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`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 17 Filed 09/30/24 Page 1 of 38 PageID# 141
`
`THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`RICHMOND DIVISION
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`SOUNDCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES LLC, §
`
`
`§
`
`
`§
`
`§ Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-00540-MHL
`v.
`§
`
`
`§
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`§ JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`§
`
`
`§
`
`
`§
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF GOOGLE LLC’s
`MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT UNDER RULE 12(b)(6)
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 17 Filed 09/30/24 Page 2 of 38 PageID# 142
`
`
`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`THE CLAIMS OF THE ’337 AND ’675 PATENTS ARE PATENT INELIGIBLE
`UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
`
`Legal Standard
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Page
`
`1
`
`3
`
`5
`
`5
`
`10
`
`12
`
`12
`
`16
`
`18
`
`20
`
`23
`
`The Claims of the ’337 Patent are Directed to Classifying a Voice Based on
`Proximity and Tailoring Output Based on that Classification (Alice Step One). 6
`
`The Claims of the ’675 Patent, like those of the ’337 Patent, are Directed to
`Classifying a Voice Based on Proximity and Tailoring Output Based on that
`Classification (Alice Step One).
`
`D. Classifying a Voice Based on Proximity and Tailoring Output Based on that
`Classification is Abstract (Alice Step One).
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Case Law Comparison Test
`
`Functional Test
`
`Real World Analogy Test
`
`E.
`
`There is No Inventive Concept in the Claim Elements Individually or as an
`Ordered Combination (Alice Step Two).
`
`IV.
`
`SOUNDCLEAR FAILS TO STATE A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR DIRECT
`INFRINGEMENT OF THE ’675 AND ’337 PATENTS
`
`A. Counts I and II of the Complaint Fail to Plausibly Allege that the Google Products
`Omit or Replace Words or Information
`25
`
`B. Count I of the Complaint Fails to Plausibly Allege that the Google Products Adjust
`the Output Volume Based on the User’s Voice
`27
`
`V.
`
`VI.
`
`SOUNDCLEAR FAILS TO STATE A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR DIRECT
`INFRINGEMENT OF THE ’487 PATENT
`
`SOUNDCLEAR FAILS TO STATE A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM FOR WILLFUL
`INFRINGEMENT
`
`VII. CONCLUSION
`
`
`
`28
`
`30
`
`30
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 17 Filed 09/30/24 Page 3 of 38 PageID# 143
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC,
`838 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................8
`
`AI Visualize, Inc. v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc.,
`97 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2024) ............................................................................................6, 17
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) .........................................................................................................5, 6, 20
`
`Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc.,
`989 F.3d 964 (Fed. Cir. 2021)..................................................................................................30
`
`Beteiro, LLC v. DraftKings Inc.,
`104 F.4th 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2024) ............................................................................12, 13, 16, 18
`
`Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am.,
`4 F.4th 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..................................................................................................25
`
`British Telcoms. PLC v. IAC/InterActiveCorp,
`813 F. App’x 584 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ..........................................................................................14
`
`Brunswick Corp. v. Volvo Penta of the Ams.,
`LLC, 640 F. Supp. 3d 498 (E.D. Va. 2022) ...............................................................................6
`
`ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc.,
`920 F.3d 759 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..........................................................................................7, 9, 14
`
`Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
`776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..........................................................................................18, 19
`
`CyberFone Sys., LLC v. CNN Interactive Grp., Inc.,
`558 F. App’x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ..........................................................................................13
`
`Dialect, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`701 F. Supp. 3d 332 (E.D. Va. 2023) ......................................................................5, 12, 15, 22
`
`DriverDo, LLC v. Soc. Auto Transport, Inc.,
`No. 3:23cv265, 2024 WL 1376218 (E.D. Va. Mar. 29, 2024) ................................6, 10, 16, 19
`
`Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
`830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..........................................................................................13, 16
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 17 Filed 09/30/24 Page 4 of 38 PageID# 144
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(Continued)
`
`ENCO Sys., Inc. v. DaVincia, LLC,
`845 F. App’x 953 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..........................................................................................18
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................16
`
`Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd.,
`955 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2020)............................................................................................7, 18
`
`Esignature Software, LLC v. Adobe Inc.,
`No. 2023-1711, 2024 WL 3289488 (Fed. Cir. July 3, 2024) ...................................................19
`
`FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
`839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................6
`
`Ficep Corp. v. Peddinghaus Corp.,
`No. 2022-1590, 2023 WL 5346043 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 2023) ...............................................20
`
`Geoscope Techs. Pte. Ltd. v. Google LLC,
`692 F. Supp. 3d 566 (E.D. Va. 2023) ........................................................................................6
`
`In re Gopalan,
`809 F. App’x 942 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ..........................................................................................22
`
`IBM v. Zillow Grp., Inc.,
`50 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................16
`
`iLife Techs., Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
`839 F. App’x 534 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..........................................................................................22
`
`Impact Engine, Inc. v. Google LLC,
`No. 2022-2291, 2024 WL 3287126 (Fed. Cir. July 3, 2024) ...................................................14
`
`Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Cap. One Fin. Corp.,
`850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017)............................................................................................9, 17
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Cap. One Bank (USA),
`792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................14
`
`IPA Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`307 F. Supp. 3d 356 (D. Del. 2018) (Andrews, J.) ............................................................16, 21
`
`In re Killian,
`45 F.4th 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................13
`
`Kim v. Green Tea Ideas,
`No. 3:17-cv- 00449-JAG, 2018 WL 1172998 (E.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2018) ..................................25
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 17 Filed 09/30/24 Page 5 of 38 PageID# 145
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(Continued)
`
`Mobile Acuity Ltd. v. Blippar Ltd.,
`110 F.4th 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2024) ..............................................................................................10
`
`In re Morsa,
`809 F. App’x 913 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ..........................................................................................14
`
`Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. MModal LLC,
`No. CV 17-1484-MN-SRF, 2018 WL 6584129 (D. Del. Dec. 14, 2018) .........................16, 21
`
`Ottah v. Bracewell LLP,
`No. 22-1876, 2022 WL 16754378 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 8, 2022) ...................................................25
`
`Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Sallie Mae Bank,
`137 F. Supp. 3d 660 (D. Del. 2015), aff’d, 677 F. App’x 682 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ......................19
`
`People.ai, Inc. v. Clari Inc.,
`No. 2022-1364, 2023 WL 2820794 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 2023) ............................................20, 21
`
`PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Google LLC,
`8 F.4th 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ....................................................................................................6
`
`Prism Techs. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`696 F. App’x 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ........................................................................................23
`
`RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co. Ltd.,
`855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................8
`
`Sanderling Mgmt. Ltd. v. Snap Inc.,
`65 F.4th 698 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ....................................................................................................6
`
`State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp.,
`751 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985)................................................................................................30
`
`TLI Commc’ns LLC v. AV Auto., L.L.C.,
`823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................13, 20, 21, 22
`
`Trinity Info Media, LLC v. Covalent, Inc.,
`72 F.4th 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ..............................................................................................6, 7
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..........................................................................................16, 23
`
`Va. Innovation Scis., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`227 F. Supp. 3d 582 (E.D. Va. 2017) ........................................................................................6
`
`Veripath, Inc. v. Didomi,
`842 F. App’x 640 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ............................................................................................9
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 17 Filed 09/30/24 Page 6 of 38 PageID# 146
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(Continued)
`
`Walton Glob. Invs., Ltd. v. Bowman Consulting Grp., Ltd.,
`No. 3:23-cv-87, 2023 WL 4138243 (E.D. Va. June 22, 2023) ................................................24
`
`WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co.,
`829 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................30
`
`Yu v. Apple Inc.,
`1 F.4th 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ....................................................................................................6
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 17 Filed 09/30/24 Page 7 of 38 PageID# 147
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Google engineers spent years designing, developing, and refining Google Home and
`
`Google Nest devices that people use throughout the world to set reminders, turn on lights, play
`
`music, report on the weather, adjust the temperature, and so much more. Plaintiff SoundClear is
`
`an entity formed solely to buy and assert patents. This is not the first time SoundClear has sued
`
`Google. Seeking a return on its investment, SoundClear first sued Google in May 2024, accusing
`
`the Google Home and Nest products of infringing three different patents relating to walkie-talkie
`
`technology. That case is pending before Judge Allen in Norfolk.
`
`In the present suit, SoundClear now alleges that Google’s Home and Nest devices infringe
`
`three different patents that SoundClear also purchased in June 2024.1 But it is clear at even this
`
`early stage that the claims of two of the Asserted Patents, the ’337 patent (asserted in Count I) and
`
`the ’675 patent (asserted in Count II), are patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for claiming an
`
`abstract idea.2 It is equally clear that SoundClear’s Complaint (Dkt. 1, “Compl.”) fails to plausibly
`
`assert infringement of the Asserted Patents under the Iqbal/Twombly standard.3
`
`Courts consistently have held that claims like those found in the ’337 and ’675 patents
`
`violate § 101 and are appropriately dismissed on the pleadings. Patent claims are subject to
`
`dismissal for violating § 101 when they fail a two-step test: (1) the claims are directed to an abstract
`
`idea, and (2) the claims do not include an inventive concept that adds significantly more than the
`
`abstract idea to transform the nature of the claim. Courts have developed an extensive and well-
`
`established body of case law that guides the application of these steps.
`
`
`1 U.S. Patent Nos. 9,223,487 (the “’487 patent”), 11,069,337 (the “’337 patent”), 11,244,675 (the
`“’675 patent”), collectively, the “Asserted Patents.”
`2 Google maintains that the claims of the ’487 patent are also patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 101 and intends to raise that issue at a later date.
`3 Google will demonstrate that its independently developed products do not infringe any of the
`Asserted Patents after the pleading stage.
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 17 Filed 09/30/24 Page 8 of 38 PageID# 148
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`
`
`The ’337 and ’675 patent claims fail both steps. Under Step One, the Federal Circuit has
`
`repeatedly held that claims are directed to an abstract idea where they focus on merely collecting
`
`information, analyzing it, and indicating the results of that analysis. Here, the ’337 and ’675 patent
`
`claims recite just that: classifying voice based on proximity of the speaker and tailoring the
`
`response based on that classification. The ’337 and ’675 patent claims use only results-oriented
`
`language to achieve the abstract goals, without reciting any concrete or specific limits on how the
`
`goals are accomplished. Under Step Two, the ’337 and ’675 patent claims include no inventive
`
`concept because there is nothing in the claims beyond the abstract idea itself that could transform
`
`the nature of the claims. The claims of the ’337 and ’675 patents are thus patent ineligible under
`
`§ 101 and Counts I and II must be dismissed with prejudice.
`
`The Court should also dismiss Counts I, II, and III for the further reason that SoundClear
`
`cannot, and does not, plausibly plead direct infringement of any of the Asserted Patents. The ’337
`
`and ’675 patents describe intelligent audio-playing devices that omit or replace words in a response
`
`depending on the detected voice. The accused Google Home and Google Nest devices do not
`
`operate in this manner. SoundClear’s Complaint includes no factual allegation that could plausibly
`
`suggest that the Google devices distinguish between different voices to thereby omit or replace
`
`words in an audio response. As to the ’487 patent, SoundClear likewise pleads no facts that the
`
`Google devices select objects on screen. Thus, Counts I, II, and III fail to state a claim under the
`
`Twombly/Iqbal standard and must be dismissed with prejudice.
`
`Finally, for all Counts, SoundClear’s bare allegations of willful infringement are facially
`
`deficient as conclusory and must be dismissed under established precedent.
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 17 Filed 09/30/24 Page 9 of 38 PageID# 149
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`
`
`II. BACKGROUND
`
`The ’337 and ’675 patents are very similar. Both patents have the same named inventor
`
`and claim priority to patent applications filed in March 2018 less than one week apart. Figures 1-
`
`7 of both patents are identical, including the
`
`same “schematic diagram”
`
`in Figure 1
`
`describing the alleged inventions. ’337 patent
`
`1:62-64; ’675 patent 1:64-66. Both patents
`
`describe a device that uses a microphone
`
`(voice-detecting unit) to detect a voice (V1)
`
`spoken by a user. ’337 patent 1:64-66, 3:22-23; ’675 patent 1:66-2:2, 3:27-28. The voice is
`
`analyzed “to perform a predetermined processing.” ’337 patent 2:67-3:1; ’675 patent 3:2-3. Then
`
`a voice (V2) is outputted in response from a speaker (voice output unit) back toward the user. ’337
`
`patent 3:1-2; ’675 patent 3:3-5.
`
`Both patents admit that by 2018, these three steps were known. The background sections
`
`of both patents refer to a Japanese patent publication, and based on that publication, explain how
`
`it was known to have a device that “analyzes detected voice of a user and performs processing
`
`according to the user’s intention . . . .” ’337 patent 1:22-24; see also ’675 patent 1:20-24. The
`
`Asserted Patents admit that it was known by 2018 to have a device “which outputs, via voice, that
`
`[the] processing intended by a user has been performed . . . .” ’337 patent 1:25-28; see also ’675
`
`patent 1:24-27 (known for devices to “output notification indicating that a processing intended by
`
`a user has been performed in voice . . . .”). The ’337 patent admits that it was known to adjust the
`
`sound volume of the device’s response to the user. ’337 patent 1:34-38.
`
`The patents diverge slightly on the problems they purportedly address. The ’675 patent
`
`identifies a purported problem: the device’s response to the user can be overheard by others, even
`
`3
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`

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`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 17 Filed 09/30/24 Page 10 of 38 PageID# 150
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`
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`when the user does not want that. ’675 patent 1:28-34. The ’337 patent raises a similar problem:
`
`that the device’s response may annoy others around the user. ’337 patent 1:29-32. “For example,
`
`if a person around the voice processing device is asleep, the output voice may be an annoyance to
`
`the person.” ’337 patent 1:32-34. The ’337 patent admits that decreasing the response’s volume
`
`was known but decreasing it too much made it hard for the user to hear. ’337 patent 1:34-38.
`
`The patents propose similar ways to address these problems. Both patents describe
`
`analyzing the voice detected from the microphone and classifying the analyzed voice as either a
`
`“first voice” or a “second voice.” ’337 patent Abs.; see also ’675 patent, Abstract. SoundClear
`
`alleges that a “first voice” is “the voice of a particular first person, or a near/close voice” and a
`
`“second voice” is “the voice of a particular second person, or a far/distant voice.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 48;
`
`see also id. at ¶ 60.4 Both patents explain that the distance the user is from the device “can be used”
`
`to perform the “first voice” or “second voice” classification:
`
`Furthermore, a proximity sensor can be provided in the voice-content control device 1, a
`distance between the user H and the voice-content control device 1 is calculated from a
`detection result of the proximity sensor, and the distance can be used as a feature value to
`perform the classification to the first voice V1A and the second voice V1B.
`
`’337 patent 8:20-26 (emphasis added); see also ’675 patent 10:32-38.
`
`Then, the device’s response via a speaker outputted back toward the user is tailored
`
`depending on whether the voice is classified as “a particular first person, or a near/close voice” or
`
`“a particular second person, or a far/distant voice.” This tailoring of the response can happen in
`
`three ways. First, the patents describe omitting information in a response if the user is classified
`
`as “a particular second person, or a far/distant voice,” as compared to if the user is classified as “a
`
`particular first person, or a near/close voice.” ’337 patent 9:37-48. Put simply, the device’s
`
`
`4 Google does not agree with SoundClear’s implied constructions in its complaint and reserves the
`right to dispute their scope and meaning but will assume SoundClear’s constructions are true for
`the purposes of this Motion.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 17 Filed 09/30/24 Page 11 of 38 PageID# 151
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`
`
`response to the user is shorter, containing less substantive content, if the voice is classified as “a
`
`particular second person, or a far/distant voice.” ’337 patent 9:48-50 (“an amount of sentence of
`
`the second output sentence is less than that of the first output sentence.”). Second, the patents
`
`explain that the device’s response may use a different volume if the voice is classified as a “first”
`
`or “second” voice. ’337 patent 13:62-65 (“the output controller 40 may use different sound
`
`volumes for the voice V2 between the first output sentence and the second output sentence.”).
`
`Third, the patents explain that words can be replaced in the device’s response to the user depending
`
`on whether the voice is classified as a “first” or “second” voice. ’675 patent 11:5-11; 11:53-59.
`
`The patents describe examples of word replacement, such as replacing “meeting” with “dinner.”
`
`’675 patent 14:7-11. The result is that the device’s response would be “understandable for the user”
`
`but “difficult to be understood by the people other than the user . . . .” ’675 patent 15:7-11.
`
`III. THE CLAIMS OF THE ’337 AND ’675 PATENTS ARE PATENT INELIGIBLE
`UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
`
`A.
`
`Legal Standard
`
`Section 101 of the Patent Act permits an inventor to obtain a patent on “any new and useful
`process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
`improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. This statutory language has long been understood
`to contain an important implicit exception . . . that abstract ideas . . . are not patentable.
`
`Dialect, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 3d 332, 337–38 (E.D. Va. 2023) (citations
`
`omitted) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court set forth a two-part test in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
`
`Bank International for determining whether challenged claims are directed to unpatentable abstract
`
`ideas under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014). At Alice Step One, courts determine
`
`whether the claims are directed to a patent ineligible abstract idea. Id. At Alice Step Two, courts
`
`“consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to
`
`determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 17 Filed 09/30/24 Page 12 of 38 PageID# 152
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`
`
`application.” Id. This “search for an ‘inventive concept’” requires “significantly more than a patent
`
`upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Id. (brackets in original).
`
`The Federal Circuit has “repeatedly recognized that in many cases it is possible and proper
`
`to determine patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” FairWarning IP,
`
`LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (citations omitted);
`
`see also PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 8 F.4th 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (§ 101
`
`“may be, and frequently has been, resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) or (c) motion where the undisputed
`
`facts, considered under the standards required by that Rule, require a holding of ineligibility under
`
`the substantive standards of law”) (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has “repeatedly affirmed
`
`§ 101 rejections at the motion to dismiss stage, before claim construction or significant discovery
`
`has commenced.” Trinity Info Media, LLC v. Covalent, Inc., 72 F.4th 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2023)
`
`(emphasis added); see also Yu v. Apple Inc., 1 F.4th 1040, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“[P]atent
`
`eligibility can be determined at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage without the aid of expert testimony.”);
`
`Sanderling Mgmt. Ltd. v. Snap Inc., 65 F.4th 698, 704 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[C]laim construction is
`
`not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity determination under § 101.”). Courts in this District
`
`routinely hold patents ineligible under § 101 on the pleadings. See, e.g., DriverDo, LLC v. Soc.
`
`Auto Transport, Inc., No. 3:23cv265, 2024 WL 1376218, *25 (E.D. Va. Mar. 29, 2024); Geoscope
`
`Techs. Pte. Ltd. v. Google LLC, 692 F. Supp. 3d 566, 570 (E.D. Va. 2023); Brunswick Corp. v.
`
`Volvo Penta of the Ams., LLC, 640 F. Supp. 3d 498, 501 (E.D. Va. 2022); Va. Innovation Scis.,
`
`Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 3d 582, 595-605 (E.D. Va. 2017).
`
`B.
`
`The Claims of the ’337 Patent are Directed to Classifying a Voice Based on
`Proximity and Tailoring Output Based on that Classification (Alice Step One).
`
`Courts “conduct the Alice step one inquiry by examining the ‘focus of the claimed advance
`
`over the prior art.’” AI Visualize, Inc. v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 97 F.4th 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 17 Filed 09/30/24 Page 13 of 38 PageID# 153
`
`
`
`2024) (citing Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
`
`“[T]he § 101 inquiry must focus on the language of the Asserted Claims themselves, and the
`
`specification cannot be used to import details from the specification if those details are not
`
`claimed.” ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 769 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations
`
`omitted); see also Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd., 955 F.3d 1317, 1328
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2020). This is because “a specification full of technical details about a physical invention
`
`may nonetheless conclude with claims that claim nothing more than the broad law or abstract idea
`
`underlying the claims, thus preempting all use of that law or idea.” ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 769;
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`see also id. at 766 (“‘[T]he concern that drives’ the judicial exceptions to patentability is ‘one of
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`pre-emption,’ and the claim language defines the breadth of each claim.”). That said, Alice Step
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`One’s “directed to” inquiry may be informed by the specification, including the problem the
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`alleged invention purports to solve. ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 767 (“The ‘directed to’ inquiry may
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`also involve looking to the specification to understand ‘the problem facing the inventor’ and,
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`ultimately, what the patent describes as the invention.”); see also Trinity, 72 F.4th at 1363 (“Our
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`focus is on the claims, as informed by the specification.”).
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`Here, SoundClear asserts Claim 4 of the ’337 patent. Dkt. 1 ¶ 44, 54. Claim 4 recites:
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`4[pre]. A voice-content control method, comprising:
`[a] calculating a distance between a user and a voice-content control device;
`[b] acquiring a voice spoken by a user;
`[c] analyzing the acquired voice to classify the acquired voice as either one of a first voice
`and a second voice based on the distance between the user and the voice-content control
`device;
`[d] analyzing the acquired voice to execute processing intended by the user;
`[e] generating, based on content of the executed processing, output sentence that is text
`data for a voice to be output to the user; and
`[f] adjusting a sound volume of voice data obtained by converting the output sentence
`thereinto, wherein
`[g] at the generating,
`[1] a first output sentence is generated as the output sentence when the acquired
`voice has been classified as the first voice, and
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`[2] a second output sentence is generated as the output sentence in which a part of
`information included in the first output sentence is omitted when the acquired
`voice has been classified as the second voice, wherein
`[h] at adjusting the sound volume of voice data, further adjusting the sound volume of voice
`data such that the sound volume of voice data obtained by converting the first output
`sentence thereinto differs from the sound volume of voice data obtained by converting
`the second output sentence thereinto.
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`The ’337 patent specification admits that it was already known by 2018 to detect the voice of a
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`user, analyze that voice and perform processing according to the user’s intention, output via voice
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`a response based on that processing, and to adjust the sound volume of the response. ’337 patent
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`1:1:21-35. This shifts the “focus of the claimed advance over the prior art” away from known
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`limitations 4[b], 4[d], 4[e], and 4[f] in grey. All remaining limitations fall into the two categories
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`of (1) classifying a voice based on proximity (4[a] and 4[c] in blue), and (2) tailoring output based
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`on that classification (4[g] and 4[h] in violet).
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`Limitations 4[a] and 4[c], in blue, are directed to classifying a voice based on proximity.
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`Limitation 4[a] recites “calculating a distance between a user and a voice-content control device.”
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`The specification indicates that this can be done using a proximity sensor. ’337 patent 8:20-24.
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`Limitation 4[c] recites analyzing the voice data to classify it “as either one of a first voice and a
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`second voice . . . .” SoundClear’s Complaint alleges that a “first voice” is “the voice of a particular
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`first person, or a near/close voice” and a “second voice” is “the voice of a particular second person,
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`or a far/distant voice.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 48; see also id. at ¶ 60. Limitation 4[c] goes on to recite that the
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`classification of a “first” or “second” voice is “based on the distance between the user and the
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`voice-content control device” where that distance was calculated at Limitation 4[a].
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`Limitations 4[g] and 4[h], in violet, stripped of excess verbiage, boil down to tailoring
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`output based on the classification of the detected voice. See RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co.
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`Ltd., 855 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming district court’s analysis of what the claims
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`“boil[ed] down to”); Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
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`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 17 Filed 09/30/24 Page 15 of 38 PageID# 155
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`2016) (“Stripped of excess verbiage, claim 1 is directed to . . . .”); Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Cap.
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`One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Stripped of excess verbiage, the claim
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`creates the dynamic document based upon ‘management record types’ (‘MRTs’) and ‘primary
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`record types’ (‘PRTs’).”); Veripath, Inc. v. Didomi, 842 F. App’x 640, 643 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
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`(“[s]tripped of excess verbiage, at its most basic level, claim 1 is anchored on the abstract idea of
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`exchanging privacy for functionality.”).
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`Limitation 4[g] recites two different output sentences depending on the classification in
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`Limitation 4[c]. If the voice is a “first voice” (e.g., “the voice of a particular first person, or a
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`near/close voice”), then a first sentence is output. ’337 patent, claim 4[g][1]. But if the voice is a
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`“second voice” (e.g., “the voice of a particular second person, or a far/distant voice”), then a second
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`sentence that omits part of the information included in the first sentence is output. ’337 patent,
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`claim 4[g][2]. The specification indicates that the response to the second voice is shorter. ’337
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`patent 9:38-57. These limitations are thus directed to tailoring the length of the response depending
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`on whether the voice is classified as a “first” or “second” voice.
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`Limitation 4[h] recites “adjusting the sound volume of voice data” where the response’s
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`sound volume differs depending on whether the voice is a “first voice” or a “second voice.” See
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`also ’337 patent 13:62-65. Limitation 4[h] is thus directed to tailoring the sound volume of the
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`response depending on whether the classification at limitation 4[c].
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`Alice Step One’s “directed to” inquiry may be informed by the problem the alleged
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`invention purports to solve. ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 767. Here, the ’337 patent specification
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`further supports that the claims are directed to classifying a voice based on proximity and tailoring
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`output based on that classification. The specification indicates that the purported problem is that
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`the device’s response needs to be loud enough for the user to hear, but not so loud as to annoy
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`others. ’337 patent 1:29-38. The alleged invention purports to solve this problem by classifying
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`the voice based on distance as a “first” or “second” voice. ’337 patent 1:67-2:1; 7:51-63; 8:20-26;
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`8:35-41. Depending on whether the voice is classified as a “first” or “second” voice, the output is
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`tailored accordingly. If the voice is classified as a “second” voice, then the device’s response is
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`shorter and the sound volume is also adjusted. ’337 patent 9:38-48; 9:48-50; 13:62-65. The
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`specification thus makes clear that the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art is classifying
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`a voice based on proximity and tailoring output based on that classification.
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`Although SoundClear has only formally asserted one claim of the 337 ’patent, all claims
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`of the ’337 patent are patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because Claim 4 is representative of
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`all claims of the ’337 patent. The Federal Circuit has held that “[l]imiting the analysis of a § 101
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`challenge to representative claims is proper when the claims at issue are ‘substantially similar and
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`linked to the same’ ineligible concept.” Mobile Acuity Ltd. v. Blippar Ltd.,