Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 1 of 16 PageID# 1307
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`NORFOLK DIVISION
`
`SOUNDCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`PLAINTIFF SOUNDCLEAR’S MEMORANDUM IN
`SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO CONDUCT VENUE DISCOVERY
`
`
`
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 2 of 16 PageID# 1308
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`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
`
`Procedural Background and Meet and Confer .................................................................... 4
`
`Legal Standards ................................................................................................................... 5
`
`Proposed Discovery ............................................................................................................ 6
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Interrogatories ......................................................................................................... 6
`
`Depositions ............................................................................................................. 7
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`V.
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`Argument ............................................................................................................................ 7
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Information as to Teams Considered and Ignored .................................................. 8
`
`Examination on Foundation of Opinion Testimony ................................................ 9
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`Information as to Omitted Witnesses .................................................................... 10
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`VI.
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`Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 11
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`
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`i
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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 3 of 16 PageID# 1309
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`In re Apple Inc.,
`52 F.4th 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ..................................................................................................6
`
`Chertoff Capital, LLC v. Syversen,
`Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-0138, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 253453 (E.D. Va.
`Dec. 8, 2020) ..............................................................................................................................6
`
`Cienega v. Echo Glob. Logistics, Inc.,
`No. 2:21-cv-00533-KJM-JDP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20972 (E.D. Cal. Feb.
`4, 2022) ......................................................................................................................................4
`
`Felton v. Felton,
`No. 98-1256, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 12081 (4th Cir. June 11, 1999) ......................................4
`
`Groove Dig., Inc. v. United Bankshares, Inc.,
`Civil Action No. 3:17cv794, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122838 (E.D. Va. July
`23, 2018) ....................................................................................................................................6
`
`MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc.,
`467 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Va. 2006) ........................................................................................3
`
`Monarch Networking Sols. LLC v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
`No. 1:23-cv-670, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237871 (E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 2023) ...........................2, 3
`
`Sandow, Sandow-Pajewski v. Busch Entm’t Corp.,
`55 F. Supp. 2d 422 (E.D. Va. 1999) ..........................................................................................4
`
`Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Systems, Inc.,
`282 F. Supp. 3d 916 (E.D. Va. 2017) ........................................................................................4
`
`Statutes
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) .....................................................................................................................1, 6
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 4 of 16 PageID# 1310
`
`I.
`
`
`
`Introduction
`
`Google’s Motion to Transfer to the Northern District of California Under 28 U.S.C. §
`
`1404(a) (Dkts. 38-47, 57) (the “MTT”) relies on two ultimate conclusions:
`
`1. “SoundClear is unable to identify any witnesses in the EDVA with relevant
`information.”
`2. “SoundClear is also unable to refute Google’s reliable declarations demonstrating that
`the overwhelming majority of evidence and material witnesses are located in the
`NDCA.”
`
`
`Dkt. 63 (“Reply”) p. 1 (emphasis added).
`
`
`
`Google insists that “SoundClear is unable to refute” the testimony of its declarants. 1 That
`
`is true only insofar as Google has actively precluded it. It is also paradoxical, because even
`
`Google distrusts the accuracy of its conclusions. It refuses to be bound by them.2
`
`
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`Google’s conclusions do not rest on simple, verifiable statements (akin to “the light was
`
`green”). They are summary-level characterizations of underlying, partially disclosed facts (more
`
`akin to “most of the people we found, who were in a good position to see, thought the light
`
`looked green”). They beg questions such as:
`
` What information is relevant?
`
` How was that determined?
`
`
`1 Christopher Haire (Dkt. 57-2), Jim Coursey (Dkt. 57-3), and Willy Cheung (Dkt. 57-4)
`(collectively, the “Declarations” or “Declarants”).
`2 Google stated in its MTT opening brief:
`
`Google employs people all over the world that may have relevant information (though
`likely duplicative of witnesses in the NDCA) but, at present, and based on Plaintiff’s
`allegations, Google anticipates relying on witnesses primarily in the NDCA. Indeed, the
`majority of any potentially relevant team members identified to date are based in the
`NDCA. See supra Section II.C. Nonetheless, given the early stage of the case, Google
`reserves the right to rely on additional employees. Google is aware of no employees in
`Virginia with any relevant information. Id.
`Dkt. 39 at 13, n.2 (emphasis added to show qualified language).
`
`
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`1
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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 5 of 16 PageID# 1311
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` What constitutes an “overwhelming majority” of evidence or witnesses?
`
` Where are the supposed “minority” of evidence or witnesses located?
`
` What types of witnesses and evidence did Google omit from the denominator in its
`“majority” calculation?
`
`
`
`Google also relies upon several “investigations.” At least one was conducted by its
`
`counsel. At least two others were conducted by Messrs. Haire and Coursey. There is no
`
`information as to how the investigations relate to one another, how they were conducted, what
`
`they sought to uncover, or what they turned up. Google has not even made clear which
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`portions/facts it has blocked as privileged and which it did not.3
`
`
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`Additionally, Google flatly denies that witnesses SoundClear identified—who worked on
`
`the accused Nest products and business—are relevant. Their titles alone indicate otherwise. Thus,
`
`that seemingly incorrect position should be examined—at least through short (1-hour)
`
`depositions.
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`
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`Google relies upon the Monarch Networking Sols. LLC v. Juniper Networks, Inc., No.
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`1:23-cv-670, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237871, at *8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 2023) case to justify its
`
`tactics. But Monarch addressed fraud. Id. SoundClear is not asserting fraud or “bad faith.” 4 The
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`fraud question arises when declarants make simple, easily verifiable statements of fact that are
`
`only unreliable or lack foundation if someone lied.
`
`
`3 Ex. 1, 3 (“Moreover to the extent SoundClear is requesting how Google’s attorneys organized
`or conducted this investigation, that is privileged and/or work product and not subject to
`discovery.”)
`4 Google asserts that SoundClear accuses it of “report[ing] the facts in bad faith.” Reply p. 2.
`Not so. SoundClear has no reason to believe the investigation was conducted in bad faith. But
`it was certainly biased. One would have to be naïve to believe Google’s trial counsel would
`seek to build a record undermining its litigation strategy. That is where the problem with
`statements of opinion comes in.
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`
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`2
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 6 of 16 PageID# 1312
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`
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`That is not the case here. There are multiple foundational issues with the Declarations.
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`Ambiguity, no basis for personal knowledge (e.g., hearsay within hearsay), ambiguous language,
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`subjective statements, and lay opinions; just to name a few.
`
`
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`SoundClear attempted to discuss these matters with Google substantively. Google made a
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`perfunctory effort: It presented a few inapplicable cases (such as Monarch) and refused to
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`address any of SoundClear’s authority. It also suggested that venue discovery was premature.
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`But, even after briefing on the MTT completed, it refused again.
`
`
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`This Court should not countenance an approach of intransigence, non-cooperation, and
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`one-sided gamesmanship.
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`
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`The larger and more distributed the entity (like Google), the more room there is for
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`selective identification of supposedly relevant witnesses. And the more room there is to not
`
`investigate avenues that might support an opponent’s position. There is almost no chance that in
`
`a company having almost 200,000 employees,5 only the nine Google addressed6 merit
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`consideration. That is especially true in a case addressing products that interact with Google’s
`
`entire ecosystem and the ecosystem of many other products.
`
`
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`Google’s counsel-driven record must be subject to the minimum requirements of an
`
`adversarial process. Cf. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 608, 617 (E.D. Va.
`
`2006) (“so long as the parties are presented an equal and fair opportunity to investigate the facts
`
`and challenge the opposing party’s evidence through traditional adversarial means.”)
`
`
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`Following venue discovery, SoundClear proposes that the parties be ordered to meet and
`
`confer and submit a status report with positions as to whether additional briefing is necessary.
`
`
`5 https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/googl/employees/.
`6 Reply p. 13.
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`3
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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 7 of 16 PageID# 1313
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`II.
`
`Procedural Background and Meet and Confer
`
`
`
`
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`On May 1, 2024, SoundClear filed its Complaint in this Action. Dkt. 1.
`
`Following May 1, Google made the decision to litigate in this Court.
`
`On September 30, 2024, Google filed a motion to dismiss (“MD”). Dkts. 13 and 14. That
`
`motion was based on an affirmative defense. Dkt. 14, 3-17. That portion of the MD was not
`
`directed to notice pleading; it sought summary ruling as to a complex legal defense, with many
`
`underlying facts (Alice). The MD also sought a dispositive ruling on a non-infringement—
`
`another fact-intensive inquiry. Dkt. 14, 17-23.
`
`
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`On November 4, 2024, only after Google did not get the immediate relief it sought, it
`
`sought to transfer the case. Dkt. 38-47. Google relied on the three Declarations.
`
`
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`On November 13, 2024, Google consented to SoundClear’s request to modify the
`
`briefing schedule. Dkt. 58.
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`
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`On November 15, 2024, SoundClear’s counsel requested to depose the Declarants in
`
`short depositions “limited to topics related to venue.” Ex. 1, 6.
`
`
`
`On November 18, 2024, Google’s counsel declined, citing one case: Symbology
`
`Innovations, LLC v. Lego Systems, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 916, 933-34 (E.D. Va. 2017). Ex. 1, 5-6.
`
`
`
`On November 19, 2024, SoundClear’s counsel responded. He differentiated Symbology
`
`as inapplicable. He stated that the Declarations “do not state simple facts,” include “lay opinions,
`
`or even expert opinion,” and are “vague and speculative.” Id. 4-5. He cited authority in support. 7
`
`
`7 Felton v. Felton, No. 98-1256, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 12081, at 7 (4th Cir. June 11, 1999);
`Sandow, Sandow-Pajewski v. Busch Entm’t Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 (E.D. Va. 1999); cf.
`Cienega v. Echo Glob. Logistics, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00533-KJM-JDP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`20972, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2022).
`
`
`
`4
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 8 of 16 PageID# 1314
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`
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`Later on November 19, 2024, Google responded, curtly and without analysis, to
`
`SoundClear’s request: “We disagree with many of your characterizations and also your
`
`interpretation of the legal authority regarding venue discovery.” Id., 3. Google declined to
`
`address any authority or arguments raised by SoundClear. Google made additional arguments
`
`based upon the authority it had previously provided. And Google asserted that venue discovery
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`“[wa]s premature until after SoundClear’s opposition is filed.” Id. (emphasis added).
`
`
`
`On November 21, 2024, SoundClear responded that Google’s curt statement of
`
`disagreement “doesn’t help to refine Google’s position or narrow our dispute.” Id., 1-2.
`
`SoundClear’s counsel again addressed Google’s authority.
`
`
`
`On November 22, 2024, Google again declined to engage in any substantive discussion:
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`“Rather than go back and forth, we simply state that we do not agree to discovery at this time.”
`
`Id., 1.
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`
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`
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`
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`On December 9, 2024, SoundClear filed its Response in Opposition. Dkt. 61.
`
`On January 6, 2025, Google filed its Reply. Dkt. 63.
`
`On January 13, 2025, counsel for SoundClear requested the relief set forth in this Motion.
`
`Ex. 2, 4-5.
`
`
`
`On January 17, 2025, counsel for both parties met and conferred on SoundClear’s
`
`request. SoundClear’s counsel stated that they would be willing to negotiate on what discovery
`
`to seek. Google agreed to consider making a counterproposal. Id., 1-2.
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`
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`On January 21, 2025, counsel for Google stated that Google would not make a
`
`counterproposal. Id.
`
`III. Legal Standards
`
`
`
`Discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is generous in scope and freely
`
`permitted; district courts “have broad discretion in [their] resolution of discovery problems that
`5
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 9 of 16 PageID# 1315
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`arise in cases pending before [them].” Groove Dig., Inc. v. United Bankshares, Inc., Civil Action
`
`No. 3:17cv794, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122838, at *13 (E.D. Va. July 23, 2018) (citing Mylan
`
`Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 64 (4th Cir. 1993). Jurisdictional discovery can be
`
`appropriate when a plaintiff identifies “specific and substantive” allegations regarding a
`
`defendant’s contacts with the forum state or when “‘significant gaps in the record’ exist[]
`
`regarding ‘defendant’s traditional . . . and also defendant’s Internet-based contacts’”. Cf. Id.
`
`(citations omitted).
`
`
`
`Limited venue discovery is appropriate when “the record in [a] case does not yet contain
`
`facts sufficient to permit a § 1404(a) analysis . . . .” Chertoff Capital, LLC v. Syversen, Civil
`
`Action No. 1:20-cv-0138, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 253453, at *7 (E.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2020).
`
`
`
`It is also necessary to “reduce ‘speculation’ and ‘allow the parties to provide the Court
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`with the best evidence for ruling on a motion to transfer.’” In re Apple Inc., 52 F.4th 1360, 1362
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2022) (emphasis added).
`
`IV.
`
`Proposed Discovery
`
`
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`Specifically, SoundClear requests the following limited, venue discovery—none of which
`
`should count toward discovery limits or limit future depositions as to any witnesses provided (at
`
`least as to non-venue related topics).
`
`A.
`
`Interrogatories
`
`Interrogatory No. 1
`Provide a list of all the teams responsible for the design, development, and
`maintenance of the features and functionalities of the accused Google Products
`and Services.
`
`Interrogatory No. 2
`Provide a list of the names and cities of residents of all members of the teams
`identified in the Declarations.
`
`
`
`6
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 10 of 16 PageID# 1316
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`Interrogatory No. 3
`Identify all hard copy documents (that are not otherwise available electronically)
`identified to date that Google believes may be relevant to the claims or defenses.8
`
`B.
`
`Depositions
`
`
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`SoundClear Proposes the following depositions:
`
`Corporate Deposition
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`A four-hour 30(b)(6) deposition as to the information provided in the requests
`
`above.
`
`Declarant Depositions
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`2.5-hour depositions with the three Declarants (Messrs. Haire, Cheung, and
`
`Coursey). Topics will be limited to:
`
`the investigation they conducted.
`
` clarifying ambiguous or indefinite terms used in the declarations.
`information about witnesses named or referenced but for which no details
`
`were provided. See, e.g., Haire Decl. ¶10.
`information about negative assertions or implications of fact.
`
` statements supporting assertions Google makes about “primarily” or
`“normally” in its briefing.
`
`Omitted Employee Depositions
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`1-hour depositions of the four individuals identified in SoundClear’s Response
`
`Brief: Sarah Hatfield, Anthony Harris, Austin Simmons, and Tyler Burcher-DuPont.
`
`V.
`
`
`
`Argument
`
`The underlying facts on which Google’s MTT relies can be separated into two categories:
`
`1. location and knowledge of certain individuals, and
`
`2. characterization of the results of an investigation to prove negative facts or
`implications. Some examples include assertions that little or no other witnesses or
`information exist beyond what Google referenced, or that information resides
`“primarily” with certain witnesses or in certain locations (to the exclusion of others).
`
`
`8 SoundClear expects the number of such documents to be small or nonexistent.
`
`
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`7
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 11 of 16 PageID# 1317
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`See, e.g., Opening Br. 1, 12, 20; Reply Br., 1, 4, 9, 11-13; Haire Decl. ¶9; Cheung
`Decl. ¶8; Coursey Decl. ¶7.
`
`Google begins its opening brief with two statements (bracketed text added): “For
`
`
`
`
`example, [(1)] relevant party and non-party witnesses reside in the NDCA; [(2)] none reside
`
`anywhere in Virginia.” Dkt. 39, 1.
`
`
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`If Google had proceeded merely on the category (1) facts, it would have had no need to
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`discuss any “investigation(s).”
`
`
`
`
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`But Google went beyond that. It relied upon subjective statements such as:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`that there are no potentially relevant teams other than the teams identified in the
`Declarations
`
`that there are no potentially relevant witnesses other than the subset its Declarants
`identified
`
`that no topics on which any other witness might have knowledge might be relevant
`
` as to where witnesses/documents are “primarily” (or “normally”) located. See also,
`e.g., Haire Decl. ¶8; Cheung Decl. ¶7; Coursey Decl. ¶6.
`
`Each constitutes an opinion based upon underlying facts. That includes the hearsay
`
`within the Declaration (hearsay). And Google relies upon such conclusions repeatedly
`
`throughout its briefs.
`
`
`
`SoundClear requests limited discovery to evaluate information underlying the
`
`investigation and how Google’s Declarants identified potentially relevant teams, witnesses, and
`
`topics to the exclusion of others. In other words, how they filtered through the mass of
`
`information at Google to identify the teams/witnesses/topics they described to the Court. And
`
`what types of information Google declined to consider.
`
`A.
`
`Information as to Teams Considered and Ignored
`
`
`
`At the top-level, Google appears to only have considered individuals on the few teams it
`
`identified: “Speech [team],” “Hotword Modeling team,” “Neural Frontend Modeling team,”
`
`
`
`8
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 12 of 16 PageID# 1318
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`“team knowledgeable about marking,” “Sound & Haptics User Experience team,” and
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`undisclosed names or numbers of “teams that work with [hardware] components.” Haire Decl.
`
`¶¶6-7; Coursey Decl. ¶¶2, 4-5; Cheung Decl. ¶4. Google likely has hundreds of such “teams.”
`
`
`
`Interrogatory No. 1 will seek a list of teams relevant to the accused products. That list
`
`will allow the Court to assess the process by which Google eliminated many entire teams from
`
`consideration.
`
`
`
`Interrogatory No. 2 will seek a list of individuals on the teams identified in the
`
`Declarations. That list will allow the Court to determine whether Google assessed a sufficient
`
`universe of individuals in preparing the Declarations.
`
`
`
`Interrogatory No. 3 will serve a similar function, but with respect to the location of hard
`
`copy documents.
`
`
`
` The Corporate Deposition will allow SoundClear the ability to participate in the
`
`adversarial process by questioning Google on those aspects.
`
`B.
`
`Examination on Foundation of Opinion Testimony
`
`
`
`The Declarants provided several summary-level conclusions (e.g., what constitutes
`
`“primary” relevance). SoundClear also requests limited discovery as to the opinions offered in
`
`the Declarations.
`
`
`
`For example, the following constitute purely subjective opinions:
`
` “As discussed for the above features and functionalities of the Google Products, the
`employees with relevant knowledge to this litigation are located primarily in
`Mountain View.”
`
` “The relevant documents were primarily created and continue to be maintained in
`Mountain View and not Virginia.”
`
` “Google maintains an office in Reston, Virginia as well as a data center in Loudoun
`County, Virginia which operates in relevant part identically to the other dozen Google
`data centers in the United States
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 13 of 16 PageID# 1319
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`See, e.g., Haire Decl. ¶¶8-9 (emphasis added); see, also Cheung Decl. ¶¶7-8; Coursey Decl. ¶¶6-
`
`7.
`
`The Declarations also contain other indefinite language:
`
` words such as “roughly” (used three times in Haire Decl., two times in Coursey Decl.,
`and once Cheung Decl.), “majority” (used once in each Decl.), “team(s)” (used 29
`times in Haire Decl., 10 times in Coursey Decl., and 5 times in Cheung Decl.), “speak
`to” (used nine times in Haire Decl., twice in Coursey Decl., and once in Cheung
`Decl.)
`
` what level of information are they able to “speak to.”
`
` Whether the Declarants actually intended to testify using generalized, boilerplate
`legalese (e.g., Haire ¶¶8-9, Coursey ¶¶6-7, Cheung ¶¶7-8)—or whether they will
`adopt it as their own.
`
` No details on where development or maintenance occurs. Only that they are
`“knowledgeable” about it (Haire Decl. ¶5, Cheung Decl. ¶5) or can “speak to” it
`(Haire Decl. ¶¶6, 6a, 6b, 6d, 6e) or teams have “responsibility for” some of it (Haire
`Decl. ¶¶6a, 6d).
`
`
`
`The Declarant Depositions will provide SoundClear the bare minimum opportunity to
`
`cross-examine testimony being offered against it. To be sure, SoundClear will be forced to
`
`conduct discovery and cross-examination at the same time (in single, short depositions). While
`
`not ideal, SoundClear is willing to compromise. It believes it is entitled to some opportunity to
`
`test the testimony Google submitted.
`
`C.
`
`Information as to Omitted Witnesses
`
`
`
`Google uses a footnote to dismiss witnesses SoundClear was able to locate:
`
`4 Sarah Hatfield (Opp., Ex. 27) is located in Boston and her LinkedIn profile simply
`lists her as “Director Nest Business”; Anthony Harris (Opp., Ex. 28) and Austin
`Simmons (Opp., Ex. 29) are sales managers for Mosaic working with the Google
`Nest product and are both based in Washington D.C.; and Tyler Burcher-DuPont
`(Opp., Ex. 30) is located in New York and their work relates to creating partnerships
`with Google’s product teams.
`
`Reply p. 11 n.4 (emphasis added).
`
`
`
`The underlined portions above show that such individuals do have relevant information.
`
`Ms. Hatfield is a “Director” of the “Business” of the accused Nest products. See Dkt. 1 (Compl.)
`
`
`
`10
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`

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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 14 of 16 PageID# 1320
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`¶8 (“(1) Google Home, Google Nest Mini (1st Gen), Google Home Mini (1st Gen), Google
`
`Home Max, Google Nest Audio, Google Nest Hub, Google Nest Hub Max, and Google Nest
`
`Hub (2nd Gen.), and Google Assistant . . .”).
`
`
`
`It is troubling that SoundClear was able to locate four individuals omitted from Google’s
`
`analysis of its own employees—using the limited information available to SoundClear. Google
`
`admits these employees work on the accused products and related business. This Court should
`
`not accept Google’s flat denial of the relevance of these employees—especially in view of
`
`Google’s admission.
`
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`The Omitted Employee Depositions will thus allow SoundClear—and the Court—to
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`assess whether Google’s undisclosed investigation properly identified the universe of relevant
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`witnesses.
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`VI. Conclusion
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`For the foregoing reasons, SoundClear respectfully requests that the Court grant it leave
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`to conduct limited venue-based discovery as set forth in Section IV above. SoundClear further
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`requests that Google be ordered to respond to such written discovery within fourteen (14) days
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`after being served with such written discovery and to present all witnesses for deposition by no
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`later than fourteen (14) days after such responses are received.
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`Within fourteen (14) days following completion of venue discovery, SoundClear
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`proposes that the parties be ordered to meet and confer and submit a status report with positions
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`as to whether additional briefing is necessary.
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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 15 of 16 PageID# 1321
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`Dated: January 23, 2025
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`By: /s/ Chandran B. Iyer
`Ronald M. Daignault (pro hac vice)*
`Chandran B. Iyer (VA Bar No. 94100)
`Steven J. Reynolds (pro hac vice)*
`Hoda Rifai-Bashjawish (pro hac vice)*
`Kevin H. Sprenger (VA Bar No. 98588)
`Austin Ciuffo (pro hac vice)*
`Matthew R. Harkins (pro hac vice)*
`James Hatton (pro hac vice)*
`rdaignault@daignaultiyer.com
`cbiyer@daignaultiyer.com
`sreynolds@daignaultiyer.com
`hrifai-bashjawish@daignaultiyer.com
`ksprenger@daignaultiyer.com
`aciuffo@daignaultiyer.com
`mharkins@daignaultiyer.com
`jhatton@daignaultiyer.com
`DAIGNAULT IYER LLP
`8229 Boone Boulevard – Suite 450
`Vienna, VA 22182
`Tel.: (202) 330-1666
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff SoundClear Technologies
`LLC
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`*Not admitted to practice in Virginia
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`12
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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 70 Filed 01/23/25 Page 16 of 16 PageID# 1322
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I certify that on January 23, 2025, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of
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`Court using the CM/ECF system, which will then send a notification of such filing (NEF) to all
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`counsel of record.
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`By:
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`/s/ Chandran B. Iyer
`Chandran B. Iyer (VA Bar No. 94100)
`cbiyer@daignaultiyer.com
`DAIGNAULT IYER LLP
`8229 Boone Boulevard – Suite 450
`Vienna, VA 22182
`Tel.: (202) 330-1666
`
`Attorney for Plaintiff SoundClear Technologies LLC
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`13
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