Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 72 Filed 02/12/25 Page 1 of 17 PageID#
`1358
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`NORFOLK DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`SOUNDCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`PLAINTIFF SOUNDCLEAR’S REPLY IN SUPPORT
`OF ITS MOTION TO CONDUCT VENUE DISCOVERY
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 72 Filed 02/12/25 Page 2 of 17 PageID#
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`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
`
`Argument ............................................................................................................................ 3
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
`
`H.
`
`Motion for Discovery .............................................................................................. 3
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`Venue Discovery Warranted .................................................................................... 3
`
`Google Withheld Relevant Information .................................................................. 3
`
`The Catch Has Landed ............................................................................................ 4
`
`Google Does Not Meaningfully Address the Hearsay or Opinion-Based Nature of
`the Declarations ...................................................................................................... 6
`
`Google’s Legal Position Is Contradictory ............................................................... 7
`
`Omitted Employees ................................................................................................. 8
`
`Proposed Discovery Is Targeted and Apt .............................................................. 10
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`III.
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`Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 12
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
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`

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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`BMW Mfg. Co., LLC v. Magnesium Prods. of Am., Inc.,
`No. 7:21-cv-01346-DCC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50401 (D.S.C. Mar. 23,
`2023) ........................................................................................................................................10
`
`Cienega v. Echo Glob. Logistics, Inc.,
`No. 2:21-cv-00533-KJM-JDP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20972 (E.D. Cal. Feb.
`4, 2022) ......................................................................................................................................8
`
`Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc.,
`236 Cal. App. 4th 243, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 486 (2015) ................................................................8
`
`Felton v. Felton,
`No. 98-1256, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 12081 (4th Cir. June 11, 1999) ......................................7
`
`Monarch Networking Sols. LLV v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
`No. 1:23-cv-670, 2023 U.S. Dist. Lexis 237871 (E.D. Va Oct. 3, 2023) ..........................1, 4, 6
`
`Sandow-Pajewski v. Busch Entm’t Corp.,
`55 F. Supp. 2d 422 (E.D. Va. 1999) ..........................................................................................7
`
`Tyson Farms, Inc. v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund,
`471 Md. 386, 241 A.3d 929 (2020) .....................................................................................9, 10
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

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`I.
`
`
`
`Introduction
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`Google’s objection to venue discovery rests on the Monarch1 case. That court made two
`
`determinations:
`
`1. Venue discovery should not be allowed simply “because one party lacks equal access
`to information.” 2023 U.S. Dist. Lexis 237871, at *19.
`
`2. Venue discovery should not be allowed to directly contest assertions that could only
`be wrong if there was some indication of “fraud or intentional misconduct.” Id. at *8-
`9.
`
`Neither applies here. SoundClear is not seeking discovery based upon the existence of
`
`
`
`
`unequal access to information. It is seeking to prevent Google from manipulating it.
`
`
`
`Google’s attorneys and Declarants provide opinions summarizing facts underlying the
`
`convenience analysis. But Google protects many of those underlying facts behind a privileged
`
`shield. Dkt. 70 (“Opening Br.”), 7-8 (see Category 2 facts); see also id. at 1 (1st paragraph).
`
`Google demonstrates its omissions in practice when addressing the questions SoundClear posed
`
`(Dkt. 71 (“Response Br.”)); because Google cannot provide any substantive information in
`
`response to them.
`
`
`
`Google acknowledges the question, “What information is relevant?” Resp. Br., 2.
`
`Google responds that it identified witnesses “based on ‘the allegations in this case.’” Id. That
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`answer is circular and tautological. It means “we identified what is relevant based on what is
`
`relevant.”2
`
`
`1 Monarch Networking Sols. LLV v. Juniper Networks, Inc., No. 1:23-cv-670, 2023 U.S. Dist.
`Lexis 237871, at *19 (E.D. Va Oct. 3, 2023).
`2 Identifying relevant, technical information is not a rote task. Google has not, in its briefs,
`actually tied any identified team, evidence, feature, product, or component to any specific
`language in the Complaint.
`
`1
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`

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`
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`Google acknowledges the next logical question, “How was that determined?” Id. at 3.
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`But it simply repeats its answer to the first question: “Google discerned the relevant information
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`based on the allegations in SoundClear’s complaint.” Id.
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`
`
`Google does the same for the next two questions—about “majority” and “minority” of
`
`evidence. Id. at 3. It simply recites statements that use the word “majority.” Id. It does not
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`explain how that determination/calculation was made. And those statements are limited to
`
`witnesses. Google does not address any foundation for its characterizations about where the
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`“majority of evidence” lies. Opening Br., 1 (citing Dkt. 63).
`
`
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`And Google avoids the final question—“What types of witnesses and evidence did
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`Google omit from the denominator in its ‘majority’ calculation?”— with a non-answer: “[a]s
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`described, the information . . . was derived from SoundClear’s allegations in its complaint.”
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`Resp. Br., 3.
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`
`
`It all boils down to ipse dixit from Google’s litigation counsel.
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`If Google’s motion to transfer is allowed on these grounds, without the underlying
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`information disclosed, every defendant that operates on a nationwide scale will be entitled to a
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`transfer. See Opening Br., 3. They would only have to identify names of a few relevant teams and
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`individuals that reside in the desired venue. The rest of the support could be opinions as to the
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`following:
`
`1. what information is relevant (a legal opinion),
`
`2. that all relevant information has been considered (a legal and factual opinion),
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`3. where documents are primarily located (a speculative, factual opinion), and
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`4. which witnesses and documents contain the majority of relevant information (a
`speculative, factual opinion).
`
`2
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`

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`The declarants would only need to believe—based upon their litigation counsel’s investigation
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`and advice—that those opinions are defensible. That is because opinions, by their essence, are
`
`subjective. See, e.g., Opening Br., 9-10. There is wiggle room—especially given Google’s view
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`that they need not be ultimately accurate. Id. at 1 n.2 (quoting Google’s refusal to be bound by its
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`conclusions). In either event, the opinions cannot be tested without access to the underlying data.
`
`II.
`
`Argument
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`A. Motion for Discovery
`
`
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`Google argues that SoundClear’s motion for venue discovery “amounts to an
`
`unauthorized sur-reply . . . .” Resp. p. 5. That is incorrect. It was Google’s counsel that suggested
`
`venue discovery be raised after briefing on its motion to transfer concluded.3 And, more
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`fundamentally, SoundClear’s motion for venue discovery neither addresses nor applies the
`
`convenience factors required under Section 1404.
`
`B.
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`Venue Discovery Warranted
`
`
`
`SoundClear proposed various discovery mechanisms. It stated that it was willing to
`
`negotiate with Google as to the limits. See generally Dkts. 70-1 and 70-2 (e-mail correspondence
`
`between the parties). But Google never offered a counterproposal. Thus, Google’s burdensome
`
`objections (Resp. p. 5) are mooted by its own refusal to compromise.
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`C.
`
`Google Withheld Relevant Information
`
`
`
`Google’s Response Brief continues to address the same “fraud and bad-faith” strawman
`
`raised in its reply in support of its motion to transfer. See Opening Br., 2; id. n.4 (citing Dkt. 63).
`
`Google uses such nefarious-sounding terms for a reason: to make this case sound more like
`
`
`3 Dkt. 70-1, p. 4 (Google’s counsel stated: “To the extent a discovery request could even
`arguably be justified, such discovery request is premature until after SoundClear’s opposition
`is filed.” (emphasis added)).
`
`3
`
`

`

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`Monarch. This is not a Monarch situation. SoundClear does not allege that Google committed
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`fraud or bad faith. Id.; see also id. at 10-11. Nor has SoundClear made any “accusations” against
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`Google. See Resp. Br., 5. If any information was withheld, Google admitted doing so on a
`
`privilege basis. SoundClear has not contested that basis nor hinted at any impropriety.
`
`SoundClear simply contests Google’s selective use of privilege—as both a sword and shield—to
`
`submit testimony containing conclusions and opinions based upon that protected information.
`
`
`
`SoundClear seeks to address specific, underlying facts that have not been disclosed—the
`
`Category 2 facts discussed in SoundClear’s Opening Brief. See Opening Br., 7-8. Google avoids
`
`addressing those facts in its Response. It repeatedly cites the information it did provide. Google
`
`states that such information is “sufficient.” Resp. Br. 5-6 (“Google provided more than sufficient
`
`information . . . .”); id. 7 (similar); id. 11 (same). But “sufficient” is less than “total” or
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`“complete.” By how much, only Google knows.
`
`
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`In terms of privilege, Google states that “it has not” “actively ‘blocked’ information
`
`unfavorable to its position using an assertion of privilege.” Resp. Br., 7. If that is true, then any
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`testimony about “primar[]y” locations and where the “majority” of witnesses are located are
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`baseless per se. Those are words of comparison. Google must have established a basis for
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`comparison for them to have any meaning.
`
`
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`Google’s statement also admits of another problem. It implies that every team its
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`litigation counsel came across in its investigation turned out to be relevant. Even if so, that would
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`indicate Google’s counsel did not investigate teams located on the East Coast—which it has
`
`assumed have no relevant information.
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`D.
`
`The Catch Has Landed
`
`
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`Google likens SoundClear’s motion to a request for a fishing expedition. Resp. Br., 7. But
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`SoundClear seeks only to examine Google’s catch. For example, Google’s counsel and
`
`4
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`Declarants identified supposedly “relevant” teams, stated conclusions as to what constitutes the
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`“majority” of teams, and where documents are “primarily” located. They did not identify any
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`irrelevant teams, witnesses, information, or locations against which to compare numbers.
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`Certainly, one cannot calculate a “majority” without a totality. That is what the proposed
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`Interrogatories Nos. 1-2 seek: which teams and individuals Google considered as part of that
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`totality. Opening Br., 6-7.
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`
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`Google’s sole argument here is undeveloped: that SoundClear’s request “does not make
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`sense.” Resp. Br. 12. SoundClear has explained that the purpose is to allow SoundClear and the
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`Court to make an assessment as to whether Google actually considered a sufficient amount
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`(universe) of teams or individuals located outside of its preferred venue. Having done so would
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`provide at least some indicia of objectivity. If, on the other hand, Google’s litigation counsel
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`looked primarily at teams located in N.D. Cal., and chose the most relevant data only from that
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`subset, then objectivity never existed; the results were preordained.
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`
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`Google states that “despite its ongoing good-faith investigation, Google has not identified
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`any relevant hard copy documents (that are not otherwise available electronically) in or outside
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`the District.” Resp. Br., 12. Certainly, then, relying on the “primary” location of hard copy
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`documents was a bit misleading to begin with. There is no primary location if there is no location
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`at all.
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`
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`The depositions SoundClear seeks also relate to information Google already collected.
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`That is, a Corporate Deposition “as to the information provided in” response to the
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`interrogatories. Opening Br., 7.
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`
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`The Omitted Employee Depositions may encompass a bit of new discovery. But it would
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`only be new because Google’s investigation improperly omitted them in the first place. Indeed,
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`5
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`

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`Google admits to operating solely on appearances: “As Google explained in its reply brief, none
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`of these four individuals appear to have material information.” Resp. Br., p. 13 (emphasis added).
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`That conclusion is doubtful, as titles for each of the Omitted Witnesses includes the name of
`
`accused Nest products. See Section G infra. Google would not have had to rely on such
`
`speculation, had it addressed those individuals in its investigation.
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`
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`Google’s approach also stands in contrast to the individual-by-individual assessment
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`made by the movant’s declarant in Monarch. Monarch, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237871, at *8
`
`(citing Martinez II Decl.); Ex. 1 (Martinez II Decl.)
`
`E.
`
`Google Does Not Meaningfully Address the Hearsay or Opinion-Based
`Nature of the Declarations
`
`
`
`Google does not address SoundClear’s need to test the Declarations (e.g., on hearsay or
`
`foundational grounds). It dedicates Section IV.B.2 of its Response Brief to these topics. But it
`
`ignores the Category 2 facts. Opening Br., 7. Indeed, Section IV.B.2 of its Response brief does
`
`not even mention the words “majority” or “minority”—let alone how the former was calculated
`
`from the latter.
`
`
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`Google’s Response does mention the determination of relevance. But its position is based
`
`upon the same circular reasoning discussed above:
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`The declarants did not opine on or provide opinions regarding what features,
`products, and components are relevant to this case. Instead, as set forth in detail in
`Google’s MTT, these features, products, and components are identified based on
`SoundClear’s complaint. MTT 2–9.
`
`Resp. Br., 9 (emphasis added).
`
`
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`Google’s use of the passive voice (above) is notable. It fails to name who identified the
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`“features, products, and components.” The answer is likely its litigation counsel.
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`6
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`Further, Google implies that determining the relevant features, products, and components
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`is a rote task. It is not. Google did not, for example, tie any identified team, evidence, feature,
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`product, or component to specific “terms” in the Complaint.
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`
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`But none of the foregoing constitute the primary problem. That is, Google does not
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`identify what its outside litigation counsel determined to not be relevant. The record contains no
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`indication of what the Category 2 facts are or how they played into the “ultimate conclusions”
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`upon which Google’s motion to transfer relied. See Opening Br., 1 (first paragraph).
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`F.
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`Google’s Legal Position Is Contradictory
`
`
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`Google takes issue with SoundClear’s assertion that Google has been intransigent and
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`non-cooperative. Resp. Br. 10. In the very next paragraph, however, Google demonstrates the
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`point—when it finally addresses authority SoundClear provided back in November.
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`
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`SoundClear repeatedly asked Google to address the authority SoundClear offered. Google
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`refused. Its counsel relied on terse statements of “disagreement.” Dkt. 70-1, p. 4 (Google’s
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`counsel stated, “We disagree with many of your characterizations and also your interpretation of
`
`the legal authority regarding venue discovery.”). See also id. at 5-6 (SoundClear’s counsel cited
`
`Felton v. Felton, No. 98-1256, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 12081, at 7 (4th Cir. June 11, 1999);
`
`Sandow-Pajewski v. Busch Entm’t Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 (E.D. Va. 1999)), 3
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`(SoundClear’s counsel advised that “[a] summary statement of disagreement on
`
`‘characterizations and . . . interpretation of legal authority’ doesn’t help to refine Google’s
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`position or narrow our dispute.”), 2 (Google’s counsel stated: “Suffice it to say that we have a
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`very different view as to whether discovery is appropriate here and we have provided you with
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`applicable authority. Rather than go back and forth, we simply state that we do not agree to
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`discovery at this time.” (emphasis added)).
`
`7
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`

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`
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`Google also cites Cienega v. Echo Glob. Logistics, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00533-KJM-JDP,
`
`2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20972, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2022). Google states that Cienega “goes
`
`against SoundClear’s position.” Resp. Br., 10. Google’s conclusion rests solely on the mere fact
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`that the court “overruled objections.” Id. Legal analysis must go deeper than restating the
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`outcome of a case. Google does not address the facts. Thus, there is no basis to state that “it goes
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`against SoundClear’s position.” Id.
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`
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`Indeed, SoundClear cited Cienega using “cf.” That denotes a Latin word inviting a
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`comparison for purpose of guidance, even if the outcome is dissimilar. Cypress Semiconductor
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`Corp. v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., 236 Cal. App. 4th 243, 254, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 486, 495
`
`(2015). Cienega stands for the proposition that declarations offered in support of motions to
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`transfer cannot rely upon speculative or vague statements. That point of law is uncontested.
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`
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`Google does not contest the authority SoundClear offered in seeking the relief requested
`
`in its motion for venue discovery. Compare Opening Br., 4 with Resp. Br. generally.
`
`G.
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`Omitted Employees
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`
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`Google asserts that the Omitted Employees are not actually employees of Google. Resp.
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`Br., 13. But each individual lists themselves as a “Full-time” employee at Google—each for over
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`3 years.
`
`Ex. 2 https://www.linkedin.com/in/sarahmhatfield/ (annotated).
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`
`
`8
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`

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`Ex. 3 https://www.linkedin.com/in/anthony-harris-mba-82542916/ (annotated).
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`Ex. 4 https://www.linkedin.com/in/tylerdupont36/ (annotated).
`
`
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`It is possible that Google did not investigate the full factual and legal basis behind its
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`denial of any employment relationship. Certainly, “a worker can at the same time be the
`
`
`
`
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`employee of two employers.” Tyson Farms, Inc. v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 471 Md. 386,
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`406-07, 241 A.3d 929, 941 (2020) (citing Whitehead v. Safway Steel Prod., Inc., 304 Md. 67, 79
`
`(1985); Mackall v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md. 221, 229 (1982)). Five factors determine whether an
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`employer-employee relationship exists.4 The “decisive test,” however, “is whether the employer
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`has the right to control and direct the employee in the performance of the work and in the manner
`
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`4 Id. (“(1) the power to select and hire the employee, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to
`discharge, (4) the power to control the employee’s conduct, and (5) whether the work is part
`of the regular business of the employer.”)
`
`9
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`

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`in which the work is to be done.” Id. The Omitted Employees appear to be closely intertwined
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`with Google and subject to the control of its business directives.
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`
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`And even if they are non-employee agents, Google has not established the absence of
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`sufficient control over the witnesses to secure their presence at a deposition. See, e.g., BMW Mfg.
`
`Co., LLC v. Magnesium Prods. of Am., Inc., No. 7:21-cv-01346-DCC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`
`50401, at *7 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2023) (“It is expected that Plaintiff will promptly make its
`
`employees and other witnesses under its control available for deposition . . . .” (emphasis
`
`added)).
`
`
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`Further, the statement that “Google cannot accept service of a subpoena for a deposition
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`on their behalf” may only be accurate in the most legal sense. Certainly, the Omitted Employees
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`are closely tied to Google and its “Business.” See Ex. 2, supra. It is thus possible that one or
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`more of the three would agree to accept service of a subpoena on behalf of Google. Tellingly,
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`Google does not represent that it ever even asked.
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`H.
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`Proposed Discovery Is Targeted and Apt
`
`
`
`SoundClear seeks disclosure of information that Google has already collected or
`
`compiled in its “investigation[s].” That is the opposite of a fishing expedition.
`
`
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`Teams. The Declarations list several specific teams. Opening Br., 8-9. Based upon the
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`team names alone, it seems unlikely they cover the universe of relevant information related to the
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`Nest devices. That would include their front- and back- end processes, research and development
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`work, and marketing. The list of team names includes speech, hotword modeling, neural
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`frontend, sound & haptics, and others. Id. Those are specific aspects of smart devices that
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`perform many other functions.
`
`
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`Further, Google states that SoundClear “baldly speculat[es] that ‘Google likely has
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`hundreds’ of teams it did not identify.” Resp. Br., 2. But Google does not deny that fact.
`
`10
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`
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`Moreover, its statement leaves but two possibilities. Either (1) there exist many
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`applicable teams that Google did not assess or disclose; or (2) there exist only a small number of
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`teams, and Google considered them all. In the latter case, it would not be burdensome for
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`Google’s counsel to provide such a short list. In either instance, though, Google’s resistance to
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`producing the information is unjustified; it should be required to respond to Interrogatory No. 1
`
`and provide a Corporate Deposition related to that specific information.
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`
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`Witnesses. Google states that “the identification of nine specific witnesses is reasonable
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`when one considers that it is the result of a good faith investigation focused on material
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`witnesses” Resp. Br., 7 (emphasis added). That is the problem. Google is requesting that the
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`Court take its representation completely on faith.
`
`
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`Indeed, Google’s Declarants use the term “majority.” See, e.g., Resp. Br., 3. No number
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`can be determined to be a “majority” until it is compared against a total. As a matter of math and
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`logic, Google must have determined a total; it must know what constitutes the minority. Thus, it
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`should disclose the total witnesses considered in response to Interrogatory No. 2 and provide a
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`Corporate Deposition related to that specific information.
`
`
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`Documents. Google states that “despite its ongoing good-faith investigation, Google has
`
`not identified any relevant hard copy documents (that are not otherwise available electronically)
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`in or outside the District.” Resp. Br., 12. The remainder of its position is speculative: “to the
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`extent these documents exist, they would most likely be located with the individuals Google has
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`already identified . . . .” Id. That logic does not hold. The individuals “already identified” are
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`those Google investigated. If they do not have hard copy documents, the folks Google did not
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`investigate are more likely to have them. A short Corporate Deposition regarding Interrogatory
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`No. 3 responses would help clarify the record in this context.
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`11
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`
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`Individual Depositions. Google states that eight depositions are “unreasonable and
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`disproportionate.” Resp. Br., 13. But SoundClear openly agreed to negotiate the limits. Google
`
`refused. See, e.g., Dkt. 70-2, p. 2 (Google counsel acknowledging SoundClear’s proposed
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`compromise). Google has never proposed what would be reasonable or proportionate. Google
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`simply contests the “fishing expedition” strawman. SoundClear expressly identified the topics
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`about which it will ask (e.g., cross examining declarants on the basis of their opinions and to
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`obtain clarity on indefinite terminology). Each is directly related to statements made in the
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`Declarations. To the extent SoundClear is fishing, then, it is fishing for the foundation supporting
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`subjective, indefinite, and opinion-based testimony.
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`III. Conclusion
`
`
`
`Google concludes by decrying the ills discussed in Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego
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`Sys.. Resp. Br., 14 (citing 282 F. Supp. 3d 916, 934 (E.D. Va. 2017)). It asserts that SoundClear’s
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`relief should be denied, so that plaintiffs will not “file suit in far-flung districts” and “demand
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`discovery on the issue of venue that would recreate the inconvenience that venue rules are
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`intended to prevent.” Both statements defy the reality of this case. Venue, in this case, is not far-
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`flung; Google has an entire office building in Virginia and invested at least $1.2 billion here. Dkt.
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`61, p. 1. SoundClear has not inconvenienced the witnesses; Google offered up their testimony.
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`And it did so by relying on opinions and subjective conclusions instead of concrete facts. Surely
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`it would have been easier to have deponents submit the information regarding teams/witnesses
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`that SoundClear seeks in the first instance. Google chose not to do so.
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`In view of the foregoing, the Court should grant SoundClear’s motion for limited venue
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`discovery in this case.
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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 72 Filed 02/12/25 Page 16 of 17 PageID#
`1373
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`Dated: February 12, 2025
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`By: /s/ Chandran B. Iyer
`Ronald M. Daignault (pro hac vice)*
`Chandran B. Iyer (VA Bar No. 94100)
`Steven J. Reynolds (pro hac vice)*
`Hoda Rifai-Bashjawish (pro hac vice)*
`Kevin H. Sprenger (VA Bar No. 98588)
`Austin Ciuffo (pro hac vice)*
`Matthew R. Harkins (pro hac vice)*
`James Hatton (pro hac vice)*
`rdaignault@daignaultiyer.com
`cbiyer@daignaultiyer.com
`sreynolds@daignaultiyer.com
`hrifai-bashjawish@daignaultiyer.com
`ksprenger@daignaultiyer.com
`aciuffo@daignaultiyer.com
`mharkins@daignaultiyer.com
`jhatton@daignaultiyer.com
`DAIGNAULT IYER LLP
`8229 Boone Boulevard – Suite 450
`Vienna, VA 22182
`Tel.: (202) 330-1666
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff SoundClear Technologies
`LLC
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`*Not admitted to practice in Virginia
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`Case 2:24-cv-00321-AWA-DEM Document 72 Filed 02/12/25 Page 17 of 17 PageID#
`1374
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I certify that on February 12, 2025, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of
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`Court using the CM/ECF system, which will then send a notification of such filing (NEF) to all
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`counsel of record.
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`
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`By:
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`
`/s/ Chandran B. Iyer
`Chandran B. Iyer (VA Bar No. 94100)
`cbiyer@daignaultiyer.com
`DAIGNAULT IYER LLP
`8229 Boone Boulevard – Suite 450
`Vienna, VA 22182
`Tel.: (202) 330-1666
`
`Attorney for Plaintiff SoundClear Technologies LLC
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`14
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