maintained. Those are not opinions.
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`SoundClear also throws in some hearsay objections for good measure. But the Court can
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`dispose of these objections easily because SoundClear summarily asserts that the declarations are
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`“hearsay” but provides no additional detail or any examples. See Opp. 12–13. According to
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`SoundClear’s unsupported argument, all declarations would be considered hearsay. In reality, the
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`declarations are supported by personal knowledge and investigation. See, e.g., Dkt. 57-2 ⁋ 5
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`6
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`
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`(stating Mr. Haire has “historical knowledge about aspects of the people and teams that were
`
`involved in designing and developing the Google Products”); Dkt. 57-3 ⁋ 5(b) (“Given our
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`working relationship, I am familiar with some aspects of Mr. Clark’s knowledge related to the
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`Google Products.”); Dkt. 57-4 ⁋ 4 (“I am familiar with hardware components of the Google
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`Products and the teams that work on these components.”).
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`Accordingly, SoundClear’s various attempts to attack the Google Declarations are nothing
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`more than distractions from the merits, which show that transfer to the NDCA is clearly warranted
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`in this case.
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`B.
`
`The Transfer Factors Weigh Heavily in Favor of Transfer.
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`Once SoundClear’s many attempts to knock down the Google Declarations are rejected,
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`the remainder of SoundClear’s argument falls apart.
`
`1.
`
`SoundClear Admits it is an NPE; Thus, its Choice of Forum Should Be
`Given Little to No Weight.
`
`SoundClear does not dispute that it is a non-practicing entity. Opp. 3 n.12. Thus, it is
`
`irrefutable that its choice of forum is entitled to little to no weight. As courts in this District have
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`repeatedly found “it may be appropriate to afford a plaintiff’s choice of forum ‘minimal weight,’
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`when the plaintiff has few business activities in the district and is appropriately classified as a
`
`‘non-practicing entity.’” Global Touch Solutions, LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 109 F. Supp. 3d 882, 896
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`(E.D. Va. 2015) (citing cases). SoundClear does not distinguish Google’s cited authority on this
`
`point. Instead, it argues that SoundClear is a startup with lofty and vague aspirations and not a
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`“patent troll” (which is a term first used by SoundClear in its opposition). Opp. 2–4. But this is a
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`strawman argument. The parties agree that SoundClear is an NPE. And an NPE’s choice of forum
`
`should be entitled to little to no weight. Global Touch, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 896. Likewise, it matters
`
`not what SoundClear may one day become. See Opp. 18 (baldly stating that there will “come a
`
`7
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`
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`day” when SoundClear will research and develop new technology in the EDVA). It defies common
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`sense to take into account unsupported facts that have not occurred. The facts are clear: SoundClear
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`purchased patents, and its New York president incorporated here to file lawsuits against Google
`
`and Amazon in this court. SoundClear does not dispute that is all it has done in its entire existence.
`
`SoundClear argues that “the proper inquiry is into the actual contacts SoundClear has with
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`the District.” Opp. 18. The parties agree SoundClear’s relevant contacts are fair game for
`
`consideration. As SoundClear admits, however, its only contacts with this district are that it is
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`incorporated here and that “[i]t brought its lawsuits here.” Id. It has no employees here. It has no
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`leadership here. It makes and offers no products for sale here. It neither owns nor leases any real
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`property here; only virtual space. See Mot. 4, 10–12. In short, it has little if no meaningful contacts
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`with this district and its choice is not entitled to significant weight. Consequently, “the
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`metaphorical ‘bar’ has been lowered” for Google to demonstrate that transfer is appropriate. See
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`Global Touch, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 899.
`
`2.
`
`The Convenience and Access of Witnesses (None of Which Are in
`Virginia) Strongly Favors Transfer.
`
`a.
`
`Party witnesses
`
`SoundClear identifies no witnesses with relevant knowledge in the EDVA. It concedes that
`
`it has only two party witnesses of its own—SoundClear President Joon Yoon and Chief
`
`Technology Officer Dr. Christopher Gittins—who are both outside of the EDVA; one of them
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`lives out of the country. Opp. 19. SoundClear does not articulate what either of them actually does
`
`nor does it explain how its Chief Technology Officer is relevant at this point. In contrast, Google
`
`identified numerous witnesses within the NDCA that are knowledgeable about and worked directly
`
`on the development, operation, and maintenance of the features and products accused in this case.
`
`Mot. 5–9, 12–14, and Google Declarations. Thus, this factor weighs heavily in favor of transfer
`
`8
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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 63 Filed 01/06/25 Page 14 of 27 PageID# 1252
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`“[b]ecause patent infringement actions typically involve the testimony of those associated with the
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`development and production of the allegedly infringing product, the preferred forum in patent
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`infringement actions is the hub of activity centered around the infringing product’s production.”
`
`Intercarrier Commc’ns, LLC v. Glympse, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-767-JAG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`
`113572, at *13–14 (E.D. Va. Aug. 12, 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`Faced with the reality that no witnesses are in the EDVA and that a significant number of
`
`witnesses are in the NDCA, SoundClear argues that this factor should not apply to Google for the
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`mere fact that it is Google. SoundClear claims that Google is “internationally present.” Opp. 6; see
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`also 20. But what matters is where the individuals relevant to this litigation are located. See
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`Intercarrier Commc’ns, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113572, at *13–14. SoundClear’s cases (which
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`confusingly address a factor considered in the District of Delaware: “where the claims arose”)
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`even reach the same conclusion. See Opp. 25 (citing Ithica Ventures K.S. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
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`No. 13-824-GMS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135734, at *9 (D. Del. Sep. 26, 2014) (finding this factor
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`in favor of transfer where Nintendo developed the products from Washington and “[b]eyond sales
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`of the accused products, no activity relating to the products takes place in Delaware.”); ChriMar
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`Sys. v. Cisco Sys., No. 11-1050-GMS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30205, at *16 (D. Del. Mar. 6, 2013)
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`(favoring transfer to a District where “the design, development, marketing, and sale of the accused
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`products largely occurred . . . .”)).
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`SoundClear insinuates that Google’s identified witnesses should be discounted because
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`they might work remotely from anywhere in the world, but this assertion is unfounded and
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`contradicted by the Google Declarations, which outline that the witnesses are primarily located in
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`the NDCA. See Google Declarations. In fact, where one witness (Mr. Clark) works remotely, the
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`declaration specifically states that Mr. Clark works remotely from San Leandro, California (in the
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`NDCA). Dkt. 57-3 ⁋ 5(b). Moreover, the articles SoundClear cites regarding Google’s allowance
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`of remote work (Opp. 6–8) confirm that employees are not working solely remotely (if they work
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`remotely at all). Instead, Google “expects most employees to spend at least three days a week at
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`the office” and Google “integrat[es] office attendance into performance reviews.” Opp., Ex. 17, at
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`2. None of this negates the fact that these witnesses are not present in any capacity in Virginia.
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`Thus, it would be inconvenient for them to travel there.
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`SoundClear next claims that it identified “637 people [who] are current or former Google
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`employees in the D.C. / Virginia Area.” Opp. 1. But the proper inquiry is relevance and materiality
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`to this case. SoundClear does not even allege that any of the 637 people have relevant knowledge.
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`Opp. 1. They appear not to, which is consistent with the Google Declarations.3 Moreover, even if
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`it were appropriate to consider current and former Google employees that simply reside in a
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`particular forum, SoundClear does not want to get into a battle of the numbers here; there are far
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`more current and former Google employees in or around the NDCA because that is the “strategic
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`center of Google’s business.” Mot. 5. In fact, the same LinkedIn search that SoundClear apparently
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`performed (searching “Google” on LinkedIn and filtering for Virginia and D.C.) yields over
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`100,000 results (compared to SoundClear’s 637) filtering for individuals in the Bay Area instead.
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`Ex. 10. SoundClear’s argument favors Google in the end.
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`3 In support, SoundClear cites to Exhibit 1 of its Opposition, which shows one page of search
`results from an unidentified search; although the search appears to merely have been for “Google”
`based on the bolded text in the results. Id. Many of these individuals are in Washington D.C., and
`not the EDVA. The others in Virginia do not appear to have any relevant knowledge to this case
`based on the cited LinkedIn profiles. For example, Sean Rastatter works on AI, Jim Tulio works
`on “Global Network Delivery”, Dr. Nicole K. Henley’s work relates to “Global Server
`Operations,” Jonathan Miller is commercial counsel, Eliot Danner works on “Google Distributed
`Cloud,” and Jared Awner does not appear to have worked at Google at all. None of this experience
`appears relevant to the allegations in this case. Id.
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`SoundClear claims that Google failed to identify four employees who work on marketing
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`of the Google Nest products in Washington D.C., New York, and Boston. Opp. 26. None of these
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`individuals are in the EDVA. And none of the submitted LinkedIn profiles rebut that “[t]he team
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`knowledgeable about marketing for the Google Products is based entirely in Mountain View and
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`San Francisco.”4 Dkt. 57-2 ⁋ 7(a). The profiles likewise do not indicate that these witnesses would
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`“have any special knowledge of the Accused Products to distinguish them from [Defendant’s]
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`employees throughout the nation” including relating to the development, operation, or
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`maintenance of the accused products or features. Monarch, at *20.
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`SoundClear implores the Court to find that “no clearly convenient forum exists for
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`Google.” Opp. 20. That is not the case. As established in Google’s motion to transfer, Google
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`employees with relevant and non-cumulative knowledge reside primarily in the NDCA. See Mot.
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`5–9. It is indisputable that travelling to the EDVA is inconvenient for these witnesses as compared
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`to the NDCA. At bottom, SoundClear argues that the inconvenience of Messrs. Haire, Gruenstein,
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`Partridge, Narayanan, Coursey, Clark, Cheung, and any member of the relevant marketing team
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`should be disregarded because they work for Google. The Court should reject this attempt and
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`instead adhere to the numerous cases of this District finding that material and relevant witnesses
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`drive analysis of this factor. See Mot. 12–16; see also ThroughPuter, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No.
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`3:21-cv-216, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52720, at *31–32 (E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2022) (finding this
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`factor strongly in favor of transfer given “the significantly higher number of potential witnesses
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`located in [the transferee forum] and the importance of their testimony in relation to the record”).
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`4 Sarah Hatfield (Opp., Ex. 27) is located in Boston and her LinkedIn profile simply lists her as
`“Director Nest Business”; Anthony Harris (Opp., Ex. 28) and Austin Simmons (Opp., Ex. 29) are
`sales managers for Mosaic working with the Google Nest product and are both based in
`Washington D.C.; and Tyler Burcher-DuPont (Opp., Ex. 30) is located in New York a