Case 3:20-cv-00004-JAG Document 2 Filed 01/03/20 Page 1 of 20 PageID# 24
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`Richmond Division
`
`FLORENCE CHESSON,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Case No. 3:20-cv-00004-JAG
`
`v.
`
`AIRBUS AMERICAS, INC., a corporation doing business in
`the Commonwealth of Virginia,
`
`AIRBUS GROUP, INC., a corporation doing
`business in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
`
`Defendants.
`
`COMPLAINT
`
`Plaintiff Florence Chesson (“Ms. Chesson”) by and through her attorneys of record, files
`
`this Complaint against the above-named Defendants (hereinafter referred to collectively as
`
`“Airbus”) and states as follows:
`
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE
`
`1.
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`This case arises from “fume” events which occur as the result of the defective design
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`and manufacture of Airbus aircrafts. Fume events occur when the air inside the passenger cabin of
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`an aircraft becomes contaminated with pyrolyzed compounds such as engine oil, lubricants, de-
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`icing or hydraulic fluid.
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`2.
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`Such events are caused by the “bleed” air system used in Airbus aircrafts which
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`draws pre-heated compressed air from the engine and pumps this air straight into the cabin after
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`being cooled.
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`3.
`
`Airbus aircrafts have repeatedly experienced fume events yet Airbus has failed to
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`eliminate or remediate the traditional pneumatic system and bleed manifold in favor of a no-bleed
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`system whereby electrically driven compressors provide the cabin pressurization function, with
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`fresh air brought onboard via dedicated cabin air inlets. Moreover, Airbus has failed to warn
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`consumers about the dangers of the “bleed” air system.
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`4.
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`This “bleed” air system has caused damage to Plaintiff in the form of personal injury
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`and monetary damages. As such, Plaintiff seeks relief.
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`
`
`PARTIES
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`1.
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`Ms. Chesson is a citizen of the United States of America, domiciled in
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`Richmond, Virginia.
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`2.
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`Defendant Airbus Americas, Inc. is a corporation with its principal place of
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`business and corporate headquarters in Herndon, Virginia.
`
`3.
`
`Defendant Airbus Group, Inc. is a corporation with its principal place of business
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`and corporate headquarters in Herndon, Virginia.
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`4.
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`Airbus routinely conducts substantial and non-isolated business activity on a
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`continuous, regular, and systematic basis in Virginia and in Richmond, Virginia including, but
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`not limited to, transacting business, contracting to supply goods or services and providing
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`goods or services to Virginia.
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`5.
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`At all times relevant to this Complaint, Airbus was engaged in the business of
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`designing, manufacturing, assembling, testing, servicing, marketing, promoting, leasing and
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`selling commercial aircraft as well as providing information and warnings about such aircraft,
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`including the aircraft at issue.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`Jurisdiction and venue is proper in this Court because the Airbus Defendants
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`6.
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`are headquartered in Virginia and they maintain a principal place of business in Virginia.
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`Likewise, Virginia is Ms. Chesson’s home state.
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`7.
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`Furthermore, the Airbus Defendants routinely conducts substantial and regular
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`business in Virginia. At all times relevant, Airbus purposefully directed their activities to
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`residents of the Commonwealth of Virginia and purposefully conducted activities within the
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`Commonwealth of Virginia.
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`
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`FACTS
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`8.
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`The facts of this case highlight a previously hidden and “dirty little secret” of the
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`commercial airline industry: Cabin air in Airbus’s commercial aircraft comes in through the
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`aircraft’s engines before entering the cabin.
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`9.
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`This is known as a “bleed air” system because the cabin air is in effect “bled” off
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`the airplane’s engines and can thus become contaminated with heated jet engine oil and its toxic
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`by-products.
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`10.
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`A bleed air system uses a network of ducts, valves and regulators to conduct
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`medium to high pressure air, "bled" from the compressor section of the engine(s) and auxiliary
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`power unit (APU), to various locations within the aircraft. There the air is utilized for a number
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`of functions including: pressurization; air conditioning; engine start; wing and engine anti-ice
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`systems; water system pressurization; hydraulic system reservoir pressurization; and boundary
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`layer separation enhancement.
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`11.
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`The use of the air for pressurization and air-conditioning is of particular
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`importance. After leaving the engine and passing through the air-conditioning pack, where it is
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`cooled, this bleed air is combined with recirculated cabin air before it enters the cabin. The
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`airliner cabin is a hermetically sealed pressure vessel, with an inflow of bleed air and a
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`computer-controlled outflow, which exhausts back to the atmosphere. Jet engines operate at
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`extremely high temperatures. It is important to note that this bleed air is cooled but not cleaned
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`(i.e., filtered) before being mixed with recirculated cabin air. The only air that enters the
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`interior of the aircraft during operation is the bleed air from the engines.
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`12.
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`Air contamination can occur during normal operation of the airplane but is
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`particularly high during “fume events” or events where additional toxins enter the air system.
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`Fume Events
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`13.
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`The term “fume” is used commonly to describe any noxious gas, smoke, or vapor
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`in the atmosphere. In the case of contaminated air inside an aircraft cockpit/cabin, the term “fume
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`event” has been used to refer to a potentially toxic environment created by contaminated bleed air.
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`14.
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`The bleed air system vents to the interior of the aircraft. In addition, the hydraulic
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`pumps, and some actuators are mounted in the engines, and the bleed air is also used to pre-
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`pressurize the hydraulic systems. The very high pressure of aircraft hydraulic systems (>10 MPa)
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`creates “sweats”, leaks and ruptures. The overall result is that the interior air of aircraft can and
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`does become contaminated by hydraulic fluid in addition to the engine lubricating oil and other
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`substances.
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`15.
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`One of the fundamental problems of the Airbus bleed air system is that all the jet
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`engine lubricating oil and aircraft hydraulic fluid are harmful to humans with various degrees of
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`toxicity. Air contamination can occur during normal operation of the airplane but is particularly
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`high during “fume events” or events where additional toxins enter the air system.
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`16.
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`Fume events can sometimes produce distinctive odors, often described as a
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`chemical, oily or a “dirty socks” smell.
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`17.
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`Gases contained in contaminated cockpit/cabin air as constituents of “bleed” air
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`include carbon monoxide (“CO”) from engine exhaust and carbon dioxide (“CO2”) as a product of
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`incomplete combustion. Exposure to high CO2 concentrations can lead to symptoms such as
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`headache, dizziness, and restlessness and ultimately lead to asphyxia.
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`18.
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`Vapors contained in contaminated cockpit/cabin air may also include both volatile
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`(“VOCs”) and semi-volatile organic compounds (“SVOCs”), both of which are chemical
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`compounds based on carbon chains or rings that also contain hydrogen with or without oxygen,
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`nitrogen, and other elements that represent constituents of jet engine oils, hydraulic fluids, and
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`deicing fluids.
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`19.
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`Among the many possible VOCs and SVOCs representing constituents of
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`contaminated bleed air, particular concern has been attributed to tricresyl phosphate (Tricresyl
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`phosphates are anti-wearing agents that are added to all jet engine oils used on jet propelled
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`commercial airliners in the United States.)
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`20.
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`Tricresyl phosphates are known neurotoxins, i.e. nerve agents. A neurotoxin or
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`nerve agent is a toxin that acts specifically on nerve cells of the central and peripheral nervous
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`systems. Inhalation exposure to tricresylortho phosphate (“TOCP”) (one of the isomeric forms of
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`Tricresyl phosphate) at higher concentrations is associated with a delayed neurotoxic toxic effect
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`(i.e., several days following exposure) manifested by peripheral nervous system abnormalities.
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`Additionally, TOCP can affect the body if it comes in contact with the eyes or skin.
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`21.
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`Tricresyl phosphates are organophosphates. Organophosphates are chemical
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`compounds used in insecticides, herbicides, pesticides, nerve agents and nerve gases, all sharing a
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`similar chemical structure. Organophosphates, as a family of chemicals, are considered toxic to
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`human health. Indeed, in 2001 the Environmental Protection Agency banned most residential uses
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`of organophosphates in part because of their risk to human health.
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`22.
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`De-icing fluids and exhaust from jet engines may also enter the bleed air supply
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`during ground operations.
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`23.
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`Thus, inhaling toxic cabin air can cause short-term or transient symptoms as well
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`as permanent and serious personal injury.
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`The January 3, 2018 Fume Event
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`24.
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`On January 3, 2018, Plaintiff was one of three working Flight Attendants assigned
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`to flight # 861 from Boston, Massachusetts to San Juan, Puerto Rico and the return flight # 462
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`from San Juan, Puerto Rico to Boston, Massachusetts. Plaintiff was assigned as “F3 Flight
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`Attendant” working primarily in the aft of the airplane cabin.
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`25.
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`As the Airbus A320 aircraft began its descent into San Juan, Plaintiff exited the aft
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`lavatory and immediately noticed a strong fume/odor. She immediately became nauseous and
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`light-headed.
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`26.
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`The “F2 Flight Attendant”, Jennylee Sosa, remarked to Plaintiff about the fume
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`odor. Plaintiff confirmed that she smelled it also, and it smelled like “dirty feet.” Plaintiff also
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`reported the fume odor to the “F1 Flight Attendant”, Angela Kerastaris.
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`27.
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`When Plaintiff sat and buckled herself into her jumpseat for final approach, she
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`was again hit with the same fume odor from the air vent that was directed toward her face.
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`28.
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`Plaintiff became extremely nauseous, her eyes began to burn, and she began to
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`cough. Passengers in both the forward and aft areas of the plane were coughing as well.
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`29.
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`On landing, Plaintiff notified the Captain and First Officer about the fume odor and
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`her symptoms. She was agitated, confused, and experiencing severe nausea. She was given
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`oxygen in the cockpit to help address her symptoms. The two other Flight Attendants who were
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`working on the flight likewise complained of symptoms. Ms. Kerastaris also received oxygen from
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`the cockpit shortly after landing in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
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`30.
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`Despite some misgivings, Plaintiff agreed to continue as planned to serve on the
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`return flight, flight # 462 from San Juan, Puerto Rico back to Boston, Massachusetts on the same
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`Airbus A320 airplane.
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`31.
`
`The defect causing the toxic cabin air in the subject aircraft, an Airbus A320
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`designed and manufactured by defendant Airbus, was not addressed in the brief stop in Puerto
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`Rico.
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`32.
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`After takeoff of flight # 462, San Juan, Puerto Rico to Boston, Massachusetts, all
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`Flight Attendants remained ill and their symptoms became exacerbated. Ms. Sosa required oxygen
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`from the cockpit as soon as the flight reached 10,000 ft.
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`33.
`
`Plaintiff and the other flight attendants began completing Medaire forms so that the
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`Captain could report the Flight Attendants’ symptoms to Medaire for medical advice and treatment.
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`Plaintiff had never completed a Medaire form before for her own medical condition. Plaintiff’s
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`handwriting changed and became less legible while she attempted to document her symptoms.
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`Plaintiff’s symptoms worsened as she experienced chest pain, nausea, a metallic taste in her mouth,
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`dizziness, her eyes were burning, and she was sweating excessively. Plaintiff was also cloudy-
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`headed due to further exposure to toxic cabin air.
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`34.
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`Ms. Kerastaris began coughing uncontrollable, vomited, and later almost lost
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`consciousness.
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`35.
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`Plaintiff used the PA system of the plane to call for a Medical Doctor. Dr. Yonanis
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`Diaz began to assist.
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`36.
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`The Medaire forms, including Plaintiff’s, were passed to the Captain who
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`contacted Medlink.
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`37.
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`There was still more than two hours of flight time before landing in Boston, and
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`there had been a toxic leak into the cabin air, putting everyone onboard at risk. Dr. Diaz
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`recommended diverting the plane, but the flight continued to Boston.
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`38.
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`While attempting to document the emergency, and record the medical equipment,
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`Plaintiff struggled with word-finding, spelling, and writing simple words. She was light-headed,
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`confused, agitated, emotional labile, and felt drugged.
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`39.
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`40.
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`The Captain arranged for paramedics to meet the plane upon landing in Boston.
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`During landing and taxiing in Boston, Plaintiff smelled the fume odor again. Her
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`nausea, dizziness, and headache worsened. She was coughing, sweating profusely and had a strong
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`metallic taste in her mouth that did not dissipate for days. Passengers in the aft of the cabin were
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`also coughing, and two passengers commented that there was a pronounced fume odor.
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`41.
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`As Plaintiff deplaned, the Captain told Plaintiff that he and the First Officer had
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`also smelled the fume odor again.
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`42.
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`Plaintiff was evaluated by the paramedics. The Medaire paramedics permitted
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`Plaintiff to fly back to her home in Richmond, Virginia, where she preferred to be treated, in
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`advance of the impending snowstorm approaching Boston on the condition that she immediately go
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`to the hospital upon landing.
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`43.
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`Upon landing in Richmond, Plaintiff presented to the St. Mary’s Hospital
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`emergency room with continued headache, nausea, mental fogginess, and tightness in her chest and
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`lungs. She was diagnosed with toxic chemical exposure.
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`44.
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`45.
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`Plaintiff experienced short-term and long-term health effects from this fume event.
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`Due to the exposure to contaminated cabin air, Plaintiff has been diagnosed with a
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`brain injury, among other personal injuries, due to toxic chemical inhalation on January 3, 2018 and
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`has suffered and/or continues to suffer from physical injuries including nausea, pain, a metallic
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`taste in their mouths, gastrointestinal difficulties, tinnitus, light/sound/sensory sensitivity, extreme
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`fatigue and exhaustion, rashes, excess sweating, balance problems, decreased motor skills,
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`numbness and tingling in their arms, hands and feet, joint and muscle pain, tremors, dizziness,
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`vertigo, shortness of breath, blurred vision, problems sleeping, cardiac issues, severe migraine
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`headaches, problematic sleeping patterns, memory loss, trouble concentrating, difficulty with
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`reading, writing or finding words when speaking, cognitive defects, emotional distress, depression,
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`anxiety, and can no longer live the normal life she previously enjoyed.
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`46.
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`Plaintiff received extensive and ongoing medical care and treatment for the
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`physical injuries caused by the January 3, 2018 fume event.
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`47.
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`As a result of this event, Plaintiff suffered loss of wages and wage-earning capacity
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`in the past and in the future, as well as an inability to work.
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`48.
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`Ms. Chesson has been unable to continue her work as a flight attendant. To date,
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`Ms. Chesson’s physicians continue to restrict her from boarding an airplane or any airline flight.
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`The Dangers of Bleed Air and Fume Events Have Been Known for Years
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`
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`49.
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`In 1994, the U.S. Congress mandated that the Federal Aviation Administration
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`(FAA) establish an aircraft cabin air quality research program and to collaborate with the Centers
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`for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to carry out studies specific to cabin air quality (Public
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`Law 103-305, 1994).
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`50.
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`In 1999, the FAA reviewed its event database between January 1978 and December
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`1999 involving “air quality” in the aviation Accidents and Incident Data Systems (AIDS).
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`51.
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`Of 240 events identified in the search, about 60 were “airplane ventilation toxic
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`contaminant events.”
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`52.
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`53.
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`Of the 60 events, 24 times crewmembers reported their performance was impacted.
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`There were also a number of reports of foreign airline crew members having their
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`performance impaired to the point that they had to be assisted in performing their flight duties or
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`had to relinquish their flying duties during the flight.
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`54.
`
`The National Research Council (NRC)’s study concluded that “Under certain
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`failure conditions, toxicants such as pyrolyzed engine oils and hydraulic fluids may leak into the
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`aircraft cabin and flight deck air supply systems, and that these toxicants may be associated with
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`health effects.”
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`55.
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`The NRC also highlighted the need to define the toxicity of these airborne
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`contaminants and concluded it was a high priority to investigate the relationship between exposure
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`and reported ill health.
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`56.
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`57.
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`The agency noted, “This is a matter of great concern to FAA.”
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`In 2002, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a report to the
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`Administrator about the National Research Council (NRC) review of air contamination issues,
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`entitled “The Airliner Cabin Environment and the Health of Passengers and Crew.”
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`58.
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`The FAA explained that the Department of Defense (DOD) had invested heavily
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`over the past decade in new sensor technology and preliminary inquiries to the scientific
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`community suggested that adaptation of those sensors for cabin environment monitoring was
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`possible and feasible.
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`59.
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`The FAA discussed the need for sensors on commercial aircraft so flight crew
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`could be quickly made aware of an “air contaminant” event and identify its source.
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`60.
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`But the FAA acknowledged that the aircraft industry was “naturally resistant to
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`making significant new investments in cabin air monitoring equipment.”
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`61.
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`The FAA noted that “viewed as a whole, NRC’s report should be seen as evidence
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`that passengers and crewmembers on commercial aircraft have a continuing concern about a variety
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`of health and comfort problems that they ascribe to poor air quality in airliner cabins. Such
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`concerns are not a new phenomenon.”
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`62.
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`At that time, both the NRC and FAA acknowledged a lack of sufficient data to
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`assess objectively passenger and crewmembers’ complaints, design effective interventions, or
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`determine whether rulemaking or guidance would be the most effective tactic for making changes.
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`63.
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`According
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`to
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`the FAA’s Aerospace Medicine Technical Report No
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`DOT/FAA/AM-15/20 report published in November of 2015, “[t]he quality of air distributed
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`throughout the cockpit and cabin during air transportation in a pressurized aircraft is critically
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`important to human health. For more than 30 years, the topic of cabin air quality has been of
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`concern.”
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`64.
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`In 2012, Congress directed the FAA to initiate a study of air quality in aircraft
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`cabins to: (a) assess bleed air quality on the full range of commercial aircraft operating in the
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`United States; (b) identify oil-based contaminants, hydraulic fluid toxins, and other air toxins that
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`appear in cabin air and measure the quantity and prevalence, or absence, of those toxins through a
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`comprehensive sampling program; (c) determine the specific amount and duration of toxic fumes
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`present in aircraft cabins that constitutes a health risk to passengers; (d) develop a systematic
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`reporting standard for smoke and fume events in aircraft cabins; and (e) identify the potential health
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`risks to individuals exposed to toxic fumes during flight.
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`65.
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`The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has issued a number of federal
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`aviation regulations (FARs), airworthiness directives (ADs), and advisory circulars (ACs)
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`regarding cabin air ventilation requirements and contaminant concentration limits.
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`66.
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`For example, 14 C.F.R. § 23.831(b) provides in pertinent part: “[f]or pressurized
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`airplanes, the ventilating air in the flight crew and passenger compartments must be free of harmful
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`or hazardous concentrations of gases and vapors in normal operations and in the event of
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`reasonably probable failures or malfunctioning of the ventilating, heating, pressurization, or other
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`systems and equipment.
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`67.
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`14 C.F.R. §23.1109(a) provides, “[t]he cabin air system may not be subject to
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`hazardous contamination following any probable failure of the turbocharger or its lubrication
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`system.”
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`68.
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`14 C.F.R. §23.1111 provides, “[h]azardous contamination of cabin air systems may
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`not result from failures of the engine lubricating system.”
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`69.
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`14 C.F.R. §25.831 provides in pertinent part: [u]nder normal operating conditions
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`and in the event of any probable failure conditions of any system which would adversely affect the
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`ventilating air, the ventilation system must be designed to provide a sufficient amount of
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`uncontaminated air to enable the crewmembers to perform their duties without undue discomfort or
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`fatigue and to provide reasonable passenger comfort. For normal operating conditions, the
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`ventilation system must be designed to provide each occupant with an airflow containing at least
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`0.55 pounds of fresh air per minute. (b) Crew and passenger compartment air must be free from
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`harmful or hazardous concentrations of gases or vapors. In meeting this requirement, the following
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`apply: (1) Carbon monoxide concentrations in excess of 1 part in 20,000 parts of air are considered
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`hazardous. For test purposes, any acceptable carbon monoxide detection method may be used. (2)
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`Carbon dioxide concentration during flight must be shown not to exceed 0.5 percent by volume
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`(sea level equivalent) in compartments normally occupied by passengers or crewmembers.
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`70.
`
`On September 19, 2019, Senator Richard Blumenthal and Congressman John
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`Garamendi co-wrote a letter to JetBlue CEO expressing “deep concern regarding the significant
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`number of cabin air safety events” and noting that such events “pose a significant health risk to in-
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`flight crewmembers and passengers.”
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`71.
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`As recently as December 16, 2019, the FAA issued a proposed airworthiness
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`directive specifically addressing Airbus A320 aircrafts, among other Airbus models. The proposed
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`directive requires Airbus A320 aircrafts like the one that caused Plaintiff’s injuries to be retrofitted
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`to replace the “bleed air hoses with a modification of hydraulic pressurization lines.”
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`72.
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`Prior to January 3, 2018, Airbus aircrafts, and A320 aircrafts in particular, have
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`experienced numerous fume events. Specifically, the Airbus A320 aircraft that is the subject
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`aircraft of this Complaint experienced a fume event in 2017 just months prior to the January 3,
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`2018 fume event that injured Plaintiff.
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`73.
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`But since 2012, Airbus has been performing real-time monitoring of cabin air
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`quality.
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`74.
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`Prior to the subject flight, Airbus received actual or constructive notice of the
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`pressurization problems in its aircrafts, the A320 aircraft, and/or the subject aircraft.
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`75.
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`Prior to the subject flight, Airbus received actual or constructive notice of the
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`contaminated bleed air problems in its aircrafts, the A320 aircraft, and/or the subject aircraft.
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`76.
`
`Prior to the subject flight, Airbus received actual or constructive notice of the
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`maintenance problems in its aircrafts, the A320 aircraft, and/or the subject aircraft.
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`77.
`
`Prior to the subject flight, Airbus received actual or constructive notice of the
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`dangers posed to the safety of its passengers and crew by allowing toxic fumes to enter the cabin of
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`its aircraft through the aircraft's ventilation system.
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`78.
`
`Prior to the subject flight, Airbus received actual or constructive notice of
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`contaminated bleed air and toxic fumes entering the cabin while passengers and crew were
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`onboard.
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`79.
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`Despite such knowledge Airbus has not, to date, retrofitted their products with
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`either sensors or recirculated air filtration systems designed to detect and/or eliminate and/or
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`minimize vaporized and/or pyrolyzed engine oil and/or hydraulic fluid and its byproducts and/or
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`other toxic substances under normal operations.
`
`
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`There Exists a Better Alternative Design for the Aircraft
`
`80.
`
`The bleed air system, while common, is not the only available system for the
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`design and manufacture of aircrafts.
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`81.
`
`In 2004, Boeing launched the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, a commercial aircraft that
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`does not use a bleed air system.
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`82.
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`The Dreamliner air system eliminates the risk of engine oil decomposition products
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`being introduced in the cabin air supply.
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`83.
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`One of the reasons Boeing developed the bleed free air supply system on the
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`Dreamliner was to eliminate “engine contaminants potentially entering cabin air supply- Improved
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`Air Quality.”
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`COUNT I
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`Strict Liability: Design Defect
`
`84.
`
`Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges all previous paragraphs as if set forth verbatim
`
`
`
`
`
`herein.
`
`85.
`
`Defendants manufactured, designed, promoted, marketed and sold the subject
`
`aircraft. At the time the subject aircraft left Airbus’s custody and control, it was defective and
`
`unreasonably dangerous because:
`
`
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`Its design rendered the aircraft unreasonably dangerous.
`
`The danger of this design was beyond that contemplated by the ordinary
`
`consumer with ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
`
`characteristics.
`
`c.
`
`The benefits of this design are outweighed by the design's inherent risk of
`
`danger.
`
`86.
`
`Airbus’s design of the subject aircraft made such aircraft unreasonably dangerous
`
`in one of more of the following respects:
`
`a. The subject aircraft’s ventilation system allows bleed air, which can become
`
`contaminated with dangerous toxins, to enter the breathing zone of the aircraft.
`
`b. The subject aircraft lacked adequate air quality monitors, sensors or alarms.
`
`c. The subject aircraft provides no safeguards or systems so the flight crew could
`
`
`
`14
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`Case 3:20-cv-00004-JAG Document 2 Filed 01/03/20 Page 15 of 20 PageID# 38
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`identify the source of the contaminated air or mitigate or prevent contamination
`
`of the cabin air.
`
`d. The subject aircraft lacked adequate or appropriate filters which would have
`
`purified the cabin air and prevented or mitigated bleed air contamination.
`
`87.
`
`By reason of the foregoing, the subject aircraft was unreasonably dangerous and
`
`defective and Airbus is strictly liable for the damages sustained by the Plaintiff.
`
`COUNT II
`
`Strict Liability: Defect in Warnings / Instructions
`
`88.
`
`Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges all previous paragraphs as if set forth verbatim
`
`
`
`
`
`herein.
`
`89.
`
`Airbus failed to adequately warn of the danger of toxic cabin air and / or failed to
`
`adequately instruct on the proper use of its aircraft to avoid cabin air contamination in one of more
`
`of the following respects:
`
`a. The subject aircraft lacked proper warnings regarding the potential of
`
`the air supply system to become contaminated.
`
`b. The subject aircraft lacked proper warnings regarding the identification
`
`or detection of contaminated air.
`
`c. The subject aircraft lacked proper warnings regarding the health dangers
`
`of exposure to contaminated air.
`
`d. Airbus failed to adequately warn or instruct on how to respond, contain
`
`or reduce the danger of fume events.
`
`90.
`
`By reason of the foregoing, the subject aircraft was unreasonably dangerous and
`
`defective and Airbus is strictly liable for the damages sustained by the Plaintiff.
`
`
`
`
`
`15
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`

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`Case 3:20-cv-00004-JAG Document 2 Filed 01/03/20 Page 16 of 20 PageID# 39
`
`COUNT III
`
`Breach of Warranties
`
`Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges all previous paragraphs as if set forth verbatim
`
`91.
`
`herein.
`
`92.
`
`Airbus’s knowing violation of minimum federal aviation regulations was a causal
`
`factor in the fume event at issue.
`
`93.
`
`Airbus voluntarily warranted, expressly and impliedly, that they complied with
`
`minimum industry standards and federal regulations during the design and manufacture of the
`
`subject aircraft such that it was not defective, in airworthy condition and reasonably fit for its
`
`intended and foreseeable uses and purposes.
`
`94.
`
`Airbus intended that passengers and crewmembers, including Plaintiff, would be the
`
`end users of their aircraft.
`
`95.
`
`As a direct and proximate result of Airbus’s breach of express and implied
`
`warranties, Airbus caused Plaintiff to suffer personal injuries and damages.
`
`COUNT IV
`
`Negligence
`
`96.
`
`Plaintiff incorporates and re-allege all previous paragraphs as if set forth verbatim
`
`
`
`
`
`herein.
`
`97.
`
`At all times relevant hereto, Airbus owed a duty to the Plaintiff to use reasonable
`
`care in designing, manufacturing, assembling, testing, maintaining, servicing, selling, marketing,
`
`promoting and providing warnings or instructions about the subject aircraft so as not to cause
`
`Plaintiff severe personal injuries and pain and suffering.
`
`98.
`
`Defendant Airbus negligently breached its duty of care owed to the Plaintiff
`
`through one or more of the following negligent acts and omissions, when Airbus:
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`Case 3:20-cv-00004-JAG Document 2 Filed 01/03/20 Page 17 of 20 PageID# 40
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`a. negligently designed, manufactured, assembled and sold the subject aircraft such
`
`that its ventilation system allowed contaminated bleed air to enter the breathing
`
`zone of the aircraft;
`
`b. negligently designed, manufactured, assembled and sold the subject aircraft
`
`without an adequate or appropriate air quality monitor, sensor or alarm to detect
`
`bleed air contamination, allow the flight to identify the source of such
`
`contamination and / or permit the flight crew to mitigate or prevent fume events;
`
`c. negligently designed, manufactured, assembled and sold the subject aircraft
`
`without adequate or appropriate filters to protect cabin air from contamination;
`
`d. negligently designed, manufactured, assembled and sold the subject aircraft
`
`without proper warnings or instructions regarding the potential of the air supply
`
`system to become contaminated or the danger of exposure to such contaminated
`
`air;
`
`e. negligently designed, manufactured, assembled and sold the subject aircraft
`
`without knowing the actual chemical composition of the aviation jet engine
`
`lubricating oil, required for use on its aircraft;
`
`f. negligently designed, manufactured, assembled and sold the subject aircraft
`
`without knowing what chemicals or byproducts are created when aviation jet
`
`engine lubricating oil is heated to temperatures consistent with those experienced
`
`in the engines, required for use on its aircraft;
`
`g. negligently designed, manufactured, assembled and sold the subject aircraft
`
`without properly testing heated aviation jet engine lubricating oil;
`
`h. negligently designed, manufactured, assembled and sold the subject aircraft
`
`without knowing the quality of the bleed cabin air;
`
`
`
`17
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`

`

`Case 3:20-cv-00004-JAG Document 2 Filed 01/03/20 Page 18 of 20 PageID# 41
`
`i. negligently failed to incorporate a proper and effective environmental control
`
`system on the subject aircraft;
`
`j. negligently failed to incorporate a proper and effective air supply system on the
`
`subject aircraft;
`
`k. negligently failed to properly test the subject aircraft before distributing it;
`
`l. negligently failed to adequately maintain, service, retrofit and/or inspect the
`
`subject aircraft;
`
`m. neglige