Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 27 Filed 10/11/24 Page 1 of 37 PageID# 203
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`RICHMOND DIVISION
`
`SOUNDCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Case No. 3:24-cv-00540-MHL
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
` v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`
`
`
`PLAINTIFF SOUNDCLEAR’S RESPONSE BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
`DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6)
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 27 Filed 10/11/24 Page 2 of 37 PageID# 204
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
`
`Legal Standard .................................................................................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Patent Validity Under 35 U.S.C. § 101. .................................................................. 2
`
`Rule 12(b)(6) Standard. .......................................................................................... 4
`
`III.
`
`Problems Common to Each of Google’s Alice Grounds .................................................... 5
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Failure to address the claims or apply caselaw. ...................................................... 5
`
`Google omits a required part of the proper Alice Step Two analysis. .................... 6
`
`IV.
`
`The ’337 patent is valid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 .................................................................. 7
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`Improved “voice control device”. ........................................................................... 7
`
`Claim 4 is not directed to an abstract idea. ............................................................. 8
`
`Claim 4 recites unconventional features. .............................................................. 17
`
`Claim 4 is not representative. ................................................................................ 19
`
`V.
`
`The ’675 patent is valid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 ................................................................ 20
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`Improved “voice control device”. ......................................................................... 20
`
`Claim 6 is not directed to an abstract idea. ........................................................... 21
`
`Claim 6 recites unconventional features. .............................................................. 22
`
`Claim 6 is not representative. ................................................................................ 24
`
`VI.
`
`The Complaint Adequately Pleads Infringement of the Patents-in-Suit ........................... 24
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`The ’337 patent. .................................................................................................... 26
`
`The ’675 patent. .................................................................................................... 28
`
`The ’487 patent. .................................................................................................... 28
`
`VII.
`
`SoundClear’s Prayer for Relief is Supported by the Complaint ....................................... 30
`
`VIII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 30
`
`i
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`

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`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 27 Filed 10/11/24 Page 3 of 37 PageID# 205
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) ......................................................................................................... passim
`
`AML IP, LLC v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc.,
`No. 6:21-cv-00823-ADA, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190623 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 19,
`2022) ......................................................................................................................................3, 6
`
`Ancora Techs. v. HTC Am., Inc.,
`908 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................13
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Bailey v. Va. Dep’t of Alcoholic Bev. Control,
`No. 2:18cv392, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108051 (E.D. Va. Apr. 25, 2019) .............................25
`
`Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.,
`687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................4
`
`Bel IP LLC v. BoomerangIt Inc.,
`2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164358 (E.D. Va. Sep. 27, 2011) .......................................................25
`
`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
`881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................4
`
`Billjco v. Cisco Systems,
`2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 251455 (E.D.T.X. Nov. 30, 2021) .....................................................30
`
`Contour IP Holding LLC v. GoPro, Inc.,
`2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22825 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 9, 2024) ................................................. passim
`
`Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
`880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................4
`
`Cosmokey Sols. GMBH & Co. KG v. Duo Sec. LLC,
`15 F.4th 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................................................................................................19
`
`Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp.,
`951 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2020)............................................................................................9, 13
`
`ii
`
`

`

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`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
`773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................................5
`
`Diamond v. Diehr,
`450 U.S. 175 (1981) .................................................................................................................10
`
`Diogenes Limited v. DraftKings, Inc.,
`2022 WL 2802391 (D. Del., July 18, 2022) ......................................................................20, 21
`
`DivX, LLC v. Netflix, Inc.,
`2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227426 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 4, 2019) ........................................................5
`
`DNT, LLC v. Sprint Spectrum, LP,
`750 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. Va. 2010) ..................................................................................7, 20
`
`Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship,
`213 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2000) .....................................................................................................4
`
`Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,
`178 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 1999) .....................................................................................................5
`
`Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrain Rivera Maynez Enterprises, Inc.,
`946 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................30
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..............................................................................................5, 8
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys.,
`879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................13
`
`Geoscope Techs. PTE. Ltd. v. Google LLC,
`2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223229 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2023) .......................................................30
`
`Goodman v. Praxair, Inc.,
`494 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2007) .....................................................................................................4
`
`Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., C.A.,
`No. 00-876, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18502 (D. Del. June 6, 2002)...........................................1
`
`Mentone Solutions LLC v. Digi Int’l Inc.,
`2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33793 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ......................................................9, 14, 15, 22
`
`Mobile Acuity Ltd. v. Blippar Ltd.,
`110 F.4th 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2024) ..........................................................................................4, 20
`
`MyMail, Ltd. v. ooVoo, LLC,
`934 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019)............................................................................................3, 10
`
`iii
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`

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`
`Orbcomm Inc. v. Calamp Corp.,
`Civil Action No. 3:16CV208, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96264 (E.D. Va. July
`22, 2016) ..................................................................................................................9, 10, 26, 28
`
`Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Ben. Pension Plan v. Weil,
`918 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2019) .....................................................................................................5
`
`Remington Arms Co. v. Modern Muzzleloading, Inc.,
`No. 2:97CV00660, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25613 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 1999) ...........................1
`
`Safe Haven Wildlife Removal & Prop. Mgmt. Experts, LLC v. Meridian Wildlife
`Servs.,
`No. 7:21-cv-00577, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56543 (W.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2023) ..........25, 26, 29
`
`Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
`873 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................6
`
`Solutran, Inc. v. Elavon, Inc.,
`931 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................20
`
`TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc.,
`978 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................10
`
`Uniloc USA, Inc. v. LG Elecs. USA, Inc.,
`957 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2020)........................................................................................3, 9, 13
`
`United States v. 8.929 Acres,
`36 F.4th 240 (4th Cir. 2022) ......................................................................................................1
`
`USA, Inc. v. Mediatek USA, Inc.,
`2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45815 (E.D.T.X. Mar. 15, 2022) .......................................................30
`
`Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc.,
`853 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................4
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ...................................................................................................................... passim
`
`35 U.S.C. § 282 ................................................................................................................................4
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) ........................................................................................................................4
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)..............................................................................................................4, 26
`
`iv
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`

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`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 27 Filed 10/11/24 Page 6 of 37 PageID# 208
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`SoundClear’s patents recite specific improvements to voice-control devices. They are not
`
`abstract. Google overgeneralizes the claims when arguing otherwise.1 And it splinters the proper
`
`holistic analysis into its own rendition of mutually exclusive tests. In other words, Google seeks
`
`to take three swings where Alice Step One provides one. Even then, Google relies mostly on
`
`select, concluding remarks from other cases instead of faithfully applying their ratio decidendi.
`
`At Alice Step Two, Google runs far aground of established law. It admits to
`
`“eliminat[ing]” certain claim limitations from its analysis—even listing the ones it eliminates.
`
`The courts categorically reject that approach. See Section III.B. Google’s eligibility grounds
`
`should be rejected for that reason alone.
`
`On non-infringement, Google’s approach is speculative and perfunctory. Infringement is
`
`an issue that can rarely be decided as a matter of law, even on a full summary judgment record.2
`
`And yet Google seeks a dispositive ruling as to three patents, on three non-infringement grounds,
`
`based upon barely over six pages of briefing. Opening Br., 23-30. Google assumes facts related
`
`to the operation of its devices that are not in the record. It usurps the role of experts to opine on
`
`such facts. And it assumes that it has already prevailed on obtaining limiting claim constructions.
`
`A brief statement on Google’s opening posture. Google3 hints that this Court should
`
`stereotype SoundClear as the type of entity that files complaints against “a plethora of diverse
`
`
`1 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (“At some level, all
`inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or
`abstract ideas.”)
`2 United States v. 8.929 Acres, 36 F.4th 240, 266 (4th Cir. 2022); Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
`Armstrong World Indus., C.A., No. 00-876, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18502, at *4 (D. Del. June
`6, 2002); Remington Arms Co. v. Modern Muzzleloading, Inc., No. 2:97CV00660, 1999 U.S.
`Dist. LEXIS 25613, at *16 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 1999).
`3 D.I. 16, along with its brief at D.I. 17 (“Opening Br.”), the “Motion.”
`
`1
`
`

`

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`defendants” where each filing includes “a demand for a quick settlement at a price far lower than
`
`the cost to defend the litigation.”4 That implication is prejudicial and wrong. JVC Kenwood
`
`created the asserted patents as part of hundreds of millions of dollars spent on research and
`
`development.5 They are valuable assets. They did not lose their value on assignment to
`
`SoundClear. And they still constitute foundational technology.
`
`Google also objects to the fact that SoundClear is a business, “seeking a return on its
`
`investment.” Opening Br., 1. Google asserts that its “engineers spent years designing,
`
`developing, and refining Google Home and Google Nest devices.” Id. But Google purchased the
`
`Nest brand,6 largely for its at least 64 Nest patents7—presumably for the purpose of obtaining a
`
`“return on its investment.” Google’s posturing is also inconsistent. It disparages patents in
`
`another SoundClear case—labeling them as “relating to walkie-talkie technology.” Opening Br.,
`
`1. And yet Google filed a motion to dismiss asserting that one of them “claim[ed] an abstract
`
`idea.”8 Patents cannot be both narrow/concrete and abstract.
`
`II.
`
`Legal Standard
`
`A.
`
`Patent Validity Under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
`
`“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
`
`composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor
`
`. . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 101. “At some level, all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or
`
`
`4 Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`5 https://www.jvckenwood.com/content/dam/pdf/jkwd_ar_2011_en_fs.pdf at 28.
`6 https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/01/14/google-nest-patents/4482201/
`7 Ex. A.
`8 Case No. 2:24-cv-00321-EWH-DEM (E.D. Va.), at D.I. 25, p. 6.
`
`2
`
`

`

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`apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (citations
`
`omitted) (emphasis added).
`
`As Google recognizes, Alice set out a two-step test for eligibility. Opening Br., 5-6 (citing
`
`Alice, 573 U.S. at 217). In that context, determining patent eligibility requires a full
`
`understanding of the basic character of the claimed subject matter. MyMail, Ltd. v. ooVoo, LLC,
`
`934 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “Even what seem like small technical details could loom
`
`large in the final eligibility analysis . . . .” AML IP, LLC v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., No. 6:21-
`
`cv-00823-ADA, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190623, at *15 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2022) (emphasis
`
`added). That is “because there is often only a very thin line between a patent that is directed at an
`
`abstract idea and a patent that is directed to improving, for example, a computer program or
`
`system.” Id. (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
`
`Indeed, “the practice of describing the claims at such a high level of abstraction and
`
`untethered from the language of the claims all but ensures that the exceptions to § 101 swallow
`
`the rule.” Contour IP Holding LLC v. GoPro, Inc., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22825 (Fed. Cir. Sept.
`
`9, 2024) (precedential) at *13 (citing Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337). Alice should be limited to the
`
`occurrence where a claim “abstractly covers results without regard to a specific process or
`
`machinery for achieving those results” and thus “would prohibit all other persons from making
`
`the same thing by any means whatsoever.” Id. (cleaned up).
`
`The USPTO even provides a “streamlined eligibility analysis (Pathway A)” to allow self-
`
`evident improvements to issue as patents. See MPEP § 2106.06 (9th ed. 2022). That is because
`
`improvements—even to general purpose computers—can pass muster at Step One. Uniloc USA,
`
`Inc. v. LG Elecs. USA, Inc., 957 F.3d 1303, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Customedia Techs.,
`
`LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2020)).
`
`3
`
`

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`Courts need only proceed to “Step Two” of the Alice test if Step One is met. But, when
`
`necessary, the Federal Circuit is unequivocal that Step Two involves a question of fact. It is
`
`subject to (1) the presumption that issued patents are valid and (2) a clear and convincing burden
`
`of proof. “The question of whether a claim element or combination of elements is well-
`
`understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of
`
`fact.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018); 35 U.S.C. § 282; Core
`
`Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “Any fact,
`
`such as this one, that is pertinent to the invalidity conclusion must be proven by clear and
`
`convincing evidence.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368.
`
`Additionally, “it will ordinarily be desirable—and often necessary—to resolve claim
`
`construction disputes prior to a § 101 analysis, for the determination of patent eligibility requires
`
`a full understanding of the basic character of the claimed subject matter.” Bancorp Servs., LLC v.
`
`Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1273-74 (Fed. Cir. 2012). And claim
`
`construction is a question of law with underlying questions of fact. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l
`
`Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
`
`B.
`
`Rule 12(b)(6) Standard.
`
`A Rule 12(b)(6) motion “generally cannot reach the merits of an affirmative defense . . .”
`
`Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007). And “a challenge to patent
`
`eligibility on § 101 grounds is an affirmative defense to a claim of patent infringement.” Mobile
`
`Acuity Ltd. v. Blippar Ltd., 110 F.4th 1280, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2024). Courts must accept as true the
`
`facts set forth in the exhibits attached to the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); Eastern Shore
`
`Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Indeed, “[t]he purpose
`
`of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of a complaint” and not to “resolve contests
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 27 Filed 10/11/24 Page 10 of 37 PageID# 212
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`surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Edwards v. City of
`
`Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up).
`
`Through the plausibility lens of Iqbal and Twombly, motions to dismiss should only be
`
`granted in narrow instances: where “after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s
`
`complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s
`
`favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim
`
`entitling him to relief.” Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Ben. Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d
`
`312, 317-18 (4th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added) (relying also on Ashcroft v.
`
`Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see
`
`also DivX, LLC v. Netflix, Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227426 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 4, 2019) at *10,
`
`*28-31 (finding that factual issues precluded dismissal under 101 of claims directed to
`
`“producing a protected stream of compressed video content”).
`
`III.
`
`Problems Common to Each of Google’s Alice Grounds
`
`A.
`
`Failure to address the claims or apply caselaw.
`
`Google selects single quotes from many cases. See, e.g., Opening Br., 8-9. Often those
`
`quotes follow, and merely summarize, what was otherwise a detailed analysis by the court. Such
`
`quotes do not constitute any ratio decidendi. They thus have no bearing out-of-context or to
`
`other cases—such as this one. Google also fails to compare the language of the “claims” of those
`
`cases to the language of the “claims” of this case—as the law requires. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1334.
`
`In short, Google presents no grounds upon which the eligibility question could be decided—let
`
`alone at the motion-to-dismiss stage. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d
`
`1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[C]ourts ‘must be careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims’ by
`
`looking at them generally and failing to account for the[ir] specific requirements . . . .”); DDR
`
`Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Distinguishing
`
`5
`
`

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`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 27 Filed 10/11/24 Page 11 of 37 PageID# 213
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`between claims that recite a patent-eligible invention and claims that add too little to a patent-
`
`ineligible abstract concept can be difficult, as the line separating the two is not always clear.”);
`
`AML IP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190623, at *15 (“Even what seem like small technical details
`
`could loom large in the final eligibility analysis . . . .” (emphasis added)); Smart Sys. Innovations,
`
`LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Linn, J. dissenting in part
`
`and concurring in part) (“[T]he contours of the abstract idea exception are not easily defined. For
`
`that reason, the abstract idea exception is almost impossible to apply consistently and
`
`coherently.”). Therein also lies a necessary-but-not-sufficient fallacy. Google’s citations and
`
`arguments establish at most that some claims, in some cases, included certain elements that were
`
`not enough—by themselves—to pass muster at Step One of Alice. They say nothing about the
`
`specific claims in this case.
`
`B.
`
`Google omits a required part of the proper Alice Step Two analysis.
`
`Google’s motion fails at Alice Step Two. Google expressly admits that it “eliminate[s]”
`
`limitations from its analysis. See, e.g., Opening Br., 20-21 (eliminating limitations 4[b], 4[d],
`
`4[e], and 4[f] of the ’337 patent and limitations 6[a], 6[c], and 6[d] of the ’675 patent). It
`
`proceeds to analyze only the remaining limitations. Opening Br., 23 (addressing only limitations
`
`4[a], 4[c], 4[g], and 4[h] of the ’337 patent and limitations 6[e] and 6[f] of the ’675 patent). Id.
`
`21. That approach is wrong, as a matter of established law. “[A]ll limitations are considered
`
`individually and as an ordered combination” to determine if “they prove an inventive concept . . .
`
`.” Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing
`
`BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2016)) (emphasis added). Google’s exact approach has been categorically rejected:
`
`[T]hat is the entire Step Two inquiry: “to determine whether the claim, as a whole
`with all of its limitations, in effect covers a patent ineligible abstract idea or a patent
`eligible application of that idea.” Alice, 717 F.3d at 1298. The Court is not
`
`6
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`

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`persuaded that dissection of the claims into “abstract and non-abstract limitations”
`and removal of the “abstract” from the jury’s consideration was intended by the
`Federal Circuit in BSG Tech.
`
`Ollnova Techs. Ltd. v. ecobee Techs. ULC, No. 2:22-CV-00072-JRG, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`
`160521, at *24 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 5, 2024). Any attempt to remedy that error on reply should be
`
`disregarded as an improper new argument. DNT, LLC v. Sprint Spectrum, LP, 750 F. Supp. 2d
`
`616, 630 (E.D. Va. 2010).
`
`BASCOM is also instructive on its facts. The claims there related to the age-old task of
`
`blocking undesirable internet websites. BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1343. The Federal Circuit
`
`“agree[d] with the district court that the limitations of the claims, taken individually, recite
`
`generic computer, network and Internet components, none of which is inventive by itself.” Id.
`
`1349. But the court found that there was no record—at the pleadings’ stage—to determine that
`
`the specific recited method was generic. The court’s reasoning applies to this case:
`
`[Patent owner] explains that the inventive concept rests on taking advantage of the
`ability of at least some ISPs to identify individual accounts that communicate with
`the ISP server, and to associate a request for Internet content with a specific
`individual account
`
`Id. at 1350. In short, even if reciting an abstract idea, the claims at issue “recite a specific
`
`implementation of the abstract idea that purports to solve a problem unique to [voice-controlled
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`devices.]” Weisner v. Google LLC, 51 F.4th 1073, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2022); see also id. n.3.
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`IV.
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`The ’337 patent is valid under 35 U.S.C. § 101
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`A.
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`Improved “voice control device”.
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`The ’337 patent and its claims are directed to an improved “voice-content control” device
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`and method. ’337 patent, Abstract. The inventor (Naganuma-san) identified problems with
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`conventional voice processing devices. Those problems resulted from the inability to adapt a
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`response and volume level based upon the identity and distance (from the device) of a specific
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`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 27 Filed 10/11/24 Page 13 of 37 PageID# 215
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`user. Id., 1:29-42. Naganuma-san invented a solution to this problem: a voice-content control
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`method/device that uses, e.g., a distance value calculated from a detection result of a proximity
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`sensor to analyze and classify the voice spoken by the user “as either one of a first voice or a
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`second voice.” Id., 1:48-52; 7:51-9:8, 9:38-57; 15:22-54. The subsequent response output by the
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`device can vary depending on how the received voice was analyzed and who the speaker was. Id.
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`It also modulates volume based upon the user and distance to avoid annoyance. Id., 1:29-42.
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`Google addresses only claim 4. That claim sets forth a specific method of controlling
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`voice content (i.e., “a voice-content control method”). Id., 19:22-20:9. The claimed method
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`includes a particular set of steps that involve several features described in the specification as
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`solutions to the identified problems. For example, claim 4 recites:
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` “calculating a distance between a user and a voice-content control device;”
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` “analyzing the acquired voice to classify the acquired voice as either one of a first
`voice and a second voice based on the distance…;”
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` “generating …a first output sentence … when the acquired voice has been classified
`as the first voice,”
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` “[generating] … a second output sentence …in which a part of information included
`in the first output sentence is omitted when the acquired voice has been classified as
`the second voice,”
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` “adjusting the sound volume of voice data [to different volumes for a first output
`sentence and a second output sentence].”
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`Id., 19:22-20:9. The elements and method steps work together to improve the functionality of
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`then-existing voice-control devices by enabling them to automatically provide an output with
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`different characteristics based on a calculated distance between the user and the device.
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`B.
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`Claim 4 is not directed to an abstract idea.
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`Claim 4 is valid at Alice Step One for a simple reason: improvements to devices that use
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`specific processes for achieving those results are eligible. Contour, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS
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`8
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`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 27 Filed 10/11/24 Page 14 of 37 PageID# 216
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`22825 at *11-12; Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335; McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314-15; CardioNet, LLC v.
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`InfoBionic, Inc., 955 F.3d 1358, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Mentone Solutions LLC v. Digi Int’l Inc.,
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`2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33793 at *8 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Uniloc, 957 F.3d at 1306-07; Customedia,
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`951 F.3d at 1364; Orbcomm Inc. v. Calamp Corp., Civil Action No. 3:16CV208, 2016 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 96264, at *7-10, *19-20 (E.D. Va. July 22, 2016) (rejecting the argument that “a method
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`for monitoring the location and status of fleets of vehicular construction equipment” entailed
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`“nothing more than the abstract idea of gathering, storing, processing, and transmitting data”
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`because they improved a “particular apparatus”). Claim 4 details the specifics of the claimed
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`invention. And it solves a specific technical problem associated with multiple voices when
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`conducting speech detection and providing responses. Id.
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`Google’s arguments under Step One (Opening Br., 6-10, 12-20) fail for at least five
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`reasons. First, Google never addresses the potential improvement aspect. It is unquestionably a
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`required part of the analysis. Enfish—and a string of subsequent cases—states that courts must
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`distinguish between whether a claim improves a device (such as a computer) or merely invokes it
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`as a tool. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336. In the case of the former, the Alice inquiry ends with
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`eligibility at Step One. Google avoids that analysis. It never even mentions the context in which
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`the claimed method is recited: to improve voice-controlled devices. Indeed, it would be
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`impossible for Google to discuss the claim limitations in their full context (of a voice-controlled
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`device), without highlighting the evident improvement they provide.
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`Second, Google asserts that the five limitations of claim 4 (discussed above) are directed
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`to “classifying a voice based on proximity and tailoring output based on that classification.”
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`Opening Br., 9-10. But the premise of Google’s approach is unfounded. It looks to the first word
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`of limitations (often a gerund) and uses each to classify the entire limitation to which it is
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`Case 3:24-cv-00540-MHL Document 27 Filed 10/11/24 Page 15 of 37 PageID# 217
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`attached. See Opening Br., 7-8, 10-11 (color coding entire limitations). Google then restates
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`certain limitations in its own words—like introducing the word “tailoring.” See, e.g., id., 9
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`(“These limitations are thus directed to tailoring the length of the response . . . .” “Limitation
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`4[h] is thus directed to tailoring the sound volume of the response . . . .”) (emphasis added). And
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`it concludes by restating the “focus” of the claim in its own words—with no supporting analysis.
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`Id., 10. Courts repeatedly caution against Google’s approach. See, e.g., MyMail, 934 F.3d at
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`1379. Doing so “overgeneraliz[es] claims . . . at a high level of abstraction that is untethered
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`from the language of the claims.” See TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc., 978 F.3d 1278, 1293 (Fed. Cir.
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`2020) (cleaned up) (quoting Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337); Contour, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22825
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`at *12-16; Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 (1981). If allowed, Google’s approach would
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`“all but ensure[] that the exceptions to § 101 swallow the rule.” Id.
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`Third, Google asserts that claim 4—the only claim it addresses—is directed to an
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`abstract idea under its own purported “case law comparison test.” Opening Br., 6-10, 12-16. But
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`Google’s case law comparison is more of a word search. For instance, Google relies on TLI
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`Communs. LLC v. AV Auto., L.L.C. because it used the word “classifying.” Opening Br., 13
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`(citing 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Google repeats that word nine times on one page. Id.
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`But a single word is about the only relation TLI bears to this case.
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`The claims in TLI were drawn to improving “the organization of